@misc{BaskaranFeldSchnellenbach, author = {Baskaran, Thushyanthan and Feld, Lars P. and Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Fiscal Federalism and Economic Growth: A Meta-Analysis}, series = {Economic Inquiry}, volume = {54}, journal = {Economic Inquiry}, number = {3}, issn = {1465-7295}, doi = {10.1111/ecin.12331}, pages = {1445 -- 1463}, abstract = {The theoretical literature on the economics of fiscal federalism has identified several potential effects of government decentralization on economic growth. Much of the traditional literature focuses on the efficiency aspects of a decentralized provision of public services. However, decentralization may also increase growth by raising the ability of the political system to innovate and carry out reforms. On the contrary, some authors argue that decentralization increases corruption and government inefficiency. After a discussion of the theoretical arguments, we provide both a traditional survey and a meta-analysis of the empirical literature on decentralization and economic growth. Based on our survey, we identify open questions and discuss possible ways of answering them.}, language = {en} } @misc{BjornskovDreherFischeretal., author = {Bj{\o}rnskov, Christian and Dreher, Axel and Fischer, Justina and Schnellenbach, Jan and Gehring, Kai}, title = {Inequality and Happiness: When Perceived Social Mobility and Economic Reality Do Not Match}, series = {Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization}, volume = {91}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization}, issn = {0167-2681}, doi = {10.1016/j.jebo.2013.03.017}, pages = {75 -- 92}, abstract = {We argue that perceived fairness of the income generation process affects the association between income inequality and subjective well-being, and that there are systematic differences in this regard between countries that are characterized by a high or, respectively, low level of actual fairness. Using a simple model of individual labor market participation under uncertainty, we predict that high levels of perceived fairness cause higher levels of individual welfare, and lower support for income redistribution. Income inequality is predicted to have a more favorable impact on subjective well-being for individuals with high fairness perceptions. This relationship is predicted to be stronger in societies that are characterized by low actual fairness. Using data on subjective well-being and a broad set of fairness measures from a pseudo micro-panel from the WVS over the 1990-2008 period, we find strong support for the negative (positive) association between fairness perceptions and the demand for more equal incomes (subjective well-being). We also find strong empirical support for the predicted differences in individual tolerance for income inequality, and the predicted influence of actual fairness.}, language = {en} } @misc{DoeringSchnellenbach, author = {D{\"o}ring, Thomas and Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {What do we know about geographical knowledge spillovers and regional growth?: A survey of the literature}, series = {Regional Studies}, volume = {40}, journal = {Regional Studies}, number = {3}, issn = {0034-3404}, doi = {10.1080/00343400600632739}, pages = {375 -- 395}, abstract = {D{\"o}ring T. and Schnellenbach J. (2006) What do we know about geographical knowledge spillovers and regional growth?: a survey of the literature, Regional Studies 40, 375-395. Modern (endogenous) growth theory tells us that knowledge is crucial for the sustained growth of high-income economies. Against this background, the paper provides a survey of theoretical and empirical findings highlighting the question of how geographically limited knowledge diffusion can help to explain clusters of regions with persistently different levels of growth. It discusses this topic in two steps. First, the theoretical concept of knowledge spillovers is outlined by discussing the different types of knowledge, the spatial dimension of knowledge spillovers, and the geographical mechanisms and structural conditions of knowledge diffusion. Second, it analyses the empirical evidence concerning the theoretical propositions.}, language = {en} } @misc{DoeringSchnellenbach, author = {D{\"o}ring, Thomas and Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {A Tale of Two Federalisms: Long-Term Institutional Change in the United States and in Germany}, series = {Constitutional Political Economy}, volume = {22}, journal = {Constitutional Political Economy}, number = {1}, issn = {1043-4062}, pages = {83 -- 102}, abstract = {This paper offers a comparison of government centralization in the United States and in Germany. After briefly laying out the history of federalism in both countries, we identify the instruments of centralization at work. It is argued that an initial constitutional framework of competitive federalism does not prevent the long-term centralization of competencies. Against a background of historical evidence, we discuss the political economics of government centralization. It is argued that formal institutions clearly have an effect on the pathways of government centralization, but not necessarily on the broader trend of centralization. The conclusion is reached that preservation of state and local autonomy may eventually hinge on informal political institutions.