A gendered person lives in and creates a gendered body. Through the sexual life of the couple, two gendered bodies come together. In this paper, I draw on case material to illustrate how a multitude of sensations associated with what it feels like to be a man or a woman is aroused, affirmed, and created as one dimension of sexual experience. I suggest that these gender sensations may be organized through the three psychological positions – autistic-contiguous, paranoid-schizoid, and depressive. The movement among all three positions gives different shapes to sensory-based gender experience – each position making its own unique contributions to the qualities of what it feels like to be a man or a woman. In one case, I consider the possibility that gender transformation occurred through an unconscious intersubjective erotic third – the body of the couple – created between the patient and her husband.
They Shall Wear Fringes
(1999)
Psychoanalytic Expertise
(1999)
Psychoanalysis, dissociation, and personality organization reflections on Peter Goldberg's essay
(1999)
In this paper, I consider the feeling of interiority as it evolves within the treatment relationship. A capacity to access and sustain one's interiority reflects a sense of personal solidity within which the validity of subjective process and privacy is taken for granted. When this capacity is relatively undeveloped, individuals rely on the >other< (including the analyst) to help them contact, elaborate, or manage their affective experience. Quite paradoxically, the analyst's active investigation of dynamic or intersubjective process may obfuscate rather than clarify this core difficulty. I suggest two alternative approaches to the treatment situation that stand in some tension and yet also complement each other. One emphasizes the >active< investigation of dynamic and dyadic process, wherein the analyst works interpretively and/or around relational issues. The other is organized around the >interior< dimension of the treatment experience, emphasizing the patient's need to develop or manage her affective process in the relative absence of input from the analyst. Two clinical situations are described, the first illustrating the use of silence with a patient whose difficulties involved affect articulation, and the second involving a patient whose need for affect regulation made her highly dependent on the analyst for soothing.
This paper discusses one family's struggle with domestic violence involving three generations. In this case, coercive negative maternal attributions interacted with parent-to-child projective identification, which resulted in the child's internalization of parental perceptions involving confusion around danger and protection from danger. Projective identification occurs as readily from a parent to a child as from a child to a parent. As is illustrated, when the parent's use of projective identification is excessive, it has severe implications for the whole of the child's psychic development (Lieberman, 1992, 1994, 1997, in press Seligman 1993, 1995, this issue Silverman, Lieberman, and Pekarsky, 1997).
Freud's characterization and dismissal of the >symbolic dream interpreting< of his time – his idiosyncratic distinction between that metaphoric form of interpretation and what he called the >scientific< mode, and his subsequent asymmetrical focusing on the latter – seriously skewed his presentation of the nature and history of the Western dream tradition. It obscured the facts that an old theory regarded the dream as the unmasker of the hidden psychic life and that a venerable hypothesis that it could bring to light licit and illicit unconscious desires had not been forgotten by Freud's fin de siècle contemporaries. For many years, his injunction against the use of symbolism, except in the case of the sexual, had an inhibiting effect on psychoanalysts’ free use of manifest dream interpretation.
Developmental Metaphors: The Dialectic of Perception and Creation in the Construction of a Novel
(1999)
Freud, Religion, and Science
(1999)
The author situates the development of Ogden's clinical theory over the past 20 years within a philosophic scheme. Ogden (1986, 1989), in using Hegel to deconstruct the Cartesian objectivist assumptions of classical psychoanalysis, goes beyond Hegel to create in Subjects of Analysis (1994) a new synthesis that is similar to aspects of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of intersubjectivity. This regrounding allows for the introduction of the analyst's prereflective and sensuous experience through reverie in the cocreation of an intersubjective >third.< The author illustrates how Ogden's solution to the problem of alterity transcends the debate over one-person versus two-person psychologies by producing a truly dialectical, postclassical psychoanalytic theory of intersubjectivity that is neither a one- nor a two-person psychology.
This paper develops a Bakhtinian dialogical perspective on the psychoanalytic discourse in general and on the concepts of true and false selves (Winnicott, 1960b) in particular. Bakhtin's assumptions about the origins of dialogicality in children's development are compared to Winnicott's ideas about the origins of true- and false-self processes. This comparison leads to a characterization of the false and true selves as different genres of the narrated self – the epic and the novel – each with its specific configurations of experience and temporality. Moreover, psychoanalysis is conceived as a unique phenomenon that centers on the internal and most of the time simultaneous dialogues that take place in each of the two participants. This perspective underscores the impact of the analyst's subjectivity on the analytic process as well as the multiplicity of the patient's and the analyst's selves. In this context, therapeutic change can be seen most of the time as a transformation of genre and not necessarily as a modification of contents. Free association allows for the transgression of the basic rules of narrativity, thus facilitating a generic shift. A dialogical relation between the openness of free association and narrativity's coherence is suggested. Life by its very nature is dialogic. To live means to participate in dialogue [Bakhtin, 1963, p. 293]. A word like >self< naturally knows more than we do [Winnicott, 1960a, p. 158].
Promises, promises.
(1999)
In the last decade Bowlby's ideas on attachment have been taken up with tremendous flourish within psychoanalysis in general and by feminists, journalists, and politicians. This paper explores this new turn and suggests some historic reasons for the convergence between feminist ideas, politics, and attachment theory. While welcoming the wider dissemination of an attachment paradigm, it cautions against the too easy uptake of ideas that may be less than congruent with the fundamental challenge that attachment theory poses for conventional psychoanalytic models of the mind.
I take this occasion to reflect on the relation between the flourishing attachment tradition established by Bowlby's work and the psychoanalytic tradition. I want to show how Bowlby's virtual expulsion from mainstream psychoanalysis in the early 1960s makes some sense in terms of the history of psychoanalytic ideas, as he was several steps ahead of his own time. I then consider the ways in which other major psychoanalytic authors, W.R.D. Fairbairn and Hans Loewald, as well as the American psychiatrist Harry Stack Sullivan, struggled with the same problems Bowlby did. There is now a marked receptivity among psychoanalysts to the same ideas that earned Bowlby his place, along with Fairbairn and Sullivan, in the psychoanalytic Gulag. Finally, I consider the way in which an integration of these different angles on the same phenomena can be helpful both conceptually and clinically.