Freud's concept of ANXIETY

Strachey, in an appendix to Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926) (hereafter abbreviated as I, H & A), notes that the topic of anxiety occurs very often in Freud's writings. He lists those works of Freud dealing with this subject that he feels is of some practical use. They include the following: Draft B. 'The Aetiology of the Neuroses', Section II, written 1893, published 1950; Draft B. 'How Anxiety Originates', written 1894, published 1950; Draft F. 'Collection III', No. 1, written 1894, published 1950; and Draft J. Written 1895 (?), published 1950. Strachey is not clear as to just where these four draft articles are to be found. His reference in the bibliography is to The Origins of Psychoanalysis, partly including 'A Project for a Scientific Psychology.' The 'Project' is to be found in volume 1 (which we do not have), but from the reference I am not certain that the four draft articles are to be found there. It seems to me, though, that most probably what Freud thought about anxiety in these very early writings will also be found in his 1895 articles published in vol. 2 which we do have. The remainder of the articles and books noted by Strachey that deal mainly with Freud's ideas on anxiety are: 'Obsessions and Phobias', Section II, 1895; 'On the Grounds for Detaching a Particular Syndrome from Neurasthenia under the Description "Anxiety Neuroses"', 1895; 'A Reply to Criticisms of my Paper on Anxiety Neurosis!', 1895; 'Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy', 1909; '"Wild" Psychoanalysis', 1910; 'From the History of an Infantile Neurosis', 1913; Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, Lecture XXV, 1916-17; Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, 1926; and, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, Lecture XXXII, first part, 1933.

Strachey himself in an introduction to I, H & A (1926) provides a pretty good summary of Freud's changing conceptions of modifications in his view of anxiety. I have already quoted a part of this introduction on pages 1 and 2 of Part II of my summary on Libido and Eros. I will probably repeat some of it here. It might be a good idea to quote at length from this introduction, since it affords an overview of the problem and will help to put what will follow below in proper perspective.

Strachey: "(a) Anxiety as Transformed Libido--It was in the course of investigating the 'actual' neuroses that Freud first came upon the problem of anxiety, and his earliest discussions of it will be found in his first paper on the anxiety neurosis (1895) and in the memorandum on the subject which he sent to Fliess a little earlier, probably in the summer of 1895 (Freud, Draft 1950a, Draft B).... When...he made the clinical discovery that in cases of anxiety neurosis it was always possible to discover some interference with the discharge of sexual tension, it was natural for him to conclude that the accumulated excitation was finding its way out in the transformed shape of anxiety. He regarded this as a purely physical process without any psychological determinants. From the first the anxiety occurring in phobias or in obsessional neuroses raised a complication, for here the presence of psychological events could not be excluded. But, as regards the emergence of anxiety, the explanation remained the same. In these cases--in the psychoneuroses--the reason for the accumulation of undischarged excitation was a psychological one: repression. But what followed was the same as in the 'actual' neuroses: the accumulated excitation (or libido) was transformed directly into anxiety....It is curious to note, however, that at quite an early stage Freud seems to have been assailed by doubts as to the subject. In a letter to Fliess of November 14, 1897,... he remarks, without any apparent connection with the rest of what he has been writing about: 'I have decided, then, henceforth to regard as separate factors what causes libido and what causes anxiety.' No further evidence is anywhere to be found of this isolated recantation. In the work before us Freud gave up the theory he had held for so long. He no longer regarded anxiety as transformed libido, but as a reaction on a particular modal to situations of danger. But even here he still maintained (p. 141) that it was very possible that in the case of the anxiety neurosis 'what finds discharge in the generating of anxiety is
precisely the surplus of unutilized libido'. This last relic of the old theory was to be abandoned a few years later. In a passage near the end of his dis-
cussion of anxiety in Lecture XXXII of his New Introductory Lectures (1933) he wrote that in the anxiety neurosis, too, the appearance of anxiety was a reac-
tion to a traumatic situation: 'We shall no longer maintain that it is the libido itself that is turned into anxiety in such cases.' (78-99).

