@misc{SchnellenbachSchwuchow, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Schwuchow, S{\"o}ren C.}, title = {Die Nationale Industriestrategie 2030: Eine kritische Diskussion}, series = {ORDO : Jahrbuch f{\"u}r die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft}, volume = {70}, journal = {ORDO : Jahrbuch f{\"u}r die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft}, number = {1}, issn = {0048-2129}, doi = {10.1515/ordo-2020-0019}, pages = {340 -- 371}, abstract = {Wir analysieren die Nationale Industriestrategie 2030, die im Februar 2019 vom Bundesministerium f{\"u}r Wirtschaft und Energie ver{\"o}ffentlicht wurde. Bei dieser Strategie handelt es sich um einen Versuch, vertikale Industriepolitik in Deutschland zu st{\"a}rken. Wir argumentieren, dass die theoretische und empirische Rechtfertigung f{\"u}r diese Strategie insgesamt schwach ist. Die vom Bundesministerium f{\"u}r Wirtschaft und Energie (BMWi) vorgeschlagenen Instrumente weisen meist nur eine sehr geringe Passgenauigkeit zur mittelst{\"a}ndisch gepr{\"a}gten deutschen Unternehmenslandschaft auf. Sie stellen Anforderungen an die F{\"a}higkeiten der staatlichen Entscheidungstr{\"a}ger, die in der Realit{\"a}t kaum vorzufinden sind. Eine sinnvolle Alternative w{\"u}rde in einer R{\"u}ckbesinnung auf ordnungspolitische Prinzipien, insbesondere die Gew{\"a}hrleistung einer hohen Wettbewerbsintensit{\"a}t, bestehen.}, language = {de} } @misc{SchnellenbachSchubert, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Schubert, Christian}, title = {Behavioral political economy: A survey}, series = {European Journal of Political Economy}, volume = {40}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, number = {B}, issn = {0176-2680}, doi = {10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2015.05.002}, pages = {395 -- 417}, abstract = {In explaining individual behavior in politics, economists should rely on the same motivational assumptions they use to explain behavior in the market: that is what Political Economy, understood as the application of economics to the study of political processes, is all about. In its standard variant, individuals who play the game of politics should also be considered rational and self-interested, unlike the benevolent despot of traditional welfare economics. History repeats itself with the rise of behavioral economics: Assuming cognitive biases to be present in the market, but not in politics, behavioral economists often call for government to intervene in a "benevolent" way. Recently, however, political economists have started to apply behavioral economics insights to the study of political processes, thereby re-establishing a unified methodology. This paper surveys the current state of the emerging field of "behavioral political economy" and considers the scope for further research.}, language = {en} } @misc{SchnellenbachSchubert, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Schubert, Christian}, title = {A note on the behavioral political economy of innovation policy}, series = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics}, volume = {29}, journal = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics}, number = {5}, issn = {1432-1386}, doi = {10.1007/s00191-019-00625-y}, pages = {1399 -- 1414}, language = {en} } @misc{SchnellenbachSchubert, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Schubert, Christian}, title = {Behavioral Political Economy: Ein neues Forschungsfeld}, series = {Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium : (WiSt)}, volume = {43}, journal = {Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium : (WiSt)}, number = {12}, doi = {10.15358/0340-1650_2014_12_658}, pages = {658 -- 662}, abstract = {Das Forschungsgebiet der Politischen {\"O}konomik kon- zentrierte sich bisher vor allem darauf, das {\"o}konomi- sche Verhaltensmodell rational-eigeninteressierten Handelns auf den Forschungsgegenstand der Politik anzuwenden. Mit der empirischen Verhaltens{\"o}konomik gera- ten aber strikte Annahmen individueller Rationalit{\"a}t zu- nehmend in die Kritik. Dazu kommt, dass die Anreiz- strukturen gerade bei kollektivem Handeln in der Politik nicht daf{\"u}r sprechen, dass Menschen individuellen Aufwand betreiben, um vollst{\"a}ndig rational zu handeln. Deshalb ist die Anwendung verhaltens{\"o}konomischer Ans{\"a}tze auf diesem Gebiet besonders vielversprechend.