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It is well known that Foulkes acknowledged Karl Mannheim as the first to use the term `group analysis'. However, Mannheim's work is otherwise not well known. This article examines the foundations of Mannheim's sociological interest in groups using the Frankfurt School (1929-1933) as a start point through to the brief correspondence of 1945 between Mannheim and Foulkes (previously unpublished). It is argued that there is close conjunction between Mannheim's and Foulkes's revision of clinical psychoanalysis along sociological lines. Current renderings of the Frankfurt School tradition pay almost exclusive attention to the American connection (Herbert Marcuse, Erich Fromm, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer) overlooking the contribution of the English connection through the work of Mannheim and Foulkes.
The aim of the study was to illuminate, from video recorded sequences, interactions between individuals with dementia and aggressive behaviour and caregivers who reported problems dealing with such behaviour and caregivers who did not. Nine caregivers and two residents participated. The video recordings were later transcribed into text and analysed by using a phenomenological hermeneutic approach, inspired by Ricoeur's philosophy. The main themes that emerged from the analysis were >Being involved and developing a positive interaction< and >Being confined to routines and remaining in negative interaction<. The findings indicated the interactions either to be in a positive or negative spiral. Caregivers who had reported problems dealing with behavioural and psychiatric symptoms in dementia focused on accomplishing the task, where the main focus was on >the goal itself<. In other sequences with caregivers who had been satisfied with their capability the focus was placed on >how< the caregivers could reach their goal. Power was central in the material, in different ways, either as a possible way to handle the situation or as a possible way of defending oneself. Parts of Kitwood's framework and Fromm's theory about power >over< and power >to<, has been used in the comprehensive understanding. Our conclusion is that caregivers should use power 'to' when they have to help persons with dementia and aggressive behaviour, as a part of behavioural and psychiatric symptoms of dementia, for being able to give help in the best possible way. They should also act in a sensitive and reflective manner, with the individual in focus.
This article examines the origins and early development of psychoanalytically inspired psychohistory from the late 1950s to the early 1970s. It focuses on Erik H. Erikson, Bruce Mazlish, and Robert Jay Lifton and illustrates their contributions to psychoanalytic psychohistory. Erikson, Mazlish, and Lifton were core members of the Wellfleet group, a research project originally funded by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1965 to conceptualize the foundation of psychohistory. The article gives an account of the early history of the Wellfleet group and argues for specific historical reasons to explain why psychoanalytic psychohistory emerged on the East Coast of the United States in the late 1950s and early 1960s. A critique of the Wellfleet group in unpublished correspondence of Erich Fromm and David Riesman is also discussed.
본 논문에서는 여성의 자아구조에 대한 접근을 여성의 심리 내지 성격에 대한 접근으로 시도되었다. 여성의 자아구조를 논의함에 있어서 프로이트를 위시하여 융, 아들러와 같은 정신의학자들은 물론 여성심리학자로 하는 호나이와 같은 여성심리학자들 조차 여성의 자아구조를 논의함에 있어서 남성을 염두에 둔 생물학적인 측면을 지나치게 강조한 면이 지적되었다. 그러므로 여성의 자아와 정신구조에 대한 이해는 시대와 문화에 따라 크게 달라지는 것임으로 생리적이고 심리적인 측면만으로 단순화해서는 곤란하다는 것이다. 그리고 남성과 여성과의 관계 속에서 검토되어야 할 필요성이 지적되었다. 그러므로 본 연구에서는 종전의 ‘남성 아니면 여성’이란 식으로 여성을 논할 것이 아니라 궁극적으로는 인간으로서의 여성론이 전개되어야 할 것을 강조하면서 여성의 자아에 대한 심리학적 측면을 연구함에 있어서도 여성의 생리적, 심리적 측면 이외에 사회적, 역사적 측면을 고려하여야 함을 강조하였다.
When we talk about the >quality of life< (QOL) we should inquire just into the >quality< of human life. Generally speaking, a qualitative thing includes something original that has no substitute. Each person's existence is an irreplaceable life, and it has a unique value. QOL is a subject about the qualitative values of human life. The pursuit of QOL is the pursuit of a >healthy< human life or >happiness.< E. Fromm said that a person represents the whole human being, and that an individual is a physico-spiritual totality. He also said that the goal of a person in life is to be himself. According to Fromm, the fundamental human desire aims to conquer >existential dichotomies,< such as >life and death,< >solidarity and aloneness.< Everyone shows one's answer depending on his/her character or personality. Only a >productive character< can get happiness through its answer. That is the basic attitude by which >human nature< and >individuality< are brought into full play at the same time. Such a person gropes for a >sane society<. And such a society ought to bring up sound persons. QOL as elements of a living environment are useful as conditions for happiness. However, the most important thing is the >quality< of each one's life itself. This kind of QOL is shown by the basic attitude as >personality.< A person who lives a well-filled life has a high quality of life. The scale of quality of life as the standard common to human beings is >human nature,< which is also the foundation of human equality. This is the >basis< of human rights. And each person will be the judge of the matter connected with >happiness<, making use of the activation of individuality. So, medical persons should not confuse QOL and >social usefulness!< Medical preference order is not a problem of QOL but purely a problem of medical technique.
