In the editor's introduction to Civilization and its Discontents (vol. 21, 1930), Strachey briefly summarizes Freud's unfolding views on aggression. "The history of Freud's views on the aggressive or destructive instinct is a complicated one and can only be summarily indicated here. Throughout his earlier writings the context in which he viewed it predominantly was that of sadism. His first lengthy discussions of this were in the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905), where it appeared as one of the 'component instincts' of the sexual instinct. (We are missing vol. 7, in which the Three Essays are to be found.) 'Thus,' he wrote in Section 2 (B) of the first essay, 'sadism would correspond to an aggressive component of the sexual instinct which has become independent ... exaggerated and, by displacement, has usurped the leading position' (vol. 7, 1938). Nevertheless, later on, in Section 4 of the second essay, the original independence of the aggressive impulses was recognized: 'It may be assumed that the impulses of cruelty arise from sources which are in fact independent of sexuality, but may become united with it at an early stage' (ibid., 1938). The independent sources indicated were to be traced to the self-preservation instinct. This passage was altered in the edition of 1915, where it was stated that 'the impulse of cruelty arises from the instinct for mastery' and the phrase about its being 'independent of sexuality' was omitted. But already, in 1909, in the course of combating Adler's theories, Freud had made a much more sweeping pronouncement. In Section II of the third chapter of the 'Little Hans' case history (vol. 10), Freud wrote: 'I cannot bring myself to assume the existence of a special aggressive instinct alongside of the familiar instincts of self-preservation and of sex, and on an equal footing with them' (ibid., 10, 1940). Footnote: "A footnote added in 1921 brought the inevitable qualification of this judgment. Since the time at which it was made 'I have myself', writes Freud, 'been obliged to assert the existence of an 'aggressive instinct', but it is different from Adler's. I prefer to call it the 'destructive' or 'death instinct'. Adler's had in fact been more in the nature of an instinct of self-assertiveness.' The reluctance to accept an aggressive instinct independent of the libido was assisted by the hypothesis of narcissism. Impulses of aggressiveness, and of hatred too, had from the first seemed to belong to the self-preservation instinct, and, since this was no subsumed under the libido, no independent aggressive instinct was called for. And this was so in spite of the bipolarity of object-relations, of the frequent admixtures of love and hate, and of the complex origin of hate itself... It was not until Freud's hypothesis of a 'death instinct' that a truly independent aggressive instinct came into view in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (vol. 18, 1920). But it is to be remarked that even there, and in Freud's later writings (for instance, in Chapter IV of The Ego and the Id), the aggressive instinct was still something secondary, derived from the primary self-destructive death instinct. This is still true of the present work, even though here the stress is much more upon the death instinct's manifestations outwards; and it is also true of the further discussions of the problem in the later part of Lecture XXXII of the New Introductory Lectures (1913), and at more than one point in the posthumously published Outline of Psychoanalysis (1940). It is nevertheless tempting to quote a couple of sentences from a letter written by Freud on May 27, 1937, to Princess Marie Bonaparte, in which he appears to be hinting at a greater original independence of external destructiveness: 'The turning inwards of the aggressive instinct is of course the counterpart to the turning outwards of the libido when it passes over from the ego to objects. We should have a neat schematic picture if we suppose that originally, at the beginning of life, all libido was directed to the inside and all aggressiveness to the outside, and that in the course of life, this gradually altered. But perhaps this may not be correct.' It is only fair to add that in his next letter Freud wrote: 'I beg you not to set too much value on my remarks about the destructive
In looking back over his previous views on the theory of the instincts, Freud writes: "...to begin with, ego-instincts and object-instincts confronted each other. It was to denote the energy of the latter and only the latter instincts that I introduced the term 'libido'. [The reference given here is to Section II of the first paper on anxiety neurosis, 1895, vol. 3.] Thus the antithesis was between the ego-instincts and the 'libidinal' instincts of love (in its widest sense) which were directed to an object. One of these object-instincts, the sadistic instinct, stood out from the rest, it is true, in that its aim was so very far from being loving. Moreover it was obviously in some respects attached to the ego-instincts; it could not hide its close affinity with instincts of mastery which have no libidinal purpose. But these discrepancies were got over; after all, sadism was clearly a part of sexual life, in the activities of which affection could be replaced by cruelty. Neurosis was regarded as the outcome of a struggle between the interest of self-preservation and the demands of the libido, a struggle in which the ego had been victorious but at the price of severe sufferings and renunciations. Every analyst will admit that even today this view has not the sound of a long-discarded error. Nevertheless, alterations in it became essential, as our enquiries advanced from the repressed to the repressing forces, from the object-instincts to the ego. The decisive step forward was the introduction of the concept of narcissism — that is to say, the discovery that the ego itself is invested with libido, that the ego, indeed, is the libido's original home, and remains to some extent its headquarters. I have commented in previous papers on Freud's alternating concepts and as to whether ego or id is the reservoir of libido. This narcissistic libido turns towards objects, and thus becomes object-libido; and it can change back into narcissistic libido once more. The concept of narcissism made it possible to obtain an analytic understanding of the traumatic neuroses and of many of the affections bordering on the psychoses, as well as of the latter themselves. It was not necessary to give up our interpretation of the transference neuroses as attempts made by the ego to defend itself against sexuality; but the concept of libido was endangered. Since the ego-instincts, too, were libidinal, it seemed for a time inevitable that we should make libido coincide with instinctual energy in general, as C. G. Jung had already advocated earlier. Nevertheless, there still remained in me a kind of conviction, for which I was not as yet able to find reasons, that the instincts could not all be of the same kind. My next step was taken in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), when the compulsion to repeat and the conservative character of instinctual life first attracted my attention. Starting from speculations on the beginning of life and from biological parallels, I drew the conclusion that, besides the instinct to preserve living substance and to join it into ever larger units, there must exist another, contrary instinct seeking to dissolve those units and to bring them back to their primitval, inorganic state. That is to say, as well as Eros there was an instinct of death. The phenomena of life could be explained from the concurrent or mutually opposing action of these two instincts. It was not easy, however, to demonstrate the activities of this supposed death instinct. The manifestations of Eros were conspicuous and noisy enough. It might be assumed that the death instinct operated silently within the organism towards its dissolution, but that, of course, was no proof. A more fruitful idea was that a portion of the instinct is diverted toward the external world and comes to light as an instinct of aggressiveness and destructiveness. In this way the instinct itself could be pressed into the service of Eros, in that the organism was destroying some other thing, whether animate or inanimate, instead of destroying its own self. Conversely, any restriction of this aggressiveness directed outwards would be bound to increase the self-destruction which, in any case proceeding. At the same time one...
can suspect from this example that the two kinds of instincts seldom—perhaps never—appear in isolation from each other, but are alloyed with each other in varying and very different proportions and so become unrecognizable to our judgement. In sadism, long since known to us as a particularly strong component of the instinct of sexuality, we should have before us a particularly strong alloy of this kind between trends of love and the destructive instinct; while its counterpart, masochism, would be a union between destructiveness directed inwards and sexuality—a union which makes what is otherwise an imperceptible trend into a conspicuous and tangible one (118-119).

"To begin with it was only tentatively that I put forward the views I have developed here, but in the course of time they have gained such a hold upon me that I can no longer think in any other way....I know that in sadism and masochism we have always seen before us manifestations of the destructive instinct (directed outwards and inwards), strongly alloyed with erotism; but I cannot any longer understand how we can have overlooked the ubiquity of non-erotic aggressivity and destructiveness and can have failed to give it its due place in our interpretation of life. (The desire of destruction when it is directed inwards mostlyclouds our perception, of course, unless it is tinged with erotism.)" (119-120).

"The name 'libido' can once more be used to denote the manifestations of the power of Eros in order to distinguish them from the energy of the death instinct.

[Footnote: "Our present point of view can be roughly expressed in the statement that libido has a share in every instinctual manifestation, but that not everything in that manifestation is libido."] It must be confessed that we have much greater difficulty in grasping that instinct; we can only suspect it, as it were, as something in the background behind eros, and it escapes detection unless its presence is betrayed by its being alloyed with eros. It is in sadism, where the death instinct twists the erotic aim in its own sense and yet at the same time fully satisfies the erotic urge, that we succeed in obtaining the clearest insight into its nature and its relation to Eros. But even where it emerges without any sexual purpose, in the blindest fury of destructiveness, we cannot fail to recognize that the satisfaction of the instinct is accompanied by an extraordinarily high degree of narcissistic enjoyment, owing to its presenting the ego with a fulfillment of the latter's old wishes for omnipotence. The instinct of destruction, moderated and tamed, and, as it were, inhibited in its aim, must, when it is directed towards objects, provide the ego with the satisfaction of its vital needs and with control over nature" (121).

