@misc{FeldSchalteggerSchnellenbach, author = {Feld, Lars P. and Schaltegger, Christoph A. and Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {On Government Centralisation and Budget Referendums: Evidence from Switzerland}, series = {European Economic Review}, volume = {52}, journal = {European Economic Review}, number = {4}, issn = {1873-572X}, doi = {10.1016/j.euroecorev.2007.05.005}, pages = {611 -- 645}, abstract = {Several authors have argued that a centralization of fiscal powers in a federation is less likely to occur if citizens have to approve a change in the assignments of responsibilities by a popular referendum. This outcome may be due to the fact that logrolling is more difficult under direct than under representative democracy. It may also be caused by citizens' fear that a centralization of fiscal authority facilitates the extraction of rents by the government or the legislature. In this paper, we test the hypothesis that centralization is less likely under referendum decision-making in the unique institutional setting of Switzerland. Using a panel of Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998, the empirical analysis provides evidence that referendums induce less centralization of fiscal activities.}, language = {en} } @misc{SchnellenbachFeldSchaltegger, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P. and Schaltegger, Christoph A.}, title = {The Impact of Referendums on the Centralization of Public Goods Provision: A Political Economy Approach}, series = {Economics of Governance}, volume = {11}, journal = {Economics of Governance}, number = {1}, issn = {1435-8131}, doi = {10.1007/s10101-009-0063-1}, pages = {3 -- 26}, abstract = {The paper compares decision-making on the centralisation of public goods provision in the presence of regional externalities under representative and direct democratic institutions. A model with two regions, two public goods and regional spillovers is developed in which uncertainty over the true preferences of candidates makes strategic delegation impossible. Instead, it is shown that the existence of rent extraction by delegates alone suffices to make cooperative centralisation more likely through representative democracy. In the non-cooperative case, the more extensive possibilities for institutional design under representative democracy increase the likelihood of centralisation. Direct democracy may thus be interpreted as a federalism-preserving institution.}, language = {en} } @misc{FeldSchnellenbach, author = {Feld, Lars P. and Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Political Institutions and Income (Re-)Distribution: Evidence from Developed Economies}, series = {Public Choice}, volume = {159}, journal = {Public Choice}, number = {3}, issn = {1573-7101}, doi = {10.1007/s11127-013-0116-4}, pages = {435 -- 455}, abstract = {We discuss the effect of formal political institutions (electoral systems, fiscal decentralization, presidential and parliamentary regimes) on the extent and direction of income (re-)distribution. Empirical evidence is presented for a large sample of 70 economies and a panel of 13 OECD countries between 1981 and 1998. The evidence indicates that presidential regimes are associated with a less equal distribution of disposable incomes, while electoral systems have no significant effects. Fiscal competition is associated with less income redistribution and a less equal distribution of disposable incomes, but also with a more equal primary income distribution. Our evidence also is in line with earlier empirical contributions that find a positive relationship between trade openness and equality in primary and disposable incomes, as well as the overall redistributive effort.}, language = {en} } @misc{FeldSchnellenbach, author = {Feld, Lars P. and Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Fiscal Federalism and Macroeconomic Performance: A Survey of Recent Research}, series = {Environment and Planning - Government and Policy}, volume = {29}, journal = {Environment and Planning - Government and Policy}, number = {2}, issn = {1472-3425}, doi = {10.1068/c1054r}, pages = {224 -- 243}, abstract = {In this paper, we offer both a broad survey of the literature on fiscal federalism and long-run economic performance, and a detailed report of some of our own recent studies in this field. We look at the difference between study types (cross-country versus single-country studies), and at the relevance of the broader institutional framework into which fiscal decentralization is embedded. We also look into structural change and intergovernmental transfers as a detailed mechanism through which federalism may have an impact on aggregate economic performance.It turns out that fiscal decentralization has no robust effect on growth, but the evidence hints at a positive effect on overall productivity, conditional on the broader institutional framework.