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The subject matter of identity belongs to the orthodox psychoanalytic movement. For about the last 15 years, the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA) has successfully tried to facilitate research and to promote projects. If the resistance of influential analysts against empirical investigation decreases further, >psychoanalytic movement< and its unfavourable concomitants will be a thing of the past. The development to a scientific community will no longer be hampered by controversies over professional identity. – The psychosocial dimension and its normative implications put the concept of identity into question. Instead the author suggests that we speak of a psychoanalytic attitude. This professional self is closely connected to the personal self. It is however, necessary to separate the method from the person. For a long time the genealogy of the training analyst determined the membership in the ever-growing family of psychoanalysts. There have been black sheep right from the beginning. Dissidents, therefore, belong to the history of Psychoanalysis. The official acceptance of pluralism within the IPA invites comparisons between the various schools according to scientific criteria. The methodology of modern psychoanalytic process and outcome research provides principles for writing treatment reports. Group identities in their dogmatic aspects are detrimental for the future of psychoanalysis. The message of the paper is to express the hope that a critical eclecticism might replace psychoanalytic schools.
Following Ferenczi's tradition of examining the dynamics between analyst and analysand, I will explore aspects of this relationship particularly around issues of mutuality versus inequality, all occurring without the conscious involvement of either participant. I propose that these issues of attachment can be further illuminated by examining the underlying neuropsychobiological processes. Case examples will be offered to illustrate these points.
This paper is a continuation of the author's thoughts on Ferenczi as >the mother< and his capacity to identify with women, as expressed in previous work from 1989, 1991, and 1997, and it revisits Hoffer's now widely quoted sobriquet for Ferenczi as >the mother of psychoanalysis<. That phrase makes assumptions about the Freud- Ferenczi relationship which contradict the still widespread view of Ferenczi as someone whose bizarre, acting-out exploitations of patients are best used as a cautionary tale, while his gargantuan creativity goes unrecognized. Freud's defensive ambivalence about Ferenczi created a legacy of mistrust that results in Ferenczi's still being misquoted in the manner deplored by Balint in 1948. This paper takes up some of these issues in the context of examining Ferenczi's unconventionality, particularly with respect to the fluidity of his masculine and feminine identifications. This was not only unusual for the time, but was so different from most of his psychoanalytic colleagues that these differences were viewed as pathology rather than as manifestations of a distinct originality. Contemporary ideas about androgyny are cited as a better descriptive fit of Ferenczi's attributes, and support for such an interpretation is marshalled, even as it is acknowledged that Ferenczi continues to elude categorizing, even on today's terms.
Infant Research e nuove prospettive su teoria e tecnica della psicoterapia e della psicoanalisi
(2004)
异化是一个古老的概念,也是一个很重要的理论范畴。马克思在吸收前人思想的基础上,创造性地提出了异化劳动理论,用于揭示早期资本主义条件下人的生存状况,马克思的异化劳动思想以及以此为基础拓展开来的人类解放理论对后世产生了深远的影响。卢卡奇在解读马克思著作的基础上,根据马克思的商品拜物教理论提出了物化思想,用以从总体上批判现代社会早期物化的社会现象;生活在晚期资本主义社会中的弗洛姆,从人本主义立场出发,具体描述了当代资本主义社会中的异化现象。本文希冀通过对这三位思想家关于异化的理论阐述,作出一个学理上的分析与比较。文章分为两大部分:第一部分从理论来源、具体理论内涵、实现异化扬弃的方式等方面来阐述三人的异化思想;第二部分是理论的比较研究,分别展开马克思与卢卡奇、马克思与弗洛姆、卢卡奇与弗洛姆的异化理论比较,主要从文化传统、理论风格、态度方式以及对具体概念的理解等方面作出较为详细的分析研究。异化是一种历史现象,同时也指认了人的某种无法摆脱的生存状况,本文只是就几位现当代思想家的异化理论所作的比较研究,本身可以看成是进入当代异化理论的一个入口,本文也希望这种研究,能为进入当代视域中的社会与文化批判理论提供一个基点。
希特勒,一个影响了20世纪历史并为人们所熟知的历史人物。有人把他看作天才的政治领袖,有人把他看作政治舞台上的小丑,有人把他看作疯子。那么,希特勒究竟何许人也?如何理解这个人?如何看待他的性格?在一些心理分析学者看来,希特勒这个独特的人物作为一个极端的案例恰好为心理分析提供了一个典型样本。我们这里要介绍的是精神分析学者弗洛姆对希特勒所做的性格分析。埃里希·弗洛姆(1900—1980)出生于德国法兰克福一个犹太人家庭。1934年,离开德国到美国。作为一位杰出的精神分析学者,他批判地继承了弗洛伊德的思想,成为新弗洛伊德主义的代表人物之一。他一生著述很多,其代表作品有《逃避自由》、《爱的艺术》、《自为 ]
What happens when governments, institutions, or associations betray our most cherished values and ideals? Through the tropes of melancholia, perversion, and the fetish, this paper examines the complex reactions that such a betrayal may elicit. The author argues that betrayal evokes shame and guilt by association, and that it also engenders the complicated form of mourning implicated in melancholia. A person may disavow the betrayal itself in order to deal with these painful reactions. This disavowal may then become stabilized via the use of the fetish in its various forms (e.g., the commodity fetish, the body fetish, and the fantasy fetish). This has perverse consequences, including subtle enactments of racism and other forms of marginalization and exclusion of Otherness.
