@misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Rational Ignorance Is Not Bliss: When Do Lazy Voters Learn from Decentralised Political Experiments?}, series = {Journal of Economics and Statistics}, volume = {228}, journal = {Journal of Economics and Statistics}, number = {4}, issn = {0021-4027}, doi = {10.2139/ssrn.990268}, pages = {372 -- 393}, abstract = {A popular argument about economic policy under uncertainty states that decentralisation offers the possibility to learn from local or regional policy experiments. Often, an analogy between market competition as a discovery procedure and political competition is used to corroborate this argument. We argue that political learning processes are not trivial and do not occur frictionlessly: Voters have an inherent tendency to retain a given stock of policy-related knowledge which was costly to accumulate, so that yardstick competition is improbable to function well particularly for complex issues, if representatives' actions are tightly controlled by the electorate. We show that factor mobility does have the potential to endogenously disturb equilibria on regional markets for political theories, and therefore does provide for improved political learning processes compared to unitary systems. But the results we can expect are far from the ideal mechanisms of producing and utilising knowledge often described in the literature. In particular, collective learning may occur in the relatively efficient region, while the status quo may be fortified in the relatively inefficient region.}, language = {en} } @misc{FeldSchalteggerSchnellenbach, author = {Feld, Lars P. and Schaltegger, Christoph A. and Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {On Government Centralisation and Budget Referendums: Evidence from Switzerland}, series = {European Economic Review}, volume = {52}, journal = {European Economic Review}, number = {4}, issn = {1873-572X}, doi = {10.1016/j.euroecorev.2007.05.005}, pages = {611 -- 645}, abstract = {Several authors have argued that a centralization of fiscal powers in a federation is less likely to occur if citizens have to approve a change in the assignments of responsibilities by a popular referendum. This outcome may be due to the fact that logrolling is more difficult under direct than under representative democracy. It may also be caused by citizens' fear that a centralization of fiscal authority facilitates the extraction of rents by the government or the legislature. In this paper, we test the hypothesis that centralization is less likely under referendum decision-making in the unique institutional setting of Switzerland. Using a panel of Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998, the empirical analysis provides evidence that referendums induce less centralization of fiscal activities.}, language = {en} } @misc{SchnellenbachFeldSchaltegger, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P. and Schaltegger, Christoph A.}, title = {The Impact of Referendums on the Centralization of Public Goods Provision: A Political Economy Approach}, series = {Economics of Governance}, volume = {11}, journal = {Economics of Governance}, number = {1}, issn = {1435-8131}, doi = {10.1007/s10101-009-0063-1}, pages = {3 -- 26}, abstract = {The paper compares decision-making on the centralisation of public goods provision in the presence of regional externalities under representative and direct democratic institutions. A model with two regions, two public goods and regional spillovers is developed in which uncertainty over the true preferences of candidates makes strategic delegation impossible. Instead, it is shown that the existence of rent extraction by delegates alone suffices to make cooperative centralisation more likely through representative democracy. In the non-cooperative case, the more extensive possibilities for institutional design under representative democracy increase the likelihood of centralisation. Direct democracy may thus be interpreted as a federalism-preserving institution.}, language = {en} } @misc{PitsoulisSchnellenbach, author = {Pitsoulis, Athanassios and Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {On Property Rights and Incentives in Academic Publishing}, series = {Research Policy}, volume = {41}, journal = {Research Policy}, number = {8}, issn = {0048-7333}, doi = {10.1016/j.respol.2012.03.005}, pages = {1440 -- 1447}, abstract = {The peer review system in academic publishing performs two important functions by screening a manuscript for its quality, and by helping to further improve an author's work. However, it often fails to perform these functions in a satisfactory manner. We argue that property rights theory can be fruitfully applied to understand these shortcomings, and to develop reform proposals. The present paper discusses the incentive-problems in journal peer review from an institutional economics perspective, arguing that the incentives of both authors and reviewers to fully exploit a manuscript's potential depend on their property rights. Based on this theory of peer review, we argue that the recent proposal of an "as is" review policy combined with increased accountability of referees can be expected to result in a higher efficiency of peer review.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {The Economics of Taxing Net Wealth: A Survey of the Issues}, series = {Public Finance and Management}, volume = {12}, journal = {Public Finance and Management}, number = {4}, issn = {1523-9721}, pages = {368 -- 400}, abstract = {This paper surveys possible motivations for having a net wealth tax. After giving a short overview over the state of wealth taxation in OECD countries, we discuss both popular arguments for such a tax, as well as economic arguments. It is argued that classical normative principles of taxation known from public economics cannot give a sound justification for a net wealth tax. The efficiency-related effects are also discussed and shown to be theoretically ambiguous, while empirical evidence hints at a negative effect on GDP growth. Finally, it is argued that despite of widespread and persistent lobbying for a revitalization of the net wealth tax, this is unlikely to happen due to political economy constraints.