"(b) Realistic and Neurotic Anxiety--In spite of his theory that neurotic anxiety was merely transformed libido, Freud was from the first at pains to insist on the close relation between anxiety due to external and to instinctual dangers. In his first paper on the anxiety neuroses (1895) he wrote: 'The psyche is overtaken by the affect  of anxiety if its feels that it is incapable of dealing by an appropriate reaction with a task (a danger) approaching from the outside. In neuroses it is overtaken by anxiety if it notices that it is incapable of allaying a (sexual) excitation that has arisen from within. Thus it behaves as though it were projecting this excitation to the outside. The affect [normal anxiety] and the corresponding neurosis stand in a firm relation to each other: the former is the reaction to an exogenous excitation and the latter to an analogous endogenous one.' This position, especially in connection with phobia, was elaborated in many of Freud's writings....But it was difficult to maintain the sameness of the anxiety in the two classes of cases so long as the direct derivation of anxiety from libido was insisted on for the 'actual' neuroses. With the abandonment of this view and with the new distinction between automatic anxiety and anxiety as a signal, the whole situation was clarified and there ceased to be any reason for seeing a generic difference between neurotic and realistic anxiety" (80).

"(c) The Traumatic Situation and Situations of Danger--It adds to the difficulties of this book that the distinction between anxiety as a direct and automatic reaction to a trauma and anxiety as a signal of danger of the approach of such a trauma, although touched on at several earlier points, is only clinched in the very last chapter....The fundamental determinant of automatic anxiety is the occurrence of a traumatic situation; and the essence of this is an ex-
perience of helplessness on the part of the ego in the face of an accumulation of excitation, whether of external or of internal origin, which cannot be dealt with (pp. 137 add 166). Anxiety 'as a signal' is the response of the ego to the threat  of the occurrence of a traumatic situation. Such a threat  constitutes a situation of danger. Internal dangers  with the period of life (pp. 146-7), but they have a common characteristic, namely that they involve separation from, or loss of, a loved object, or a loss of its love (p. 151)--a loss or separation which might in various ways lead to an accumulation of unsatisfied desires and so to a situation of helplessness.

Though Freud has not brought all these factors together before, each of them has a long previous history. The traumatic situation is clearly the direct descen-
dant of the state of accumulated and undischarged tension in Freud's earliest writings on anxiety. Some of the accounts of it given here might be quotations from 1894 or 1895. For instance, 'suffering a pain which will not stop or experiencing an accumulation of instinctual needs which cannot obtain satisfac-
tion' on p. 168 below may be compared with 'a psychical accumulation of exci-
tation...due to discharge being held up', from 'Draft E' (Freud, 1950 (written 1894)). At this early period the accumulated excitation, it is true, were almost invariably thought of as libidinal, but not quite invariably. Later on in the same 'Draft E' is a sentence which points out that anxiety may be 'a sensation of an accumulation of another endogenous stimulus--the stimulus towards breathing...; anxiety may therefore be capable of being used in relation to accumulated physical tension in general.' Again, in the 'Project' of 1895...Freud enumerates the major needs which give rise to endogenous stimuli calling for discharge--'hunger, respiration and sexuality', and in a later passage...remarks that in some conditions this discharge 'requires an alteration  in the external world (e.g., the supply of nourishment or the proximity of the sexual object)' which 'at early stages the human organism
is incapable of achieving.' To bring this about 'extraneous help' is needed, which the child attracts by his screams. And here Freud comments on the 'original helplessness of human beings'. There is a similar reference in

...the same work to the necessity of 'attracting the attention of some helpful personage (who is usually the wished-for object itself) to the child's longing and distress'. These passages seem to be an early hint at the situation of helplessness described here (pp. 136-8), in which the infant misses his mother--a situation that had been clearly stated in the footnote to the Three Essays (1905) in which Freud explained a child's anxiety in the dark as being due to 'the absence of someone he loved'....But this has taken us on to the question of the various specific dangers which are liable to precipitate a traumatic situation at different times of life. These are briefly: birth, loss of the mother as an object, loss of the penis, loss of the object's love, loss of the super-ego's love. The question of birth is dealt with in the next section and we have just mentioned some early references to the importance of separation from the mother. The danger of castration with its devastating effects is no doubt the most familiar of all these dangers. But it is worth recalling a footnote added in 1923 to the case of 'Little Hans' (1909), in which Freud deprecates the application of the name 'castration complex' to the other kinds of separation which the child must inevitably experience (vol. 10, 8n). We may possibly see in that passage a first hint at the concept of anxiety due to separation which comes into prominence here. The stress laid on the danger of losing the love of the loved object is explicitly related (on p. 143) to the characteristics of female sexuality, which had only recently begun to occupy Freud's mind. Finally, the danger of losing the love of the super-ego carries us back to the long-debated problems of the sense of guilt, which had been restated only shortly before in The Ego and the Id (1923)." (81-83).

