Refine
Language
- English (2)
Document Type
- Articles (2)
Has Fulltext
- no (2) (remove)
Year of publication
- 2002 (2) (remove)
This paper addresses the postmodern critique of unified-self theories that argues that the self is not unified but multiple, not a static entity but in constant flux, not a separate center of initiative but intersubjectively constituted. The author proposes that there are two kinds of division in self-experience: the dissociative divisions of multiple-self theory, and a division, akin to the divisions between Freud's structural agencies, between what are here termed the >intersubjective self< and >primary subjective experience.< In contrast to dissociated self-states, which occur in different moments in time, these two dimensions of self-experience occur simultaneously indeed, what is most important about them is their relationship. The author suggests that it is this intrapsychic relationship, as it occurs in a given psychological moment, that determines the qualities of self-experience that are emphasized in unified-self theories: such qualities as cohesiveness versus fragmentation authenticity vs. falseness vitality versus depletion optimal versus nonoptimal self-regulation and agency versus feeling one is at the mercy of others. Furthermore, a major organizer of the intersubjective self is early identifications, especially >identifications with the other's response to the self.< The implications of these concepts for therapeutic action are discussed and illustrated with an extended account of an analytic case.
The discussions by Pizer and Brandchaft are so different in tone and focus that I answer them separately. Pizer invites dialogue about the relationship between identification and dissociation, which I pursue further with him. I then briefly consider his therapeutic model, which emphasizes the negotiation of paradox, in the light of the identificatory divisions in self-experience that my model highlights. Finally, I address his concern that I bypassed the >crunch< of the repeated relationship in the case example of Jonathan. I argue that the stance I ultimately adopted was my way of bridging the paradoxes presented by Jonathan. Brandchaft couched his discussion as a dismissive attack, prompting me to defend myself while trying to engage in a dialogue about substantive issues. I respond to his criticisms regarding my epistemological position, my use of the concepts of identification and projective identification, and the process and outcome of my treatment of Jonathan. The bottom line is that the differences between our perspectives are not, as Brandchaft contends, those between an objectivist, causally >unidirectional< model and an intersubjective one, but rather those between two versions of intersubjectivity.