@misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Neuer Paternalismus und individuelle Rationalit{\"a}t: eine ordnungs{\"o}konomische Perspektive}, series = {List-Forum f{\"u}r Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik}, volume = {40}, journal = {List-Forum f{\"u}r Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik}, number = {3}, issn = {0937-0862}, pages = {239 -- 257}, abstract = {In den letzten Jahren hat sich ein breiter Literatur strang etabliert, der neue Formen paternalistischer Interventionen vorschl {\"a}gt, um individuelle Entscheidungen zu verbessern, die nicht vollst{\"a}ndig rational sind. Di e Motivation hierf{\"u}r liegt in zahlreichen Verhaltensanomalien und anderen Abweichungen vom Mo dell vollst{\"a}ndiger Rationalit{\"a}t, die von der empirischen Verhaltens{\"o}konomik identifizier t wurden. Der neue Paternalismus zeichnet sich nach seinen Bef{\"u}rwortern dadurch aus, dass er 'libert{\"a}r' ist, da die betroffenen Individuen in die als effizient erachtete Richtung geschubst, aber nicht gezwungen werden. Die M{\"o}glichkeit zu abweichendem Verhalten soll grun ds{\"a}tzlich erhalten bleiben. In diesem Papier wird der neue Paternalismus aus einer ordnung s{\"o}konomischen Perspektive untersucht. Es wird gezeigt, dass wichtige Varianten des neuen Paternalismus mit den ordnungs{\"o}konomischen Steuerungsidealen der Konsumen tensouver{\"a}nit{\"a}t und der B{\"u}rgersouver{\"a}nit{\"a}t kollidieren.}, language = {de} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Does Classical Liberalism Imply an Evolutionary Approach to Policy-Making?}, series = {Journal of Bioeconomics}, volume = {17}, journal = {Journal of Bioeconomics}, number = {1}, issn = {1573-698}, doi = {10.1007/s10818-014-9188-6}, pages = {53 -- 70}, abstract = {This paper argues that an evolutionary approach to policy-making, which emphasizes openness to change and political variety, is particularly compatible with the central tenets of classical liberalism. The chief reasons are that classical liberalism acknowledges the ubiquity of uncertainty, as well as heterogeneity in preferences and beliefs, and generally embraces gradual social and economic change that arises from accidental variation rather than deliberate, large-scale planning. In contrast, our arguments cast doubt on a different claim, namely that classical liberalism is particularly compatible with the evolutionary biological heritage of humans.}, language = {en} } @misc{SchnellenbachSchubert, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Schubert, Christian}, title = {Behavioral political economy: A survey}, series = {European Journal of Political Economy}, volume = {40}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, number = {B}, issn = {0176-2680}, doi = {10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2015.05.002}, pages = {395 -- 417}, abstract = {In explaining individual behavior in politics, economists should rely on the same motivational assumptions they use to explain behavior in the market: that is what Political Economy, understood as the application of economics to the study of political processes, is all about. In its standard variant, individuals who play the game of politics should also be considered rational and self-interested, unlike the benevolent despot of traditional welfare economics. History repeats itself with the rise of behavioral economics: Assuming cognitive biases to be present in the market, but not in politics, behavioral economists often call for government to intervene in a "benevolent" way. Recently, however, political economists have started to apply behavioral economics insights to the study of political processes, thereby re-establishing a unified methodology. This paper surveys the current state of the emerging field of "behavioral political economy" and considers the scope for further research.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {A Constitutional Economics Perspective on Soft Paternalism}, series = {Kyklos}, volume = {69}, journal = {Kyklos}, number = {1}, issn = {1467-6435}, doi = {10.1111/kykl.12106}, pages = {135 -- 156}, abstract = {Using a framework that distinguishes short-term consumer preferences, individual reflective preferences and political preferences, we discuss from a constitutional economics perspective whether individuals find it in their common constitutional interest to endow representatives and bureaucrats with the competence to impose soft paternalist policies. The focus is specifically on soft paternalist policies, because these often work with non-transparent 'nudges' that are considered as manipulative in some contributions to the literature. We show that those soft paternalist policies that are manipulative indeed collide with three criteria of consumer sovereignty, reflective sovereignty and citizen sovereignty that can be argued to represent common constitutional interest of citizens. On the other hand, we argue that the set of paternalist policies that is deemed acceptable on the constitutional level is restricted to non-manipulative instruments, and their application as government policies is limited to cases with stable and very homogenous preferences. However, we also argue that competitive markets are capable of supplying many mechanisms that allow individuals to cope with problems in their decision-making processes on a private level.}, language = {en} } @misc{PitsoulisSchwuchow, author = {Pitsoulis, Athanassios and Schwuchow, S{\"o}ren C.