}, language = {en} } @misc{FeldSchalteggerSchnellenbach, author = {Feld, Lars P. and Schaltegger, Christoph A. and Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {On Government Centralisation and Budget Referendums: Evidence from Switzerland}, series = {European Economic Review}, volume = {52}, journal = {European Economic Review}, number = {4}, issn = {1873-572X}, doi = {10.1016/j.euroecorev.2007.05.005}, pages = {611 -- 645}, abstract = {Several authors have argued that a centralization of fiscal powers in a federation is less likely to occur if citizens have to approve a change in the assignments of responsibilities by a popular referendum. This outcome may be due to the fact that logrolling is more difficult under direct than under representative democracy. It may also be caused by citizens' fear that a centralization of fiscal authority facilitates the extraction of rents by the government or the legislature. In this paper, we test the hypothesis that centralization is less likely under referendum decision-making in the unique institutional setting of Switzerland. Using a panel of Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998, the empirical analysis provides evidence that referendums induce less centralization of fiscal activities.}, language = {en} } @misc{FeldSchnellenbach, author = {Feld, Lars P. and Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Political Institutions and Income (Re-)Distribution: Evidence from Developed Economies}, series = {Public Choice}, volume = {159}, journal = {Public Choice}, number = {3}, issn = {1573-7101}, doi = {10.1007/s11127-013-0116-4}, pages = {435 -- 455}, abstract = {We discuss the effect of formal political institutions (electoral systems, fiscal decentralization, presidential and parliamentary regimes) on the extent and direction of income (re-)distribution. Empirical evidence is presented for a large sample of 70 economies and a panel of 13 OECD countries between 1981 and 1998. The evidence indicates that presidential regimes are associated with a less equal distribution of disposable incomes, while electoral systems have no significant effects. Fiscal competition is associated with less income redistribution and a less equal distribution of disposable incomes, but also with a more equal primary income distribution. Our evidence also is in line with earlier empirical contributions that find a positive relationship between trade openness and equality in primary and disposable incomes, as well as the overall redistributive effort.}, language = {en} } @misc{FeldSchnellenbach, author = {Feld, Lars P. and Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Fiscal Federalism and Macroeconomic Performance: A Survey of Recent Research}, series = {Environment and Planning - Government and Policy}, volume = {29}, journal = {Environment and Planning - Government and Policy}, number = {2}, issn = {1472-3425}, doi = {10.1068/c1054r}, pages = {224 -- 243}, abstract = {In this paper, we offer both a broad survey of the literature on fiscal federalism and long-run economic performance, and a detailed report of some of our own recent studies in this field. We look at the difference between study types (cross-country versus single-country studies), and at the relevance of the broader institutional framework into which fiscal decentralization is embedded. We also look into structural change and intergovernmental transfers as a detailed mechanism through which federalism may have an impact on aggregate economic performance.It turns out that fiscal decentralization has no robust effect on growth, but the evidence hints at a positive effect on overall productivity, conditional on the broader institutional framework.}, language = {en} } @misc{FeldSchnellenbachBaskaran, author = {Feld, Lars P. and Schnellenbach, Jan and Baskaran, Thushyanthan}, title = {Creative Destruction and Fiscal Institutions: A Long-Run Case Study of Three Regions}, series = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics}, volume = {22}, journal = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics}, number = {3}, issn = {0936-9937}, pages = {563 -- 583}, abstract = {We analyze the rise and decline of the steel and mining industries in the regions of Saarland, Lorraine and Luxembourg. Our main focus is on the period of structural decline in these industries after the second world war. Differences in the institutional framework of these regions are exploited to analyze the way in which the broader fiscal constitution sets incentives for governments either to obstruct or to encourage structural change in the private sector. Our main result is that fiscal autonomy of a region subjected to structural change in its private sector is associated with a relatively faster decline of employment in the sectors affected. Contrary to the political lore, fiscal transfers appear not to be used to speed up the destruction of old sectors, but rather to stabilize them.}, language = {en} } @misc{Gross, author = {Groß, Steffen}, title = {Warum sich {\"O}konomen (wieder) mit Philosophie besch{\"a}ftigen sollten - und Philosophen (wieder) mit {\"O}konomie}, series = {ORDO - Jahrbuch f{\"u}r die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft}, volume = {61}, journal = {ORDO - Jahrbuch f{\"u}r die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft}, issn = {2366-0481}, pages = {75 -- 94}, language = {de} } @misc{Gross, author = {Groß, Steffen}, title = {Auktionsrekorde. Sammler, H{\"a}ndler, Finanziers - Kunst und Markt, Garantien und Kommerz}, series = {Lettre International}, journal = {Lettre International}, number = {112}, issn = {0945-5167}, pages = {102 -- 105}, language = {de} }