"In all that follows, I adopt the standpoint, therefore, that the inclination to aggression is an original self-subsisting instinctual disposition in man, and I return to my view that it constitutes the greatest impediment to civilization...I may now add that civilization is a process in the service of Eros, whose purpose is to combine single human individuals, and after that families, then races, peoples and nations, into one great unity, the unity of mankind. Why this has to happen, we do not know; the work of Eros is precisely this....But man's natural aggressive instinct is the derivative and the main representative of the death instinct which we have found alongside of Eros and which shares world-dominion with it. And now, I think, the meaning of the evolution of civilization is no longer obscure to us. It must present the struggle between Eros and Death, between the instinct of life and the instinct of destruction, as it works itself out in the human species. This struggle is what all life essentially consists of, and the evolution of civilization may therefore be simply described as the struggle for life of the human species. And it is this battle of the giants that our nurse-maids try to appease with their lullaby about Heaven" (122).
that appears to be the most important. This we can study in the history of the
development of the individual. What happens in him to render his desire for ag-
gression innocuous? Something very remarkable, which we should never have
assumed, and which is nevertheless quite obvious. His aggressiveness is intro-
jected, internalized; it is, in point of fact, sent back to where it came from—
that is, it is directed towards his own ego. There it is taken over by a portion
of the ego, which, now, in the form of 'conscience', is ready to put into action
against the ego the same harsh aggressiveness that the ego would have liked to
satisfy upon others, extraneous individuals. The tension between the harsh
super-ego and the ego that is subjected to it, is called by us the sense of
guilt; it expresses itself as a need for punishment. Civilization, therefore,
obtains mastery over the individual's dangerous desire for aggression by weakening
and disarming it and by setting up an agency within him to watch over it, like
a garrison in a conquered city" (123-124).

Before the appearance of the super-ego "...the sense of guilt coincided with
remorse. (We may remark, incidentally, that the term 'remorse' should be re-
served for the reaction after an act of aggression has actually been carried
out.) After this, owing to the omniscience of the super-ego, the difference
between an aggression intended and an aggression carried out lost its force.
Henceforward a sense of guilt could be produced not only by an act of violence
that is actually carried out (as all the world knows), but also by one that is
merely intended (as psycho-analysis has discovered). Irrespectively of this
alteration in the psychological situation, the conflict arising from ambivalence--
the conflict between the two primal instincts—leaves the same result behind. We
are tempted to look here for the solution of the problem of the varying relation
in which the sense of guilt stands to consciousness. It might be thought
that a sense of guilt arising from remorse for an evil deed must always be
conscious, whereas a sense of guilt arising from the perception of an evil
impulse may remain unconscious. But the answer is not so simple as that.
Obsessional neurosis speaks energetically against it" (137). "The second
contradiction concerned the aggressive energy with which we suppose the super-ego
to be endowed. According to one view, that energy merely carries on the punitive
energy of the external authority and keeps it alive in the mind; while, according
to another view, it consists, on the contrary, of one's own aggressive energy
which has not been used and which one now directs against that inhibiting authority.
The first view seemed to fit in better with the history, and the second with the
theory, of the sense of guilt. Closer reflection has resolved this apparently
irreconcilable contradiction almost too completely: what remained as the essen-
tial and common factor which had been displaced "towards. Clinical observation,
moreover, allows us in fact to distinguish two sources for the aggressiveness
which we attribute to the super-ego; one or the other of them exercises the stronger effect in any given case, but as a general rule
they operate in unison....In the most recent analytic literature a predilection
is shown for the idea that any kind of frustration, any thwarted instinctual
satisfaction, results, or may result, in a heightening of the sense of guilt. A
great theoretical simplification will, I think, be achieved if we regard this as
applying only to the aggressive instincts, and little will be found to contra-
dict this assumption. For how are we to account, on dynamic and economic grounds,
for an increase in the sense of guilt appearing in place of an unfilled
erotic demand? This only seems possible in a round-about way—if we suppose,
that is, that the prevention of an erotic satisfaction calls up a piece of aggres-
siveness against the person who has interfered with the satisfaction, and that
this aggressiveness has itself to be suppressed in turn. But if this is so,
it is after all only the aggressiveness which is transformed into a sense of
guilt, by being suppressed and made over to the super-ego. I am convinced
that many processes will admit of a simpler and clearer exposition if the
findings of psycho-analysis with regard to the derivation of the sense of guilt
are restricted to the aggressive instincts. Examination of the clinical material

gives us no unequivocal answer here, because, as our hypothesis tells us, the
two classes of instinct hardly ever appear in pure form, isolated from each
other; but an investigation of extreme cases would probably point in the direc-
tion I anticipate. . . . It now seems plausible to formulate the following propo-
sition. When an instinctual trend undergoes repression, its libidinal elements
are turned into symptoms, and its aggressive components into a sense of guilt.
Even if this proposition is only an average approximation to the truth, it is worthy
of our interest" (137-139).

"The fateful question for the human species seems to be to be whether and to what
extent their cultural development will succeed in mastering the disturbance of their
communal life by the instinct of aggression and self-destruction" (145).


"To begin with, the opposition between the ego-instincts and the sexual instincts
lay at the base of our libido theory. When later on we began to study the ego
itself more closely and arrived at the conception of narcissism, this distinction
itself lost its foundation. In rare cases one can observe that the ego has taken
itself as an object and is behaving as though it were in love with itself. Hence
the term 'narcissism', borrowed from the Greek myth. But that is only an extreme
exaggeration of a normal state of affairs. We came to understand that the ego is
always the main reservoir of libido, from which libidinal cathexes of objects go out
and into which they return again, while the major part of this libido remains per-
manently in the ego. Thus ego libido is being constantly changed into object
libido and object libido into ego libido. But in that case they could not be
different in their nature and it could have no sense to distinguish the energy of
the one from the energy of the other; we could either drop the term 'libido' or
use it as synonymous with psychical energy in general. We did not maintain this
position for long. Our feeling of their being a contrariety in instinctual life
soon found another and sharper expression. It is not my wish, however, to put
before you the origin of this novelty in the theory of the instincts; it too is
based essentially on biological considerations. I shall offer you a ready-made
product. Our hypothesis is that there are two essentially different classes of
instincts: the sexual instincts, understood in the widest sense—Eros; if you
prefer that name—and the aggressive instincts, whose aim is destruction" (102-103).

"...belief in the 'goodness' of human nature is one of those evil illusions by
which mankind expect their lives to be beautified and made easier while in reality
they only cause damage. We need not continue this controversy, since we have
argued in favour of a special aggressive and destructive instinct in men not on
account of the teachings of history or of our experience in life but on the basis
of general considerations to which we were led by examining the phenomena of sadism
and masochism. As you know, we call it sadism when sexual satisfaction is
linked to the condition of the sexual object's suffering pain, ill-treatment
and humiliation, and masochism when the need is felt of being the ill-treated
object oneself. As you know too, a certain admixture of these two trends is
included in normal sexual relations, and we speak of perversions when they push
the other sexual aims into the background and replace them by their own aims.
And you will scarcely have failed to notice that sadism has a more intimate rela-
tion with masculinity and masochism with femininity, as though there were a secret
kinship present; though I must add that we have made no progress along that path.
Both phenomena, sadism and masochism, are linked, though there is one area
which is a truly puzzling problem to the libido theory; and it is only proper if
what was a stumbling-block for the one theory should become the cornerstone of
the theory replacing it. It is our opinion, then, that in sadism and in
masochism we have before us two excellent examples of a mixture of the two classes
of instinct, of Eros and aggressiveness; and we proceed to the hypothesis that
this relation is a model one—that every instinctual impulse that we can examine
consists of similar fusions or alloys of the two classes of instinct. These fusions, of course, would be in the most varied ratios. Thus the erotic instincts would introduce the multiplicity of their sexual aims into the fusion, while the others would only admit of mitigations or gradations in their monotonous trend. Let us go back to the special problem presented to us by masochism. If for a moment we leave its erotic components on one side, it affords us a guarantee of the existence of a trend that has self-destruction as its aim. If it is true of the destructive instinct (as of the libido) that the ego—\[but what we have in mind here is rather the id, the whole person—\]originally includes all the instincual impulses, we are led to the view that masochism is older than sadism, and that sadism is the destructive instinct directed outwards, thus acquiring the characteristic of aggressiveness. A certain amount of the original destructive instinct may still remain in the interior. It seems that we can only perceive it under two conditions: if it is combined with erotic instincts into masochism or if—with a greater or lesser erotic addition—it is directed against the external world as aggressiveness. And now we are struck by the significance of the possibility that the aggressiveness may not be able to find satisfaction in the external world because it comes up against real obstacles. If this happens, it will perhaps retreat and increase the amount of self-destructiveness holding sway in the interior. We shall hear how this is in fact what occurs and how important a process this is. Impeded aggressiveness seems to involve a grave injury. It really seems as though it is necessary for us to destroy some other thing or person in order not to destroy ourselves, in order to guard against the impulse to self-destruction. A sad disclosure for the moralist! (104–105).