}, language = {de} } @incollection{SchnellenbachPamp, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Pamp, Oliver}, title = {Finanzpolitik}, series = {Politik und Wirtschaft. Ein integratives Kompendium}, booktitle = {Politik und Wirtschaft. Ein integratives Kompendium}, editor = {Mause, Karsten and M{\"u}ller, Christian and Schubert, Klaus}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Wiesbaden}, isbn = {978-3-658-06476-1}, pages = {267 -- 296}, language = {de} } @misc{SchnellenbachKoehler, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and K{\"o}hler, Ekkehard}, title = {Zur{\"u}ck zum Rubikon: Wie der Primat der Politik in der Eurozone wieder dauerhaft hergestellt werden kann}, series = {Badische Zeitung}, journal = {Badische Zeitung}, number = {23.08.2012}, language = {de} } @misc{SchnellenbachKliemt, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Kliemt, Hartmut}, title = {Pro \& Contra: Sollte Sterbehilfe in Deutschland erlaubt sein?}, series = {Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium (WiSt)}, volume = {47}, journal = {Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium (WiSt)}, number = {4}, issn = {0340-1650}, doi = {10.15358/0340-1650-2018-4-38}, pages = {38 -- 39}, language = {de} } @misc{SchnellenbachFeldSchaltegger, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P. and Schaltegger, Christoph A.}, title = {The Impact of Referendums on the Centralization of Public Goods Provision: A Political Economy Approach}, series = {Economics of Governance}, volume = {11}, journal = {Economics of Governance}, number = {1}, issn = {1435-8131}, doi = {10.1007/s10101-009-0063-1}, pages = {3 -- 26}, abstract = {The paper compares decision-making on the centralisation of public goods provision in the presence of regional externalities under representative and direct democratic institutions. A model with two regions, two public goods and regional spillovers is developed in which uncertainty over the true preferences of candidates makes strategic delegation impossible. Instead, it is shown that the existence of rent extraction by delegates alone suffices to make cooperative centralisation more likely through representative democracy. In the non-cooperative case, the more extensive possibilities for institutional design under representative democracy increase the likelihood of centralisation. Direct democracy may thus be interpreted as a federalism-preserving institution.}, language = {en} } @misc{SchnellenbachFeldSavioz, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P. and Savioz, Marcel}, title = {Gebhard Kirchg{\"a}ssner, 60 Years On}, series = {Public Choice}, volume = {144}, journal = {Public Choice}, number = {3-4}, issn = {1573-7101}, pages = {393 -- 399}, language = {en} } @misc{SchnellenbachFeldBaskaran, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P. and Baskaran, Thushyanthan}, title = {Die deutsche Schuldenbremse - ein institutioneller Fortschritt?}, series = {Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium (WiSt)}, volume = {38}, journal = {Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium (WiSt)}, number = {10}, issn = {0340-1650}, pages = {512 -- 518}, language = {de} } @incollection{SchnellenbachFeld, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P.}, title = {Beg{\"u}nstigt fiskalischer Wettbewerb die Politikinnovation und -diffusion? Theoretische Anmerkungen und erste Befunde aus Fallstudien}, series = {Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik - Festschrift zum 65. Geburtstag von Prof. Dr. Ren{\´e} L. Frey}, booktitle = {Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik - Festschrift zum 65. Geburtstag von Prof. Dr. Ren{\´e} L. Frey}, editor = {Schaltegger, Christoph A. and Schaltegger, Stefan}, publisher = {vdf Hochschulverl.}, address = {Z{\"u}rich}, isbn = {3-7281-2939-1}, pages = {259 -- 277}, language = {de} } @misc{SchnellenbachFeld, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P.}, title = {Das Finanzierungssystem der EU und die Nettozahlerdebatte}, series = {Wirtschaftsdienst}, volume = {87}, journal = {Wirtschaftsdienst}, number = {2}, issn = {0043-6275}, doi = {10.1007/s10273-007-0618-0}, pages = {114 -- 120}, abstract = {Die deutsche Nettozahlerposition innerhalb der EU wird in der {\"o}ffentlichen Meinung h{\"a}ufig kritisch beurteilt. Wie funktioniert das Finanzierungssystem der EU? Worauf l{\"a}sst sich die Auszahlungsstruktur zur{\"u}ckf{\"u}hren? Ist der Nutzen der EU-Mitgliedschaft allein anhand der Zahlungsstr{\"o}me zu messen?}, language = {de} } @incollection{SchnellenbachFeld, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P.