@incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {A Behavioral Economics Perspective on the Entrepreneurial State and Mission-Oriented Innovation Policy}, series = {Moonshots and the New Industrial Policy: Questioning the Mission Economy}, booktitle = {Moonshots and the New Industrial Policy: Questioning the Mission Economy}, editor = {Henrekson, Magnus and Sandstr{\"o}m, Christian and Stenkula, Mikael}, publisher = {Springer Nature Switzerland}, address = {Cham}, isbn = {9783031491955}, issn = {1572-1922}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-49196-2_4}, pages = {61 -- 76}, abstract = {It is argued that the concepts of mission-oriented innovation policy and also of the entrepreneurial state will lead to the implementation of policies that are highly vulnerable to behavioral biases and the inefficient use of heuristics. In political practice, we can therefore not expect efficient mission-oriented policies. In particular, I argue that missions as a political commitment mechanism intended to devote massive resources to a specific cause will often only work if biases like the availability bias and loss aversion are deliberately used in order to secure voter consent. Furthermore, I also argue that the argument used by Mazzucato (Mission Economy: A Moonshot Guide to Changing Capitalism. London: Penguin UK, 2021) herself also contains several behavioral biases.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schwuchow, author = {Schwuchow, S{\"o}ren C.}, title = {Organized crime as a link between inequality and corruption}, series = {European Journal of Law and Economics}, volume = {55}, journal = {European Journal of Law and Economics}, number = {3}, issn = {0929-1261}, doi = {10.1007/s10657-023-09764-x}, pages = {469 -- 509}, abstract = {We study a model that establishes a novel theoretical rationale for the empirically well-documented relation between inequality and corruption. According to our model, inequality can nurture corruption by empowering organized crime because collusion between local police forces and criminal organizations is more likely in societies characterized by high inequality or weak security forces. Law enforcement and organized crime have a strong incentive to collude due to efficiency gains from specialization. However, their agreement breaks down when the mobsters can no longer credibly commit to joint rent maximization and thus start to compete with law enforcement for citizens' wealth. The mobsters then non-violently monopolize the market for extortion by undercutting the police forces, similar to a strategy of predatory pricing. Criminal collusion is thus not very different from its corporate equivalent; hence, similar policy measures should be promising. In addition, our model also suggests that the criminal organization's higher efficiency in extracting rents has a greater impact when the relative power between law enforcement and organized crime is rather balanced. Accordingly, when violent conflict becomes less predictable, non-violent elements of relative power become more relevant. Our model also allows for the interpretation that in the absence of strong social norms against corruption, organized crime is more difficult to challenge.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {The Concept of Ordnungspolitik: Rule-Based Economic Policy-Making from the Perspective of the Freiburg School}, series = {Public Choice}, volume = {195}, journal = {Public Choice}, issn = {1573-7101}, doi = {10.1007/s11127-021-00903-z}, pages = {283 -- 300}, language = {en} } @misc{SchwuchowTridimas, author = {Schwuchow, S{\"o}ren C. and Tridimas, George}, title = {The political economy of Solon's law against neutrality in civil wars}, series = {Public Choice}, volume = {192}, journal = {Public Choice}, number = {3-4}, issn = {1573-7101}, doi = {10.1007/s11127-022-00980-8}, pages = {249 -- 272}, abstract = {In 594 BCE, the Athenian lawgiver Solon, called upon to resolve a deepening social crisis, introduced a new constitution and mandated that in civil conflicts, no citizen is to remain apathetic and must take sides. Because the law seemed to support strife, it presents a puzzle. The paper offers a political economy rationale for Solon's law against neutrality, modeling social conflict as a rent-seeking competition. We divide society into three groups, a hereditary aristocracy, which monopolized power before the Solonian constitution, a rival wealth-based commercial elite, called the new Solonian elite, and the poor, who are enfranchised only partly. We then identify the conditions under which the third group is better off by allying with one of the other groups, protecting the Solonian constitution. In our framework, Solon's ban on neutrality is an attempt to change the payoffs from violent redistributions of rents, so that conflict is avoided. Accordingly, the ban should not only impede excessive rent seeking, but also prevent the exclusion of any social group.}, language = {en} } @misc{Gross, author = {Groß, Steffen}, title = {On the Regulation of the International Exchange of Cultural Property}, series = {ORDO : Jahrbuch f{\"u}r die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft}, volume = {70}, journal = {ORDO : Jahrbuch f{\"u}r die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft}, number = {1}, issn = {0048-2129}, pages = {166 -- 187}, abstract = {With its foundation in 1945, UNESCO declared as its main purpose the promotion of international cultural exchange1. A number of legal instruments (Conventions, Recommendations and Declarations) should duly help to substantiate that general purpose and make it work in practice. In this process, the regulation of the international exchange of cultural property plays a key role. However, the proper regulation of cultural property exchange has been a highly controversial issue. This paper focus on UNESCO's guiding ideas and conceptions of cultural property, international exchange and regulation. The central question is: Are the regulations codified in UNESCO's Conventions and Recommendations helpful in encouraging international cultural exchange or are we faced, due to the neglect of private agents and the roles they play in cultural exchange, with some sort of one-sided regulation running counter to that aim? The author argues that UNESCO's legal instruments are driven by and express a strong anti-private and anti-market bias, which produce problematic economic incentives in the art and antiquities world to the disadvantage of the international exchange of cultural property.