}, language = {en} } @misc{BjornskovDreherFischeretal., author = {Bj{\o}rnskov, Christian and Dreher, Axel and Fischer, Justina and Schnellenbach, Jan and Gehring, Kai}, title = {Inequality and Happiness: When Perceived Social Mobility and Economic Reality Do Not Match}, series = {Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization}, volume = {91}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization}, issn = {0167-2681}, doi = {10.1016/j.jebo.2013.03.017}, pages = {75 -- 92}, abstract = {We argue that perceived fairness of the income generation process affects the association between income inequality and subjective well-being, and that there are systematic differences in this regard between countries that are characterized by a high or, respectively, low level of actual fairness. Using a simple model of individual labor market participation under uncertainty, we predict that high levels of perceived fairness cause higher levels of individual welfare, and lower support for income redistribution. Income inequality is predicted to have a more favorable impact on subjective well-being for individuals with high fairness perceptions. This relationship is predicted to be stronger in societies that are characterized by low actual fairness. Using data on subjective well-being and a broad set of fairness measures from a pseudo micro-panel from the WVS over the 1990-2008 period, we find strong support for the negative (positive) association between fairness perceptions and the demand for more equal incomes (subjective well-being). We also find strong empirical support for the predicted differences in individual tolerance for income inequality, and the predicted influence of actual fairness.}, language = {en} } @misc{FeldSchnellenbach, author = {Feld, Lars P. and Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Political Institutions and Income (Re-)Distribution: Evidence from Developed Economies}, series = {Public Choice}, volume = {159}, journal = {Public Choice}, number = {3}, issn = {1573-7101}, doi = {10.1007/s11127-013-0116-4}, pages = {435 -- 455}, abstract = {We discuss the effect of formal political institutions (electoral systems, fiscal decentralization, presidential and parliamentary regimes) on the extent and direction of income (re-)distribution. Empirical evidence is presented for a large sample of 70 economies and a panel of 13 OECD countries between 1981 and 1998. The evidence indicates that presidential regimes are associated with a less equal distribution of disposable incomes, while electoral systems have no significant effects. Fiscal competition is associated with less income redistribution and a less equal distribution of disposable incomes, but also with a more equal primary income distribution. Our evidence also is in line with earlier empirical contributions that find a positive relationship between trade openness and equality in primary and disposable incomes, as well as the overall redistributive effort.}, language = {en} } @misc{FeldSchnellenbach, author = {Feld, Lars P. and Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Fiscal Federalism and Macroeconomic Performance: A Survey of Recent Research}, series = {Environment and Planning - Government and Policy}, volume = {29}, journal = {Environment and Planning - Government and Policy}, number = {2}, issn = {1472-3425}, doi = {10.1068/c1054r}, pages = {224 -- 243}, abstract = {In this paper, we offer both a broad survey of the literature on fiscal federalism and long-run economic performance, and a detailed report of some of our own recent studies in this field. We look at the difference between study types (cross-country versus single-country studies), and at the relevance of the broader institutional framework into which fiscal decentralization is embedded. We also look into structural change and intergovernmental transfers as a detailed mechanism through which federalism may have an impact on aggregate economic performance.It turns out that fiscal decentralization has no robust effect on growth, but the evidence hints at a positive effect on overall productivity, conditional on the broader institutional framework.}, language = {en} } @misc{DoeringSchnellenbach, author = {D{\"o}ring, Thomas and Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {A Tale of Two Federalisms: Long-Term Institutional Change in the United States and in Germany}, series = {Constitutional Political Economy}, volume = {22}, journal = {Constitutional Political Economy}, number = {1}, issn = {1043-4062}, pages = {83 -- 102}, abstract = {This paper offers a comparison of government centralization in the United States and in Germany. After briefly laying out the history of federalism in both countries, we identify the instruments of centralization at work. It is argued that an initial constitutional framework of competitive federalism does not prevent the long-term centralization of competencies. Against a background of historical evidence, we discuss the political economics of government centralization. It is argued that formal institutions clearly have an effect on the pathways of government centralization, but not necessarily on the broader trend of centralization. The conclusion is reached that preservation of state and local autonomy may eventually hinge on informal political institutions.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Wohlwollendes Anschubsen? Liberaler Paternalismus und seine Nebenwirkungen}, series = {Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik}, volume = {12}, journal = {Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik}, number = {4}, issn = {1465-6493}, pages = {445 -- 459}, abstract = {In diesem Papier wird das Konzept des liberalen Paternalismus diskutiert, dessen Vertreter {\"u}berzeugt sind, die Qualit{\"a}t der Entscheidungen von Individuen durch ein effizientes Design der Randbedingungen dieser Entscheidungen verbessern zu k{\"o}nnen. Nach einem {\"U}berblick {\"u}ber die verhaltens{\"o}konomischen Grundlagen des liberalen Paternalismus werden insbesondere seine normativen Grundlagen und politisch-{\"o}konomischen Implikationen diskutiert. Es zeigt sich, dass paternalistische Ans{\"a}tze selbst Entscheidungen h{\"a}ufig verzerren werden und dass eine Verbesserung der Qualit{\"a}t individueller Entscheidungen h{\"o}chst zweifelhaft ist.}, language = {de} }