}, title = {Political Institutions and Policy Innovations: Theoretical Thoughts and Evidence on Labor Market Regulations}, series = {Democracy, Freedom and Coercion: A Law and Economics Approach}, booktitle = {Democracy, Freedom and Coercion: A Law and Economics Approach}, editor = {Marciano, Alain and Rosselin, Jean-Michel}, publisher = {Elgar}, address = {Cheltenham}, isbn = {978-1-84720-126-3}, pages = {192 -- 220}, language = {en} } @misc{SchnellenbachFeld, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P.}, title = {Mehr Autonomie f{\"u}r die Bundesl{\"a}nder: Ansatzpunkte zu einer grundlegenden Reform der Bund-L{\"a}nder-Finanzbeziehungen}, series = {ifo-Schnelldienst}, volume = {67}, journal = {ifo-Schnelldienst}, number = {1}, pages = {32 -- 36}, abstract = {Lars P. Feld, Universit{\"a}t Freiburg und Walter-Eucken-Institut, Freiburg, und Jan Schnellenbach, Walter-Eucken-Institut, Freiburg, und Universit{\"a}t Heidelberg, formulieren einen Reformvorschlag, der den Finanzausgleich in seiner Gesamtheit deutlich anreizorientierter ausgestaltet.}, language = {de} } @misc{SchnellenbachFeld, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P.}, title = {Effizienzgewinn oder Risiko: Eine Frage der Abw{\"a}gung im Einzelfall}, series = {ifo-Schnelldienst}, volume = {59}, journal = {ifo-Schnelldienst}, number = {24}, issn = {0018-974X}, pages = {13 -- 16}, language = {de} } @misc{SchnellenbachFeld, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P.}, title = {Optionen f{\"u}r eine Reform des deutschen Finanzausgleichs}, series = {Jahrbuch der Juristischen Gesellschaft Bremen}, volume = {13}, journal = {Jahrbuch der Juristischen Gesellschaft Bremen}, pages = {90 -- 109}, language = {de} } @incollection{SchnellenbachFeld, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P.}, title = {Neuordnung der Bund-L{\"a}nder-Finanzbeziehungen: {\"o}konomische Perspektiven}, series = {Verhandlungen des 70. Deutschen Juristentages : Hannover 2014, Bd. 2,1. Sitzungsberichte - Referate und Beschl{\"u}sse}, booktitle = {Verhandlungen des 70. Deutschen Juristentages : Hannover 2014, Bd. 2,1. Sitzungsberichte - Referate und Beschl{\"u}sse}, publisher = {Beck}, address = {M{\"u}nchen}, isbn = {978-3-406-66238-6}, pages = {M11 -- M65}, language = {de} } @incollection{SchnellenbachFeld, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P.}, title = {Demokratische Strukturen und Einbindung in internationale Netzwerke als Voraussetzung f{\"u}r politische Reformen}, series = {Voraussetzungen f{\"u}r grundlegende institutionelle Reformen}, booktitle = {Voraussetzungen f{\"u}r grundlegende institutionelle Reformen}, editor = {Eger, Thomas and Apolte, Thomas}, publisher = {Duncker \& Humblot}, address = {Berlin}, isbn = {978-3-428-12062-8}, pages = {77 -- 115}, language = {de} } @techreport{SchnellenbachFeld, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P.}, title = {Still a Director's Law? The Political Economy of Income Redistribution: Research Report im Auftrag des Institut de Recherches Economiques et Fiscales, Universit{\´e} Aix-Marseille}, publisher = {Univ.}, address = {Heidelberg}, pages = {57}, language = {en} } @misc{SchnellenbachBorchardDoeringetal., author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Borchard, Michael and Doering, Detmar and Freytag, Andreas and Habermann, Gerd and Hagen, Albrecht von der and Hasse, Rolf and Horn, Karen and Kolev, Stefan and K{\"o}ster, Thomas and Roth, Steffen J. and Starbatty, Joachim and Wilde, Martin and Wohlgemuth, Michael}, title = {Wirtschaftsverfassung statt Wirtschaftsregierung, Frankfurter Aufruf f{\"u}r eine ordnungspolitische Weichenstellung in Europa}, series = {Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung}, journal = {Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung}, number = {22.06.2012}, language = {de} } @misc{SchnellenbachBjornskovDreheretal., author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Bj{\o}rnskov, Christian and Dreher, Axel and Fischer, Justina}, title = {Gl{\"u}ck trotz Ungleichheit}, series = {Welt am Sonntag}, journal = {Welt am Sonntag}, number = {27.03.2011}, language = {de} } @incollection{SchnellenbachBaskaranFeld, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Baskaran, Thushyanthan and Feld, Lars P.}, title = {Creative Destruction and Fiscal Institutions: A Long-Run Case Study of Three Regions}, series = {The Two Sides of Innovation: Creation and Destruction in the Evolution of Capitalist Economies}, booktitle = {The Two Sides of Innovation: Creation and Destruction in the Evolution of Capitalist Economies}, editor = {B{\"u}storf, Guido and Cantner, Uwe and Hanusch, Horst and Huttner, Michael and Lorenz, Hans-Walter and Rahmeyer, Fritz}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {New York, NY [u.a.]