}, language = {en} } @misc{SchnellenbachSchubert, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Schubert, Christian}, title = {A note on the behavioral political economy of innovation policy}, series = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics}, volume = {29}, journal = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics}, number = {5}, issn = {1432-1386}, doi = {10.1007/s00191-019-00625-y}, pages = {1399 -- 1414}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Revisiting the tension between classical liberalism and the welfare state}, series = {Journal of Contextual Economics}, volume = {139}, journal = {Journal of Contextual Economics}, number = {2-4}, issn = {2568-7603}, pages = {365 -- 384}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {On the Behavioural Political Economy of Regulating Fake News}, series = {Ordo - Jahrbuch f{\"u}r die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft}, volume = {68}, journal = {Ordo - Jahrbuch f{\"u}r die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft}, issn = {2366-0481}, pages = {197 -- 219}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Fiscal Sovereignty in a Globalised World: The Pressure of European Fiscal Governance on Domestic Public Finance}, series = {Comparing Fiscal Federalism}, booktitle = {Comparing Fiscal Federalism}, editor = {Valdesalici, Alice and Palermo, Francesco}, publisher = {Brill-Martinus Nijhoff}, address = {Leiden}, isbn = {978-90-04-34095-4}, pages = {328 -- 346}, language = {en} } @misc{Gross, author = {Groß, Steffen}, title = {Can Cultural Property Protection Be an Effective Counter-Terrorism Instrument?}, series = {The Journal of Art Crime}, volume = {19}, journal = {The Journal of Art Crime}, issn = {1947-5926}, pages = {47 -- 59}, language = {en} } @misc{Schwuchow, author = {Schwuchow, S{\"o}ren C.}, title = {Military Spending and Inequality in Autocracies: A Simple Model}, series = {Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy}, volume = {24}, journal = {Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy}, number = {4}, issn = {1554-8597}, doi = {10.1515/peps-2018-0025}, pages = {5}, abstract = {In this note, we outline a general framework for analyzing how inequality and military spending interact in a society governed by a rent-seeking autocrat. Relying on a general equilibrium model, we show that, generally, the autocrat utilizes the military for redistribution in favor of poorer citizens. However, the dictator's own rent-seeking activity weakens the extent of redistribution and, in the extreme, can even reverse its direction, yielding more unequal secondary distributions instead. Accordingly, the initial level of inequality also affects the impact of military spending on inequality as the former has an impact on the extent of both, the regime's rent-seeking activity as well as redistribution. Here, our model shows that primary and secondary distributions are rather equal for extreme initial equality/inequality. For medium levels of initial inequality, redistribution is rather large and can be in favor of the poor or of the rich, depending on the extent of rent-seeking and the primary distribution. Based on these results, we highlight the importance of a society's institutional framework for analyzing the relation of inequality and military spending.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Evolving Hierarchical Preferences and Behavioral Economic Policies}, series = {Public Choice}, volume = {178}, journal = {Public Choice}, number = {1/2}, issn = {1573-7101}, doi = {10.1007/s11127-018-0607-4}, pages = {31 -- 52}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {German Federalism at the Crossroads: Renegotiating the Allocation of Competencies in a New Financial Environment}, series = {The Future of Federalism: Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in an Age of Austerity}, booktitle = {The Future of Federalism: Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in an Age of Austerity}, editor = {Eccleston, Richard and Krever, Richard}, publisher = {Elgar}, address = {Cheltenham, UK}, isbn = {978-1-78471-777-3}, pages = {147 -- 172}, language = {en} } @misc{PitsoulisSchwuchow, author = {Pitsoulis, Athanassios and Schwuchow, S{\"o}ren C.}, title = {Holding out for a better deal: Brinkmanship in the Greek bailout negotiations}, series = {European Journal of Political Economy}, volume = {48}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, issn = {0176-2680}, doi = {10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.08.011}, pages = {40 -- 53}, abstract = {Greece and its creditors concluded negotiations over a third bailout by signing a Memorandum of Understanding on 19 August 2015. The dominant view among most economic policy analysts and commentators seems to be that the actions of the Greek government in the months before the deal had been erratic and lacked coordination. In this paper we argue instead that the decisions of the Greek leaders, including asking the voters to reject the earlier terms demanded by the creditors in a referendum, can be rationally explained by the logic of brinkmanship. We develop a game-theoretic model to show that the actions of the Greek government are consistent with a strategy aimed at getting a better bailout deal.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {A Constitutional Economics Perspective on Soft Paternalism}, series = {Kyklos}, volume = {69}, journal = {Kyklos}, number = {1}, issn = {1467-6435}, doi = {10.1111/kykl.12106}, pages = {135 -- 156}, abstract = {Using a framework that distinguishes short-term consumer preferences, individual reflective preferences and political preferences, we discuss from a constitutional economics perspective whether individuals find it in their common constitutional interest to endow representatives and bureaucrats with the competence to impose soft paternalist policies. The focus is specifically on soft paternalist policies, because these often work with non-transparent 'nudges' that are considered as manipulative in some contributions to the literature. We show that those soft paternalist policies that are manipulative indeed collide with three criteria of consumer sovereignty, reflective sovereignty and citizen sovereignty that can be argued to represent common constitutional interest of citizens. On the other hand, we argue that the set of paternalist policies that is deemed acceptable on the constitutional level is restricted to non-manipulative instruments, and their application as government policies is limited to cases with stable and very homogenous preferences. However, we also argue that competitive markets are capable of supplying many mechanisms that allow individuals to cope with problems in their decision-making processes on a private level.}, language = {en} } @misc{BaskaranFeldSchnellenbach, author = {Baskaran, Thushyanthan and Feld, Lars P. and Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Fiscal Federalism and Economic Growth: A Meta-Analysis}, series = {Economic Inquiry}, volume = {54}, journal = {Economic Inquiry}, number = {3}, issn = {1465-7295}, doi = {10.1111/ecin.12331}, pages = {1445 -- 1463}, abstract = {The theoretical literature on the economics of fiscal federalism has identified several potential effects of government decentralization on economic growth. Much of the traditional literature focuses on the efficiency aspects of a decentralized provision of public services. However, decentralization may also increase growth by raising the ability of the political system to innovate and carry out reforms. On the contrary, some authors argue that decentralization increases corruption and government inefficiency. After a discussion of the theoretical arguments, we provide both a traditional survey and a meta-analysis of the empirical literature on decentralization and economic growth. Based on our survey, we identify open questions and discuss possible ways of answering them.