Altman's commentary challenged this author on both a personal and a theoretical level. On a personal level, she was encouraged to explore her knowing at one moment but not knowing at another, her own self-interest in the position of beneficiary. Thus, the mechanism of disavowal that underpins liberal racism was revisited in a more clinically oriented manner. On a theoretical level, Altman's response invited a more refined exploration of liberal racism as it differs from blatant racism. It also facilitated a more nuanced application of Lacanian and Kleinian theory to this matter.
In light of the contemporary shift away from the universalizing of the Eurocentric perspective, brought into focus with the advent of globalization, it may be useful to consider reorienting traditional psychoanalytic assumptions about human nature to those that are more appropriate to the recognition of a culturally pluralistic world. The author argues that ego psychology originated in the Western Enlightenment's emphasis on liberal individualism, which has limited its applicability across races, classes, and cultures. Relational theories, in their capacity to include the examination of the socially constructed dimensions of the analytic dyad (including race, class, gender, ethnicity, and sexual orientation), offer crucial theoretical and clinical possibilities, lacking in traditional psychoanalysis, that may help analysts to address some of the important cultural sources of psychological suffering. In the relational view expressed here, the unconscious – as made manifest in everyday life and in the transference and countertransference of the analytic situation – is reformulated to include social and cultural influences.
The author notes that, overall, he and White seem to agree on many important issues that she writes about in her commentary, such as the necessity of recognizing both our shared humanity and the agency of separate, subjective selves. He argues, however, that White mischaracterizes what it means to think of the self as socially constructed, and he clarifies his views of how the concept of a socially constructed self may be related to individual differences in the same culture, and to personal agency. He responds to White's imputation that his paper implicitly prescribes a type of intervention or mandates some particular view of the Truth as a new theology, substituting a concrete environmental or social determinism for the abstract (intrapsychic) determinism that he criticizes. Finally, he responds to some interesting and insightful questions White raises about the case vignette of Mr. J that was presented in his essay.
The undeniable realities of globalization at the dawn of the 21st century have brought the United States and its citizens to the startling realization that we must grapple politically, economically, and culturally with the wide range of diversity existing within and without our borders. As greater numbers of culturally diverse persons are now represented in their caseloads, psychoanalysts are also forced to examine the relevance of psychoanalytic theories and practice in meeting their needs. The author discusses three papers that propose overlapping and differing opinions as to the function of psychoanalysis in the lives of culturally diverse patients, and its capacity to influence more public, social and political change. This paper questions the meaning of the term >culture.< It attempts to tease apart the nature of memory and dissociation among those who suffer intergenerational trauma because of their membership in particular cultural or ethnic groups. Also addressed is the extent to which, as described by social constructivist theory, self is entirely a socially constructed phenomenon. The author questions the extent to which, alternatively, >self,< possessed of will, agency and authority, exists in a mutually influencing relationship with the social world.
This author argues that therapeutic action in child psychoanalytic psychotherapy rests with the creation and transformation of fantasy through play, which in turn shifts psychic structure. The paper details the treatment of an eight-year-old girl whose mother's inability to playfully participate in the inner world of her child interfered with the child's development of a fantasy life. The author suggests that the introduction of objective reality (i.e., interpretations that link the child's play with the real world) potentially impinges on and interferes with the transformational processes of fantasy. Developing the capacity to distinguish reality from fantasy does not take place through a forced accommodation to reality, but rather through the expansion of fantasy and a widening of the realm of the imagination. The elaboration of fantasy in concert with a parent or analyst is what builds the child's capacity to differentiate reality from fantasy.
White contrasts the primacy of individual personality process with a more dialectical position. Nonetheless, Bodnar reaffirms that understanding dialectical process in self-experience does not detract from the unique self-state of individuality. The philosophical roots of dialecticism indicate that the >I-ness< of me is only enhanced by recognizing dialogic processes, especially in the psychotherapeutic relationship.