}, isbn = {978-3-319-01495-1}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-01496-8}, pages = {187 -- 207}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Model Uncertainty and the Rationality of Economic Policy}, series = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics}, volume = {15}, journal = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics}, number = {1}, issn = {0936-9937}, doi = {10.1007/s00191-004-0231-y}, pages = {101 -- 116}, abstract = {This paper examines the process of economic policy-making under conditions of model uncertainty. A median voter model is introduced in which the electorate is uncertain of the policy measures available as well as their respective outcomes and opinion formation is a social process of communication and contagion. Learning from experience is also considered. It is shown that economic policy-making under uncertainty produces novel policy routines, but that a mechanism of efficiently utilising the generated knowledge is missing.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Tax Morale and the Taming of Leviathan}, series = {Constitutional Political Economy}, volume = {17}, journal = {Constitutional Political Economy}, number = {2}, issn = {1043-4062}, doi = {10.1007/s10602-006-0001-y}, pages = {117 -- 132}, abstract = {An explanation for tax morale based upon a simple model of psychological costs that depend on the perceived legitimacy of public policies is introduced. It is shown that empirically observed low levels of tax evasion can be explained even for a risk-neutral taxpayer with such a model. In a discussion of aggregate tax revenue, it is argued that tax revenue as a function of tax rates may differ fundamentally from the notorious Laffer curve. It is then necessary to look at the interaction of formal and informal institutions to predict the nominal tax rates chosen by a revenue maximizer.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Appeasing Nihilists? Some Economic Thoughts on Reducing Terrorist Activity}, series = {Public Choice}, volume = {129}, journal = {Public Choice}, number = {3/4}, issn = {0048-5829}, doi = {10.1007/s11127-006-9029-9}, pages = {301 -- 313}, abstract = {Recent contributions to the economics of terrorism have given contradicting recommendations for campaigning against terrorism, from the proposal to deprive terrorists of their resources to the proposal of raising the opportunity costs of terrorism by increasing the wealth of the affected regions. Within a simple framework which differentiates between the decision to become an active terrorist and the decision to support terrorists and which allows for reciprocal reactions to anti-terrorism policies, it is argued here that undifferentiated deterrence may indeed backfire, but so may an increase of the opportunity costs of terrorism. A very targeted anti-terrorism policy aimed only at active terrorists would then be the most reasonable remaining approach.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {New Political Economy, Scientism and Knowledge: A Critique from a Hayekian Perspective, and a Proposal for an Extension of the Research Agenda}, series = {The American Journal of Economics and Sociology}, volume = {61}, journal = {The American Journal of Economics and Sociology}, number = {1}, issn = {0002-9246}, pages = {193 -- 214}, abstract = {New Political Economy has something very important in common with welfare economics: its focus on static, technical efficiency criteria to judge the rationality of a social, political or economic order. This often leads theorists to perceive their objects of research as well-defined problems to which clear-cut solutions can be found and prescribed as policy proposals, addressed at the policymaker or the democratic sovereign. This perspective frequently excludes important empirical phenomena from the research agenda. Although, for example, certain well-defined informational asymmetries are frequently modeled, fundamental knowledge problems such as ignorance of the true model of the economy are usually ignored. In the present paper, this approach is criticized from a Hayekian point of view, with an emphasis on the problems of "scientism" (i.e., the inappropriate transfer of methods from the natural to the social sciences) and irremediably imperfect knowledge, troubling both the agents in the theoretical model and the theorist. Furthermore, it is argued and illustrated with two examples that an extension of Public Choice's research agenda along Hayekian lines may be fruitful, because it leads to a fresh perception even of such problems that already have been extensively researched within the traditional framework.