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Does Classical Liberalism Imply an Evolutionary Approach to Policy-Making?}, series = {Journal of Bioeconomics}, volume = {17}, journal = {Journal of Bioeconomics}, number = {1}, issn = {1573-698}, doi = {10.1007/s10818-014-9188-6}, pages = {53 -- 70}, abstract = {This paper argues that an evolutionary approach to policy-making, which emphasizes openness to change and political variety, is particularly compatible with the central tenets of classical liberalism. The chief reasons are that classical liberalism acknowledges the ubiquity of uncertainty, as well as heterogeneity in preferences and beliefs, and generally embraces gradual social and economic change that arises from accidental variation rather than deliberate, large-scale planning. In contrast, our arguments cast doubt on a different claim, namely that classical liberalism is particularly compatible with the evolutionary biological heritage of humans.}, language = {en} } @misc{SchnellenbachSchubert, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Schubert, Christian}, title = {Behavioral political economy: A survey}, series = {European Journal of Political Economy}, volume = {40}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, number = {B}, issn = {0176-2680}, doi = {10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2015.05.002}, pages = {395 -- 417}, abstract = {In explaining individual behavior in politics, economists should rely on the same motivational assumptions they use to explain behavior in the market: that is what Political Economy, understood as the application of economics to the study of political processes, is all about. In its standard variant, individuals who play the game of politics should also be considered rational and self-interested, unlike the benevolent despot of traditional welfare economics. History repeats itself with the rise of behavioral economics: Assuming cognitive biases to be present in the market, but not in politics, behavioral economists often call for government to intervene in a "benevolent" way. Recently, however, political economists have started to apply behavioral economics insights to the study of political processes, thereby re-establishing a unified methodology. This paper surveys the current state of the emerging field of "behavioral political economy" and considers the scope for further research.}, language = {en} } @misc{GrossPitsoulis, author = {Groß, Steffen and Pitsoulis, Athanassios}, title = {"The Other Side of the Argument": Isaiah Berlin versus F.A. von Hayek on Liberty, Public Policies and the Market}, series = {Constitutional Political Economy}, volume = {26}, journal = {Constitutional Political Economy}, number = {4}, issn = {1572-9966}, doi = {10.1007/s10602-015-9193-3}, pages = {475 -- 494}, language = {en} } @misc{FeldSchnellenbach, author = {Feld, Lars P. and Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Political Institutions and Income (Re-)Distribution: Evidence from Developed Economies}, series = {Public Choice}, volume = {159}, journal = {Public Choice}, number = {3}, issn = {1573-7101}, doi = {10.1007/s11127-013-0116-4}, pages = {435 -- 455}, abstract = {We discuss the effect of formal political institutions (electoral systems, fiscal decentralization, presidential and parliamentary regimes) on the extent and direction of income (re-)distribution. Empirical evidence is presented for a large sample of 70 economies and a panel of 13 OECD countries between 1981 and 1998. The evidence indicates that presidential regimes are associated with a less equal distribution of disposable incomes, while electoral systems have no significant effects. Fiscal competition is associated with less income redistribution and a less equal distribution of disposable incomes, but also with a more equal primary income distribution. Our evidence also is in line with earlier empirical contributions that find a positive relationship between trade openness and equality in primary and disposable incomes, as well as the overall redistributive effort.}, language = {en} } @misc{PitsoulisSchwuchow, author = {Pitsoulis, Athanassios and Schwuchow, S{\"o}ren C.}, title = {Coercion, credibility, and mid-air interceptions of military planes}, series = {Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy}, volume = {20}, journal = {Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy}, number = {4}, issn = {1554-8597}, doi = {10.1515/peps-2014-0040}, pages = {697 -- 707}, abstract = {Pointing out the remarkable levels of hostile interaction in the air space over contested territory between states like China and Japan or Greece and Turkey we argue that air space incursions can be interpreted as a rational strategy with ultimately political aims. In our interpretation deliberate intrusions of military aircraft into sensitive air space serve as an indirect risk-generating mechanism, as they will trigger scrambles of the opposed government's air force which may escalate into a military crisis. We derive testable hypotheses from a game-theoretic model, which we developed in earlier work to explore the strategic logic behind this risk-generating mechanism more rigorously. In order to test whether the model's predictions regarding the effect of short-term economic developments on the states' interaction hold, we built a database of daily event observations from the Hellenic National Defence General Staff reports of the last 4 years, containing time series data of Turkish intrusions into Greek-claimed air space and the number of dogfights between Greek and Turkish fighter planes. What we find is that not only Greek engagements of Turkish intruders but also massed, provocative Turkish intrusions have become significantly less likely after the onset of the Greek economic crisis. These findings are well in line with the predictions of the model and thus supportive of our theory.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Path-dependent rule evolution}, series = {Encyclopedia of Law and Economics}, booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Law and Economics}, editor = {Backhaus, J{\"u}rgen G.