@misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Does Classical Liberalism Imply an Evolutionary Approach to Policy-Making?}, series = {Journal of Bioeconomics}, volume = {17}, journal = {Journal of Bioeconomics}, number = {1}, issn = {1573-698}, doi = {10.1007/s10818-014-9188-6}, pages = {53 -- 70}, abstract = {This paper argues that an evolutionary approach to policy-making, which emphasizes openness to change and political variety, is particularly compatible with the central tenets of classical liberalism. The chief reasons are that classical liberalism acknowledges the ubiquity of uncertainty, as well as heterogeneity in preferences and beliefs, and generally embraces gradual social and economic change that arises from accidental variation rather than deliberate, large-scale planning. In contrast, our arguments cast doubt on a different claim, namely that classical liberalism is particularly compatible with the evolutionary biological heritage of humans.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Wohlwollendes Anschubsen? Liberaler Paternalismus und seine Nebenwirkungen}, series = {Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik}, volume = {12}, journal = {Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik}, number = {4}, issn = {1465-6493}, pages = {445 -- 459}, abstract = {In diesem Papier wird das Konzept des liberalen Paternalismus diskutiert, dessen Vertreter {\"u}berzeugt sind, die Qualit{\"a}t der Entscheidungen von Individuen durch ein effizientes Design der Randbedingungen dieser Entscheidungen verbessern zu k{\"o}nnen. Nach einem {\"U}berblick {\"u}ber die verhaltens{\"o}konomischen Grundlagen des liberalen Paternalismus werden insbesondere seine normativen Grundlagen und politisch-{\"o}konomischen Implikationen diskutiert. Es zeigt sich, dass paternalistische Ans{\"a}tze selbst Entscheidungen h{\"a}ufig verzerren werden und dass eine Verbesserung der Qualit{\"a}t individueller Entscheidungen h{\"o}chst zweifelhaft ist.}, language = {de} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Nudges and Norms: On the Political Economy of Soft Paternalism}, series = {European Journal of Political Economy}, volume = {28}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, number = {2}, issn = {0176-2680}, doi = {10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.12.001}, pages = {266 -- 277}, abstract = {This paper discusses soft (or libertarian) paternalism, as proposed among others by Thaler and Sunstein (2008). It is argued that soft paternalism should not be understood as an efficiency-enhancing, but as a redistributive concept. The relationship between soft paternalism and social norms is discussed in detail. In particular, it is argued that soft paternalism increases the stability of given social norms, which in turn need not be efficient, nor in the material self-interest of a majority of individuals. Soft paternalism is argued to be an essentially conservative concept of policy-making in the sense that it tends to increase the longevity of status quo social norms.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Kollektiver Verbraucherschutz und Finanzmarktw{\"a}chter: eine ordnungspolitische Diskussion aktueller Entwicklungen beim finanziellen Verbraucherschutz}, series = {List-Forum f{\"u}r Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik}, volume = {42}, journal = {List-Forum f{\"u}r Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik}, number = {4}, issn = {0937-0862}, doi = {10.1007/s41025-017-0053-y}, pages = {365 -- 394}, language = {de} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Verhaltens{\"o}konomische Theorie der Politik und die Robustheit politischer Institutionen}, series = {List-Forum f{\"u}r Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik}, volume = {43}, journal = {List-Forum f{\"u}r Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik}, number = {3}, issn = {2364-3943}, pages = {197 -- 219}, language = {de} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {On the Behavioural Political Economy of Regulating Fake News}, series = {Ordo - Jahrbuch f{\"u}r die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft}, volume = {68}, journal = {Ordo - Jahrbuch f{\"u}r die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft}, issn = {2366-0481}, pages = {197 -- 219}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Zwischen homo oeconomicus und homo sapiens: ein Nobelpreis f{\"u}r Realismus in den Verhaltensannahmen}, series = {ORDO - Jahrbuch f{\"u}r die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft}, volume = {68}, journal = {ORDO - Jahrbuch f{\"u}r die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft}, issn = {2366-0481}, pages = {325 -- 330}, language = {de} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Evolving Hierarchical Preferences and Behavioral Economic Policies}, series = {Public Choice}, volume = {178}, journal = {Public Choice}, number = {1/2}, issn = {1573-7101}, doi = {10.1007/s11127-018-0607-4}, pages = {31 -- 52}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Herausforderungen f{\"u}r die Finanzpolitik in Deutschland nach der Covid-Krise}, series = {Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Politik : ZfP}, volume = {68}, journal = {Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Politik : ZfP}, number = {2}, issn = {0044-3360}, pages = {175 -- 192}, language = {de} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {The Concept of Ordnungspolitik: Rule-Based Economic Policy-Making from the Perspective of the Freiburg School}, series = {Public Choice}, volume = {195}, journal = {Public Choice}, issn = {1573-7101}, doi = {10.1007/s11127-021-00903-z}, pages = {283 -- 300}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Die geplante Kindergrundsicherung: ein sinnvoller Ansatz?}, series = {Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Wirtschaftspolitik}, volume = {72}, journal = {Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Wirtschaftspolitik}, number = {2}, issn = {2366-0317}, doi = {10.1515/zfwp-2023-2011}, pages = {150 -- 158}, language = {de} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {On the reform of fiscal rules in the European Union : what has been achieved, and how did we get here?}, series = {Economist's voice}, journal = {Economist's voice}, publisher = {De Gruyter}, address = {Berlin ; Boston, Massachusetts}, issn = {1553-3832}, doi = {10.1515/ev-2024-0060}, abstract = {In April 2024, the European Union has reformed its set of fiscal rules, aimed at securing sustainable public finances in its member countries. In this paper, we discuss the pathway towards reform and highlight the main characteristics of the reformed set of rules. It is argued that, relative to the original proposals by the Commission, the rules have improved. However, the numerical safeguards may be circumvented to some extent. In sum, there remains plenty of discretionary leeway for a conflict-averse Commission to appease non-compliant member countries.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Revisiting the tension between classical liberalism and the welfare state}, series = {Journal of Contextual Economics}, volume = {139}, journal = {Journal of Contextual Economics}, number = {2-4}, issn = {2568-7603}, doi = {10.3790/schm.139.2-4.365}, pages = {365 -- 384}, language = {en} } @misc{SchnellenbachFeldSchaltegger, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P. and Schaltegger, Christoph A.}, title = {The Impact of Referendums on the Centralization of Public Goods Provision: A Political Economy Approach}, series = {Economics of Governance}, volume = {11}, journal = {Economics of Governance}, number = {1}, issn = {1435-8131}, doi = {10.1007/s10101-009-0063-1}, pages = {3 -- 26}, abstract = {The paper compares decision-making on the centralisation of public goods provision in the presence of regional externalities under representative and direct democratic institutions. A model with two regions, two public goods and regional spillovers is developed in which uncertainty over the true preferences of candidates makes strategic delegation impossible. Instead, it is shown that the existence of rent extraction by delegates alone suffices to make cooperative centralisation more likely through representative democracy. In the non-cooperative case, the more extensive possibilities for institutional design under representative democracy increase the likelihood of centralisation. Direct democracy may thus be interpreted as a federalism-preserving institution.}, language = {en} } @misc{SchnellenbachSchubert, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Schubert, Christian}, title = {Behavioral political economy: A survey}, series = {European Journal of Political Economy}, volume = {40}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, number = {B}, issn = {0176-2680}, doi = {10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2015.05.002}, pages = {395 -- 417}, abstract = {In explaining individual behavior in politics, economists should rely on the same motivational assumptions they use to explain behavior in the market: that is what Political Economy, understood as the application of economics to the study of political processes, is all about. In its standard variant, individuals who play the game of politics should also be considered rational and self-interested, unlike the benevolent despot of traditional welfare economics. History repeats itself with the rise of behavioral economics: Assuming cognitive biases to be present in the market, but not in politics, behavioral economists often call for government to intervene in a "benevolent" way. Recently, however, political economists have started to apply behavioral economics insights to the study of political processes, thereby re-establishing a unified methodology. This paper surveys the current state of the emerging field of "behavioral political economy" and considers the scope for further research.