"(d) Anxiety as a Signal--As applied to unpleasure in general, this notion was a very old one of Freud's. In Section 6 of Part II of the posthumous Project' of 1895...there is an account of a mechanism by which the ego restricts the generation of painful experiences: 'In this way the release of unpleasure is restricted in quantity, and its start acts as a signal to the ego to set normal defence in operation.' Similarly in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900)...[page 602, vol. 5]...it is laid down that thinking must aim 'at restricting the development of affect in thought-activity to the minimum required for acting as a signal.' In The Unconscious! (1915, vol. 14, p. 183), the idea is already applied to anxiety. Discussing the appearance of 'substitutive ideas' in phobia, Freud writes: 'Excitation of any point in this outer structure must inevitably, on account of its connection with the substitutive idea, give rise to a slight development of anxiety; and this is now used as a signal to inhibit...the further progress of the development of anxiety.' Similarly in Lecture XXV of Introductory Lectures the state of 'anxious expectancy' is described in one or two places as offering a 'signal' to prevent an outbreak of severe anxiety. From this it was not a long step to the illuminating exposition in these pages. It may be remarked that in the present work too the concept is first introduced as a signal of 'unpleasure' (p. 92) and only subsequently as one of 'anxiety'." (83).

"(e) Anxiety and Birth--[I have covered this topic in detail in a separate paper; I gave Annis my copy of this paper which she gave you in NYC.] There remains the question of what it is that determines the form in which anxiety is manifested. This, too, was discussed by Freud in his early writings. To begin with (consistently with his view of anxiety as transformed libido) he regarded the most striking of its symptoms—the breathlessness and palpitations—as elements in the act of copulation, which, in the absence of the normal means of discharging the excitation, made their appearance in an isolated and exaggerated shape....It is not clear how all this fitted in with Freud's views on the expression of the emotions in general. These seem certainly to have been ultimately derived from Darwin. In the Studies on Hysteria (1895) he twice
quoted Darwin's volume on the subject..., and on the second occasion recalled that Darwin has taught us that the expression of the emotions 'consists of actions which originally had a meaning and served a purpose'...In a discussion before the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society in 1909, Freud is reported by Jones...as having said that 'every affect...is only a reminiscence of an event'. Much later, in Lecture XXV of the Introductory Lectures (1916-17), he took up this point again, and expressed his belief that the 'nucleus' of an affect is 'the repetition of some particular significant experience'. He recalled, too, the explanation he had earlier given of hysterical attacks (vol. 9, p. 232) as revivals of events in infancy, and added his conclusion that a hysterical attack may be likened to a freshly constructed individual affect, and a normal affect to the expression of a general hysteria which has become a heritage. He repeats this theory in almost the same terms in the present work (pp. 93 and 133). Whatever part this theory of the affects played in Freud's earlier explanation of the form taken by anxiety, it played an essential one in his new explanation, which emerged, apparently without warning, in a footnote added to the second edition of The Interpretation of Dreams (vol. 5, p. 400).

At the end of some discussion of phantasies about life in the womb, he went on...

'Moreover, the act of birth is the first experience of anxiety, and thus the source and prototype of the affect of anxiety.' The edition was published in 1909, but the preface is dated 'Summer 1908'...the subject lay fallow for some years, till it suddenly re-appeared at the end of the last paragraph but two of The Ego and the Id (1923), where Freud spoke of birth as 'the first great anxiety-state'. This carries us up to the time of the publication of Rank's book The Trauma of Birth. The chronological relation between this sentence of Freud's and Rank's book is not entirely clear. The Ego and the Id was published in April, 1923. The title-page of Rank's book bears the date '1924'; but on its last page appear the words 'written in April, 1923', and the dedication declare that the book was 'presented' to Freud on May 6, 1923 (Freud's birthday). Although Ernest Jones...says that specifically that Freud had not read it before its publication in December, 1923, he had nevertheless been aware of the general line of Rank's ideas as early as in September, 1922..., and this is no doubt enough to account for the reference to birth in The Ego and the Id. Rank's book was far more than an adoption of Freud's explanation of the form taken by anxiety. He argued that all later attacks of anxiety were attempts at 'abreacting' the trauma of birth. He accounted for all neuroses in similar lines, incidentally dethroning the Oedipus complex, and proposed a reformed therapeutic technique based on the overcoming of the birth trauma. Freud's published references to the book seemed at first to be favourable. But the present work shows a complete and final reversal of that opinion. His rejection of Rank's views, however, stimulated him into a reconsideration of his own, and Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety was the result." (83-86). This concludes Strachey's introduction to I, S & A. Since I have already reviewed in detail Freud's ideas on the birth as the prototype for anxiety in a separate paper, I will not attend very much to that topic in the summarizations that follow.