"The instincts rule not only mental but also vegetative life, and these organic instincts exhibit a characteristic which deserves our deepest interest....For they reveal an effort to restore an earlier state of things. We may suppose that from the moment at which a state of things has once been attained is upset, an instinct arises to create it afresh and brings about the phenomena which we can describe as a 'compulsion to repeat'. Thus the whole of embryology is an example of the compulsion to repeat. A power of regenerating lost organs extends far up into the animal kingdom, and the instinct for recovery to which, alongside of therapeutic assistance, our cures are due must be the residue of this capacity which is so enormously developed in the lower animals. The spawning migrations of fishes, the migratory lights of birds, and possibly all that we describe as manifestations of instinct in animals, take place under the orders of the compulsion to repeat, which expresses the conservative nature of the instincts. Nor have we far to look in the mental field for its manifestations. We have been struck by the fact that the forgotten and repressed experiences of childhood are reproduced during the work of analysis in dreams and reactions, particularly those occurring in the transference, although their revival runs counter to the interest of the pleasure principle; and we have explained this by supposing that in these cases a compulsion to repeat is overcoming even the pleasure principle. Outside analysis, too, something similar can be observed. There are people in whose lives the same reactions are perpetually being repeated uncorrected, to their own detriment, or others who seem to be pursued by a relentless fate, though closer investigation teaches us that they are unwittingly bringing this fate on themselves. In such cases we attribute a 'daemonic' character to the compulsion to repeat. But how can this conservative characteristic of instincts help us to understand our self-destructiveness? What earlier state of things does an instinct such as this want to restore? Well, the answer is not far to seek and opens wide perspectives. If it is true that—at some immeasurably remote time and in a manner we cannot conceive—life once proceeded out of inorganic matter, then, according to our presumption, an instinct must have arisen which sought to do away with life once more and to reestablish the inorganic state. If we recognize in this instinct the self-destructiveness of our hypothesis, we may regard the self-destructiveness as an expression of a 'death instinct' which cannot fail to be present in every vital process. And now the instincts that we believe in divide themselves into two groups—the erotic instincts, which seek to combine more and more living substance..."
into ever greater unities, and the death instincts, which oppose this effort and
lead what is living back into an inorganic state. From the concurrent and opposing
action of these two proceed the phenomena of life which are brought to an end
by death" (106-107).

"We are not asserting that death is the only aim of life; we are not overlooking
the fact that there is life as well as death. We recognize two basic instincts
give each of them its own aim. How the two of them are mingled in the process
of living, how the death instinct is made to serve the purposes of Eros, es-
pecially by being turned outwards as aggressiveness—these are tasks which are
left to future investigations. We have not gone beyond the point at which this
prospect lies open before us. The question, too, of whether the conservative
character may not belong to all instincts without exception, whether the erotic
instincts as well as may not be seeking to bring back an earlier state of things
when they strive to bring about a synthesis of living things into greater unities—
this question, too, we must leave unanswered" (107-108).

"We have traveled far from our basis. I will tell you retrospect the starting-
point of these reflections on the theory of the instincts. It was the same as that
which led us to revise the relation between the ego and the unconscious—the im-
pression derived from the work of analysis that the patient who puts up a resistance
is so often unaware of that resistance. Not only the fact of the resistance is un-
conscious to him, however, but its motives as well. We were obliged to search out
these motives or motive, and to our surprise we found them in a powerful need for
punishment which we could only class with masochistic wishes. The practical sig-
nificance of this discovery is not less than its theoretical one, as for the need
for punishment is the worst enemy of our therapeutic efforts. It is satisfied by
the suffering which is linked to the neurosis, and for that reason holds fast to
being ill. It seems that this factor, an unconscious need for punishment, has a
share in every neurotic illness" (108).

"There is, as we think, no doubt about the origin of this unconscious need for
punishment. It behaves like a piece of conscience, like a prolongation of our
consciousness into the unconscious; and it must have the same origin as conscience
and correspond, therefore, to a piece of aggressiveness that has been internalized
and taken over by the super-ego. If only the words went together better, we should
be justified for all practical purposes in calling it an 'unconscious sense of
guilt'. Theoretically we are in fact in doubt whether we should suppose that all
the aggressiveness that has returned from the external world is bound by the super-
ego and accordingly turned against the ego, or that a part of it is carrying on its
mutilation uncanny activity as a free destructive instinct in the ego amid the id.
A distribution of the latter kind is the more probable; but we know nothing more
about it. There is no doubt that, when the super-ego was first instituted, in
equipping that agency use was made of the piece of the child's aggressiveness
towards his parents for which he was unable to effect a discharge outwards on account
of his erotic fixation as well as of external difficulties; and for that reason,
the severity of the super-ego need not simply correspond to the strictness of the
upbringing. It is very possible that, when there are later occasions for suppress-
ing aggressiveness, the instinct may take the same path that was opened to it
at that decisive point of time. People in whom this unconscious sense of guilt is
excessively strong betray themselves in analytic treatment by the negative thera-
peutic reaction which is so disagreeable from the prognostic point of view. When
one has given them the solution of a symptom, which should normally be followed
by at least its temporary disappearance, what they produce instead is a
momentary exacerbation of the symptom and of the illness....you will see in this
behavior a manifestation of the unconscious sense of guilt, for which being ill,
with its sufferings and impediments, is just what is wanted. The problems which
the unconscious sense of guilt has opened up, its connections with morality, educa-
tion, crime and delinquency, are at present the preferred field of work
for psycho-analysts" (109-110).
"...what we have come to see about the sexual instincts, applies equally and perhaps still more to the other ones, the aggressive instincts. It is they above all that make human communal life difficult and threaten its survival. Restriction of the individual's aggressiveness is the first and perhaps the severest sacrifice which society requires of him. We have learnt the ingenious way in which the taming of this unruly thing has been achieved. The institution of the super-ego which takes over the dangerous aggressive impulses, introduced a garrison, as it were, into regions that are inclined to rebellion. But on the other hand, if we look at it purely psychologically, we must recognize that the ego does not feel happy in being thus sacrificed to the needs of society, in having to submit to the destructive trends of aggressiveness which it would have been glad to employ itself against others. It is like a prolongation in the mental sphere of the dilemma of 'eat or be eaten' which dominates the organic animate world. Luckily the aggressive instincts are never alone but always alloyed with the erotic ones. These latter have much to mitigate and much to avert under the conditions of the civilization which mankind has created" (110-111).


"There is one particularly constant relation between femininity and instinctual life which we do not want to overlook. The suppression of women's aggressiveness which is prescribed for them constitutionally and imposed on them socially favours the development of powerful masochistic impulses, which succeed, as we know, in binding erotically the destructive trends which have been diverted inwards. Thus masochism, as people say, is truly feminine. But if, as happens so often, you meet with masochism in men, what is left to you but to say that these men exhibit very plain feminine traits?" (116).

"The difference in the structure of the genitals is accompanied by other bodily differences which are too well known to call for mention. Differences emerge too in the instinctual disposition which give a glimpse of the later nature of women. A little girl is as a rule less aggressive, defiant and self-sufficient; she seems to have a greater need for being shown affection and that account to be more dependent and plaint" (117).

"Both sexes seem to pass through the early phases of libidinal development in the same manner. It might have been expected that in girls there would already have been some lag in aggressiveness in the sadistic-anal phase, but such is not the case. Analysis of children's play has shown women analysts that the aggressive impulses of little girls leaves nothing to be desired in the way of abundance and violence" (118).
possible there must be as a rule a combination of such compounded motives" (210).

"When we read of the atrocities of the past, it sometimes seems as though the idealistic motives served only as an excuse for the destructive appetites; and sometimes—in the case, for instance, of the cruelties of the Inquisition—it seems as though the idealistic motives had pushed themselves forward in consciousness, while the destructive ones lent them an unconscious reinforcement. Both may be true" (210).

"As a result of a little speculation, we have come to suppose that this destructive instinct is at work in every living creature and is striving to bring it to ruin and to reduce life to its original condition of inanimate matter. Thus it quite seriously deserves to be called a death instinct, while the erotic instincts represent the effort to live. The death instinct turns into the destructive instinct when, with the help of special organs, it is directed outwards, on to objects. The organism preserves its own life, so to say, by destroying an extraneous one. Some portion of the death instinct, however, remains operative within the organism, and we have sought to trace quite a number of normal and pathological phenomena to this internalization of the destructive instinct. We have even been guilty of heresy of attributing the origin of conscience to this diversion inwards of aggressiveness. You will notice that it is by no means a trivial matter if this process is carried too far: it is positively unhealthy. On the other hand if these forces are turned to destruction in the external world, the organism will be relieved and the effect must be beneficial. This would serve as a biological justification for all the ugly and dangerous impulses against which we are struggling. It must be admitted that they stand nearer to Nature than does our resistance to them for which an explanation also needs to be found" (211).

"For our immediate purpose then, this much follows from what has been said: there is no use in trying to get rid of men's aggressive inclinations. We are told that in certain happy regions of the earth, where nature provides in abundance everything that man requires, there are races whose life is passed in tranquility and who know neither coercion nor aggression. I can scarcely believe it and I should be glad to hear more of these fortunate beings. The Russian Communists, too, hope to be able to cause human aggressiveness to disappear by guaranteeing the satisfaction of all material needs and by establishing equality in other respects among all the members of the community. That, in my opinion, is an illusion" (211-212).

