Refine
Document Type
- Articles (116) (remove)
Has Fulltext
- no (116) (remove)
Year of publication
- 2015 (116) (remove)
Isaiah Berlin’s >Two Concepts of Liberty< was a milestone in the development of modern political theory, with his advocacy of negative freedom supporting the neoliberal demand for ‘freedom from’ the state. This article defends the conception of positive freedom by calling on the neglected insights of the sociological tradition. I demonstrate how Marx, Durkheim and Simmel all understood freedom to be a socially conditioned phenomenon, with >freedom from< being an idealist fiction (Marx), and a recipe for anomie (Durkheim) and loss of meaning (Simmel). I argue, however, that positive freedom as it was theorised by the classical sociologists must be distinguished from the more fashionable idea of individual self-realisation and self-identity, a notion equally susceptible to idealist constructions, and one increasingly targeted by Foucault-inspired critics. Instead I draw on Hannah Arendt and André Gorz to show how positive freedom should be theorised as a worldly, conflictual, and pre-eminently political affair.
在《为自己的人》一书中,围绕>道—德形态<的基本问题,弗洛姆揭示了人与自然伦理关系的二律背反、理性—人所蕴涵的二律背反;围绕>伦—理形态<的基本问题,他揭示了当代人与自身力量的关系被作为商品的知识所中介,进而导致人与其自身力量的二律背反;围绕>伦理—道德形态<的基本问题,弗洛姆指出,现代发达资本主义社会由于缺乏设计>更好的<人和>更好的<社会之眼光,使人与人、人与社会二律背反。如何才能消除或者超越上述的二律背反,成为一个完整意义上的人。弗洛姆试图从伦理学与心理学的结合构建基于生产性的人道主义—普遍伦理学。然而,在方法论上,他囿于人本主义伦理学及其精神分析社会—心理学的运思,脱离了现实社会基础,在实践中只能是一种>乌托邦<。