}, language = {en} } @misc{FeldSchnellenbachBaskaran, author = {Feld, Lars P. and Schnellenbach, Jan and Baskaran, Thushyanthan}, title = {Creative Destruction and Fiscal Institutions: A Long-Run Case Study of Three Regions}, series = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics}, volume = {22}, journal = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics}, number = {3}, issn = {0936-9937}, pages = {563 -- 583}, abstract = {We analyze the rise and decline of the steel and mining industries in the regions of Saarland, Lorraine and Luxembourg. Our main focus is on the period of structural decline in these industries after the second world war. Differences in the institutional framework of these regions are exploited to analyze the way in which the broader fiscal constitution sets incentives for governments either to obstruct or to encourage structural change in the private sector. Our main result is that fiscal autonomy of a region subjected to structural change in its private sector is associated with a relatively faster decline of employment in the sectors affected. Contrary to the political lore, fiscal transfers appear not to be used to speed up the destruction of old sectors, but rather to stabilize them.}, language = {en} } @misc{BaskaranFeldSchnellenbach, author = {Baskaran, Thushyanthan and Feld, Lars P. and Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Fiscal Federalism and Economic Growth: A Meta-Analysis}, series = {Economic Inquiry}, volume = {54}, journal = {Economic Inquiry}, number = {3}, issn = {1465-7295}, doi = {10.1111/ecin.12331}, pages = {1445 -- 1463}, abstract = {The theoretical literature on the economics of fiscal federalism has identified several potential effects of government decentralization on economic growth. Much of the traditional literature focuses on the efficiency aspects of a decentralized provision of public services. However, decentralization may also increase growth by raising the ability of the political system to innovate and carry out reforms. On the contrary, some authors argue that decentralization increases corruption and government inefficiency. After a discussion of the theoretical arguments, we provide both a traditional survey and a meta-analysis of the empirical literature on decentralization and economic growth. Based on our survey, we identify open questions and discuss possible ways of answering them.}, language = {en} } @incollection{SchnellenbachFeld, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P.}, title = {Beg{\"u}nstigt fiskalischer Wettbewerb die Politikinnovation und -diffusion? Theoretische Anmerkungen und erste Befunde aus Fallstudien}, series = {Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik - Festschrift zum 65. Geburtstag von Prof. Dr. Ren{\´e} L. Frey}, booktitle = {Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik - Festschrift zum 65. Geburtstag von Prof. Dr. Ren{\´e} L. Frey}, editor = {Schaltegger, Christoph A. and Schaltegger, Stefan}, publisher = {vdf Hochschulverl.}, address = {Z{\"u}rich}, isbn = {3-7281-2939-1}, pages = {259 -- 277}, language = {de} } @incollection{SchnellenbachBaskaranFeld, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Baskaran, Thushyanthan and Feld, Lars P.}, title = {Creative Destruction and Fiscal Institutions: A Long-Run Case Study of Three Regions}, series = {The Two Sides of Innovation: Creation and Destruction in the Evolution of Capitalist Economies}, booktitle = {The Two Sides of Innovation: Creation and Destruction in the Evolution of Capitalist Economies}, editor = {B{\"u}storf, Guido and Cantner, Uwe and Hanusch, Horst and Huttner, Michael and Lorenz, Hans-Walter and Rahmeyer, Fritz}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {New York, NY [u.a.]}, isbn = {978-3-319-01495-1}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-01496-8}, pages = {187 -- 207}, language = {en} } @misc{SchnellenbachFeld, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P.