"If willingness to engage in war is an effect of the destructive instinct, the most obvious plan will be to bring Eros, its antagonist, into play against it. Anything that encourages the growth of emotional ties between men must operate against war. These ties may be of two kinds. In the first place they may be relations resembling those toward a loved object, though without having a sexual aim. There is no need for psycho-analysis to be ashamed to speak of love in this connection, for religion itself uses the same words: 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.' This, however, is more easily said than done. The second kind of emotional tie is by means of identification. Whatever leads men to share important interests produces this community of feeling, these identifications. And the structure of human society is to a large extent based on them" (212). (continued)
Freud: on death instinct, destructiveness, aggression, etc. (CONTINUED)

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In the editor's introduction, Strachey comments: "It is noticeable, in the first place, that the factors to which he [Freud] largely draws attention are of a physiological and biological nature. [Here referring to Freud's cool attitude as indicated in this paper toward the therapeutic ambitions of psychoanalysis or in his enumeration of the difficulties confronting it.] They are thus in the main unsusceptible to psychological influences. Such, for instance, are the relative 'constitutional' strength of the instincts and the relative weakness of the ego owing to physiological causes such as puberty, the menopause, and physical illness. But the most powerful impeding factor of all and one totally beyond any possibility or control... is the death instinct. Freud here suggests that this is not only, as he had pointed out in earlier writings, responsible for much of the resistance met with in analysis, but that it is actually the ultimate cause of conflict in the mind. In all this, however, there is once again nothing revolutionary. Freud may be laying more stress than usual on constitutional factors among the difficulties confronting psychoanalysis, but he had always recognized their importance" (212).

Freud is discussing various difficulties in therapy. "In yet another group of cases the distinguishing characteristics of the ego, which are held responsible as sources of resistance against analytic treatment and as impediments to therapeutic success, may spring from different and deeper roots. Here we are dealing with the ultimate things which psychological research can learn about: the behaviour of the two primal instincts, their distribution, mingling and defusion--things which we cannot think of as being confined to a single province of the mental apparatus, the MAX id, the ego, or the super-ego. No stronger impression arises from the resistances during the work of analysis than of there being a force which is defending itself by every possible means against recovery and which is absolutely resolved to hold on to illness and suffering. One portion of this force has been recognized by us, undoubtedly with justice, as the sense of guilt and need for punishment, and has been localized by us in the ego's relation to the super-ego. But this is only the portion of it which is, as it were, psychically bound by the super-ego and thus becomes recognizable; other quotas of the same force, whether bound or free may be at work in other, unspecified places. If we take into consideration the total picture made up of the phenomena of masochism immanent in so many people, the negative therapeutic reaction and the sense of guilt found in so many neurotics, we shall no longer be able to adhere to the belief that mental events are exclusively governed by the desire for pleasure. These phenomena are unmistakable indications of the presence of a power in mental life which we call the instinct of aggression or of destruction according to its aims, and which we trace back to the original death instinct of living matter. It is not a question of an antithesis between an optimistic and a pessimistic theory of life. Only by the concurrent or mutually opposing action of the two primal instincts--Eros and the death-instinct--never by one of the other alone, can we explain the rich multiplicity of the phenomena of life." (242-243).
an explanation of this kind, and the sharper our eye grows, the more copiously they strike us. The subject is too new and too important for me to treat it as a side-issue in this discussion. I shall therefore content myself with selecting a few sample cases. Here is one instance. It is well known that at all periods there have been, as there still are, people who can take as their sexual objects members of their own sex as well as of the opposite one, without the one trend interfering with the other. We call such people bisexuals, and we accept their existence without feeling much surprise about it. We have come to learn, however, that every human being is bisexual in this sense and that his libido is distributed, either in a manifest or a latent fashion, over objects of both sexes. But we are struck by the following point. Whereas in the first class of people the two trends have got on together without clashing, in the second and more numerous class they are in a state of irreconcilable conflict. A man's heterosexuality will not put up with any homosexuality, and vice versa. If the former is the stronger it succeeds in keeping the latter latent and forcing it away from satisfaction in reality. On the other hand, there is no greater danger for a man's heterosexual function than its being disturbed by his latent homosexuality. We might attempt to explain this by saying that each individual only has a certain quota of libido at his disposal, for which the two rival trends have to struggle. But it is not clear why the rivals do not always divide up the available quota of libido between them according to their relative strength, since they are able to do so in a number of cases. We are forced to the conclusion that the tendency to a conflict is something special, something which is newly added to the situation, irrespective of the quantity of libido. An independently-emerging tendency to conflict of this sort can scarcely be attributed to anything but the intervention of an element of free aggressiveness. If we recognize the case we are discussing as an expression of the destructive or aggressive instinct, the question at once arises whether this view should not be extended to other instances of conflict, and, indeed, whether all that we know about psychical conflict should not be revised from this new angle. After all, we assume that in the course of a man's development from a primitive state to a civilized one his aggressiveness undergoes a very considerable degree of internalization or turning inwards; if so, his internal conflicts would certainly be the proper equivalent for the external struggles which have then ceased. I am well aware that the dualistic theory according to which an instinct of death or of destruction or aggression claims equal rights as a partner with Eros as manifested in the libido, has found little sympathy and has not really been accepted even among psychoanalysts (243-244).

An Outline of Psychoanalysis (written in 1933, published in 1940, vol. 23)

"The forces which we assume to exist behind the tensions caused by the needs of the in are called instincts. They represent the somatic demands upon the mind. Though they are the ultimate cause of all activity, they are of a conservative nature; the state whatever it may be, which an organism has reached gives rise to a tendency to re-establish that state so soon as it has been abandoned. . . . After long hesitations and vacillations we have decided to assume the existence of only two basic instincts, Eros and the destructive instinct. (The contrast between the instincts of self-preservation and the preservation of the species, as well as the contrast between ego-love and object-love, fall within Eros.) The aim of the first of these basic instincts is to establish ever greater unities and to preserve them thus— in short, to bind together; the aim of the second is, on the contrary, to undo connections and so to destroy things. In the case of the destructive instinct we may suppose that its final aim is to lead what is living into an inorganic state. For this reason we also call it the death instinct. If we assume that living things came later than inanimate ones and arose from them, then the death instinct fits in with the formula we have proposed to the effect that instincts tend towards a return to an earlier state. In the case of Eros (or the love instinct) we cannot apply this formula. To do so would presuppose that living substance was once a unity which had
later been torn apart and was now striving toward re-union" (148-149). (There seems to be some confusion here. An instinct is something that arises when a particular state of being is upset and is oriented toward re-establishing that former state...then exactly how does Eros fit in with this idea of what an instinct is. Freud himself here says that Eros does not fit in with this idea, but he does not then resolve the question of where that leaves Eros. According to his definition of Eros as an instinct, it would deny Eros a place as an instinct.)

"In biological functions the two basic instincts operate against each other or combine with each other. Thus, the act of eating is a destruction of the object with the final aim of incorporating it, and the sexual act is an act of aggression with the purpose of the most intimate union. This concurrent and mutually opposing action of the two basic instincts gives rise to the whole variegation of the phenomena of life" (149).

"We may picture an initial state as one in which the total available energy of Eros, which henceforward we shall speak of as 'libido', is present in the still undifferentiated ego-in and serves to neutralize the destructive tendencies which are simultaneously present. (We are without a term analogous to 'libido' for describing the energy of the destructive instinct.) At a later stage it becomes relatively easy for us to follow the vicissitudes of the libido, but this is more difficult with the destructive instinct. So long as that instinct operates internally, as a death instinct, it remains silent; it only comes to our notice when it is diverted outwards as an instinct of destruction. It seems to be essential for the preservation of the individual that this diversion should occur; the muscular apparatus serves this purpose. When the super-ego is established, considerable amounts of the aggressive instinct are fixated in the interior of the ego and operate there self-destructively. This is one of the dangers to health by which human beings are faced on their path to cultural development. Holding back aggressiveness is in general unhealthy and leads to illness (to mortification)....Some portion of self-destructiveness remains within, whatever the circumstances; till at last it succeeds in killing the individual, not, perhaps, until his libido has been used up or fixated in a disadvantageous way. Thus it may in general be suspected that the individual dies of his internal conflicts but that the species dies of its unsuccessful struggle against the external world if the latter changes in a fashion which cannot be adequately dealt with by the adaptations which the species has acquired" (149-150).

"There can be no question but that the libido has somatic sources, that it streams to the ego from various organs and parts of the body. This is most clearly seen in the case of that portion of the libido which, from its instinctual aim, is described as sexual excitation. The most prominent of the parts of the body from which this libido arises are known by the name of 'erotic zones'. This part of what we know about Eros—that is to say, about its exponent, the libido—has been raised from a study of the sexual function, which, indeed, on the prevailing view, even if not according to our theory, coincides with Eros. We have been able to form a picture of the way in which the sexual urge, which is destined to exercise a decisive influence on our life, gradually develops out of successive contributions from a number of component instincts, which represent particular erotic zones" (151).