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {The Evolution of a Fiscal Constitution When Individuals are Theoretically Uncertain}, series = {European Journal of Law and Economics}, volume = {17}, journal = {European Journal of Law and Economics}, number = {1}, issn = {0929-1261}, doi = {10.1023/A:1026389926709}, pages = {97 -- 115}, abstract = {In contrast to the contractarian approach to constitutional economics, we follow Voigt (1999) in assuming that constitutional rules are closely connected to informal institutions and that their evolution is a matter of interest group activity and implicit re-interpretation. We add to this the assumption of theoretical uncertainty of individuals regarding the working properties of constitutional rules. Collective learning processes are considered as the third driving force of constitutional evolution, and at the same time as the source of path-dependencies which allow suboptimal constitutions to persist. Finally, it is argued that direct legislation offers more protection than a written fiscal constitution.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {The Dahrendorf hypothesis and its implications for (the theory of) economic policy-making}, series = {Cambridge Journal of Economics}, volume = {29}, journal = {Cambridge Journal of Economics}, number = {6}, issn = {1464-3545}, doi = {10.1093/cje/bei086}, pages = {997 -- 1009}, abstract = {The sociologist R. Dahrendorf has recently suggested that there is no and there ought to be no convergence of economic policies towards some common ideal model. On the contrary, he states that 'diversity is […] at the very heart of a world that has abandoned the need for closed, encompassing systems'. It is shown in this paper that the Dahrendorf hypothesis is difficult to reconcile with orthodox economic approaches to economic policy-making. A perspective on policy-making that introduces either fundamental uncertainty or endogenous policy preferences or both is, however, shown to be consistent with the Dahrendorf hypothesis.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Tax Morale and the Legitimacy of Economic Policy}, series = {Homo Oeconomicus}, volume = {24}, journal = {Homo Oeconomicus}, number = {1}, issn = {0943-0180}, pages = {21 -- 45}, abstract = {It is proposed that a more accurate prediction of tax evasion activity than in the standard portfolio-choice model can be derived even for risk-neutral individuals if psychological costs are considered. Contrary to earlier models integrating psychological costs they are systematically derived by assuming a relationship between psychological costs, taxpayer satisfaction with public policy and taxes evaded. A formal concept of legitimacy of public policies is introduced and it is shown that legitimacy influences evasion activity.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Public Entrepreneurship and the Economics of Reform}, series = {Journal of Institutional Economics}, volume = {3}, journal = {Journal of Institutional Economics}, number = {2}, issn = {1744-1382}, doi = {10.1017/S1744137407000641}, pages = {183 -- 202}, abstract = {Public entrepreneurship is commonly understood as the outcome of the activities of a Schumpeterian political innovator. However, empirical research suggests that changes to a more efficient economic policy, even if it is known and technically easy to implement, are usually delayed. This is difficult to reconcile with Schumpeterian notions of public entrepreneurship. In this paper, it is argued that the attempt to transfer a Schumpeterian approach to the public sector is fundamentally flawed. Institutional checks and balances that characterise most modern liberal democracies make the strategy of bold leadership an unlikely choice for an incumbent. If change occurs, it occurs normally as a response to the fact that the status quo has become untenable. From a normative point of view, it is argued that if public entrepreneurship nevertheless occurs, it will often be associated with unwanted consequences. A dismantling of formal institutional checks and balances is therefore not reasonable.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Rational Ignorance Is Not Bliss: When Do Lazy Voters Learn from Decentralised Political Experiments?