@misc{BatzLineiroMuesgens, author = {Batz Li{\~n}eiro, Taimyra and M{\"u}sgens, Felix}, title = {A first analysis of the photovoltaic auction program in Germany}, series = {16th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM)}, journal = {16th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM)}, isbn = {978-1-7281-1257-2}, issn = {2165-4093}, doi = {10.1109/EEM.2019.8916472}, pages = {5}, language = {en} } @misc{BatzLineiroMuesgens, author = {Batz Li{\~n}eiro, Taimyra and M{\"u}sgens, Felix}, title = {Evaluating the German PV auction program: The secrets of individual bids revealed}, series = {Energy Policy}, journal = {Energy Policy}, issn = {0301-4215}, doi = {10.1016/j.enpol.2021.112618}, abstract = {Auctions have become the primary instrument for promoting renewable energy around the world. However, the data published on such auctions are typically limited to aggregated information (e.g., total awarded capacity, average payments). These data constraints hinder the evaluation of realisation rates and other relevant auction dynamics. In this study, we present an algorithm to overcome these data limitations in German renewable energy auction programme by combining publicly available information from four different databases. We apply it to the German solar auction programme and evaluate auctions using quantitative methods. We calculate realisation rates and—using correlation and regression analysis—explore the impact of PV module prices, competition, and project and developer characteristics on project realisation and bid values. Our results confirm that the German auctions were effective. We also found that project realisation took, on average, 1.5 years (with 28\% of projects finished late and incurring a financial penalty), nearly half of projects changed location before completion (again, incurring a financial penalty) and small and inexperienced developers could successfully participate in auctions.}, language = {en} } @misc{HoffmannJalboutVillanuevaetal., author = {Hoffmann, Christin and Jalbout, Eddy and Villanueva, Monica and Batz Li{\~n}eiro, Taimyra and M{\"u}sgens, Felix}, title = {Positive and Negative Externalities from Renewable and Conventional Power Plants in the Backyard: The Value of Participation}, series = {SSRN eLibrary}, journal = {SSRN eLibrary}, issn = {1556-5068}, doi = {10.2139/ssrn.4203184}, pages = {1 -- 33}, abstract = {We quantify the net external effects of conventional and renewable electricity generators by analyzing housing prices in their vicinity. Using a Differences-in-Differences approach, we find that (1) wind turbines reduce prices significantly, (2) solar fields have no significant impact, and (3) conventional plants over 1 km away show positive net effects. We set out to explain this result by disentangling the positive local external effects of energy generation, which we measure in terms of local purchasing power and tax revenues. Our results show that the commissioning of conventional power stations results in a significant increase in both purchasing power and business tax income in the vicinity. We thus conclude that significant financial participation of the local public in the development of renewable energy projects, especially wind turbines, could be key to increasing their acceptance and accelerating their expansion.}, language = {en} } @misc{BatzLineiroMuesgens, author = {Batz Li{\~n}eiro, Taimyra and M{\"u}sgens, Felix}, title = {Evaluating the German onshore wind auction programme: An analysis based on individual bids}, series = {Energy Policy}, volume = {172}, journal = {Energy Policy}, issn = {1873-6777}, doi = {10.1016/j.enpol.2022.113317}, abstract = {Auctions are a highly demanded policy instrument for the promotion of renewable energy sources. Their flexible structure makes them adaptable to country-specific conditions and needs. However, their success depends greatly on how those needs are operationalised in the design elements. Disaggregating data from the German onshore wind auction programme into individual projects, we evaluated the contribution of auctions to the achievement of their primary (deployment at competitive prices) and secondary (diversity) objectives and have highlighted design elements that affect the policy's success or failure. We have shown that, in the German case, the auction scheme is unable to promote wind deployment at competitive prices, and that the design elements used to promote the secondary objectives not only fall short at achieving their intended goals, but create incentives for large actors to game the system.}, language = {en} }