}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Heidelberg}, doi = {10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_362-1}, language = {en} } @misc{Gross, author = {Groß, Steffen}, title = {The Power of "Mapping the Territory". Why Economists Should Become More Aware of the Performative Powers of their Models}, series = {Journal of Business Economics}, volume = {84}, journal = {Journal of Business Economics}, number = {9}, issn = {1861-8928}, doi = {10.1007/s11573-014-0746-0}, pages = {1237 -- 1259}, language = {en} } @misc{Schubert, author = {Schubert, Christian}, title = {The pitfalls of Darwinian "progress": a comment on "Evolvability and progress in evolutionary economics" by Tim Cochrane and James Maclaurin}, series = {Journal of Bioeconomics}, volume = {15}, journal = {Journal of Bioeconomics}, number = {3}, issn = {1573-6989}, doi = {10.1007/s10818-012-9146-0}, pages = {325 -- 328}, language = {en} } @misc{BjornskovDreherFischeretal., author = {Bj{\o}rnskov, Christian and Dreher, Axel and Fischer, Justina and Schnellenbach, Jan and Gehring, Kai}, title = {Inequality and Happiness: When Perceived Social Mobility and Economic Reality Do Not Match}, series = {Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization}, volume = {91}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization}, issn = {0167-2681}, doi = {10.1016/j.jebo.2013.03.017}, pages = {75 -- 92}, abstract = {We argue that perceived fairness of the income generation process affects the association between income inequality and subjective well-being, and that there are systematic differences in this regard between countries that are characterized by a high or, respectively, low level of actual fairness. Using a simple model of individual labor market participation under uncertainty, we predict that high levels of perceived fairness cause higher levels of individual welfare, and lower support for income redistribution. Income inequality is predicted to have a more favorable impact on subjective well-being for individuals with high fairness perceptions. This relationship is predicted to be stronger in societies that are characterized by low actual fairness. Using data on subjective well-being and a broad set of fairness measures from a pseudo micro-panel from the WVS over the 1990-2008 period, we find strong support for the negative (positive) association between fairness perceptions and the demand for more equal incomes (subjective well-being). We also find strong empirical support for the predicted differences in individual tolerance for income inequality, and the predicted influence of actual fairness.}, language = {en} } @incollection{SchnellenbachBaskaranFeld, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Baskaran, Thushyanthan and Feld, Lars P.}, title = {Creative Destruction and Fiscal Institutions: A Long-Run Case Study of Three Regions}, series = {The Two Sides of Innovation: Creation and Destruction in the Evolution of Capitalist Economies}, booktitle = {The Two Sides of Innovation: Creation and Destruction in the Evolution of Capitalist Economies}, editor = {B{\"u}storf, Guido and Cantner, Uwe and Hanusch, Horst and Huttner, Michael and Lorenz, Hans-Walter and Rahmeyer, Fritz}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {New York, NY [u.a.]}, isbn = {978-3-319-01495-1}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-01496-8}, pages = {187 -- 207}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Current Issues in Tax Policy in Germany and the Netherlands}, series = {Taxation in Europe 2013 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, booktitle = {Taxation in Europe 2013 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, editor = {Garello, Pierre}, publisher = {Institute for Research on Economic and Fiscal Issues}, address = {Paris}, language = {en} } @misc{Schubert, author = {Schubert, Christian}, title = {How to evaluate creative destruction: Reconstructing Schumpeter's approach}, series = {Cambridge Journal of Economics}, volume = {37}, journal = {Cambridge Journal of Economics}, number = {2}, issn = {1464-3545}, doi = {10.1093/cje/bes055}, pages = {227 -- 250}, language = {en} } @misc{SchubertCordes, author = {Schubert, Christian and Cordes, Christian}, title = {Role Models that make you unhappy: Light Paternalism, Social Learning and Welfare}, series = {Journal of Institutional Economics}, volume = {9}, journal = {Journal of Institutional Economics}, number = {2}, issn = {1744-1382}, doi = {10.1017/S1744137413000015}, pages = {131 -- 159}, language = {en} } @misc{PitsoulisSchnellenbach, author = {Pitsoulis, Athanassios and Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {On Property Rights and Incentives in Academic Publishing}, series = {Research Policy}, volume = {41}, journal = {Research Policy}, number = {8}, issn = {0048-7333}, doi = {10.1016/j.respol.2012.03.005}, pages = {1440 -- 1447}, abstract = {The peer review system in academic publishing performs two important functions by screening a manuscript for its quality, and by helping to further improve an author's work. However, it often fails to perform these functions in a satisfactory manner. We argue that property rights theory can be fruitfully applied to understand these shortcomings, and to develop reform proposals. The present paper discusses the incentive-problems in journal peer review from an institutional economics perspective, arguing that the incentives of both authors and reviewers to fully exploit a manuscript's potential depend on their property rights. Based on this theory of peer review, we argue that the recent proposal of an "as is" review policy combined with increased accountability of referees can be expected to result in a higher efficiency of peer review.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {The Economics of Taxing Net Wealth: A Survey of the Issues}, series = {Public Finance and Management}, volume = {12}, journal = {Public Finance and Management}, number = {4}, issn = {1523-9721}, pages = {368 -- 400}, abstract = {This paper surveys possible motivations for having a net wealth tax. After giving a short overview over the state of wealth taxation in OECD countries, we discuss both popular arguments for such a tax, as well as economic arguments. It is argued that classical normative principles of taxation known from public economics cannot give a sound justification for a net wealth tax. The efficiency-related effects are also discussed and shown to be theoretically ambiguous, while empirical evidence hints at a negative effect on GDP growth. Finally, it is argued that despite of widespread and persistent lobbying for a revitalization of the net wealth tax, this is unlikely to happen due to political economy constraints.