}, series = {Journal of Economics and Statistics}, volume = {228}, journal = {Journal of Economics and Statistics}, number = {4}, issn = {0021-4027}, doi = {10.2139/ssrn.990268}, pages = {372 -- 393}, abstract = {A popular argument about economic policy under uncertainty states that decentralisation offers the possibility to learn from local or regional policy experiments. Often, an analogy between market competition as a discovery procedure and political competition is used to corroborate this argument. We argue that political learning processes are not trivial and do not occur frictionlessly: Voters have an inherent tendency to retain a given stock of policy-related knowledge which was costly to accumulate, so that yardstick competition is improbable to function well particularly for complex issues, if representatives' actions are tightly controlled by the electorate. We show that factor mobility does have the potential to endogenously disturb equilibria on regional markets for political theories, and therefore does provide for improved political learning processes compared to unitary systems. But the results we can expect are far from the ideal mechanisms of producing and utilising knowledge often described in the literature. In particular, collective learning may occur in the relatively efficient region, while the status quo may be fortified in the relatively inefficient region.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {The Economics of Taxing Net Wealth: A Survey of the Issues}, series = {Public Finance and Management}, volume = {12}, journal = {Public Finance and Management}, number = {4}, issn = {1523-9721}, pages = {368 -- 400}, abstract = {This paper surveys possible motivations for having a net wealth tax. After giving a short overview over the state of wealth taxation in OECD countries, we discuss both popular arguments for such a tax, as well as economic arguments. It is argued that classical normative principles of taxation known from public economics cannot give a sound justification for a net wealth tax. The efficiency-related effects are also discussed and shown to be theoretically ambiguous, while empirical evidence hints at a negative effect on GDP growth. Finally, it is argued that despite of widespread and persistent lobbying for a revitalization of the net wealth tax, this is unlikely to happen due to political economy constraints.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Neuer Paternalismus und individuelle Rationalit{\"a}t: eine ordnungs{\"o}konomische Perspektive}, series = {List-Forum f{\"u}r Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik}, volume = {40}, journal = {List-Forum f{\"u}r Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik}, number = {3}, issn = {0937-0862}, pages = {239 -- 257}, abstract = {In den letzten Jahren hat sich ein breiter Literatur strang etabliert, der neue Formen paternalistischer Interventionen vorschl {\"a}gt, um individuelle Entscheidungen zu verbessern, die nicht vollst{\"a}ndig rational sind. Di e Motivation hierf{\"u}r liegt in zahlreichen Verhaltensanomalien und anderen Abweichungen vom Mo dell vollst{\"a}ndiger Rationalit{\"a}t, die von der empirischen Verhaltens{\"o}konomik identifizier t wurden. Der neue Paternalismus zeichnet sich nach seinen Bef{\"u}rwortern dadurch aus, dass er 'libert{\"a}r' ist, da die betroffenen Individuen in die als effizient erachtete Richtung geschubst, aber nicht gezwungen werden. Die M{\"o}glichkeit zu abweichendem Verhalten soll grun ds{\"a}tzlich erhalten bleiben. In diesem Papier wird der neue Paternalismus aus einer ordnung s{\"o}konomischen Perspektive untersucht. Es wird gezeigt, dass wichtige Varianten des neuen Paternalismus mit den ordnungs{\"o}konomischen Steuerungsidealen der Konsumen tensouver{\"a}nit{\"a}t und der B{\"u}rgersouver{\"a}nit{\"a}t kollidieren.}, language = {de} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Does Classical Liberalism Imply an Evolutionary Approach to Policy-Making?}, series = {Journal of Bioeconomics}, volume = {17}, journal = {Journal of Bioeconomics}, number = {1}, issn = {1573-698}, doi = {10.1007/s10818-014-9188-6}, pages = {53 -- 70}, abstract = {This paper argues that an evolutionary approach to policy-making, which emphasizes openness to change and political variety, is particularly compatible with the central tenets of classical liberalism. The chief reasons are that classical liberalism acknowledges the ubiquity of uncertainty, as well as heterogeneity in preferences and beliefs, and generally embraces gradual social and economic change that arises from accidental variation rather than deliberate, large-scale planning. In contrast, our arguments cast doubt on a different claim, namely that classical liberalism is particularly compatible with the evolutionary biological heritage of humans.