@misc{BazartBoneinHokampetal., author = {Bazart, C{\´e}cile and Bonein, Aur{\´e}lie and Hokamp, Sascha and Seibold, G{\"o}tz}, title = {Bahavioural Economics and Tax Evasion: Calibrating an Agent-based Econophysics Model with Experimental Tax Compliance Data}, series = {Journal of Tax Administration}, volume = {2}, journal = {Journal of Tax Administration}, number = {1}, pages = {126 -- 144}, language = {en} } @incollection{HokampSeibold, author = {Hokamp, Sascha and Seibold, G{\"o}tz}, title = {How Much Rationality Tolerates the Shadow Economy? - An Agent-Based Econophysics Approach}, series = {Advances in social simulation : proceedings of the 9th Conference of the European Social Simulation Association}, booktitle = {Advances in social simulation : proceedings of the 9th Conference of the European Social Simulation Association}, editor = {Kaminski, Bogumil and Koloch, Grzegorz}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Berlin [u.a.]}, isbn = {978-3-642-39828-5}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-39829-2_11}, pages = {128}, abstract = {We calculate the size of the shadow economy within a multi-agent econophysics model previously developed for the study of tax evasion. In particular, we analyze deviating behavior depending on the fraction of rational agents which aim to pursue their self interest. Two audit mechanisms are considered within our model, that are, (i) a constant compliance period which is enforced after black market activities of an agent have been detected and (ii) a backauditing method which determines the compliance period according to the particpation rate in the shadow economy within a previously preassigned time interval. We calibrate our simulation with respect to experimental evidence of tax compliance in France and Germany and give estimates for the percentage of selfish agents in these countries. This implies different policy recommendations that may work to fight the shadow economy, tax evasion, and the like.}, language = {en} } @misc{BergerHokampSeibold, author = {Berger, Wolfram and Hokamp, Sascha and Seibold, G{\"o}tz}, title = {Dynamic behavioral changes in an agent-based econophysics tax compliance model. Bomb-crater versus target effects and efficient audit strategies}, series = {Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice}, volume = {36}, journal = {Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice}, number = {1}, issn = {2515-6926}, doi = {10.1332/251569120X15840237292628}, pages = {3 -- 24}, abstract = {We investigate an inhomogeneous Ising model in the context of tax evasion dynamics where different types of agents are parametrised via local temperatures and magnetic fields. Our work focuses on the dynamic behavioural change of agents after an audit which either corresponds to a temporal reduction or enhancement of compliance and is also known under the terms 'bomb crater' and 'target effect', respectively. We analyse this effect for different types of agents: endogenously non-compliant types, agents that have the tendency to copy (non-)compliant behaviour from their social environment, ethical agents with strong endogenous morale attitudes and random types that show large uctuations between compliant and non-compliant behaviour. Each type in uences the overall tax evasion differently, and interestingly, our model predicts that increasing the audit probability can have the counterintuitive effect of increasing tax evasion under certain circumstances. We analyse audit strategies that can suppress this effect and thus contribute to the burgeoning literature on the actual impact of tax audits.}, language = {en} } @misc{HokampSeibold, author = {Hokamp, Sascha and Seibold, G{\"o}tz}, title = {Tax Compliance and Public Goods Provision An Agent-based Econophysics Approach}, series = {Central European Journal of Economic Modelling and Econometrics}, volume = {6}, journal = {Central European Journal of Economic Modelling and Econometrics}, number = {4}, issn = {2080-0886}, pages = {217 -- 236}, abstract = {We calculate the dynamics of tax evasion within a multi-agent econophysics model which is adopted from the theory of magnetism and previously has been shown to capture the main characteristics from agent-based based models which build on the standard Allingham and Sandmo approach. In particular, we implement a feedback of public goods provision on the decision-making of selfish agents which aim to pursue their self interest. Our results imply that such a feedback enhances the moral attitude of selfish agents thus reducing the percentage of tax evasion. Two parameters govern the behavior of selfish agents, (i) the rate of adaption to changes in public goods provision and (ii) the threshold of perception of public goods provision. Furtheron we analyze the tax evasion dynamics for different agent compositions and under the feedback of public goods provision. We conclude that policymakers may enhance tax compliance behavior via the threshold of perception by means of targeted public relations.}, language = {en} }