}, language = {en} } @misc{SchnellenbachSchubert, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Schubert, Christian}, title = {A note on the behavioral political economy of innovation policy}, series = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics}, volume = {29}, journal = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics}, number = {5}, issn = {1432-1386}, doi = {10.1007/s00191-019-00625-y}, pages = {1399 -- 1414}, language = {en} } @misc{SchnellenbachSchwuchow, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Schwuchow, S{\"o}ren C.}, title = {Die Nationale Industriestrategie 2030: Eine kritische Diskussion}, series = {ORDO : Jahrbuch f{\"u}r die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft}, volume = {70}, journal = {ORDO : Jahrbuch f{\"u}r die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft}, number = {1}, issn = {0048-2129}, doi = {10.1515/ordo-2020-0019}, pages = {340 -- 371}, abstract = {Wir analysieren die Nationale Industriestrategie 2030, die im Februar 2019 vom Bundesministerium f{\"u}r Wirtschaft und Energie ver{\"o}ffentlicht wurde. Bei dieser Strategie handelt es sich um einen Versuch, vertikale Industriepolitik in Deutschland zu st{\"a}rken. Wir argumentieren, dass die theoretische und empirische Rechtfertigung f{\"u}r diese Strategie insgesamt schwach ist. Die vom Bundesministerium f{\"u}r Wirtschaft und Energie (BMWi) vorgeschlagenen Instrumente weisen meist nur eine sehr geringe Passgenauigkeit zur mittelst{\"a}ndisch gepr{\"a}gten deutschen Unternehmenslandschaft auf. Sie stellen Anforderungen an die F{\"a}higkeiten der staatlichen Entscheidungstr{\"a}ger, die in der Realit{\"a}t kaum vorzufinden sind. Eine sinnvolle Alternative w{\"u}rde in einer R{\"u}ckbesinnung auf ordnungspolitische Prinzipien, insbesondere die Gew{\"a}hrleistung einer hohen Wettbewerbsintensit{\"a}t, bestehen.}, language = {de} } @misc{Schubert, author = {Schubert, Christian}, title = {The pitfalls of Darwinian "progress": a comment on "Evolvability and progress in evolutionary economics" by Tim Cochrane and James Maclaurin}, series = {Journal of Bioeconomics}, volume = {15}, journal = {Journal of Bioeconomics}, number = {3}, issn = {1573-6989}, doi = {10.1007/s10818-012-9146-0}, pages = {325 -- 328}, language = {en} } @misc{Schwuchow, author = {Schwuchow, Soeren C.}, title = {Extractive politics, redistribution, and war : on the rationality of kleptocratic mismanagement}, series = {Defence and peace economics}, volume = {36}, journal = {Defence and peace economics}, number = {5}, publisher = {Routledge, Taylor \& Francis Group}, address = {London ; Abingdon}, issn = {1024-2694}, doi = {10.1080/10242694.2024.2385389}, pages = {683 -- 705}, abstract = {We study a model on the impact of vertical inequality on autocrats' exploitation of societal wealth and their intended risk of war. Using a general equilibrium model, we demonstrate that autocrats are willing to use the military for redistribution when it increases their share of the rents. They are also willing to harm the economy to deter external threats and are most powerful for extreme un-/equal distributions. These findings offer interesting interpretations. Firstly, even in the absence of external military threats, some autocrats maintain large armies for redistribution, depending on the level of inequality. Secondly, not too low inequality can benefit ordinary citizens. Thirdly, kleptocratic mismanagement is not necessarily an unintended side effect of shameless self-enrichment, but rather a rationally chosen governance to deter too large military threats. This policy could prevent hostilities, but ruins the economy, destroying a society's wealth. The latter causes ordinary citizens to favor war since the autocrat would then lose their grip at home. These results help to explain why some autocrats maintain excessively large armies, while others stifle their economies, and yet others are drawn into wars.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schwuchow, author = {Schwuchow, S{\"o}ren C.