This article discusses Sándor Ferenczi’s contributions to the evolution of psychoanalytic theories, and how these ideas were passed through the generations. Ferenczi introduced such concepts as greater activity by the psychotherapist, the need for emotional connection between the therapist and client, the significance of the interpersonal aspects of the therapeutic experience, and the place of empathy within the therapeutic milieu. The second generation reviewed here is the Neo-Freudian, including Andras Angyal, Izette deForest, Erich Fromm, Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, Karen Horney, Harry Stack Sullivan, and Clara Thompson. The next generation reviewed is that of the foremost humanistic psychologists, Abraham Maslow, Rollo May, Carl Rogers, and James Bugental.
Einleitung
(2003)
Introducción
(2003)
Préface
(2003)
Foreword (Farsi)
(2003)
The article explores the romantic face of cannibalism where the act of devouring human flesh is deconstructed as the ultimate expression of love. It focuses on the issue of love cannibalism and the romanticised myth of the loving cannibal which has been functioning as a successful cultural metaphor since the 1990s. The article sets love cannibalism in the broader context of necrophilia, understood both in terms of a sexual disorder and a morbid fascination with the subject of love in death, Finally, it compares the romantic representation of cannibalism in contemporary texts to the similarly romantic depiction of AIDS, the infection which is treated as equivalent with taking control of the lover's body. The core of the article is the discussion of two criminal cases – Jeffrey Dahmer's and Issei Sagawa's – which serve to illustrate the relationship between love cannibalism and necrophilia. The argument is further expanded to examine various representations of necrophilia and love cannibalism in contemporary literature and film.
在目前我国改革开放和现代化建设过程中,存在着人性发展与制度创新的矛盾,表现为两个方面:体制创新先行与人性发展水平低下的矛盾;人性发展进步与制度创新滞后的矛盾。一方面,社会主义市场经济体制在我国确立以后,已经初步建立起了相应的制度、体制与相关机制,但是权大于法、情大于理、>关系<大于能力等现象依然存在;另一方面,随着社会主义市场经济体制取代传统计划经济体制,独立、自主、个性、民主、人权、平等、利益、能力、理性、创新、竞争等观念已经潜入人心,但是相对滞后的制度创新给逐步走向成熟的市场主体的积极性、主动性和创造性以极大的挫伤。在这两对矛盾中,主要矛盾是人性发展进步与制度创新滞后之间的矛盾,因为社会主义市场经济已经建立多年,人的主体意识不断增强,但是我们的产权制度、分配制度、管理制度、干部人事制度以及教育制度等都还保留着浓厚的传统计划体制的痕迹,严重束缚了人的创造精神和聪明才智的发挥。因此,人性发展进步与制度创新滞后的矛盾就是本文所要着手解决的重点问题。要解决这一问题,内在要求本文确立以下几种研究方法:唯物史观的方法论、价值原则与科学原则的统一、逻辑分析与历史考察的一致、批判原则与建构原则并用、贯彻主客体统一的历史辩证法。 本文指出,要解决人性发展进步与制度创新滞后的矛盾,根本的出路在于制度创新。那么如何进行制度创新?当代中国制度创新的总体路向是什么?一般而言,制度创新的过程是这样的:理念创新先行,以理论创新为支撑,以人与制度的矛盾为动力,按照价值性与科学性统一的原则,对那些不适合人性发展要求的部分进行调整和完善,从而达到人与制度的和谐发展。就当代中国制度创新而言,应当确立>利益<、>能力<、>理性<、>自立<等理念,以>能力本位<理论为支撑平台,并根据当代中国人性发展的总体要求及其发展趋势,构建出当代中国制度创新的整体框架。我们认为,随着社会主义市场经济的建立和完善,我国人性发展的总体水平已经取得了很进步,但是还只是处在刚刚走出人的依赖、正在进入物的依赖的阶段,是人的依赖关系与物的依赖关系的共时态存在状态。但是,其发展的总体趋势是:追求利益、崇尚能力、提倡理性、主张自立。所以当代中国的制度创新就是从制度上确立>能力本位<核心理念的实现,在产权、用人、分配、管理、教育等制度上将责权利落实到每个人身上,从而在根本上能保证和鼓励人充分正确发挥各种能力。 在分析和解决问题的过程中,本文获得了以下几点学术创新。第一,关于马克思>人与制度<思想的整理研究。本文系统整理了马克思在各个时期研究>制度与人<的理论成果,提出了>制度是个人交往的产物<、>制度为人而存在人是制度的目的<、>从人的交往活动的变迁理解制度变迁<是马克思关于>制度与人<研究的思想结晶。第二,关于人性发展的基本规律。本文从人的对象化这个命题出发,认为人性发展的过程就是人的对象化过程,并按照从个体到类的原则提出了人性发展的四个规律,即主客体相互建构规律、社会塑造与主体自觉建构相统一规律、类特性发展与个体人性发展辨证统一规律、人性发展在不同时期侧重于人性不同方面的规律。