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A measure of immature love
(2005)
Based on the theoretical underpinnings of Fromm, Maslow, and Sorokin, this study described the empirical development of a measure to assess love. In its immature form, love is conceptualized as being rooted in self-other distinctions, and can be selfish and instrumental. In its mature form, love becomes autotelic and is expressed as a form of being, independent of others and relationships. Four separate studies revealed 4-6 items for an immature love scale, and were supported in confirmatory factor analyses among college students. The robustness of the scale was demonstrated in its consistent findings with other constructs (personality, other love measures, self-transcendence) regardless of assessment style (true/false, forced-choice). The scale was also found to have satisfactory validity but fairly low reliability, suggesting caution in using it. Implications and future directions are discussed.
Following Fromm's (1976) and Rand's (1993) theory, a scale of 51 items on attitudes towards the Being, Doing and Having >Modes of Existence< has been constructed (Reichenberg 1996). Our objectives are two-fold: first, an examination, in parallel, of the validity of the scale with two methods: Factor Analysis and Facet Theory. And second, a shortening of the scale from 51 questions to a more compact one. The present article is based on empirical data gathered from 386 female teachers, students and counselors in college education departments in Israel in 1995 and 1997.
Marginality is an important concept in the history of science, though it is often used in a manner that presumes marginality to be a static designation. We contend that the dynamics of marginality are crucial to the history of psychoanalysis, a discipline that has moved between dominant and marginal positions. We address psychoanalytic marginality via three specific >cases<: the marginalization among Freud and his followers when psychoanalysis was an emergent discipline; the marginality trope in Erich Fromm's popular psychoanalytic writing when psychoanalysis was orthodoxy in American academic psychiatry; and the rhetorical marginality of psychoanalysis in Sweden as psychoanalysis entered a decline within psychiatry. Our aim is to show that marginalization and self-marginalization serve interpersonal, social, and professional strategies. (© 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.)
The interdisciplinary journal Psychiatry, founded in 1938 by the psychiatrist Harry Stack Sullivan, provided a remarkable interdisciplinary forum for such outstanding social scientists as Edward Sapir, Harold Lasswell, Ruth Benedict, Gregory Bateson, Ashley Montague, Lev Vygotsky, Erich Fromm, Erving Goffman, A. H. Maslow, and Robert Merton. The journal sought an interdisciplinary synthesis concerning personality, problems of living, and community mental health. Almost all of the major contributors to the early years of the journal drew strongly on the pragmatic tradition. In that tradition, Sullivan saw language shaping the development of personality and the interactions that constitute social life. Major themes of articles in the journal included the relation of personality of culture, the relation of the political order to the psychic order, propaganda and the creation of public and private meaning, racial and gender issues, and social arrangements influencing mental health. While pursuing the many dimensions of being human revealed by the different social sciences, the journal never developed an integrative theory to create a coherence among the many thematic strands and disciplinary perspectives on its pages. The journal also never developed an adequate account of how language served a central role in mediating personality development and social interactions. With the added theoretical and methodological tools now at our disposal we may be in a position to advance the unfinished project proposed by this journal.
Within post-Kantian, liberal accounts of law, freedom emerges as the law that is moral. Opposed to the relative and restricted necessity of positive law, freedom is understood as a law that is individual and autonomously given. The space of such self-determination is protected, usually negatively, by positive law. Freedom and necessity, morality and law, autonomy and heteronomy: these summarise the oppositions within which much modern thinking has moved and moves to this day.