}, language = {en} } @misc{FeldSchnellenbachBaskaran, author = {Feld, Lars P. and Schnellenbach, Jan and Baskaran, Thushyanthan}, title = {Creative Destruction and Fiscal Institutions: A Long-Run Case Study of Three Regions}, series = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics}, volume = {22}, journal = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics}, number = {3}, issn = {0936-9937}, pages = {563 -- 583}, abstract = {We analyze the rise and decline of the steel and mining industries in the regions of Saarland, Lorraine and Luxembourg. Our main focus is on the period of structural decline in these industries after the second world war. Differences in the institutional framework of these regions are exploited to analyze the way in which the broader fiscal constitution sets incentives for governments either to obstruct or to encourage structural change in the private sector. Our main result is that fiscal autonomy of a region subjected to structural change in its private sector is associated with a relatively faster decline of employment in the sectors affected. Contrary to the political lore, fiscal transfers appear not to be used to speed up the destruction of old sectors, but rather to stabilize them.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Nudges and Norms: On the Political Economy of Soft Paternalism}, series = {European Journal of Political Economy}, volume = {28}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, number = {2}, issn = {0176-2680}, doi = {10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.12.001}, pages = {266 -- 277}, abstract = {This paper discusses soft (or libertarian) paternalism, as proposed among others by Thaler and Sunstein (2008). It is argued that soft paternalism should not be understood as an efficiency-enhancing, but as a redistributive concept. The relationship between soft paternalism and social norms is discussed in detail. In particular, it is argued that soft paternalism increases the stability of given social norms, which in turn need not be efficient, nor in the material self-interest of a majority of individuals. Soft paternalism is argued to be an essentially conservative concept of policy-making in the sense that it tends to increase the longevity of status quo social norms.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Current Issues in Tax Policy in Germany}, series = {Taxation in Europe 2012 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, booktitle = {Taxation in Europe 2012 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, editor = {Garello, Pierre}, publisher = {Institute for Research on Economic and Fiscal Issues}, address = {Paris}, language = {en} } @misc{Schubert, author = {Schubert, Christian}, title = {Is Novelty always a good thing? Towards an evolutionary welfare economics}, series = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics}, volume = {22}, journal = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics}, number = {3}, issn = {1432-1386}, doi = {10.1007/s00191-011-0257-x}, pages = {585 -- 619}, language = {en} } @misc{Schubert, author = {Schubert, Christian}, title = {Pursuing Happiness}, series = {Kyklos}, volume = {65}, journal = {Kyklos}, number = {2}, issn = {1467-6435}, doi = {10.1111/j.1467-6435.2012.00537.x}, pages = {245 -- 261}, language = {en} } @misc{PitsoulisSiebel, author = {Pitsoulis, Athanassios and Siebel, Jens Peter}, title = {Four Budget Deficit Theories in One Model}, language = {en} } @misc{Pitsoulis, author = {Pitsoulis, Athanassios}, title = {The egalitarian battlefield: Reflections on the origins of majority rule in archaic Greece}, language = {en} } @misc{PitsoulisSchwuchow, author = {Pitsoulis, Athanassios and Schwuchow, S{\"o}ren C.}, title = {Consumer Choice: Income, Tastes, and Prices}, abstract = {Wolfram Demonstrations Project}, language = {en} } @misc{FeldSchnellenbach, author = {Feld, Lars P. and Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Fiscal Federalism and Macroeconomic Performance: A Survey of Recent Research}, series = {Environment and Planning - Government and Policy}, volume = {29}, journal = {Environment and Planning - Government and Policy}, number = {2}, issn = {1472-3425}, doi = {10.1068/c1054r}, pages = {224 -- 243}, abstract = {In this paper, we offer both a broad survey of the literature on fiscal federalism and long-run economic performance, and a detailed report of some of our own recent studies in this field. We look at the difference between study types (cross-country versus single-country studies), and at the relevance of the broader institutional framework into which fiscal decentralization is embedded. We also look into structural change and intergovernmental transfers as a detailed mechanism through which federalism may have an impact on aggregate economic performance.It turns out that fiscal decentralization has no robust effect on growth, but the evidence hints at a positive effect on overall productivity, conditional on the broader institutional framework.}, language = {en} } @misc{DoeringSchnellenbach, author = {D{\"o}ring, Thomas and Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {A Tale of Two Federalisms: Long-Term Institutional Change in the United States and in Germany}, series = {Constitutional Political Economy}, volume = {22}, journal = {Constitutional Political Economy}, number = {1}, issn = {1043-4062}, pages = {83 -- 102}, abstract = {This paper offers a comparison of government centralization in the United States and in Germany. After briefly laying out the history of federalism in both countries, we identify the instruments of centralization at work. It is argued that an initial constitutional framework of competitive federalism does not prevent the long-term centralization of competencies. Against a background of historical evidence, we discuss the political economics of government centralization. It is argued that formal institutions clearly have an effect on the pathways of government centralization, but not necessarily on the broader trend of centralization. The conclusion is reached that preservation of state and local autonomy may eventually hinge on informal political institutions.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Current Issues in Tax Policy in Germany}, series = {Taxation in Europe 2011 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, booktitle = {Taxation in Europe 2011 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, editor = {Garello, Pierre}, publisher = {Institute for Research on Economic and Fiscal Issues}, address = {Paris}, language = {en} } @misc{SchnellenbachFeldSchaltegger, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P. and Schaltegger, Christoph A.}, title = {The Impact of Referendums on the Centralization of Public Goods Provision: A Political Economy Approach}, series = {Economics of Governance}, volume = {11}, journal = {Economics of Governance}, number = {1}, issn = {1435-8131}, doi = {10.1007/s10101-009-0063-1}, pages = {3 -- 26}, abstract = {The paper compares decision-making on the centralisation of public goods provision in the presence of regional externalities under representative and direct democratic institutions. A model with two regions, two public goods and regional spillovers is developed in which uncertainty over the true preferences of candidates makes strategic delegation impossible. Instead, it is shown that the existence of rent extraction by delegates alone suffices to make cooperative centralisation more likely through representative democracy. In the non-cooperative case, the more extensive possibilities for institutional design under representative democracy increase the likelihood of centralisation. Direct democracy may thus be interpreted as a federalism-preserving institution.