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This is the third in a series of papers comparing the work of three contemporary theorists, each of whom is associated with the intersubjective turn in psychoanalysis: Jessica Benjamin (Gerhardt, Sweetnam, and Borton, 2000), Christopher Bollas (Gerhardt and Sweetnam 2001), and Darlene Ehrenberg. This paper describes aspects of the work of Ehrenberg and attempts to show how her trailblazing ideas of the therapeutic relationship and its nuanced particularities bear on issues in intersubjectivity theory. Ehrenberg's distinctive twist lies in her painstaking exploration of the processes of mutual influence in the ongoing therapeutic interaction and their bearing on the analytic process. The manner in which Ehrenberg attempts to integrate both interpersonal and intrapsychic perspectives and uses the interpersonal as a way of locating the intrapsychic is another focus of this inquiry. Moreover, the sense conveyed through Ehrenberg's voice – a voice both sensuous and strident, tender and provocative – in her attempt to make living, breathing contact in the moment with patients otherwise deadened to their own desire is also examined as bearing on issues associated with the intersubjective turn. While our own authorial positioning is never quite declared, our object relational biases exert their influence throughout our reading of her work, not surprising for a paper on intersubjectivity.
In Donna Orange's interesting paper, psychoanalysis is put into dialogue with philosophy as a royal road for questioning certain essentialist habits of thought as Orange asks us to consider the continued viability of certain overly freighted theoretical descriptors given recent shifts in theoretical assumptions. Instead of being viewed as neutral, timeless, culturally disembodied descriptors, our psychoanalytic lexicon is itself sociohistorically grounded in a particular tradition or assumptive context. Thus, given recent shifts in the assumptions on which psychoanalysis is grounded, the continued use of terms from a previous world view or context, without explicit reflection, is, according to Orange, at the least, problematic. The present commentary seeks to raise questions about the reasonableness of Orange's claims – including the use of reason itself as a way into this problem-space. In short, it is argued that the semantic structure of many words in a natural language lexicon derives from the fact of our embodiment – such that the controversial terms are claimed to rest on a background of prereflective, bodily based experiences that exist as echoes saturating the use of such terms. To strip our theoretical discourse of the use of the terms in question would seriously jeopardize losing the layers of sedimented meanings based on unconscious associations that echo through their continued use.