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Wohlwollendes Anschubsen? Liberaler Paternalismus und seine Nebenwirkungen}, series = {Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik}, volume = {12}, journal = {Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik}, number = {4}, issn = {1465-6493}, pages = {445 -- 459}, abstract = {In diesem Papier wird das Konzept des liberalen Paternalismus diskutiert, dessen Vertreter {\"u}berzeugt sind, die Qualit{\"a}t der Entscheidungen von Individuen durch ein effizientes Design der Randbedingungen dieser Entscheidungen verbessern zu k{\"o}nnen. Nach einem {\"U}berblick {\"u}ber die verhaltens{\"o}konomischen Grundlagen des liberalen Paternalismus werden insbesondere seine normativen Grundlagen und politisch-{\"o}konomischen Implikationen diskutiert. Es zeigt sich, dass paternalistische Ans{\"a}tze selbst Entscheidungen h{\"a}ufig verzerren werden und dass eine Verbesserung der Qualit{\"a}t individueller Entscheidungen h{\"o}chst zweifelhaft ist.}, language = {de} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Nudges and Norms: On the Political Economy of Soft Paternalism}, series = {European Journal of Political Economy}, volume = {28}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, number = {2}, issn = {0176-2680}, doi = {10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.12.001}, pages = {266 -- 277}, abstract = {This paper discusses soft (or libertarian) paternalism, as proposed among others by Thaler and Sunstein (2008). It is argued that soft paternalism should not be understood as an efficiency-enhancing, but as a redistributive concept. The relationship between soft paternalism and social norms is discussed in detail. In particular, it is argued that soft paternalism increases the stability of given social norms, which in turn need not be efficient, nor in the material self-interest of a majority of individuals. Soft paternalism is argued to be an essentially conservative concept of policy-making in the sense that it tends to increase the longevity of status quo social norms.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {A Constitutional Economics Perspective on Soft Paternalism}, series = {Kyklos}, volume = {69}, journal = {Kyklos}, number = {1}, issn = {1467-6435}, doi = {10.1111/kykl.12106}, pages = {135 -- 156}, abstract = {Using a framework that distinguishes short-term consumer preferences, individual reflective preferences and political preferences, we discuss from a constitutional economics perspective whether individuals find it in their common constitutional interest to endow representatives and bureaucrats with the competence to impose soft paternalist policies. The focus is specifically on soft paternalist policies, because these often work with non-transparent 'nudges' that are considered as manipulative in some contributions to the literature. We show that those soft paternalist policies that are manipulative indeed collide with three criteria of consumer sovereignty, reflective sovereignty and citizen sovereignty that can be argued to represent common constitutional interest of citizens. On the other hand, we argue that the set of paternalist policies that is deemed acceptable on the constitutional level is restricted to non-manipulative instruments, and their application as government policies is limited to cases with stable and very homogenous preferences. However, we also argue that competitive markets are capable of supplying many mechanisms that allow individuals to cope with problems in their decision-making processes on a private level.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Verbraucherleitbilder aus {\"o}konomischer Sicht}, series = {Verbraucherleitbilder - Interdisziplin{\"a}re und europ{\"a}ische Perspektiven}, booktitle = {Verbraucherleitbilder - Interdisziplin{\"a}re und europ{\"a}ische Perspektiven}, editor = {Klinck, Fabian and Riesenhuber, Karl}, publisher = {de Gruyter}, address = {Berlin}, isbn = {978-3-11-036339-5}, pages = {53 -- 72}, language = {de} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Path-dependent rule evolution}, series = {Encyclopedia of Law and Economics}, booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Law and Economics}, editor = {Backhaus, J{\"u}rgen G.}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Heidelberg}, doi = {10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_362-1}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Gradualism and Public Entrepreneurship in the Evolution of Formal Institutions}, series = {The Evolution and Design of Institutions}, booktitle = {The Evolution and Design of Institutions}, editor = {Schubert, Christian and Wangenheim, Georg von}, publisher = {Routledge}, address = {London}, isbn = {9-78-0-415-37531-3}, pages = {123 -- 143}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {New Political Economy, Scientism and Knowledge: A Critique from a Hayekian Perspective}, series = {The New Political Economies: A Collection of Essays from Around the World}, booktitle = {The New Political Economies: A Collection of Essays from Around the World}, editor = {Moss, Laurence S.