In speaking of the oral-sadistic phase in the development of the sexual function, Freud notes: "During this oral phase sadistic impulses already occur sporadically along with the appearance of the teeth. Their extent is far greater in the second phase, which we describe as the sadistic-anal one, because satisfaction is then sought in aggression and in the excretory function. Our justification for including aggressive urges under the libido is based on the view that sadism is an instinctual fusion of purely libidinal and purely destructive urges, a
fusion which thenceforward persists uninterruptedly. (Footnote: "The question arises whether the satisfaction of purely destructive instinctual impulses can be felt as pleasure, whether pure destructiveness without any libidinal admixture occurs. Satisfaction of the death instinct remaining in the ego seems not to produce feelings of pleasure, though masochism represents a fusion which is entirely analogous to sadism.")" (154).

In writing on psychoanalytic technique, he notes: "There are some neurotics in whom, to judge by all their reactions, the instinct of self-preservation has actually been reversed. They seem to aim at nothing other than self-injury and self-destruction. It is possible too that the people who in fact do in the end commit suicide belong to this group. It is to be assumed that in such people far-reaching defusions of instinct have taken place, as a result of which there has been a liberation of excessive quantities of the destructive instinct directed inwards. Patients of this kind are not able to tolerate recovery through our treatment and fight against it with all their strength. But we must confess that this is a case which we have not yet succeeded in completely explaining" (180).

"The core of our being is formed by the obscure id, which has no direct communication with the external world and is accessible even to our own knowledge only through the medium of another agency. Within this id the organic instincts operate, which are themselves compounded of fusions of two primal forces (Eros and destructiveness) in varying proportions and are differentiated from one another by their relation to organs or systems of organs. The one and only urge of these instincts is towards satisfaction, which is expected to arise from certain changes in the organs with the help of objects in the external world" (197-198).

The id obeys the inexorable pleasure principle. But not the id alone. It seems that the activity of the other psychical agencies too is able only to modify the pleasure principle but not to nullify it; and it remains a question of the highest theoretical importance, and one that has not yet been answered when and how it is ever possible for the pleasure principle to be overcome. The consideration that the pleasure principle demands a reduction, at bottom the extinction perhaps, of the tensions of instinctual needs (that is, Nirvana) leads to the still unassessed relations between the pleasure principle and the two primal forces, Eros and the death instinct" (193).

I am now going to go back and see what Freud has to say on this topic between the time he wrote Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) and Civilization and its Discontents (1930). I have already summarized Beyond the Pleasure Principle and then I skipped to Civilization and its Contents and what followed that up to 1940.

Two Encyclopaedia Articles (1923 [1922]), vol. 18. From: (B) The libido theory: Recognition of Two Classes of Instincts in Mental Life:—Though psychanalysis endeavours as a rule to develop its theories as independently as possible from those of other sciences, it is nevertheless obliged to seek a basis for the theory of the instincts in biology. On the ground of a far-reaching consideration of these processes which go to make up life and which lead to death, it becomes probable that we should recognize the existence of two classes of instincts, corresponding to the contrary processes of construction and dissolution in the organism. On this view, the one set of instincts, which work essentially in silence, would be those which follow the aim of leading the living creature to death and therefore deserve to be called the 'death instincts'; these would be directed outwards as the result of the combination of numbers of unicellular elementary organisms, and would manifest themselves as the destructive or aggressive impulses. The other set of instincts would be those which are better known to us in analysis—the libidinal, sexual or life instincts, which are best comprised under the name of Eros; their purpose..."
would be to form living substance into ever greater unities, so that life may
be prolonged and brought to higher development. The erotic instincts and the
death instincts would be present in living beings in regular mixtures or fusions;
but 'defusions' would also be liable to occur. Life would consist in the mani-
festations of the conflict or interaction between the two classes of instincts;
death would mean for the individual the victory of the destructive instincts, but
reproduction would mean for him the victory of Eros." (258-259)

"The Nature of the Instincts.— This view would enable us to characterise
instincts as tendencies inherent in living substance towards restoring an earlier
state of things: that is to say, they would be historically determined and of a
conservative nature and, as it were, the expression of an inertia or elasticity
present in what is organic. Both classes of instincts, Eros as well as the death
instinct, would, on this view, have been in operation and working against each
other from the first origin of life" (259).

The Ego and the Id, 1923, vol. 19

Freud summarizes his theory of instincts: "I have lately developed a view of the
instincts which I shall here hold to and take as the basis of my further discus-
sions. According to this view we have to distinguish two classes of instincts,
one of which, the sexual instincts or Eros, is by far the more conspicuous and
accessible to study. It comprises not merely the uninhibited sexual instinct
proper and the instinctual impulses of an aim-inhibited or sublimated nature
derived from it, but also the self-preservative instinct, which must be assigned
to the ego and which at the beginning of our analytic work we had good reason
for contrasting with the sexual object-instincts. The second class of instincts
was not so easy to point to; in the end we came to recognize sadism as its repre-
sentative. On the basis of theoretical considerations, supported by biology,
we put forward the hypothesis of a death instinct, the task of which is to lead
organic life back into the inanimate state; on the other hand, we supposed that
Eros, by bringing about a more and more far-reaching combination of the particles
into which living substance is dispersed, aims at complicating life and at the
same time, of course, at preserving it. Acting in this way, both the instincts
would be conservative in the strictest sense of the word, since both would be
endeavouring to re-establish a state of things that was disturbed by the emergence
of life. (I am still unsure what Freud means here when he also classifies Eros
as conservative. If Eros aims at bringing about further combinations of
living particles, what past state is being re-established?) The emergence of
life would thus be the cause of the continuance of life and also at the same
time of the striving towards death; and life itself would be a conflict and
compromise between these two trends. The problem of the origin of life would
remain a cosmological one; and the problem of the goal and purpose of life would
be answered dualistically. On this view, a special physiological process (of
anabolism and catabolism) would be associated with each of the two classes of
instincts; both kinds of instinct would be active in every particle of living
substance, though in unequal proportions, so that some one substance might be
the principal representative of Eros? (40-41).

"This hypothesis throws no light whatever upon the manner in which the two classes
of instincts are fused, blended, alloyed with each other; but that this takes place
regularly and very extensively is an assumption indispensable to our conception.
It appears that, as a result of the combination of unicellular organisms into
multicellular forms of life, the death instinct of the single cell can be success-
fully be neutralized and the destructive impulses be diverted on to the external
world through the instrumentality of a special organ. This special organ would
seem to be the muscular apparatus: and the death instinct would thus seem to
express itself—though probably only in part—as an instinct of destruction di-
rected against the external world and other organisms" (41).
Once we have admitted the idea of a fusion of the two classes of instinct with each other, the possibility of a more or less complete 'defusion' of them forces itself upon us. The sadistic component of the sexual instinct would be a classical example of a serviceable instinctual fusion; and the sadism which has made itself independent as a perversion would be typical of a defusion, though not of one carried to extremes. From this point we obtain a view of a great domain of facts which has not before been considered in this light. We perceive that for purposes of discharge the instinct of destruction is habitually brought into the service of Eros; we suspect that the epileptic fit is a product and indication of an instinctual defusion, and we come to understand that instinctual defusion and the marked emergence of the death instinct call for particular consideration among the effects of some severe neuroses—for instance, the obsessional neuroses. Making a swift generalization, we might conjecture that the essence of a regression of libido (e.g., from the genital to the sadistic-anal phase) lies in a defusion of instincts, just as, conversely, the advance from the earlier phase to the definitive genital one would be conditioned by an accession of aitropic components. The question also arises whether ordinary ambivalence—which is so often unusually strong in the constitutional disposition to neurosis, should not be regarded as the product of a defusion; ambivalence, however, is such a fundamental phenomenon that it more probably represents an instinctual fusion that has not been completed" (41-42).

"Over and over again we find, when we are able to trace instinctual impulses back, that they reveal themselves as derivatives of Eros. If it were not for the considerations put forward in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, and multilaterally for the sadistic constituents which have attached themselves to Eros, we should have difficulty in holding to our fundamental dualistic point of view. But since we cannot escape that view, we are driven to conclude that the death instincts are by their nature mute and that the clamor of life proceeds for the most part from Eros. And from the struggles against Eros! It can hardly be doubted that the pleasure principle serves the id as a compass in its struggle against the libido—the force that introduces disturbances into the process of life. If it is true that Fechner's principle of constancy governs life, which thus consists of a continuous descent towards death, it is the claim of Eros, of the sexual instincts, which, in the form of instinctual needs, hold up the falling level and introduce fresh tensions. The id, guided by the pleasure principle—that is, by the perception of unpleasantness—feels off these tensions in various ways. It does so in the first place by complying as swiftly as possible with the demands of the non-sexualized libido—by striving for the satisfaction of the directly sexual trends. But it does so in a far more comprehensive fashion in relation to one particular form of satisfaction in which all component instincts demands converge—by discharge of the sexual substances, which are saturated vehicles, so to speak, of the erotic tensions. The ejection of the sexual substances in the sexual act corresponds in a sense to the separation of soma and germ-plasm. This accounts for the likeness of the condition that follows complete sexual satisfaction to dying, and for the fact that death coincides with the act of copulation in some of the lower animals. These creatures die in the act of reproduction because, after Eros has been eliminated through the process of satisfaction, the death instinct has a free hand for accomplishing its purposes. Finally, as we have seen, the ego, by sublimating some of the libido for itself and its purposes, assists the id in its work of mastering the tensions" (46-47).

