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This article explores the >lack of meaning< in contemporary society as a consequence of Western dualist thought paradigms and ontologies, via Gilles Deleuze’s concept of >reactivenihilism< following the colloquial murder of God. The article then explores processual and new materialist approaches in the understanding of the lived and carnal self, arguing for immanent and senseful materiality as an ethical platform for religious, environmental, and societal solidarity for tomorrow. For the theoretical justification of the processual approach in understanding the enfleshed self, the article employs John Dupré’s processual approach in the philosophy of biology, as well as Astrida Neimani’s critical posthumanism, and contextualizes these considerations with Erich Fromm’s ethical distinction of being and having.
In this paper, we will analyze the dynamic and relational drivers behind the choice to embark on a therapy via Skype. The fear of relationships could be the origin of this choice. Can Skype be a means by which the patient’s difficulties manifest themselves? We suggest that this is possible, and we will use the case of Matilde to show it. Matilde uses relationships to see herself, as she is unable to do this alone. She tries to find herself through others and the virtual world. She prefers to skip a session because the therapist’s webcam is not working rather than having the session without them seeing each other. Can we speculate that Matilde feels lost when she is in contact with herself without an other’s mediation? What are her fears? In this case, has Skype helped or slowed down the process? How would her borderline emptiness manifest itself in a traditional session? And what does it mean to live in the virtual world for a patient who tries to find herself through others? We will try to answer all of these questions, thinking about the functionality that technology has for some patients, for the therapist, and for the therapeutic process.
In recent years, the influence of Cohen’s Religion of Reason on Erich Fromm’s con¬cept of Judaism began to appear in the research literature. The current study broadens the scope of Cohen’s influence to include Fromm’s concept of history, as well as his social criticism. In this paper I would like to suggest, that Cohen’s criticism of >historical consciousness’<in the early 20th century, can be compared to Fromm’s criticism of >intelligence< and >progress< in the mid- 20th century. Cohen’s distinction between >reason< (Vernunft) and >consciousness< (Bewusstsein) is echoed in Fromm’s distinction between >reason< and >intelligence<. For Cohen and Fromm, >reason< is an eternal universal and moral compass for evaluating history and progress. Both Cohen’s >consciousness< and Fromm’s >intelligence<, without >reason< as an ethical component, are perceived as a threat to the capability of the individual to achieve self-fulfillment, as well as to the progress of humanity.
The author discusses some aspects of the impact of our changing society on the latency phase, while presenting a clinical case. At this age, children need a reliable environment, protecting them from sexual and aggressive overstimulation, as an essential condition for the work of latency to be carried out. As some authors point out, if post-Oedipal repression is hindered, children may be pushed towards an early, highly disruptive adolescence process. Strong and untimely anxieties may arise, requiring particular defensive and adaptive strategies. According to the author’s experience, concerns about death may be observed, these not usually being expected at the latency age. In some children, these seem to promote an early process of intellectualization. The patient described here was a violent, self-harming child from a disturbed family. As soon as his psychic state improved with psychotherapy, he expressed anxiety about mortality as a general human condition and was able to reason on the concept of infinity at a quite abstract level. The significance of this observation is discussed from a developmental point of view.
This article presents a research on the reception of Erich Fromm’s ideas in Bulgaria. The criticism of Fromm’s ideas is presented and an attempt is made to evaluate it according to its context – ideological, psychological and philosophical. The author aims at explaining the theoretical and substantive side of the criticism.
The present paper addresses Baruch Spinoza’s radical affirmation of individual identity emergent from within the psychosocial tensions of group membership. Focusing upon psychological experience beginning with a lived history of fearful Inquisitional persecution, and continuing from conformity to rebellion within the constraints of the Amsterdam Jewish synagogue, we trace the psychological recognition of individual identity in Spinoza’s understanding of the self-determined, immanent acts of daily life. Spinoza’s multiple names are depicted as markers, corresponding to membership in mutually exclusive social groups, each constraining freedom of thought and action.
The author addresses contemporary clinical practice, where we encounter individuals, seemingly incapable of getting in touch with their own existential dimension, who communicate their detachment, at times even total, from their feelings and fears, wilfully committed as they are to avoid experiencing the inevitable angst that may accompany them through life. This dissociation from the angst-producing emotion is revealed to the clinician through either detachment or a simple action. This feeling that generates both detachment and its opposite, perhaps a hypomanic reaction, proves to be >absent,< and is not perceived by the patient. In this way, angst can be avoided and indeed seems >absent,< but what is experienced is the complete range of raw emotions connected to it, such as fear, terror, panic, detachment, apathy, and anhedonia. The author sets out to clarify the terms >fear,< >anxiety,< and >angst< as they have been historically used in philosophy, psychoanalysis, psychiatry, and psychology. Ultimately, she explains her reason for her choice of the word >angst< instead of >anxiety< in her distinct and explicit handling of this subject matter.