}, publisher = {Blackwell Publishers}, address = {Malden}, isbn = {0-631-23497-7}, doi = {10.1111/1536-7150.00156}, pages = {193 -- 214}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {{\"O}ffentliches Unternehmertum und die {\"O}konomik der Reform}, series = {Innovation zwischen Markt und Staat - Die institutionelle Dynamik wirtschaftlicher Entwicklung}, booktitle = {Innovation zwischen Markt und Staat - Die institutionelle Dynamik wirtschaftlicher Entwicklung}, editor = {Ebner, Alexander and Heine, Klaus and Schnellenbach, Jan}, edition = {1. Auflage}, publisher = {Nomos}, address = {Baden-Baden}, isbn = {978-3-8329-2880-3}, doi = {10.5771/9783845205694-2}, pages = {117 -- 133}, language = {de} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Vertical and Horizontal Reciprocity in a Theory of Taxpayer Compliance}, series = {Developing Alternative Frameworks Explaining Tax Compliance}, booktitle = {Developing Alternative Frameworks Explaining Tax Compliance}, editor = {Alm, James and Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge and Torgler, Benno}, publisher = {Routledge}, address = {London}, isbn = {978-0-415-57698-7}, pages = {56 -- 73}, abstract = {This paper examines the interplay of horizontal and vertical reci- procity in determining the degree of tax compliance. Horizontal reciprocity is of the type that is frequently observed in public goods games, where reciprocally minded taxpayers may respond to non-contributing, strictly sel sh taxpayers by mimicking their sel sh behaviour. Vertical reciprocity is located in the relationship between the taxpayer and her government. Some recent empirical evidence is suggesting that initial cooperation of taxpayers with the scal authorities is not so much the result of positive reciprocity, but rather of a general tendency to obey authorities. Vertical reciprocity is therefore modeled as the propensity of taxpayers to retaliate against an uncooperative government by means of reducing the level of tax compliance. This allows us to identify feedback mechanisms between horizontal and vertical reciprocity.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Unvollst{\"a}ndige Rationalit{\"a}t ist keine hinreichende Begr{\"u}ndung f{\"u}r paternalistisches Eingreifen}, series = {Wirtschaftsdienst}, volume = {94}, journal = {Wirtschaftsdienst}, number = {11}, issn = {1613-978X}, pages = {778 -- 781}, language = {de} } @techreport{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Respektiert eine Politik des weichen Paternalismus die Autonomie individueller Konsumenten? Gutachten im Auftrag von Prometheus - das Freiheitsinstitut gGmbH, Berlin}, publisher = {Fakult{\"a}t f{\"u}r Wirtschaft, Recht und Gesellschaft Lehrstuhl f{\"u}r Volkswirtschaftslehre, insb. Mikro{\"o}konomie}, address = {Cottbus-Senftenberg}, pages = {37}, language = {de} } @book{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Von der Schuldenbremse zur Sparregel: Ans{\"a}tze zu einer regelgebundenen Haushaltskonsolidierung}, publisher = {Liberales Institut}, address = {Berlin}, language = {de} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Herrscht am Markt Gerechtigkeit, wenn alle gleich viel bekommen?}, series = {Schw{\"a}bische Zeitung}, journal = {Schw{\"a}bische Zeitung}, number = {19. Juni 2013}, language = {de} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Haushaltskonsolidierung: Je schneller, desto besser}, series = {Handelsblatt }, journal = {Handelsblatt }, number = {26. M{\"a}rz 2013}, issn = {0017-7296}, language = {de} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Current Issues in Tax Policy in Germany}, series = {Taxation in Europe 2012 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, booktitle = {Taxation in Europe 2012 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, editor = {Garello, Pierre}, publisher = {Institute for Research on Economic and Fiscal Issues}, address = {Paris}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Current Issues in Tax Policy in Germany}, series = {Taxation in Europe 2011 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, booktitle = {Taxation in Europe 2011 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, editor = {Garello, Pierre}, publisher = {Institute for Research on Economic and Fiscal Issues}, address = {Paris}, language = {en} }