"The dangerous death instincts are dealt with in the individual in various ways: in part they are diverted towards the external world in the form of aggression, while to a large extent they undoubtedly continue their internal work unhindered." (54).

"Towards the two classes of instincts the ego's attitude is not impartial. Through its work of identification and sublimation it gives the death instincts in the id assistance in gaining control over the libido, but in so doing it
runs the risk of becoming the object of the death instincts and of itself perishing. In order to be able to help in this way it has had itself to become filled with libido; it thus itself becomes the representative of Eros and thenceforward desires to live and to be loved. But since the ego's work of sublimation results in a defusion of the instincts and a liberation of the aggressive instincts in the super-ego, its struggle against the libido exposes it to the danger of maltreatment and death. In suffering under the attacks of the super-ego or perhaps even succumbing to them, the ego is meeting with a fate like that of the protista which are destroyed by the products of decomposition that they themselves have created. From the economic point of view the morality that functions in the super-ego seems to be a similar product of decomposition (56-57).

"The id, to which we finally come back, has no means of showing love or hate. It cannot say what it wants; it has achieved no unified will. Eros and the death instinct struggle within it; we have seen with what weapons the one group of instincts defends itself against the other. It would be possible to picture the id as under the domination of the mute but powerful death instincts, which desire to be at peace and (prompted by the pleasure principle) to put Eros, the mischief-maker, to rest; but perhaps that might be to undervalue the part played by Eros" (59).

Th Economic Problem of Masochism, 1924, vol. 19

In the editor's introduction, Strachey writes: "In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), after the introduction of the 'death instinct', we find a statement that 'there might be such a thing as primary masochism', and in the present paper the existence of a primary masochism is taken as certain" (Footnote: It should perhaps be mentioned that it was only in later writings, beginning with Civilization and its Discontents (1930), that Freud turned his attention more particularly to the outward operation of the death instinct—to aggressiveness and destructiveness, though it is discussed to some extent in the later part of the present paper)" (157-158).

Freud: "If we go back to our hypothesis of the two classes of instincts which we regard as operative in the living organism, we arrive at another derivation of masochism, which, however, is not in contradiction with the former one. In (multicellular) organisms the libido meets the instinct of death, or destruction, which is dominant in them and which seeks to disintegrate the cellular organism and to conduct each separate unicellular organism (composing it) into a state of inorganic stability (relative though this may be). The libido has the task of making the destroying instinct innocuous, and it fulfills the task by diverting that instinct to a great extent outwards—soon with the help of a special organic system, the muscular apparatus—towards objects in the external world. The instinct is then called the destructive instinct, the instinct for mastery, or the will to power. A portion of the instinct is placed directly in the service of the sexual function, where it has an important part to play. This is sadism proper. Another portion does not share in this transposition outwards; it remains inside the organism and, with the help of the accompanying sexual excitation described above, becomes libidinally bound there. It is in this portion that we have to recognize the original, erogenous masochism." (163-164).

"We are without any physiological understanding of the ways and means by which this taming of the death instinct by the libido may be effected. So far as the psycho-analytic field of ideas is concerned, we can only assume that a very extensive fusion and amalgamation, in varying proportions, of the two classes of instincts takes place, so that we never have to deal with pure life instincts or pure death instincts, but only with mixtures of them in different amounts. Corresponding to a fusion of instincts of this kind, there may, as a result of certain influences, be a defusion of them. How large the portions of the death instincts are which refuse to be tamed in this way by being bound to admixtures of libido we cannot at present guess. If one is prepared to overlook a little
inexactitude, it may be said that the death instinct which is operative in the organism—primal sadism—is identical with masochism. After the main portion of it has been transposed outwards on to objects, there remains inside, as a residuum of it, the erogenic masochism proper, which on the one hand has become a component of the libido and, on the other, still has the self as its object. This masochism would thus be evidence of, and a remainder from, the phase of development in which the coalescence, which is so important for life, between the death instinct and Eros took place. We shall not be surprised to hear that in certain circumstances the sadism, or instinct of destruction, which has been directed outwards, projected, can be once more introjected, turned inwards, and in this way regress to its earlier situation. If this happens, a secondary masochism is produced, which is added to the original masochism" (164).

"Patients do not easily believe us when we tell them about the unconscious sense of guilt. They know only too well by what torments—the pangs of conscience—a conscious sense of guilt, a consciousness of guilt, expresses itself, and they therefore cannot admit that they could harbour exactly analogous impulses in themselves without being in the least aware of them. We may, I think, to some extent meet their objection if we give up the term 'unconscious sense of guilt', which is in any case psychologically incorrect (this relates back to Freud's view that feeling cannot be properly described as "unconscious"—which I covered in my review of consciousness, unconsciousness, preconscious), and speak instead of a 'need for punishment', which covers the observed state of affairs just as aptly. We cannot, however, restrain ourselves from judging and localizing this unconscious sense of guilt in the same way as we do the conscious kind" (166).

"The turning back of sadism against the self regularly occurs where a cultural suppression of the instincts holds back a large part of the subject's destructive instinctual components from being exercised in life. We may suppose that this portion of the destructive instinct which has retreated appears in the ego as an intensification of masochism. The phenomena of conscience, however, leads us to infer that the destructiveness which returns from the external world is also taken up by the super-ego, without any such transformation, and increases its sadism against the ego. The sadism of the super-ego and the masochism of the ego supplement each other and unite to produce the same effects. It is only in this way, I think, that we can understand how the suppression of an instinct can—frequently or quite generally—result in a sense of guilt and how a person's conscience becomes more severe and more sensitive the more he refrains from aggression against others. One might expect that if a man knows that he is in the habit of avoiding the commission of acts of aggression that are undesirable from a cultural standpoint he will for that reason have a good conscience and will watch over his ego less suspiciously. The situation is usually presented as though ethical requirements were the primary things and the renunciation of instinct followed from them. This leaves the origin of the ethical sense unexplained. Actually, it seems to be the other way about. The first instinctual renunciation is enforced by external powers, and it is only this which creates the ethical sense, which expresses itself in conscience and demands a further renunciation of instinct. Thus moral masochism becomes a classical piece of evidence for the existence of fusion of instinct. Its danger lies in the fact that it originates from the death instinct and corresponds to the part of that instinct which has escaped being turned outwards as an instinct of destruction. But since, on the other hand, it has the significance of an erotic component, even the subject's destruction of himself cannot take place without libidinal satisfaction" (170).

I am going to quote the following section at length, not because it has direct relevance to the topic of the death instinct and destructiveness, but it distinguishes clearly between the pleasure principle and Nirvana principle, which are often used interchangeably by other writers in psychoanalysis, and even sometimes by Freud: "It will be remembered that we have taken the view that the
principle which governs all mental processes is a special case of Fechner's 'tendency towards stability', and have accordingly attributed to the mental apparatus the purpose of reducing to nothing, or at least of keeping as low as possible, the sums of excitation which flow in upon it. Barbara Low has suggested the name of 'Nirvana principle' for this supposed tendency, and we have accepted the term. Sigmund Freud has previously given this same principle the name of 'the principle of constancy'. But we have unhesitatingly identified the pleasure-unpleasure principle with this Nirvana principle. Every pleasure ought thus to coincide with a heightening, and every pleasure with a lowering, of mental tension due to stimulus; the Nirvana principle (and the pleasure principle which is supposedly identical with it) would be entirely in the service of the death instincts, whose aim is to conduct the restless life into the stability of the inorganic state, and it would have the function of giving warnings against the demands of the life instincts—the libido—which try to disturb the intended course of life. But such a view cannot be correct. It seems that in the series of feelings of tension we have a direct sense of the increase and decrease of amounts of stimulus, and it cannot be doubted that there are pleasurable tensions and unpleasurable relaxations or tension. The state of sexual excitement is the most striking example of a pleasurable increase of stimulus of this sort, but it is certainly not the only one. Pleasure and unpleasure, therefore, cannot be referred to an increase or decrease of a quantity (which we describe as 'tension due to stimulus'), although they obviously have a great deal to do with that factor. It appears that they depend, not on this quantitative factor, but on some characteristic of it which we can only describe as a qualitative one. If we were able to say what this qualitative characteristic is, we should be much further advanced in psychology. Perhaps it is the rhythm, the temporal sequence of changes, rises and falls in the quantity of stimulus. We do not know. However this may be, we must perceive that the Nirvana principle belonging as it does to the death instinct, has undergone a modification in living organisms through which it has become the pleasure principle; and we shall henceforward avoid regarding the two principles as one. It is not difficult, if we care to follow up this line of thought, to guess what power was the source of the modification. It can only be the life instinct, the libido, which has thus, alongside of the death instinct, seized upon a share in the regulation of the processes of life. In this way we obtain a small but interesting set of connections. The Nirvana principle expresses the trend of the death instinct; the pleasure principle represents the demands of the libido; and the modification of the latter principle, the reality principle, represents the influence of the external world. None of these three principles is actually put out of action by another. As a rule they are able to tolerate one another, although conflicts are bound to arise occasionally from the fact of the differing aims that are set for each—in one case a quantitative reduction of the load of the stimulus, in another a qualitative characteristic of the stimulus, and, lastly (in the third case), a postponement of the discharge of the stimulus and a temporary quiescence in the unpleasure due to tension. The conclusion to be drawn from these considerations is that the description of the pleasure principle as the watchman over our life cannot be rejected" (159-161).