There is another excerpt from Strachey which is worth quoting before going into a review of what Freud himself had to say about anxiety. This is an appendix to the 1895 papers on anxiety neuroses. Strachey: "The Term 'Angst' and its English Translation--There are at least three passages in which Freud discusses the various shades of meaning expressed by the German word 'Angst' and the cognates 'Furcht' and 'Schreck'. (These are to be found in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, vol. 18, p. 12; I, S & A, vol. 20, pp. 164-5; and a paragraph near the beginning of Lecture XXV of the Intro. Lectures, vol. 16.) Though he stresses the anticipatory element and absence of an object in 'Angst', the distinctions he draws are not entirely convincing, and his actual usage is far from invariably obeying them. And this is scarcely surprising, since 'Angst' is a word in common use in ordinary German speech and by no means exclusively a technical psychiatric term. It may on occasion be translated by any one of half a dozen similarly common English words--'fear', 'fright',...
'alarm', and so on—and it is therefore quite unpractical to fix on some single English term as its sole translation. Nevertheless 'Angst' does often appear as a psychiatric term (particularly in such combinations as 'Angstneurose' or 'Angstanfall') and for such occasions an English technical equivalent seems to be called for. The word universally, and perhaps unfortunately, adopted for the purpose has been 'anxiety'. This has a current everyday meaning, and one which has only a rather remote connection with any of the uses of the German 'Angst'. There is, however, a well-established psychiatric, or at least medical, use of the English 'anxiety', going back (so the Oxford Dictionary tells us) to the middle of the seventeenth century. Indeed, the psychiatric use of the two words brings to light their parallel origins. 'Angst' is akin to 'eng', the German word for 'narrow', 'restricted'; 'anxiety' is derived from the Latin 'angere', 'to throttle' or 'squeeze'; in both cases the reference is to the choking feelings which characterize severe forms of the psychological state in question. A still more acute condition is described in English by the word 'anguish', which has the same derivation; and it is to be remarked that Freud in his French papers uses the kindred word 'angoisse' (as well as the synonymous 'anxiète') to render the German 'Angst'. The English translator is thus driven to compromise: he must use 'anxiety' in technical or semi-technical connections, and must elsewhere choose whatever everyday English word seems most appropriate. Incidentally, the solution adopted in many of the earlier Freud translations of rendering 'Angst' by 'morbid anxiety' seems especially ill-judged. One of the main theoretical problems discussed by Freud is precisely whether, and if so why, 'Angst' is sometimes pathological and sometimes normal." (vol. 2, 116-7).

Freud:

'Obsessions and Phobias,' 1895, vol. 3

"I hope to be able to demonstrate, on another occasion, (Footnote: The first paper on anxiety neurosis (1895) had in fact been published a fortnight before the present one. [That paper is reviewed following this one. Freud wrote the other paper later than he wrote this one, but it was published just earlier than this one.] that there is reason to distinguish a special neurosis, the 'anxiety neurosis', of which the chief symptom is this emotional state. I shall then enumerate its various symptoms and insist on the necessity for differentiating this neurosis from neurasthenia, with which it is now confused. Phobias, then, are a part of the anxiety neurosis, and are almost always accompanied by other symptoms of the same group. The anxiety neurosis, too, has a sexual origin as far as I can see, but it does not attach itself to ideas taken from sexual life; properly speaking, it has no psychical mechanisms. Its specific cause is the accumulation of sexual tension, produced by abstinence or by unconsummated sexual excitation (using the term as a general formula for the effects of coitus reservatus, of relative impotence in the husband, of excitation without satisfaction in engaged couples, of enforced abstinence, etc.). It is under such conditions, extremely frequent in modern society, especially among women, that anxiety neurosis (of which phobias are a psychical manifestation develops)" (81).

On the Grounds for Detaching a Particular Syndrome from Neurasthenia under the Description 'Anxiety Neurosis'. 1895, vol. 3

