@misc{PetrykKabinLangendoerferetal., author = {Petryk, Dmytro and Kabin, Ievgen and Langendoerfer, Peter and Dyka, Zoya}, title = {Horizontal attack against EC kP accelerator under laser illumination}, series = {Electronics}, volume = {14}, journal = {Electronics}, number = {10}, editor = {Kotulski, Zbigniew}, publisher = {MDPI}, address = {Basel}, issn = {2079-9292}, doi = {10.3390/electronics14102072}, pages = {1 -- 21}, abstract = {Devices employing cryptographic approaches have to be resistant to physical attacks. Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) and Fault Injection (FI) attacks are frequently used to reveal cryptographic keys. In this paper, we present a combined SCA and laser illumination attack against an Elliptic Curve Scalar Multiplication accelerator, while using different equipment for the measurement of its power traces, i.e., we performed the measurements using a current probe from Riscure and a differential probe from Teledyne LeCroy, with an attack success of 70\% and 90\%, respectively. Our experiments showed that laser illumination increased the power consumption of the chip, especially its static power consumption, but the success of the horizontal power analysis attacks changed insignificantly. After applying 100\% of the laser beam output power and illuminating the smallest area of 143 µm² , we observed an offset of 17 mV in the measured trace. We assume that using a laser with a high laser beam power, as well as concentrating on measuring and analysing only static current, can significantly improve the attack's success. The attacks exploiting the Static Current under Laser Illumination (SCuLI attacks) are novel, and their potential has not yet been fully investigated. These attacks can be especially dangerous against cryptographic chips manufactured in downscaling technologies. If such attacks are feasible, appropriate countermeasures have to be proposed in the future.}, language = {en} } @misc{AssafoLangendoerfer, author = {Assafo, Maryam and Langendoerfer, Peter}, title = {Tool remaining useful life prediction using feature extraction and machine learning-based sensor fusion}, series = {Results in engineering}, volume = {28}, journal = {Results in engineering}, publisher = {Elsevier BV}, address = {Amsterdam}, issn = {2590-1230}, doi = {10.1016/j.rineng.2025.107297}, pages = {1 -- 14}, abstract = {Tool remaining useful life prediction (RUL) is a critical task for predictive maintenance in manufacturing. Common limitations of existing data-driven solutions include: 1) Dependence on tool wear labels which are intricate to obtain on shop floors. 2) High resource requirements, affecting applicability on resource-constrained Internet-of-things devices. 3) Heavy feature engineering. To address these limitations, we present a methodology aiming at accurately predicting RUL without using wear labels, while ensuring implementation efficiency and minimal feature engineering. It involves extracting time-domain features and multiscale features using maximal overlap discrete wavelet transform (MODWT) from three cutting-force sensor signals. Without undergoing any feature selection or dimensionality reduction, the features are fed to machine learning (ML) regression models where they are fused into an RUL decision. For this purpose, one-to-one and sequence-to-sequence regression using random forest (RF) and different long short-term memory (LSTM) networks were used, respectively. The 2010 PHM Data Challenge milling dataset was used for validation. The results highlighted the significant role of sensor fusion in reducing prediction errors and increasing the performance consistency over three test cutters, compared to single sensors. Global interpretations were provided using RF-based feature importance analysis. Our methodology was compared with six existing state-of-the-art works, including different end-to-end deep learning (DL) models using raw data as input, and works coupling heavy feature engineering with DL. The results showed that our methodology consistently outperformed all the comparative methods over the test cutters, despite using fewer sensors, which further proves its competitiveness and suitability in resource- and sensor-constrained environments.}, language = {en} } @misc{KabinLangendoerferDyka, author = {Kabin, Ievgen and Langendoerfer, Peter and Dyka, Zoya}, title = {On the SCA resistance of TMR-protected cryptographic designs}, series = {Electronics}, volume = {14}, journal = {Electronics}, number = {16}, publisher = {MDPI}, address = {Basel}, issn = {2079-9292}, doi = {10.3390/electronics14163318}, pages = {1 -- 15}, abstract = {The influence of redundant implementations on success of physical attacks against cryptographic devices is currently under-researched. This is especially an issue in application fields such as wearable health, industrial control systems and the like in which devices are accessible to potential attackers. This paper presents results of an investigation of the TMR application impact on the vulnerability of FPGA-based asymmetric cryptographic accelerators to side-channel analysis attacks. We implemented our cryptographic cores using full- and partial-TMR application approaches and experimentally conducted evaluation of their side-channel resistance. Our results reveal that TMR can significantly impact side-channel leakage, either increasing resistance by introducing noise or amplifying leakage depending on the part of the design where redundancy was applied.