An Autobiographical Study, written 1924, published 1925, vol. 20

"There is no more urgent need in psychology than for a securely founded theory of the instincts on which it might then be possible to build further. Nothing of the sort exists, however, and psychoanalysis is driven to making tentative efforts towards some such theory. It began by drawing a contrast between the ego-instincts (the instinct of self-preservation, hunger) and the libidinal instincts (love), but later replaced it by a new contrast between narcissistic and object-libido. This was clearly not the last word on the subject; biological considerations seemed to make it impossible to remain content with assuming the existence of only a single class of instincts. In the works of my later years (Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921), and The Ego and the Id (1923)), I have given free rein to the
inclination, which I kept down for so long, to speculation, and I have also contemplated a new solution of the problem of the instincts. I have combined the instincts for self-preservation and for the preservation of the species under the concept of Eros and have contrasted with it an instinct of death or destruction which works in silence. Instinct in general is regarded as a kind of elasticity of living things, an impulsion towards the restoration of a situation which once existed but was brought to an end by some external disturbance. This essentially conservative character of instincts is exemplified by the phenomena of the compulsion to repeat. The picture which life presents to us is the result of the concurrent and mutually opposing action of Eros and the death instinct (56-57).

Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 1926, vol. 20

"The advent of puberty opens a decisive chapter in the history of an obsessional neurosis. The genital organization which has been broken off in childhood starts again with great vigour. But, as we know, the sexual development in childhood determines what direction this new start at puberty will take. Not only will the early aggressive impulses be re-awakened; but a greater or lesser proportion of the new libidinal impulses—in bad cases the whole of them—will have to follow the course prescribed to them by regression and will emerge as aggressive and destructive tendencies. In consequence of the erotic trends being disguised in this way and owing to the powerful reaction-formations in the ego, the struggle against sexuality will henceforward be carried on under the banner of ethical principles. The ego will recoil with astonishment from promptings to cruelty and violence which enters consciousness from the id, and it has no notion that that in them it is combating erotic wishes, including some to which it would not otherwise have taken exception. The overstrict super-ego insists in all the more strongly on the suppression of sexuality, since this has assumed such repellent forms. Thus in obsessional neurosis the conflict is aggravated in two directions: the defensive forces become more intolerant and the forces that are to be fended off become more intolerable. Both effects are due to a signile factor, namely, regression of the libido" (116-117).

"The aggressive impulse flows mainly from the destructive instinct; and we have always believed that in a neurosis it is against the demands of the libido and not against those of any other instinct that the ego is defending itself" (124).

"We began by tracing the organization of the libido through its successive stages—from the oral through the sadistic-anal to the genital—and in doing so placed all the components of the sexual instinct on the same footing. Later it appeared that sadism was the representative of another instinct, which was opposed to Eros. This new view, that the instincts fall into two groups, seems to explode the earlier construction of the successive stages of libidinal organization. But we do not have to break fresh ground in order to find a way out of the difficulty. The solution has been at hand for a long time and lies in the fact that what we are concerned with are scarcely ever pure instinctual impulses but mixtures in various proportions of the two groups of instincts. If this is so, there is no need to revise our view of the organizations of the libido. A sadistic cathexis of an object may also legitimately claim to be treated as a libidinal one; and an aggressive impulse against the father can just as well be subjected to repression as a tender impulse towards the mother. Nevertheless we shall bear in mind for future consideration the possibility that repression is a process which has a special relation to the genital organization of the libido and that the ego resorts to other methods of defence when it has to secure itself against the libido on other levels of organization" (124-125).

Footnote, page 168: "It may quite often happen that although a danger-signal is correctly estimated in itself, a certain amount of instinctual anxiety is added to the realistic anxiety. (168-169)"
In that case the instinctual demand before whose satisfaction the ego recoils is a masochistic one: the instinct of destruction directed against the subject himself. Perhaps an addition of this kind explains cases in which reactions of anxiety are exaggerated, inexpedient, or paralyzing. Phobias of heights (windows, towers, precipices and so on) may have some such origin. The hidden feminine significance is closely associated with masochism.

The following are the more significant excerpts from Freud on destruction, sadism, and masochism from about 1895 up to 1920 (at which time Beyond the Pleasure Principle was published). In looking over these years generally, I don't see too much on the topic until the Three Essays on Sexuality (1905) in which sadism and masochism were discussed in relation to sexuality. And then perhaps not too much more until his Papers on Metapsychology (1914-1915). Thus far, in reviewing this topic in general, I have noted two excerpts which are a pretty accurate and complete summary of Freud's unfolding views on instinct and on aggression. The first is found on page 7 of my summarizing of Beyond the Pleasure Principle. At the bottom of that page, I have quoted the long footnote which pertains to this subject. And, secondly, on pages 1 and 2 of my review of Freud: on death instinct, destructiveness, aggression, etc. (this paper), I have quoted Strache's summarization of this topic. In general, I am not certain as to how much more will be added by the summarization of the material to follow to what has already come from the material previously reviewed.

Here is a brief quote from 'Civilized' sexual morality and modern nervous illness, 1908, vol. 9: "Generally speaking, our civilization is built up on the suppression of instincts. Each individual has surrendered some part of his possession--some part of the sense of omnipotence or of the aggressive or vindictive inclination in his personality. From these contributions has grown civilization's common possession of material and ideal property. The sexual instinct--or, more correctly, the sexual instincts, for analytic investigation teaches us that the sexual instinct is made up of many separate constituents or component instincts--is probably more strongly developed in man than in most of the higher animals; it is certainly more constant, since it has almost entirely overcome the periodicity to which it is tied in animals. It places extraordinarily large amounts of force at the disposal of civilized activity, and it does this in virtue of its especially marked characteristic of being able to displace its aim without materially diminishing in intensity. This capacity to exchange its original sexual aim for another one, which is no longer sexual but which is psychically related to the first aim, is called the capacity for sublimation." (165-167).

Hysterical phantasies and their relation to bisexuality, 1903, vol. 9
"...it has been found that the content of the hysteric's unconscious phantasies corresponds completely to the situations in which satisfaction is consciously obtained by perverts....The delusions of paranoids are phantasies of the same nature, though they are phantasies which have become directly conscious. They rest on the sado-masochistic components of the sexual instinct, and they, too, may find their complete counterpart in certain unconscious phantasies of hysterical
subjects. We also know of cases—cases which have their practical importance as well—in which hysterics do not give expression to their phantasies in the form of symptoms but as conscious realizations, and in that way devise and stage assaults, attacks or acts of sexual aggression" (162).

Analysis of a phobia in a five-year-old boy, 1909, vol. 10
In his discussion section of this paper, Freud writes: "Alfred Adler in a suggestive paper, has recently developed the view that anxiety arises from the suppression of what he calls the 'aggressive instinct', and by a very sweeping synthetic process he ascribes to that instinct the chief part in human events, 'in real life and in the neuroses'. As we have come to the conclusion that in our present case of phobia the anxiety is to be explained as being due to the repression of Hans' aggressive propensities (the hostile ones against his father and the sadistic ones against his mother), we seem to have produced a most striking piece of confirmation of Adler's view. I am nevertheless unable to assent to it, and indeed I regard it as a misleading generalization. I cannot bring myself to assume the existence of a special aggressive instinct alongside of the familiar instincts of self-preservation and of sex, and on an equal footing with them. I already made reference to this early view of Freud in the quote by Strachey on page 1 of this paper."

Footnote added 1923: The above passage was written at a time when Adler still seemed to be taking his stand upon the ground of psycho-analysis, and before he had put forward the masculine protest and disavowal of repression. Since then I have myself been obliged to assert the existence of an 'aggressive instinct', but it is different from Adler's. I prefer to call it the 'destructive' or 'death instinct.' (See Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) and The Ego and the Id (1923)). Its opposition to the libidinal instincts finds an expression in the familiar polarity of love and hate. My disagreement with Adler's view, which (as explained later in the paragraph) results in a universal characteristic of instincts in general being reduced to be the property of a single one of them, remains unaltered. It appears to me that Adler has mistaken the uniqueness of the aggressive instinct into a special and self-sustaining instinct which is in reality a universal and indispensable attribute of all instincts—their instinctual and 'pressing' character, what might be described as their capacity for initiating movement. Nothing would then remain of the other instincts but their relation to an aim, for their relation to the means of reaching that aim would have been taken over from them by the 'aggressive instinct'. In spite of all the uncertainty and obscurity of our theory of instincts I should prefer for the present to adhere to the usual view, which leaves each instinct its own power of becoming aggressive; and I should be inclined to recognize the two instincts which became repressed in Hans as familiar components of the sexual libido" (140-141).