}, title = {Military Spending and Inequality in Autocracies: A Simple Model}, series = {Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy}, volume = {24}, journal = {Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy}, number = {4}, issn = {1554-8597}, doi = {10.1515/peps-2018-0025}, pages = {5}, abstract = {In this note, we outline a general framework for analyzing how inequality and military spending interact in a society governed by a rent-seeking autocrat. Relying on a general equilibrium model, we show that, generally, the autocrat utilizes the military for redistribution in favor of poorer citizens. However, the dictator's own rent-seeking activity weakens the extent of redistribution and, in the extreme, can even reverse its direction, yielding more unequal secondary distributions instead. Accordingly, the initial level of inequality also affects the impact of military spending on inequality as the former has an impact on the extent of both, the regime's rent-seeking activity as well as redistribution. Here, our model shows that primary and secondary distributions are rather equal for extreme initial equality/inequality. For medium levels of initial inequality, redistribution is rather large and can be in favor of the poor or of the rich, depending on the extent of rent-seeking and the primary distribution. Based on these results, we highlight the importance of a society's institutional framework for analyzing the relation of inequality and military spending.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schwuchow, author = {Schwuchow, S{\"o}ren C.}, title = {Organized crime as a link between inequality and corruption}, series = {European Journal of Law and Economics}, volume = {55}, journal = {European Journal of Law and Economics}, number = {3}, issn = {0929-1261}, doi = {10.1007/s10657-023-09764-x}, pages = {469 -- 509}, abstract = {We study a model that establishes a novel theoretical rationale for the empirically well-documented relation between inequality and corruption. According to our model, inequality can nurture corruption by empowering organized crime because collusion between local police forces and criminal organizations is more likely in societies characterized by high inequality or weak security forces. Law enforcement and organized crime have a strong incentive to collude due to efficiency gains from specialization. However, their agreement breaks down when the mobsters can no longer credibly commit to joint rent maximization and thus start to compete with law enforcement for citizens' wealth. The mobsters then non-violently monopolize the market for extortion by undercutting the police forces, similar to a strategy of predatory pricing. Criminal collusion is thus not very different from its corporate equivalent; hence, similar policy measures should be promising. In addition, our model also suggests that the criminal organization's higher efficiency in extracting rents has a greater impact when the relative power between law enforcement and organized crime is rather balanced. Accordingly, when violent conflict becomes less predictable, non-violent elements of relative power become more relevant. Our model also allows for the interpretation that in the absence of strong social norms against corruption, organized crime is more difficult to challenge.}, language = {en} } @misc{SchwuchowTridimas, author = {Schwuchow, S{\"o}ren C. and Tridimas, George}, title = {The political economy of Solon's law against neutrality in civil wars}, series = {Public Choice}, volume = {192}, journal = {Public Choice}, number = {3-4}, issn = {1573-7101}, doi = {10.1007/s11127-022-00980-8}, pages = {249 -- 272}, abstract = {In 594 BCE, the Athenian lawgiver Solon, called upon to resolve a deepening social crisis, introduced a new constitution and mandated that in civil conflicts, no citizen is to remain apathetic and must take sides. Because the law seemed to support strife, it presents a puzzle. The paper offers a political economy rationale for Solon's law against neutrality, modeling social conflict as a rent-seeking competition. We divide society into three groups, a hereditary aristocracy, which monopolized power before the Solonian constitution, a rival wealth-based commercial elite, called the new Solonian elite, and the poor, who are enfranchised only partly. We then identify the conditions under which the third group is better off by allying with one of the other groups, protecting the Solonian constitution. In our framework, Solon's ban on neutrality is an attempt to change the payoffs from violent redistributions of rents, so that conflict is avoided. Accordingly, the ban should not only impede excessive rent seeking, but also prevent the exclusion of any social group.}, language = {en} }