@misc{MuellerSpindlerBrueggemannetal., author = {M{\"u}ller, Konrad and Spindler, G. and Br{\"u}ggemann, E. and Gnauk, T. and Koziar, C. and Schwarz, Jaroslav and Cafmeyer, Jan and Maenhaut, W. and Even, A. and Kok, J. and Berner, A. and Ctyroky, P. and Hitzenberger, R. and Galambos, Z. and Tursic, J. and M{\"a}kela, Timo and Laitinen, A. and Acker, Karin and Wieprecht, Wolfgang and Hillamo, Risto and Streit, N.}, title = {The "INTERCOMP 2000" in Melpitz - an EUROTRAC-2 Activity}, series = {Journal of Aerosol Science}, volume = {32}, journal = {Journal of Aerosol Science}, number = {Supplement 1}, issn = {0021-8502}, pages = {1021 -- 1022}, language = {en} } @misc{MuellerPisch, author = {M{\"u}ller, David and Pisch, Marcus Franz Konrad}, title = {Faire Verteilung von Medienerl{\"o}sen im Sport : eine spieltheoretische Analyse am Beispiel der Premier League}, series = {Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung und Praxis}, volume = {77}, journal = {Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung und Praxis}, number = {1}, issn = {0340-5370}, pages = {92 -- 109}, abstract = {Die Bedeutung der zentralisierten medialen Vermarktung von professionellem Sport und Sportereignissen ist stark gestiegen. Im Bereich des professionellen Fußballs ist es {\"u}blich, dass die Ligen ihre Medienrechte zentral vermarkten und dann die Erl{\"o}se an ihre Klubs verteilen. Aus sport{\"o}konomischer Sicht ergibt sich die Frage einer gerechten Aufteilung dieser zentral eingenommenen Erl{\"o}se, die im vorliegenden Aufsatz mittels der kooperativen Spieltheorie beantwortet wird. Am Beispiel der englischen Premier League wird erl{\"a}utert, wie diese Anteile ermittelt werden k{\"o}nnen. Dazu wird eine L{\"o}sung entwickelt, um eine Koalitionsfunktion f{\"u}r eine so große Spielermenge praktisch zu konstruieren. Erg{\"a}nzend wird gezeigt, dass die Gleichverteilung im Fall der Premier League leistungsgerecht ist.}, language = {de} } @misc{MuellerPisch, author = {M{\"u}ller, David and Pisch, Marcus Franz Konrad}, title = {An improper solution to the flood cost sharing problem}, series = {Economic Letters}, volume = {238}, journal = {Economic Letters}, issn = {0165-1765}, doi = {10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111706}, pages = {1 -- 3}, abstract = {A model for sharing the costs of flood damage has recently been proposed in this journal (Abraham and Ramachandran, 2020). The suggested model is correct from a mathematical point of view, but unfortunately lacks economic coherence.}, language = {en} } @misc{PischMueller, author = {Pisch, Marcus Franz Konrad and M{\"u}ller, David}, title = {How cooperative are games in river sharing models?}, series = {Water}, volume = {17}, journal = {Water}, number = {15}, publisher = {MDPI}, address = {Basel}, issn = {2073-4441}, doi = {10.3390/w17152252}, pages = {1 -- 28}, abstract = {There is a long tradition of studying river sharing problems. A central question frequently examined and addressed is how common benefits or costs can be distributed fairly. In this context, axiomatic approaches of cooperative game theory often use contradictory principles of international water law, which are strictly rejected in practice. That leads to the question: Are these methods suitable for a real-world application? First, we conduct a systematic literature review based on the PRISMA approach to categorise the river sharing problems. We identified several articles describing a variety of methods and real-world applications, highlighting interdisciplinary interest. Second, we evaluate the identified axiomatic literature related to TU games with regard to their suitability for real-world applications. We exclude those "standalone" methods that exclusively follow extreme principles and/or do not describe cooperative behaviour. This is essential for a fair distribution. Third, we propose to use the traditional game-theoretical approach of airport games in the context of river protection measures to ensure a better economic interpretation and to enforce future cooperation in the joint implementation of protective measures.}, language = {en} }