}, language = {en} } @misc{MykytynChitauroDykaetal., author = {Mykytyn, Pavlo and Chitauro, Ronald and Dyka, Zoya and Langendoerfer, Peter}, title = {Channel state information analysis for jamming attack detection in static and dynamic UAV networks - an experimental study}, series = {2025 21st International Conference on Distributed Computing in Smart Systems and the Internet of Things (DCOSS-IoT)}, journal = {2025 21st International Conference on Distributed Computing in Smart Systems and the Internet of Things (DCOSS-IoT)}, publisher = {IEEE}, address = {Piscataway, NJ}, isbn = {979-8-3315-4372-3}, doi = {10.1109/DCOSS-IoT65416.2025.00060}, pages = {322 -- 327}, abstract = {Networks built on the IEEE 802.11 standard have experienced rapid growth in the last decade. Their field of application is vast, including smart home applications, Internet of Things (IoT), and short-range high throughput static and dynamic inter-vehicular communication networks. In this work, we conduct an experimental study on the feasibility of jamming attack detection in static and dynamic vehicular networks by using real-time Channel State Information (CSI) analysis of the communication channel. To set up a communication network between an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and a Ground Control Station (GCS), we utilize the ESP32-S3 modules from Espressif Systems. The configured link is then subjected to experimental testing of the constant jammer impact on the CSI parameters, including individual subcarrier amplitude attenuation, phase shift, temporal variation (jitter) and Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) in static and dynamic conditions. Our study experimentally confirms the feasibility of jamming attack detection through CSI analysis in both static and dynamic communication scenarios.}, language = {en} } @misc{AssafoLangendoerfer, author = {Assafo, Maryam and Langendoerfer, Peter}, title = {Self-organizing map applications for predictive maintenance : a review}, series = {2025 IEEE 8th International Conference on Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems (ICPS)}, journal = {2025 IEEE 8th International Conference on Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems (ICPS)}, publisher = {Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)}, address = {Piscataway, NJ}, isbn = {979-8-3315-4299-3}, doi = {10.1109/ICPS65515.2025.11087894}, pages = {1 -- 7}, abstract = {Machine learning (ML) has proven to be a key enabler of various industrial cyber-physical systems-empowered functionalities, such as predictive maintenance (PdM) in Industry 4.0. Among many ML methods, the scope of this paper is self-organizing map (SOM). SOM has many attractive properties for industry applications (e.g., unsupervised learning, noise robustness). Further, it can yield various tasks (e.g., clustering, dimensionality reduction, health indicator construction, visualization, etc.), rendering it versatile for data-driven PdM, including anomaly detection, fault diagnosis, and prognosis tasks. This paper presents a brief review of the main SOM applications in the PdM field, as well as future research opportunities.}, language = {en} } @misc{KabinLangendoerferDyka, author = {Kabin, Ievgen and Langendoerfer, Peter and Dyka, Zoya}, title = {Impact of thermal effects on cryptographic resilience : a study of an ASIC implementation of the Montgomery ladder}, series = {2025 IEEE 26th Latin American Test Symposium (LATS)}, journal = {2025 IEEE 26th Latin American Test Symposium (LATS)}, publisher = {Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)}, address = {Piscataway, NJ}, isbn = {978-1-6654-7763-5}, doi = {10.1109/LATS65346.2025.10963949}, pages = {1 -- 4}, abstract = {The side-channel attack resistance of hardware implementations of cryptographic algorithms can vary significantly with operating parameters, such as operating voltage, clock frequency, temperature, etc. This study investigates the influence of temperature on the resilience of an ASIC implementation of the Montgomery ladder against SCA. We conducted a series of experiments to evaluate how varying temperature conditions impact the resistance of our ASIC to horizontal attacks. Our results reveal that in contrast to the state-of-the-art approach of increasing the operating temperature, operating under sub-zero temperatures can result in increased vulnerability to side-channel attacks compared to high temperature experiments. We present a detailed analysis of the thermal sensitivity of our ASIC, correlating specific temperature ranges with potential security degradation.}, language = {en} } @misc{PetrykLangendoerferDyka, author = {Petryk, Dmytro and Langendoerfer, Peter and Dyka, Zoya}, title = {Sensitivity of logic cells to laser fault injections : an overview of experimental results for IHP technologies}, series = {IEEE transactions on device and materials reliability}, volume = {25}, journal = {IEEE transactions on device and materials reliability}, number = {3}, publisher = {Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)}, address = {Piscataway, NJ}, issn = {1530-4388}, doi = {10.1109/TDMR.2025.3596380}, pages = {410 -- 423}, abstract = {In this work, we provide an overview of our front-side Fault Injection (FI) experiments with different logic cells manufactured in two IHP BiCMOS technologies using Riscure equipment for laser FIs. We were able to inject faults into different types of cells including standard library cells as well as into two types of radiation tolerant flip-flops. Experimenting with radiation-tolerant flip-flops faults were injected illuminating areas with PMOS transistors in OFF state. We determined the cells areas, which were sensitive to the laser FI attacks. Only few works discussed this aspect in the past determining NMOS transistors as the sensitive part of the logic cells. Knowledge about the areas which are sensitive to the laser FI attacks can be generalized experimenting with other technologies and used in future by designers to implement corresponding countermeasure(s) at the initial stage of chip development.