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>Krieg der Zivilisationen< oder rechtsintellektuelle Deutungsmacht im Dienste westlicher Hegemonie
(2002)
Historicity, Humility, and the Analytic Exercise Reply to Commentaries by Drs. Palombo and Horner
(2002)
This study is to suggest the aggression, human`s instinct as the new essence of sport. Through the psychological approach it could be found that the aggression which is human instinct is deeply related with the origin of sport. In relation to the instinct of death Freud has proved that there exists the aggression in human mentality and it could be said that the aggression of sport is related with Thanatos, the instinct of death that Freud said. Fromm, a sociopsychologist expanded the concept of Freud`s aggression and divided the aggression in human mentality as the defensive and positive aggression and destructive and malignant aggression and he saw that sport is related with the malignant aggression. I think we have to discard the attitude just to try to adapt the methodical value of sport although the value of sport exists with human instinct. Sport is the only thing to express and purify the aggression and it is expected to play the important role to create the future culture.
Zauważyć należy, że mimo ogromnej różnicy między poglądami Fromma i Berlina a stanowiskiem Kościoła pojęcia wolności pozytywnej i wolności negatyw-nej spełniają funkcję pomocną w analizie fenomenu wolności religijnej. Oczywiście nie są to narzędzia umożliwiające ukazanie istoty wolności religijnej, ale mogą się przyczynić do unaocznienia takich rzadziej stanowiących przedmiot refleksji filozofów warunków koniecznych przyznawania się do religii, jak np. wolność od społecznego nacisku na grupy religijne, wolność od nieuprawnionych ingerencji państwa w sprawy religijne, wolność do swobodnego przekazywania wiedzy religijnej, do publicznego wyrażania przekonań religijnych itp. Myśliciele liberalni, których refleksja była inspiracją do napisania tego szkicu, skupiali swoją uwagę na wolności negatywnej. W tak rozumianej wolności upatrywali szczególną wartość. Wolność w rozumieniu przedstawianym w Dignitatis humanae, o ile można ją charakteryzować przy użyciu pojęć proponowanych przez Berlina czy Fromma, będzie zdecydowanie bliższe wolności w sensie pozytywnym, a jej urzeczywistnienie jednostka będzie osiągać przez dobrowolne poddanie się prowadzeniu przez rozpoznaną Prawdę.
Review Robert F. Bornstein and Joseph M. Masling (Eds.): Empirical Studies of the Therapeutic Hour
(2002)
Much contemporary analytic writing is focused on the intersubjective >space< between analyst and analysand. This article focuses on a different area of analytic subjectivity and intersubjectivity – on the implicit rules that guide psychoanalytic thought and discourse, which have not received the kind of critical scrutiny as our explicit theories. The paper describes five problematic aspects of this implicit grammar and corresponding ways of refining it: articulating conceptual multiplicity where we often use unitary constructs (such as the unconscious or the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis) specifying mechanisms rather than causally ambiguous descriptions (such as two unconsciouses talking to one another) and conditional rather than blanket statements avoiding using terms in overdetermined ways that lead to theoretical imprecision and confusion of theory and metaphor exercising greater caution in the use of developmental constructs and analogies, particularly from infancy and rethinking the nature and presentation of evidence in psychoanalytic discourse.
Two central questions raised by Spezzano's commentary have to do with the extent to which we seek objectivity in psychoanalytic theory and practice, and the extent to which one or another set of methods (e.g., clinical observation) is adequate or optimal for generating that knowledge. A discipline and treatment devoted to understanding subjectivity is nevertheless devoted to objective knowledge about a patient's subjectivity, defenses, and so forth and requires valid theories to guide exploration, inference, and intervention. Seeking objective knowledge does not require a naïve empiricism ignorant of the limits of objectivity. We would do well to use multiple methods to learn about how the mind works and what leads to therapeutic change.
Three distinct, yet overlapping, phases of treatment emerge when working with some borderline and psychotic patients. This are patients who test the ordinary limits of psychoanalysis, but can profit from its deep exploration. The first phase is colored by acting out, interpersonally and intrapsychically. An analytic envelope of containment is necessary to sustain the treatment. Interpretive holding and containing help the patient find a psychic receptacle capable of detoxifying violent projections. Many of these patients terminate prematurely. The second phase is centered around the patient's defensive use of the death instinct to extinguish or destroy certain parts of their mental functioning. This difficult standoff between parts of the patient's mind becomes replicated in the transference. The third phase reveals the more fundamental problem of paranoid~schizoid anxieties of loss and primitive experiences of guilt. These include fears of persecution and annihilation. Some patients abort treatment in the first or second phase and never work through the phantasies and feelings of loss. Nevertheless, much intrapsychic and interpersonal progress is possible. Given the instability and chaotic nature of these patient's object relations, the analyst must be cautiously optimistic in their work and realize the potential to help the patient even when presented with less than optimal working conditions.