}, title = {Das Finanzierungssystem der EU und die Nettozahlerdebatte}, series = {Wirtschaftsdienst}, volume = {87}, journal = {Wirtschaftsdienst}, number = {2}, issn = {0043-6275}, doi = {10.1007/s10273-007-0618-0}, pages = {114 -- 120}, abstract = {Die deutsche Nettozahlerposition innerhalb der EU wird in der {\"o}ffentlichen Meinung h{\"a}ufig kritisch beurteilt. Wie funktioniert das Finanzierungssystem der EU? Worauf l{\"a}sst sich die Auszahlungsstruktur zur{\"u}ckf{\"u}hren? Ist der Nutzen der EU-Mitgliedschaft allein anhand der Zahlungsstr{\"o}me zu messen?}, language = {de} } @incollection{SchnellenbachFeld, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P.}, title = {Political Institutions and Policy Innovations: Theoretical Thoughts and Evidence on Labor Market Regulations}, series = {Democracy, Freedom and Coercion: A Law and Economics Approach}, booktitle = {Democracy, Freedom and Coercion: A Law and Economics Approach}, editor = {Marciano, Alain and Rosselin, Jean-Michel}, publisher = {Elgar}, address = {Cheltenham}, isbn = {978-1-84720-126-3}, pages = {192 -- 220}, language = {en} } @misc{SchnellenbachFeld, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P.}, title = {Mehr Autonomie f{\"u}r die Bundesl{\"a}nder: Ansatzpunkte zu einer grundlegenden Reform der Bund-L{\"a}nder-Finanzbeziehungen}, series = {ifo-Schnelldienst}, volume = {67}, journal = {ifo-Schnelldienst}, number = {1}, pages = {32 -- 36}, abstract = {Lars P. Feld, Universit{\"a}t Freiburg und Walter-Eucken-Institut, Freiburg, und Jan Schnellenbach, Walter-Eucken-Institut, Freiburg, und Universit{\"a}t Heidelberg, formulieren einen Reformvorschlag, der den Finanzausgleich in seiner Gesamtheit deutlich anreizorientierter ausgestaltet.}, language = {de} } @misc{SchnellenbachFeld, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P.}, title = {Effizienzgewinn oder Risiko: Eine Frage der Abw{\"a}gung im Einzelfall}, series = {ifo-Schnelldienst}, volume = {59}, journal = {ifo-Schnelldienst}, number = {24}, issn = {0018-974X}, pages = {13 -- 16}, language = {de} } @misc{SchnellenbachFeld, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P.}, title = {Optionen f{\"u}r eine Reform des deutschen Finanzausgleichs}, series = {Jahrbuch der Juristischen Gesellschaft Bremen}, volume = {13}, journal = {Jahrbuch der Juristischen Gesellschaft Bremen}, pages = {90 -- 109}, language = {de} } @incollection{SchnellenbachFeld, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P.}, title = {Neuordnung der Bund-L{\"a}nder-Finanzbeziehungen: {\"o}konomische Perspektiven}, series = {Verhandlungen des 70. Deutschen Juristentages : Hannover 2014, Bd. 2,1. Sitzungsberichte - Referate und Beschl{\"u}sse}, booktitle = {Verhandlungen des 70. Deutschen Juristentages : Hannover 2014, Bd. 2,1. Sitzungsberichte - Referate und Beschl{\"u}sse}, publisher = {Beck}, address = {M{\"u}nchen}, isbn = {978-3-406-66238-6}, pages = {M11 -- M65}, language = {de} } @incollection{SchnellenbachFeld, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P.}, title = {Demokratische Strukturen und Einbindung in internationale Netzwerke als Voraussetzung f{\"u}r politische Reformen}, series = {Voraussetzungen f{\"u}r grundlegende institutionelle Reformen}, booktitle = {Voraussetzungen f{\"u}r grundlegende institutionelle Reformen}, editor = {Eger, Thomas and Apolte, Thomas}, publisher = {Duncker \& Humblot}, address = {Berlin}, isbn = {978-3-428-12062-8}, pages = {77 -- 115}, language = {de} } @misc{SchnellenbachFeldBaskaran, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P. and Baskaran, Thushyanthan}, title = {Die deutsche Schuldenbremse - ein institutioneller Fortschritt?}, series = {Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium (WiSt)}, volume = {38}, journal = {Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium (WiSt)}, number = {10}, issn = {0340-1650}, pages = {512 -- 518}, language = {de} } @misc{SchnellenbachFeldSavioz, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P. and Savioz, Marcel}, title = {Gebhard Kirchg{\"a}ssner, 60 Years On}, series = {Public Choice}, volume = {144}, journal = {Public Choice}, number = {3-4}, issn = {1573-7101}, pages = {393 -- 399}, language = {en} } @techreport{SchnellenbachFeld, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P.}, title = {Still a Director's Law? The Political Economy of Income Redistribution: Research Report im Auftrag des Institut de Recherches Economiques et Fiscales, Universit{\´e} Aix-Marseille}, publisher = {Univ.}, address = {Heidelberg}, pages = {57}, language = {en} }