}, language = {en} } @misc{SigourouDykaLietal., author = {Sigourou, Alkistis Aikaterini and Dyka, Zoya and Li, Sze Hei and Langendoerfer, Peter and Kabin, Ievgen}, title = {Revisiting atomic patterns for elliptic curve scalar multiplication revealing inherent vulnerability to simple SCA}, series = {2025 12th IFIP International Conference on New Technologies, Mobility and Security (NTMS)}, journal = {2025 12th IFIP International Conference on New Technologies, Mobility and Security (NTMS)}, publisher = {Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)}, address = {Piscataway, NJ}, isbn = {979-8-3315-5276-3}, doi = {10.1109/NTMS65597.2025.11076762}, pages = {252 -- 258}, abstract = {Elliptic Curve Scalar Multiplication, denoted as kP operation, is the basic operation in all Elliptic Curve-based cryptographic protocols. The atomicity principle and different atomic patterns for kP algorithms were proposed in the past as countermeasures against simple side-channel analysis. In this work, we investigated the resistance of a kP algorithm implemented in hardware using Longa's atomic patterns. We analysed its simulated power trace. We show in the example of our kP implementation for the NIST EC P-256 that the field squaring operations are distinguishable from the field multiplications even if they are performed by the same field multiplier, due to the addressing of the second multiplicand. This inherent vulnerability of atomic patterns can be successfully exploited to reveal the scalar k.}, language = {en} } @misc{PetrykKabinLangendoerferetal., author = {Petryk, Dmytro and Kabin, Ievgen and Langendoerfer, Peter and Dyka, Zoya}, title = {Case study : horizontal side-channel analysis attack against elliptic curve scalar multiplication accelerator under laser illumination}, series = {2025 IEEE 26th Latin American Test Symposium (LATS)}, journal = {2025 IEEE 26th Latin American Test Symposium (LATS)}, publisher = {Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)}, address = {Piscataway, NJ}, doi = {10.1109/LATS65346.2025.10963958}, pages = {1 -- 4}, abstract = {Devices employing cryptographic approaches have to be resistant to physical attacks. Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) and Fault Injection (FI) attacks are frequently used to reveal cryptographic keys. In this paper, we present a combined SCA and laser illumination attack against an Elliptic Curve Scalar Multiplication accelerator using a differential probe from Teledyne LeCroy. Our experiments show that laser illumination increases the power consumption of the chip, especially its static power consumption but the success of the horizontal power analysis attacks was changed insignificantly. We assume that using a laser with a high laser beam power and concentrating on measuring and analysing only static current can improve the attack success significantly. The horizontal attacks against public key cryptosystems exploiting the Static Consumption under Laser Illumination (SCuLI attacks) are novel and their potential is not investigated yet. These attacks can be especially dangerous against cryptographic chips manufactured in scaled technologies. If such attacks are feasible, appropriate countermeasures have to be proposed in the future.}, language = {en} } @misc{SigourouDykaLangendoerferetal., author = {Sigourou, Alkistis Aikaterini and Dyka, Zoya and Langendoerfer, Peter and Kabin, Ievgen}, title = {Atomic patterns : field operation distinguishability on cryptographic ASICs}, series = {2025 IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (CSR)}, journal = {2025 IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (CSR)}, publisher = {Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)}, address = {Piscataway, NJ}, isbn = {979-8-3315-3591-9}, doi = {10.1109/CSR64739.2025.11130154}, pages = {990 -- 995}, abstract = {Scalar multiplication kP is the most frequently attacked operation in Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems (ECC) protocols. To counter simple Side-Channel Analysis (SCA), the atomicity principle and various atomic block constructions have been proposed in the past. In this paper, we demonstrate that binary kP algorithms based on atomic patterns remain vulnerable to simple SCA, due to different energy consumption of the field multiplier while obtaining the second multiplicand for field multiplication or squaring operations. The reasons for this difference are the data-bit as well as the address-bit effects. Please note, this leakage does not depend on the multiplication formula used. We validate this vulnerability through experiments using Longa's atomic patterns, revealing that such leakage significantly compromises the SCA resistance of numerous atomic implementations and facilitates potential key extraction. We conclude by providing some potential solutions to mitigate the revealed vulnerability.}, language = {en} }