Five lectures on psycho-analysis, 1909, vol. 1
This quote is of particular interest in that it equates libido with sexual pleasure: "...we find in children at a very early age manifestations of those instinctual components of sexual pleasure (or, as we like to say, of libido) which presuppose the taking of an extraneous person as an object. These instincts occur in pairs of opposites, active and passive. I may mention as the most important representatives of this group the desire to cause pain (sadism) with its passive counterpart (masochism) and the active and passive desires for looking, from the former of which curiosity branches off later on and from the latter the impulse to artistic and theatrical display" (44).

Instincts and their Vicissitudes, 1915, vol. 14
From Strachey's introduction: "The course of Freud's changing views on the classification of the instincts may perhaps be appropriately summarized here. It is a surprising fact that the instincts make their explicit appearance at a comparatively late point in the sequence of his writings. The word 'instinct' is scarcely to be found in the works of the Breuer period or in the Fliess correspondence or even in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900). Not until in the Three Essays (1905)
is the 'sexual instinct' freely mentioned as such; the 'instinctual impulses',
which were to become one of Freud's commonest terms, seem not to appear till the
paper on 'Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices' (1907). But this is mainly
no more than a verbal point: the instincts were of course there under other names.
Their place was taken to a great extent by such things as 'excitations', 'affec-
tive ideas', 'wishful impulses', 'endogenous stimuli', and so on. For instance,
a distinction is drawn below in Inst. and their Viciss. between a 'stimulus',
which operates as a force giving a single impact, and an 'instinct', which always
operates as a constant one. This precise distinction had been drawn by Freud twenty
years earlier in almost identical words except that instead of 'stimulus'
and 'instinct' he spoke of 'exogenous' and 'endogenous excitations'.

The conflict which underlies the psychoneuroses was at this early period
sometimes described as being between 'the ego' and 'sexuality'; and though the
term 'libido' was often used, the concept was of a manifestation of 'somato-somatic
sexual tension', which in its turn was regarded as a chemical event. Only in the Three
Essays was libido explicitly established as an expression of the sexual instinct.
The other party to the conflict, 'the ego', remained undefined for much longer. It
was chiefly discussed in connection with its functions—in particular 'repression',
'resistance' and 'reality-testing'—but (apart from a very early attempt in...the
'Project') little was said either of its structure or dynamics. The self-
preservative instincts had scarcely ever been referred to, except indirectly
in connection with the theory that the libido had attached itself to them in the
earlier phases of its development; and there seemed no obvious reason for connecting
them with the part played by the ego as the repressive agent in neurotic conflicts.

Then, with apparent suddenness, in a short paper on psychogenic disturbance of
vision (1910), Freud introduced the term 'ego instincts' and identified these on
the one hand with the self-preservative instincts and on the other with the repres-
sive function. From this time forward the conflict was regularly represented as
being between two sets of instincts—the libido and the ego-instincts. The intro-
duction of the concept of 'narcissism', however, raised a complication. In his
paper on that theory (1914), Freud advanced the notion of 'ego-libido' (or'nar-
cissistic libido') which cathects the ego, as contrasted with 'object-libido
which cathects objects. A passage in that paper as well as a remark in the
present one (p. 124) show that he was already feeling uneasy as to whether
his 'dualistic' classification of the instincts would hold. It is true that
in the Schreber analysis (1911) he insisted on the difference between 'ego-cathexes'
and 'libido' and between 'interest emanating from erotic sources' and 'interest
in general'. The term 'interest' is used again in the present paper; and
in Lecture XVII of the Introductory Lectures (1916-17) 'ego-interest' or simply
'interest' is regularly contrasted with 'libido'. Nevertheless, the exact nature
of these non-libidinal instincts was obscure. The turning-point in Freud's
classification of the instincts was reached in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920).
...that work he frankly recognized the difficulty of the position that had
been reached, and explicitly declared that the 'narcissistic libido was of
course a manifestation of the force of the sexual instinct' and that it has
to be identified with the 'self-preservative instincts' 
(1920), pp. 50ff).

He still held, however, that there were ego-institents and object-instincts
other than libidinal ones; and it was here that, still adhering to a dualistic
view, he introduced his hypothesis of the death-instinct. An account of the
development of his views on the classification of the instincts up to that point
was given in the long footnote 
vol. 18, pp. 60-61---I have already quoted this
on the bottom of page 7 of Freud, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), pp. 113-116).

Reversal of content is found in the single instance of the transformation of love into hate. The turning round of an instant upon the subject's own self is made plausible by the reflection that masochism is actually sadism turned round upon the subject's own ego, and that exhibitionism includes looking at his own body. Analytic observation, indeed, leaves us in no doubt that the masochist shares in the enjoyment of the assault upon himself, and that the exhibitionist shares in the enjoyment of (the sight of) his exposure. The essence of the process is thus transformed the change of the object, while the aims remain unchanged. We cannot fail to notice, however, that in these examples the turning round upon the subject's self and the transformation from activity to passivity converge or coincide. To elucidate the situation, a more thorough investigation is essential. In the case of the pair of opposites sadism—masochism, the process may be represented as follows: (a) Sadism consists in the exercise of violence or power upon some other person as object. (b) This object is given up and replaced by the subject's self. With the turning round upon the self the change from an active to a passive instinctual aim is also effected. (c) An extra-neous person is once more sought as object: this person, in consequence of the alteration which has taken place in the instinctual aim, has to take over the role of the subject. Case (c) is what is commonly termed masochism. Here, too, satisfaction follows along a path of the original sadism, the passive ego placing itself back in phantasy in its first role, which has now in fact been taken over by the extraneous subject. Whether there is, besides this, a more direct or primary masochistic satisfaction is highly doubtful. A primary masochism, not derived from sadism in the manner I have described, seems not to be met with. (Footnote: In later works—'The Economic Problem of Masochism'—1924—relating to problems of instinctual life I have expressed an opposite view. See except on pp. 16-18.) That it is not superfluous to assume the existence of stage (b) is to be seen from the behaviour of the sadistic instinct in obsessional neurosis. There there is a turning round upon the subject's self without any attitude of passivity towards another person: the change has only got as far as stage (b). The desire to torture has turned into self-torture and self-punishment, not into masochism. The active voice is changed, not into the passive, but into the reflexive, middle voice (127-128).

"Our view of sadism is further prejudiced by the circumstances that this instinct, side by side with its general aim (or perhaps, rather, within or in it) seems to strive towards the accomplishment of a quite special aim—not only to humiliate and master, but, in addition, to inflict pains. Psycho-analysis would appear to show that the infliction of pain plays no part among the original purposive actions of the instinct. A sadistic child takes no account of whether or not he inflicts pain, nor does he intend to do so. Yet when once the transformation into masochism has taken place, the pains are very well fitted to provide a passive masochistic aim; for we have every reason to believe that sensations of pain, like other unpleasurable sensations, trenched upon sexual excitation and produce a pleasurable condition, for the sake of which the subject will even willingly experience the unpleasure of pain. When once feeling pains has become a masochistic aim, the sadistic aim of causing pains can arise also, retrogressively; for while these pains are inflicted on other people, they are enjoyed masochistically by the subject through his identification with the suffering object. In both cases, of course, it is not the pain itself which is enjoyed, but the accompanying sexual excitation—so that this can be done especially conveniently from the sadistic position. The enjoyment of pain would thus be an aim which was originally masochistic, but which can only become an instinctual aim in someone who was originally sadistic" (128-129).
we see liberated in the fear that emerges at a threat to life, that we cannot conceive how that ego can consent to its own destruction. We have long known, it is true, that no neurotic harbours thoughts of suicide which he has not turned back upon himself from murderous impulses against others, but we have never been able to explain what interplay of forces can carry such a purpose through to execution. The analysis of melancholia now shows that the ego can kill itself only if, owing to the return of the object-cathexis, it can treat itself as an object—if it is able to direct against itself the hostility which relates to an object and which represents the ego's original reaction to objects in the external world. Thus in regression from narcissistic object-choice the object has, it is true, been got rid of, but it has nevertheless proved more powerful than the ego itself. In the two opposed situations of being most intensely in love and of suicide the ego is overwhelmed by the object, though in totally different ways" (252).

From the above through volumes 15, 16, and 17, I have found nothing further to add to this topic of aggressiveness. It thus appears that most of what Freud had to say on this subject began in 1920 (vol. 18) with the appearance of Beyond the Pleasure Principle and what followed. I have already summarized all of those works.