第三,关于人性发展与制度安排、制度创新之间的辨证关系以及匹配性规律。本文提出人性发展与制度安排之间是在实践的基础上相互影响、相互渗透的辨证统一的关系。一方面,制度安排源自人的行为和实践活动,人是制度安排的主持者,制度安排表现为人的作品,没有人及其交往活动,也就没有制度安排:另一方面,制度安排作为一种人的本质对象化的观念性存在,它的结构、规律以及它在历史中长期形成的各种关系和惯性等,又制约着人的活动,成为人的实践活动的构成机制。人性发展和制度安排之间存在着的内在的必然联系,可表述为制度安排一定要与人性发展状况(水平和发展要求)相匹配的规律。这一规律的内容就是:人性发展在相互作用中占据主导地位,制度安排是否应当进行创新以及创新的方向,取决于人性发展的状况;制度安排对人性发展具有反作用,制度安排之适合或不适合于人性发展,对于人性发展起着促进或阻碍作用。 本文在行文的过程中主要思路如下:第一部分是历史考察,回顾了西方近代哲学家霍布斯、卢梭、黑格尔等人的观点,挖掘了马克思>制度与人<的思想,并分析了现代西方人本主义代表海德格尔、萨特。马尔库塞和弗洛姆等人对资本主义制度下人的发展状况的揭露。第二部分是理论研究,从实践的观点出发,分析了人的本质、人性的基本特征及其发展的一般规律,并从人学的角度阐释了制度的本质、制度创新及其基本规律。在此基础上,重点剖析了人性发展与制度安排、制度创新在实践基础上的辩证统一关系,提出了>制度安排一定要与人性发展状况相匹配的规律<。第三部分是实践分析,总结了传统计划经济体制下制度设计与人性发展的矛盾以及社会主义市场经济体制对人性发展的双重作用,考察了当前我国人性发展的现实状况及其发展要求,并提出了当代中国制 […]
The author underscores the importance of Slochower's and Grand's papers on the misdemeanors and crimes committed by psychoanalysts during their clinical work. Both authors are described as being courageous in exploring the realm of analysts' secrets, small misdemeanors, and crimes as a valuable source of collecting and processing countertransference material. Instead of looking at every self-involved activity as a theft from the patient, the author suggests that an analyst may have to retreat to self-enclosed activities in order to be fully present for the patient. At the same time, the kind of activity in which an analyst is engaged while listening to a patient may encapsulate and foreshadow crucial aspects of the transference–countertransference dynamic.
All understanding is context dependent, and one of the most significant contexts for clinical purposes is the self-state. How we understand the other, and ourselves, depends on the state(s) we occupy. Dissociations between an analyst's self-states can, therefore, limit or impede understanding of the analysand by depriving the analyst of a fitting context within which to grasp what the analysand says and does. Clinical understanding may require the breach of such dissociations. I lay out some of the implications of thinking about transference and countertransference along these lines, with detailed examples illustrating the consequences of the analyst's dissociations and their eventual resolutions. Among the advantages of this way of thinking is that it amounts to a psychoanalytic account of the hermeneutic circle.
Current understanding of the process of therapy and development focuses on the interactions between the partners. The interaction is a negotiation of differences and of change. The equilibrium of the relationship is inevitably subject to frequent destabilizations, by virtue of normal developmental processes, life events such as losses, and the divergence of aims as each process unfolds. The destabilizations are pivotal to the creation of new states. If a newly emerging state is to be advantageous for the development of the infant or the health of the patient, the associated toxic affects have to be tolerated and dealt with openly. If the analyst defensively hides, opportunities for change will be lost and the old patterns will persist. The therapist and patient, like the parent and child, are engaged together in this mutually altering process.