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Vertical and Horizontal Reciprocity in a Theory of Taxpayer Compliance}, series = {Developing Alternative Frameworks Explaining Tax Compliance}, booktitle = {Developing Alternative Frameworks Explaining Tax Compliance}, editor = {Alm, James and Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge and Torgler, Benno}, publisher = {Routledge}, address = {London}, isbn = {978-0-415-57698-7}, pages = {56 -- 73}, abstract = {This paper examines the interplay of horizontal and vertical reci- procity in determining the degree of tax compliance. Horizontal reciprocity is of the type that is frequently observed in public goods games, where reciprocally minded taxpayers may respond to non-contributing, strictly sel sh taxpayers by mimicking their sel sh behaviour. Vertical reciprocity is located in the relationship between the taxpayer and her government. Some recent empirical evidence is suggesting that initial cooperation of taxpayers with the scal authorities is not so much the result of positive reciprocity, but rather of a general tendency to obey authorities. Vertical reciprocity is therefore modeled as the propensity of taxpayers to retaliate against an uncooperative government by means of reducing the level of tax compliance. This allows us to identify feedback mechanisms between horizontal and vertical reciprocity.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Current Issues in Tax Policy in Germany and the Netherlands}, series = {Taxation in Europe 2010 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, booktitle = {Taxation in Europe 2010 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, publisher = {Institut de Recherches Economiques et Fiscales}, address = {Marseille}, language = {en} } @misc{SchnellenbachFeldSavioz, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P. and Savioz, Marcel}, title = {Gebhard Kirchg{\"a}ssner, 60 Years On}, series = {Public Choice}, volume = {144}, journal = {Public Choice}, number = {3-4}, issn = {1573-7101}, pages = {393 -- 399}, language = {en} } @incollection{Gross, author = {Groß, Steffen}, title = {The Legacy of Open Thought}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Current Issues in Tax Policy in Germany and the Netherlands}, series = {Taxation in Europe 2009 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, booktitle = {Taxation in Europe 2009 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, editor = {Garello, Pierre}, publisher = {Institute for Research on Economic and Fiscal Issues}, address = {Paris}, language = {en} } @misc{PitsoulisSiebel, author = {Pitsoulis, Athanassios and Siebel, Jens Peter}, title = {Capturing Four Budget Deficit Theories in a Simple Graphical Model}, series = {SSRN eLibrary}, journal = {SSRN eLibrary}, pages = {10}, language = {en} } @inproceedings{PitsoulisSiebel, author = {Pitsoulis, Athanassios and Siebel, Jens Peter}, title = {Stubborn Conservatives, Tax Competition and Strategic Deficit}, series = {Papers and Proceedings of the Third Panhellenic Conference on International Political Economy, Athen, 2008}, booktitle = {Papers and Proceedings of the Third Panhellenic Conference on International Political Economy, Athen, 2008}, pages = {12}, language = {en} } @incollection{Pitsoulis, author = {Pitsoulis, Athanassios}, title = {A Dynamic Theory of Collective Persuasion}, series = {The Shadow Economy, Corruption and Governance}, booktitle = {The Shadow Economy, Corruption and Governance}, editor = {Shinnick, Edward and Pickhardt, Michael}, publisher = {Elgar}, address = {Cheltenham}, isbn = {978-1-84844-079-1}, pages = {43 -- 62}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Rational Ignorance Is Not Bliss: When Do Lazy Voters Learn from Decentralised Political Experiments?}, series = {Journal of Economics and Statistics}, volume = {228}, journal = {Journal of Economics and Statistics}, number = {4}, issn = {0021-4027}, doi = {10.2139/ssrn.990268}, pages = {372 -- 393}, abstract = {A popular argument about economic policy under uncertainty states that decentralisation offers the possibility to learn from local or regional policy experiments. Often, an analogy between market competition as a discovery procedure and political competition is used to corroborate this argument. We argue that political learning processes are not trivial and do not occur frictionlessly: Voters have an inherent tendency to retain a given stock of policy-related knowledge which was costly to accumulate, so that yardstick competition is improbable to function well particularly for complex issues, if representatives' actions are tightly controlled by the electorate. We show that factor mobility does have the potential to endogenously disturb equilibria on regional markets for political theories, and therefore does provide for improved political learning processes compared to unitary systems. But the results we can expect are far from the ideal mechanisms of producing and utilising knowledge often described in the literature. In particular, collective learning may occur in the relatively efficient region, while the status quo may be fortified in the relatively inefficient region.}, language = {en} } @misc{FeldSchalteggerSchnellenbach, author = {Feld, Lars P. and Schaltegger, Christoph A. and Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {On Government Centralisation and Budget Referendums: Evidence from Switzerland}, series = {European Economic Review}, volume = {52}, journal = {European Economic Review}, number = {4}, issn = {1873-572X}, doi = {10.1016/j.euroecorev.2007.05.005}, pages = {611 -- 645}, abstract = {Several authors have argued that a centralization of fiscal powers in a federation is less likely to occur if citizens have to approve a change in the assignments of responsibilities by a popular referendum. This outcome may be due to the fact that logrolling is more difficult under direct than under representative democracy. It may also be caused by citizens' fear that a centralization of fiscal authority facilitates the extraction of rents by the government or the legislature. In this paper, we test the hypothesis that centralization is less likely under referendum decision-making in the unique institutional setting of Switzerland. Using a panel of Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998, the empirical analysis provides evidence that referendums induce less centralization of fiscal activities.