}, title = {Coercion, credibility, and mid-air interceptions of military planes}, series = {Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy}, volume = {20}, journal = {Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy}, number = {4}, issn = {1554-8597}, doi = {10.1515/peps-2014-0040}, pages = {697 -- 707}, abstract = {Pointing out the remarkable levels of hostile interaction in the air space over contested territory between states like China and Japan or Greece and Turkey we argue that air space incursions can be interpreted as a rational strategy with ultimately political aims. In our interpretation deliberate intrusions of military aircraft into sensitive air space serve as an indirect risk-generating mechanism, as they will trigger scrambles of the opposed government's air force which may escalate into a military crisis. We derive testable hypotheses from a game-theoretic model, which we developed in earlier work to explore the strategic logic behind this risk-generating mechanism more rigorously. In order to test whether the model's predictions regarding the effect of short-term economic developments on the states' interaction hold, we built a database of daily event observations from the Hellenic National Defence General Staff reports of the last 4 years, containing time series data of Turkish intrusions into Greek-claimed air space and the number of dogfights between Greek and Turkish fighter planes. What we find is that not only Greek engagements of Turkish intruders but also massed, provocative Turkish intrusions have become significantly less likely after the onset of the Greek economic crisis. These findings are well in line with the predictions of the model and thus supportive of our theory.}, language = {en} } @book{Schwuchow, author = {Schwuchow, S{\"o}ren C.}, title = {V{\"o}lkerrecht als Restriktion f{\"u}r das Handeln von Regierungen: Diplomatie durch Zwang und internationales {\"o}ffentliches Luftrecht}, publisher = {Springer Gabler}, address = {Wiesbaden}, isbn = {978-3-658-07782-2}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-658-07782-2}, pages = {261 S.}, abstract = {Ausgehend von einer ausf{\"u}hrlichen Darstellung der Entwicklungslinien des V{\"o}lkerrechts analysiert S{\"o}ren C. Schwuchow die Entstehung von Jurisdiktionskonflikten im internationalen Luftraum vor dem Hintergrund rechtlicher Rahmenbedingungen sowie der strategischen Interessen der Staaten. Grundlage ist die Annahme, dass manche Regierungen „Kanonenbootdiplomatie" im Luftraum betreiben, indem sie {\"u}ber umstrittenen Territorien gezielt Abfangman{\"o}ver provozieren, um die eigene Konfliktbereitschaft zu signalisieren. Der Autor analysiert modelltheoretisch die strategische Interdependenz der Staaten und {\"u}berpr{\"u}ft sie empirisch. Er liefert so einen Beitrag zum besseren Verst{\"a}ndnis der Bestimmungsgr{\"u}nde staatlicher Außenpolitik sowie der Ausgestaltung des V{\"o}lkerrechts.}, language = {de} } @misc{BaskaranFeldSchnellenbach, author = {Baskaran, Thushyanthan and Feld, Lars P. and Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Fiscal Federalism and Economic Growth: A Meta-Analysis}, series = {Economic Inquiry}, volume = {54}, journal = {Economic Inquiry}, number = {3}, issn = {1465-7295}, doi = {10.1111/ecin.12331}, pages = {1445 -- 1463}, abstract = {The theoretical literature on the economics of fiscal federalism has identified several potential effects of government decentralization on economic growth. Much of the traditional literature focuses on the efficiency aspects of a decentralized provision of public services. However, decentralization may also increase growth by raising the ability of the political system to innovate and carry out reforms. On the contrary, some authors argue that decentralization increases corruption and government inefficiency. After a discussion of the theoretical arguments, we provide both a traditional survey and a meta-analysis of the empirical literature on decentralization and economic growth. Based on our survey, we identify open questions and discuss possible ways of answering them.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Verbraucherleitbilder aus {\"o}konomischer Sicht}, series = {Verbraucherleitbilder - Interdisziplin{\"a}re und europ{\"a}ische Perspektiven}, booktitle = {Verbraucherleitbilder - Interdisziplin{\"a}re und europ{\"a}ische Perspektiven}, editor = {Klinck, Fabian and Riesenhuber, Karl}, publisher = {de Gruyter}, address = {Berlin}, isbn = {978-3-11-036339-5}, pages = {53 -- 72}, language = {de} } @techreport{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Respektiert eine Politik des weichen Paternalismus die Autonomie individueller Konsumenten? Gutachten im Auftrag von Prometheus - das Freiheitsinstitut gGmbH, Berlin}, publisher = {Fakult{\"a}t f{\"u}r Wirtschaft, Recht und Gesellschaft Lehrstuhl f{\"u}r Volkswirtschaftslehre, insb. Mikro{\"o}konomie}, address = {Cottbus-Senftenberg}, pages = {37}, language = {de} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {German Federalism at the Crossroads: Renegotiating the Allocation of Competencies in a New Financial Environment}, series = {The Future of Federalism: Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in an Age of Austerity}, booktitle = {The Future of Federalism: Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in an Age of Austerity}, editor = {Eccleston, Richard and Krever, Richard}, publisher = {Elgar}, address = {Cheltenham, UK}, isbn = {978-1-78471-777-3}, pages = {147 -- 172}, language = {en} }