Despite a burgeoning literature on major analytic boundary violations, there has been little investigation of what might be called analytic delinquencies or misdemeanors – the small and virtually ubiquitous ways in which analysts deliberately withdraw from the therapeutic endeavor. I consider the impact of professional misdemeanors on patient and analyst and compare both with more serious analytic >crimes< and enactments. Professional delinquencies may reflect a therapeutic reenactment, an expression of the analyst's split-off or disavowed need, or an unconscious attempt to self-regulate or to negotiate space within the constraints of the treatment setting. Because the professional ideal leaves so little room for the analyst's humanity, it is often difficult for us to address and work with evidence of our own need when it clashes with what we regard as the analytic contract.
I respond to two key issues raised by Bernstein and Frankel. One concerns the complex and potentially useful impact of misdemeanors on the treatment process. Without, however, minimizing this dimension of misdemeanors, I focus instead on how we deal with instances when we fail our patients by deliberately placing our own needs ahead of theirs. Bernstein raises the possibility that we are most likely to commit misdemeanors when we embrace an idealized Winnicottian model. I disagree, suggesting that all theoretical positions exclude some aspect of the analyst's personhood. Ultimately, we cannot escape the conflict between the analytic ideal and the reality of our nonideal humanity.
Review Ethel Spector Person (Ed.): On Freud's >Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego,<
(2003)
The emergence of an American middle school of psychoanalysis. Commentary on Karen Rosica's paper
(2003)
Foucault challenged the unified, the foundational, and the codified system of knowledge because he believed that the epistemological privilege attached to >scientific< theory lead to a dominating discourse. This occurs, Foucault believed, not only through social institutions, but also through the language, rituals, and practices of ordinary communicative experiences, which are vehicles for the subtle domination of knowledge and all knowledge serves power and the dominant hierarchy. Engaging with Foucault, I challenge some traditional psychoanalytic views and indicate how the psychoanalytic discourse contributed to the shaping of female sexuality. Using a >genealogical< approach such as Foucault considered, I trace some of the historical factors as well as the Zeitgeist for women that shaped early psychoanalytic views. I offer, as well, challenges to Foucault's position because I maintain the relevance of truth claims for the advancement of a psychoanalytic theory of mind and behavior. Such claims, however, need to be held lightly, subject, as they inevitably are, to revision through the acquisition of new knowledge. I present the attachment system as a contrast, as well as an addition to some traditional theorizing, thereby expanding our notions of early development and its interdependent base. I especially challenge the concept of early-stage symbiosis and its role in limiting and constraining women's lives. In this article I focus primarily on the power relations that have shaped female sexuality and have influenced our knowledge and understanding of female development. I challenge some normative views. Such a challenge to normativity is consistent with Foucault's entire intellectual journey, as his biographer comments (Eribon, 1991). My vision includes a conviction about the importance of theory construction and its development, and it proceeds from my focus on research data about the organization of mind and the nature of early bonding. I structure my presentation of female sexuality around the inclusion of such knowledge. I concede that as I upend an old >truth< about the developmental line of female sexuality, I am establishing a new one that will need future interrogation. My hope is that the new narrative will offer another perspective to our view of female sexuality.
The Schizophrenic Person and the Benefits of the Psychotherapies – Seeking a PORT in the Storm
(2003)
Reciprocal and Evoked Developmental Changes in Patient and Analyst: Shifting Sands of Influence.
(2003)
This discussion compares Pizer's concept of >relational (k)nots< with >crunches< and double bind impasses. It argues that all of these constructs capture what happens when conventional analytic method – the exploration, elucidation, and interpretation of transference – fails to work. In this context a >last-ditch effort< emerges, a necessary crisis of treatment. The situation is a plea that something must occur >now or never< or the >charade of therapy is over.< This plea is extraordinarily challenging since it embodies contradictory elements wherein the patient's very call for involvement with the analyst is embedded in a process that obfuscates their connection. Notably this sets the stage for the >damned if one ‘gets it’ and damned if one doesn't< experience that is a part of the paradox of recognition/mis-recognition that befuddles many analyses. Extrication from such impasses requires the analyst's recognition that she is colluding in a kind of avoidance or distraction from recognizing their disconnection. Her second act involves meta-communication about their process. That is how their >relational knot< both binds them together while negating their connection. While this observation may be necessary it is recognized as insufficient on its own. Thus her third move out of the impasse requires her to enter into a state of improvisation. That is, to use some part of herself that must surrender from the one-up one-down impasse position of >either your version of reality or mine.< Instead, she must cultivate through her action a third way in which both she and her patient can think about their impasse and do something about it, including something different from what either one might have imagined before.