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Current Issues in Tax Policy in Germany and the Netherlands}, series = {Taxation in Europe 2008 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, booktitle = {Taxation in Europe 2008 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, publisher = {Institute for Research on Economic and Fiscal Issues}, address = {Paris}, language = {en} } @misc{WittSchubert, author = {Witt, Ulrich and Schubert, Christian}, title = {Constitutional Interests in the Face of Innovations: How much do we need to know about Risk Preferences?}, series = {Constitutional Political Economy}, volume = {19}, journal = {Constitutional Political Economy}, number = {3}, issn = {1572-9966}, doi = {10.1007/s10602-008-9044-6}, pages = {203 -- 225}, language = {en} } @article{PitsoulisSiebel, author = {Pitsoulis, Athanassios and Siebel, Jens Peter}, title = {Political and Economic Effects of Tax Competition and Deficits}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Tax Morale and the Legitimacy of Economic Policy}, series = {Homo Oeconomicus}, volume = {24}, journal = {Homo Oeconomicus}, number = {1}, issn = {0943-0180}, pages = {21 -- 45}, abstract = {It is proposed that a more accurate prediction of tax evasion activity than in the standard portfolio-choice model can be derived even for risk-neutral individuals if psychological costs are considered. Contrary to earlier models integrating psychological costs they are systematically derived by assuming a relationship between psychological costs, taxpayer satisfaction with public policy and taxes evaded. A formal concept of legitimacy of public policies is introduced and it is shown that legitimacy influences evasion activity.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Public Entrepreneurship and the Economics of Reform}, series = {Journal of Institutional Economics}, volume = {3}, journal = {Journal of Institutional Economics}, number = {2}, issn = {1744-1382}, doi = {10.1017/S1744137407000641}, pages = {183 -- 202}, abstract = {Public entrepreneurship is commonly understood as the outcome of the activities of a Schumpeterian political innovator. However, empirical research suggests that changes to a more efficient economic policy, even if it is known and technically easy to implement, are usually delayed. This is difficult to reconcile with Schumpeterian notions of public entrepreneurship. In this paper, it is argued that the attempt to transfer a Schumpeterian approach to the public sector is fundamentally flawed. Institutional checks and balances that characterise most modern liberal democracies make the strategy of bold leadership an unlikely choice for an incumbent. If change occurs, it occurs normally as a response to the fact that the status quo has become untenable. From a normative point of view, it is argued that if public entrepreneurship nevertheless occurs, it will often be associated with unwanted consequences. A dismantling of formal institutional checks and balances is therefore not reasonable.}, language = {en} } @incollection{SchnellenbachFeld, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P.}, title = {Political Institutions and Policy Innovations: Theoretical Thoughts and Evidence on Labor Market Regulations}, series = {Democracy, Freedom and Coercion: A Law and Economics Approach}, booktitle = {Democracy, Freedom and Coercion: A Law and Economics Approach}, editor = {Marciano, Alain and Rosselin, Jean-Michel}, publisher = {Elgar}, address = {Cheltenham}, isbn = {978-1-84720-126-3}, pages = {192 -- 220}, language = {en} } @misc{SchubertCordes, author = {Schubert, Christian and Cordes, Christian}, title = {Toward a Naturalistic Foundation of the Social Contract}, series = {Constitutional Political Economy}, volume = {18}, journal = {Constitutional Political Economy}, number = {1}, issn = {1572-9966}, doi = {10.1007/s10602-006-9011-z}, pages = {35 -- 62}, language = {en} } @techreport{SchnellenbachFeld, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P.}, title = {Still a Director's Law? The Political Economy of Income Redistribution: Research Report im Auftrag des Institut de Recherches Economiques et Fiscales, Universit{\´e} Aix-Marseille}, publisher = {Univ.}, address = {Heidelberg}, pages = {57}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schubert, author = {Schubert, Christian}, title = {A contractarian view on institutional evolution}, series = {Evolution and Design of Institutions}, booktitle = {Evolution and Design of Institutions}, editor = {Schubert, Christian and Wangenheim, Georg von}, publisher = {Routledge}, address = {London}, isbn = {978-0-415-37531-3}, pages = {149 -- 179}, language = {en} } @misc{DoeringSchnellenbach, author = {D{\"o}ring, Thomas and Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {What do we know about geographical knowledge spillovers and regional growth?: A survey of the literature}, series = {Regional Studies}, volume = {40}, journal = {Regional Studies}, number = {3}, issn = {0034-3404}, doi = {10.1080/00343400600632739}, pages = {375 -- 395}, abstract = {D{\"o}ring T. and Schnellenbach J. (2006) What do we know about geographical knowledge spillovers and regional growth?: a survey of the literature, Regional Studies 40, 375-395. Modern (endogenous) growth theory tells us that knowledge is crucial for the sustained growth of high-income economies. Against this background, the paper provides a survey of theoretical and empirical findings highlighting the question of how geographically limited knowledge diffusion can help to explain clusters of regions with persistently different levels of growth. It discusses this topic in two steps. First, the theoretical concept of knowledge spillovers is outlined by discussing the different types of knowledge, the spatial dimension of knowledge spillovers, and the geographical mechanisms and structural conditions of knowledge diffusion. Second, it analyses the empirical evidence concerning the theoretical propositions.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Tax Morale and the Taming of Leviathan}, series = {Constitutional Political Economy}, volume = {17}, journal = {Constitutional Political Economy}, number = {2}, issn = {1043-4062}, doi = {10.1007/s10602-006-0001-y}, pages = {117 -- 132}, abstract = {An explanation for tax morale based upon a simple model of psychological costs that depend on the perceived legitimacy of public policies is introduced. It is shown that empirically observed low levels of tax evasion can be explained even for a risk-neutral taxpayer with such a model. In a discussion of aggregate tax revenue, it is argued that tax revenue as a function of tax rates may differ fundamentally from the notorious Laffer curve. It is then necessary to look at the interaction of formal and informal institutions to predict the nominal tax rates chosen by a revenue maximizer.