@misc{Drechsler, author = {Drechsler, Martin}, title = {On the cost-effective temporal allocation of credits in conservation Ooffsets when habitat restoration takes time and is uncertain}, series = {Environmental and Resource Economics}, volume = {82}, journal = {Environmental and Resource Economics}, number = {2}, publisher = {Springer Netherlands}, issn = {0924-6460}, doi = {10.1007/s10640-022-00685-y}, pages = {437 -- 459}, abstract = {Tradable permits, or offsetting schemes, are increasingly used as an instrument for the conservation of biodiversity on private lands. Since the restoration of degraded land often involves uncertainties and time lags, conservation biologists have strongly recommended that credits in conservation offset schemes should be awarded only with the completion of the restoration process. Otherwise, the instrument is claimed to fail on the objective of no net loss in species habitat and biodiversity. What is ignored in these arguments, however, is that such a scheme design may incur higher economic costs than a design in which credits are already awarded at the initiation of the restoration process. In the present paper a generic agent-based ecological-economic simulation model is developed to explore different pros and cons of the two scheme designs, in particular their cost-effectiveness. The model considers spatially heterogeneous and dynamic conservation costs, risk aversion and time preferences in the landowners, as well as uncertainty in the duration and the success of the restoration process. It turns out that, especially under fast change of the conservation costs, awarding credits at the initiation of restoration can be more cost-effective than awarding them with completion of restoration.}, language = {en} } @misc{Drechsler, author = {Drechsler, Martin}, title = {Learning coalition formation under an agglomeration bonus : impacts on coalition structure and scheme performance}, series = {Resorce and energy economics}, volume = {83}, journal = {Resorce and energy economics}, publisher = {Elsevier BV}, address = {Amsterdam}, doi = {10.1016/j.reseneeco.2025.101512}, pages = {1 -- 17}, abstract = {Numerous theoretical and empirical studies have demonstrated the potential of coordination incentives like the agglomeration bonus for the establishment of species habitat networks in agricultural landscapes. Less well understood is the social process behind this coordination, and how it affects the performance of the instrument. In the present paper this issue is addressed by simulating the coalition formation between several landowners in a stylized but structurally realistic landscape. Rather than assuming perfectly informed rational decision makers, the landowners are modeled as learning agents. A variety of learning strategies is considered. While these affect the coalition structure they have comparatively little influence on the land-use dynamics and the scheme expenditure, suggesting that knowledge about the details of the coordination process may be less relevant for predicting the performance of an agglomeration bonus. Instead, the performance is shown to mainly depend on the economic settings, such as the spatial correlation of the conservation costs, the spatial distribution of the landowners' properties, and the presence or absence of side payments between the landowners - where the present results largely confirm the results of previous studies. A weak relationship is observed, though, between the average size of the coalitions on the one hand and the ecological scheme performance and scheme expenditure on the other. Confirming previous studies, budget-effectiveness gains of the agglomeration bonus are limited.}, language = {en} }