@misc{PetrykDykaLangendoerfer, author = {Petryk, Dmytro and Dyka, Zoya and Langend{\"o}rfer, Peter}, title = {Sensitivity of Standard Library Cells to Optical Fault Injection Attacks in IHP 250 nm Technology}, series = {Mediterranean Conference on Embedded Computing (MECO 2020)}, journal = {Mediterranean Conference on Embedded Computing (MECO 2020)}, isbn = {978-1-7281-6949-1}, issn = {2637-9511}, doi = {10.1109/MECO49872.2020.9134146}, pages = {4}, language = {en} } @misc{PetrykDykaPerezetal., author = {Petryk, Dmytro and Dyka, Zoya and P{\´e}rez, Eduardo and Mahadevaiah, Mamathamba Kalishettyhalli and Kabin, Ievgen and Wenger, Christian and Langend{\"o}rfer, Peter}, title = {Evaluation of the Sensitivity of RRAM Cells to Optical Fault Injection Attacks}, series = {EUROMICRO Conference on Digital System Design (DSD 2020), Special Session: Architecture and Hardware for Security Applications (AHSA)}, journal = {EUROMICRO Conference on Digital System Design (DSD 2020), Special Session: Architecture and Hardware for Security Applications (AHSA)}, isbn = {978-1-7281-9535-3}, issn = {978-1-7281-9536-0}, doi = {10.1109/DSD51259.2020.00047}, pages = {8}, language = {en} } @misc{PetrykDykaSorgeetal., author = {Petryk, Dmytro and Dyka, Zoya and Sorge, Roland and Schaeffner, Jan and Langend{\"o}rfer, Peter}, title = {Optical Fault Injection Attacks against Radiation-Hard Registers}, series = {Proc. 24th EUROMICRO Conference on Digital System Design (DSD 2021), Special Session: Architectures and Hardware for Security Applications (AHSA), 371}, journal = {Proc. 24th EUROMICRO Conference on Digital System Design (DSD 2021), Special Session: Architectures and Hardware for Security Applications (AHSA), 371}, doi = {10.48550/arXiv.2106.07271}, pages = {7}, language = {en} } @misc{KabinSchaeffnerSigourouetal., author = {Kabin, Ievgen and Schaeffner, Jan and Sigourou, Alkistis and Petryk, Dmytro and Dyka, Zoya and Klein, Dominik and Freud, Sven and Langend{\"o}rfer, Peter}, title = {Stealth attacks on PCBs: an experimental plausibility analysis}, series = {2024 IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (CSR)}, journal = {2024 IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (CSR)}, publisher = {IEEE}, doi = {10.1109/CSR61664.2024.10679465}, pages = {905 -- 912}, language = {en} } @misc{PetrykDykaLangendoerfer, author = {Petryk, Dmytro and Dyka, Zoya and Langend{\"o}rfer, Peter}, title = {Optical Fault Injection Attacks: Single-Mode versus Multi-Mode Laser}, series = {Proc. 33rd Crypto-Day Matters 2021, (2021)}, journal = {Proc. 33rd Crypto-Day Matters 2021, (2021)}, doi = {10.18420/cdm-2021-33-23}, pages = {2}, language = {en} } @misc{PetrykDykaLangendoerfer, author = {Petryk, Dmytro and Dyka, Zoya and Langend{\"o}rfer, Peter}, title = {Laser Fault Injection Attacks against IHP Chips}, series = {Proc. 32. Crypto-Day Matters 2021, (2021)}, journal = {Proc. 32. Crypto-Day Matters 2021, (2021)}, doi = {10.18420/cdm-2021-32-22}, pages = {2}, language = {en} } @misc{PetrykDykaPerezetal., author = {Petryk, Dmytro and Dyka, Zoya and P{\´e}rez, Eduardo and Kabin, Ievgen and Katzer, Jens and Sch{\"a}ffner, Jan and Langend{\"o}rfer, Peter}, title = {Sensitivity of HfO2-based RRAM Cells to Laser Irradiation}, series = {Microprocessors and Microsystems}, journal = {Microprocessors and Microsystems}, number = {87}, issn = {0141-9331}, doi = {10.1016/j.micpro.2021.104376}, language = {en} } @misc{PetrykKabinLangendoerferetal., author = {Petryk, Dmytro and Kabin, Ievgen and Langendoerfer, Peter and Dyka, Zoya}, title = {Horizontal attack against EC kP accelerator under laser illumination}, series = {Electronics}, volume = {14}, journal = {Electronics}, number = {10}, editor = {Kotulski, Zbigniew}, publisher = {MDPI}, address = {Basel}, issn = {2079-9292}, doi = {10.3390/electronics14102072}, pages = {1 -- 21}, abstract = {Devices employing cryptographic approaches have to be resistant to physical attacks. Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) and Fault Injection (FI) attacks are frequently used to reveal cryptographic keys. In this paper, we present a combined SCA and laser illumination attack against an Elliptic Curve Scalar Multiplication accelerator, while using different equipment for the measurement of its power traces, i.e., we performed the measurements using a current probe from Riscure and a differential probe from Teledyne LeCroy, with an attack success of 70\% and 90\%, respectively. Our experiments showed that laser illumination increased the power consumption of the chip, especially its static power consumption, but the success of the horizontal power analysis attacks changed insignificantly. After applying 100\% of the laser beam output power and illuminating the smallest area of 143 µm² , we observed an offset of 17 mV in the measured trace. We assume that using a laser with a high laser beam power, as well as concentrating on measuring and analysing only static current, can significantly improve the attack's success. The attacks exploiting the Static Current under Laser Illumination (SCuLI attacks) are novel, and their potential has not yet been fully investigated. These attacks can be especially dangerous against cryptographic chips manufactured in downscaling technologies. If such attacks are feasible, appropriate countermeasures have to be proposed in the future.}, language = {en} } @misc{PetrykLangendoerferDyka, author = {Petryk, Dmytro and Langendoerfer, Peter and Dyka, Zoya}, title = {Sensitivity of logic cells to laser fault injections : an overview of experimental results for IHP technologies}, series = {IEEE transactions on device and materials reliability}, volume = {25}, journal = {IEEE transactions on device and materials reliability}, number = {3}, publisher = {Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)}, address = {Piscataway, NJ}, issn = {1530-4388}, doi = {10.1109/TDMR.2025.3596380}, pages = {410 -- 423}, abstract = {In this work, we provide an overview of our front-side Fault Injection (FI) experiments with different logic cells manufactured in two IHP BiCMOS technologies using Riscure equipment for laser FIs. We were able to inject faults into different types of cells including standard library cells as well as into two types of radiation tolerant flip-flops. Experimenting with radiation-tolerant flip-flops faults were injected illuminating areas with PMOS transistors in OFF state. We determined the cells areas, which were sensitive to the laser FI attacks. Only few works discussed this aspect in the past determining NMOS transistors as the sensitive part of the logic cells. Knowledge about the areas which are sensitive to the laser FI attacks can be generalized experimenting with other technologies and used in future by designers to implement corresponding countermeasure(s) at the initial stage of chip development.}, language = {en} } @misc{PetrykKabinLangendoerferetal., author = {Petryk, Dmytro and Kabin, Ievgen and Langendoerfer, Peter and Dyka, Zoya}, title = {Case study : horizontal side-channel analysis attack against elliptic curve scalar multiplication accelerator under laser illumination}, series = {2025 IEEE 26th Latin American Test Symposium (LATS)}, journal = {2025 IEEE 26th Latin American Test Symposium (LATS)}, publisher = {Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)}, address = {Piscataway, NJ}, doi = {10.1109/LATS65346.2025.10963958}, pages = {1 -- 4}, abstract = {Devices employing cryptographic approaches have to be resistant to physical attacks. Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) and Fault Injection (FI) attacks are frequently used to reveal cryptographic keys. In this paper, we present a combined SCA and laser illumination attack against an Elliptic Curve Scalar Multiplication accelerator using a differential probe from Teledyne LeCroy. Our experiments show that laser illumination increases the power consumption of the chip, especially its static power consumption but the success of the horizontal power analysis attacks was changed insignificantly. We assume that using a laser with a high laser beam power and concentrating on measuring and analysing only static current can improve the attack success significantly. The horizontal attacks against public key cryptosystems exploiting the Static Consumption under Laser Illumination (SCuLI attacks) are novel and their potential is not investigated yet. These attacks can be especially dangerous against cryptographic chips manufactured in scaled technologies. If such attacks are feasible, appropriate countermeasures have to be proposed in the future.}, language = {en} }