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Appeasing Nihilists? Some Economic Thoughts on Reducing Terrorist Activity}, series = {Public Choice}, volume = {129}, journal = {Public Choice}, number = {3/4}, issn = {0048-5829}, doi = {10.1007/s11127-006-9029-9}, pages = {301 -- 313}, abstract = {Recent contributions to the economics of terrorism have given contradicting recommendations for campaigning against terrorism, from the proposal to deprive terrorists of their resources to the proposal of raising the opportunity costs of terrorism by increasing the wealth of the affected regions. Within a simple framework which differentiates between the decision to become an active terrorist and the decision to support terrorists and which allows for reciprocal reactions to anti-terrorism policies, it is argued here that undifferentiated deterrence may indeed backfire, but so may an increase of the opportunity costs of terrorism. A very targeted anti-terrorism policy aimed only at active terrorists would then be the most reasonable remaining approach.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Gradualism and Public Entrepreneurship in the Evolution of Formal Institutions}, series = {The Evolution and Design of Institutions}, booktitle = {The Evolution and Design of Institutions}, editor = {Schubert, Christian and Wangenheim, Georg von}, publisher = {Routledge}, address = {London}, isbn = {9-78-0-415-37531-3}, pages = {123 -- 143}, language = {en} } @misc{OPUS4-9676, title = {Evolution and Design of Institutions}, editor = {Schubert, Christian and Wangenheim, Georg von}, publisher = {Routledge}, address = {London}, isbn = {978-0-415-37531-3}, pages = {XII, 214}, language = {en} } @incollection{OPUS4-9678, title = {Hayek and the Evolution of Designed Institutions: A critical assessment}, series = {Entrepreneurship, money and coordination : Hayek's theory of cultural evolution}, booktitle = {Entrepreneurship, money and coordination : Hayek's theory of cultural evolution}, editor = {Backhaus, J{\"u}rgen G.}, publisher = {Elgar}, address = {Cheltenham}, isbn = {1-84542-130-2}, pages = {107 -- 130}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Model Uncertainty and the Rationality of Economic Policy}, series = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics}, volume = {15}, journal = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics}, number = {1}, issn = {0936-9937}, doi = {10.1007/s00191-004-0231-y}, pages = {101 -- 116}, abstract = {This paper examines the process of economic policy-making under conditions of model uncertainty. A median voter model is introduced in which the electorate is uncertain of the policy measures available as well as their respective outcomes and opinion formation is a social process of communication and contagion. Learning from experience is also considered. It is shown that economic policy-making under uncertainty produces novel policy routines, but that a mechanism of efficiently utilising the generated knowledge is missing.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {The Dahrendorf hypothesis and its implications for (the theory of) economic policy-making}, series = {Cambridge Journal of Economics}, volume = {29}, journal = {Cambridge Journal of Economics}, number = {6}, issn = {1464-3545}, doi = {10.1093/cje/bei086}, pages = {997 -- 1009}, abstract = {The sociologist R. Dahrendorf has recently suggested that there is no and there ought to be no convergence of economic policies towards some common ideal model. On the contrary, he states that 'diversity is […] at the very heart of a world that has abandoned the need for closed, encompassing systems'. It is shown in this paper that the Dahrendorf hypothesis is difficult to reconcile with orthodox economic approaches to economic policy-making. A perspective on policy-making that introduces either fundamental uncertainty or endogenous policy preferences or both is, however, shown to be consistent with the Dahrendorf hypothesis.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {The Evolution of a Fiscal Constitution When Individuals are Theoretically Uncertain}, series = {European Journal of Law and Economics}, volume = {17}, journal = {European Journal of Law and Economics}, number = {1}, issn = {0929-1261}, doi = {10.1023/A:1026389926709}, pages = {97 -- 115}, abstract = {In contrast to the contractarian approach to constitutional economics, we follow Voigt (1999) in assuming that constitutional rules are closely connected to informal institutions and that their evolution is a matter of interest group activity and implicit re-interpretation. We add to this the assumption of theoretical uncertainty of individuals regarding the working properties of constitutional rules. Collective learning processes are considered as the third driving force of constitutional evolution, and at the same time as the source of path-dependencies which allow suboptimal constitutions to persist. Finally, it is argued that direct legislation offers more protection than a written fiscal constitution.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {New Political Economy, Scientism and Knowledge: A Critique from a Hayekian Perspective, and a Proposal for an Extension of the Research Agenda}, series = {The American Journal of Economics and Sociology}, volume = {61}, journal = {The American Journal of Economics and Sociology}, number = {1}, issn = {0002-9246}, pages = {193 -- 214}, abstract = {New Political Economy has something very important in common with welfare economics: its focus on static, technical efficiency criteria to judge the rationality of a social, political or economic order. This often leads theorists to perceive their objects of research as well-defined problems to which clear-cut solutions can be found and prescribed as policy proposals, addressed at the policymaker or the democratic sovereign. This perspective frequently excludes important empirical phenomena from the research agenda. Although, for example, certain well-defined informational asymmetries are frequently modeled, fundamental knowledge problems such as ignorance of the true model of the economy are usually ignored. In the present paper, this approach is criticized from a Hayekian point of view, with an emphasis on the problems of "scientism" (i.e., the inappropriate transfer of methods from the natural to the social sciences) and irremediably imperfect knowledge, troubling both the agents in the theoretical model and the theorist. Furthermore, it is argued and illustrated with two examples that an extension of Public Choice's research agenda along Hayekian lines may be fruitful, because it leads to a fresh perception even of such problems that already have been extensively researched within the traditional framework.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {New Political Economy, Scientism and Knowledge: A Critique from a Hayekian Perspective}, series = {The New Political Economies: A Collection of Essays from Around the World}, booktitle = {The New Political Economies: A Collection of Essays from Around the World}, editor = {Moss, Laurence S.}, publisher = {Blackwell Publishers}, address = {Malden}, isbn = {0-631-23497-7}, doi = {10.1111/1536-7150.00156}, pages = {193 -- 214}, language = {en} }