Self psychology: Today
(2002)
In this commentary it is appreciated that in his approach Safran avoids some of the common pitfalls of brief therapy discourses, namely, the extremes of therapeutic grandiosity and therapeutic nihilism. Instead, seeking to maintain a >middle way,< he strives to balance the pragmatic and instrumental aims of time-limited psychotherapy with an appreciation of the existential and human dimensions of the therapeutic encounter. Safran also works to extend the full implications of relational theory to the theory and practice of brief psychotherapy. In this effect he relies on the contributions of constructivism, interpersonal psychoanalytic theory, and relational clinical theory. In this commentary some tensions and even contradictions are remarked upon between certain aspects of Safran's approach and the fundamental assumptions of relational theory. A tension is noted between the instrumental aims of brief therapy and Safran's goal of radical openness to patients. The importance of therapist decentering is acknowledged, along with paradoxes in the use of the concept of metacommunication. Finally, a question is raised as to the compatibility of empirically oriented approaches to psychotherapy research with the philosophical assumptions of a two-person psychology.
Czlowiek pozbawiony
(2002)
In discussing the complexities and dialectical tensions inherent in the relational point of view, this commentary seeks to alert the reader to the simplifying dichotomies that can lead theory and clinical practice to be hostage to ideology. In exploring those dichotomies and their problematic implications for our work, emphasis is placed particularly on the nature of what constitutes evidence for our formulations and conclusions the different blind spots that different epistemological positions are designed to alert us to or, at least partially, to overcome the ways in which our efforts to transcend those blind spots often themselves create new blind spots the relation between insight and new relational experience the ambiguities associated with the (highly important but at times conceptually perilous) distinction between the one-person and the two-person models and the tensions between the need to hear patients in a fashion that is affirming and accepting and the equally important need to hear their fervent wish to change what they also want to have accepted. Many of these tensions and complexities are examined in the context of a critique of Bion's claim that analysts should be >without memory or desire.<
In order to discuss the depressive personality we have first to distinguish between this clinical entity and other types of depressive psychopathology that might also be chronic. The character traits and psychodynamics of the depressive personality confirm that there is a special group of patients, who belong to a depressive disorder continuum. The particular technical problems that depressive personality present are: (1) the inability to enjoy anything and the consequences of this on the therapist's experience and interventions, and (2) the negative therapeutic reaction which threatens the analytic process and the therapist's competence. If we combine transference/ extratransference interpretations with an >empathetic understanding< approach to systematic confrontation and interpretation, we can therefore justify the need for a slightly modified psychoanalytic technique in the treatment of the depressive personality.
Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Children. Impact of armed conflict on children. 78 pp.
(2002)
Marx's 'radical humanism', as presented in Erich Fromm's prominent study, To Have or to Be, is reflected in his criticism of the capitalist system, not only in terms of its social and economic aspects, but also in terms of its devastating effects upon the human psyche. The capitalist system, Marx and Fromm maintain, produces an impoverished human character dominated by avarice and greed, which tends to alienate all the physical and intellectual senses and replace them by the single sense of having. Instead of the myriad of ways in which an individual can appropriate an object, or human reality in general – such as by the faculty of senses, by thinking, feeling, observing, acting or loving – only the utilitarian, materialistic form of appropriation is considered relevant by the dominant Western mindset. Such a reduction of meaningful human relations to the world is depicted in Caryl Churchill's Owners. Churchill's characters' obsessive need to own – both objects and other people – deprives their lives of deeper meaning and fulfilment, either driving them into despair, madness and suicide, or turning their vitality into destructiveness, compelling them to annihilate everything that cannot be possessed. The paper also focuses on another common feature of Fromm's study and Churchill's play, namely, their recourse to Buddhism, which for both authors represents a system of thought diametrically opposed to the spirit of capitalist society centred in property and egotism.
There has been little or no research on the establishment of infant moods or the mechanisms underlying them. One reason may be our difficulty in entertaining the idea that there are affective processes in infants that have long-lasting organizing continuous effects. It is this possibility that is considered in this paper. I attempt to address the questions of how moods are created and what some of their functions are. My model of moods is that infants have long-lasting (e.g., hours, days, and even longer) mood states. Mood states are dynamically changing yet distinct assemblages of affective behaviors. Mood control processes are modified by affective input from others. Thus moods are cocreated by the interplay of active, self-organized, biorhythmic affective control processes in the infant and the effect of the emotions expressed by others on mood control processes. In recognition of the importance of Sander's thinking to this work, I have named one of these processes the Sanderian Affective Wave. Mood states organize behavior and experience over time. Critically, moods serve an anticipatory representational function by providing directionality to an infant's behavior as he >moves< into the future. Thus they provide continuity to infants' experiential life. Furthermore, moods fulfill the Janus principle of bringing the past into the future for the infant, but as a noncognitive/symbolic/linguistic process – that is, as a purely affective–memorial process. Moreover, I believe that consideration of the development of moods opens the way for thinking about dynamic conflictual emotional processes in infants. Lastly, thinking about moods has important implications for understanding the development of pathology and for therapy.