Freud labels a syndrome which he detaches from neurasthenia in this paper 'anxiety neurosis.' In his first section of this paper, he describes the clinical symptomology of anxiety neurosis. "What I call 'anxiety neurosis' may be observed in a completely developed form or in a rudimentary one, in isolation or combined with other neuroses....The clinical picture of anxiety neurosis comprises the following symptoms: (1) General irritability. This is a common nervous symptom and as such belongs to many status nervosi....Increased irritability always points to an accumulation of excitation or an inability to tolerate such an accumulation—that is, to an absolute or a relative accumulation of excitation.... (2) Anxious expectation....Anxious expectation, of course, shades off imperceptibly into normal anxiety, comprising all that is ordinarily spoken of as anxiousness--
or a tendency to take a pessimistic view of things; but at every opportunity
it goes beyond a plausible anxiousness of this kind, and it is frequently re-
cognized by the patient himself as a kind of compulsion. For one form of an-
xious expectation—that relating to the subject's own health—we may reserve
the old term hypochondria....A further expression of anxious expectation is no
doubt to be found in the inclination to moral anxiety, scrupulosity
and pedantry....Anxious expectation is the nuclear symptom of the neurosis. It
openly reveals, too, a portion of the theory of the neurosis. We may perhaps
say that here a quantum of anxiety in a freely floating state is present, which,
where there is expectation, controls the choice of ideas and is always ready to
link itself with any suitable ideational content" (92-93). "(3) But anxiousness--
which, though most latent as regards consciousness, is constantly lurking in
the background—has other means of finding expression besides this. It can
suddenly break through into consciousness without being aroused by a train of
ideas, and thus provoke an anxiety attack. An anxiety attack of this sort may
consist of the feeling of anxiety, alone, without any associated idea, or accom-
panied by the interpretation that is nearest to hand, such as the ideas of the
extinction of life, or of a stroke, or of a threat of madness; or else some kind
of paraesthesia...may be combined with the feeling of anxiety, or, finally, the
feeling of anxiety may have linked to it a disturbance of one or more of the
bodily functions—such as respiration, heart action, vasomotor innervation or
ganglionic activity....(4) Now if is an interesting fact, add an important one from
a diagnostic point of view, that the proportion in which these elements are
mixed in an anxiety attack varies to a remarkable degree, and that almost every
accompanying symptom alone can constitute the attack just as well as can the
anxiety itself. There are consequently rudimentary anxiety attacks and equivalents
of anxiety attacks, all probably having the same significance, which exhibit a
great wealth of forms that has as yet been little appreciated....(5) Waking up at
night in a fright..., which is usually combined with anxiety, dyspnoea, sweat-
ing and so on, is very often nothing else than a variant of the anxiety attack....
(6) 'Vertigo' occupies a prominent place in the group of symptoms of anxiety
neurosis. In its mildest form it is best described as 'giddiness'; in its
severer manifestations, as 'attacks of vertigo' (with or without anxiety),
it must be classed among the gravest symptoms of the neurosis. (93-95). "(7) On the
basis of chronic anxiousness (anxious expectation) on the one hand, and a ten-
dency to anxiety attacks accompanied by vertigo on the other, two groups of
typical phobias develop, the first relating to general physiological dangers,
the second relating to locomotion. To the first group belong fear of snakes,
thunderstorms, darkness, vermin, and so on, as well as the typical moral over-
scrupulosity and forms of doubting mania. Here the available anxiety is simply
employed to reinforce aversions which are instinctively implanted in everyone. But
as a rule a phobia which acts in an obsessional manner is only formed if there is
added to this the recollection of an experience in which the anxiety was able
to find expression—as, for instance, after the patient has experienced a thunder-
storm in the open....The other group includes agrophobia with all its accessory
forms, the whole of them characterized by their relation to locomotion....(8) The
digestive activities undergo only a few disturbances in anxiety neurosis; but
these are characteristic ones. Sensations such as an inclination to vomit and
nausea are not rare, and the symptom of ravenous hunger may, by itself or in
conjunction with other symptoms (such as congestions), give rise to a rudimentary
anxiety attack. As a chronic change, analogous to anxious expectation, we find
an inclination to diarrhoea, and this has been the occasion of the strangest
diagnostic errors....(9) The paraesthesias which may accompany attacks of
vertigo or anxiety are interesting because they, like the sensations of the
hysterical aura, become associated in a definite sequence; although I find that
these associations, in contrast to the hysterical ones, are atypical and changing....
(10) Several of the symptoms I have mentioned, which accompany or take the place
of an anxiety attack, also appear in a chronic form. In that case they are still
less easy to recognize, since the anxious sensation which goes with them is
less clear than in an anxiety attack" (96-98).
In the second section of this paper, Freud takes up the incidence and aetiology of anxiety neurosis. "In some cases of anxiety no aetiology at all is to be discovered. It is worth nothing that in such cases there is seldom any difficulty in establishing evidence of a grave hereditary taint. But where there are grounds for regarding the neurosis as an acquired one, careful enquiry directed to that end reveals that a set of noxae and influences from the sexual life are the operative aetiological factors.... This sexual aetiology of anxiety neurosis can be demonstrated with such overwhelming frequency that I venture, for the purpose of this short paper, to disregard those cases where the aetiology is doubtful or different. In order that the aetiological conditions under which anxiety neurosis makes its appearance may be presented with greater accuracy, it will be advisable to consider males and females separately. In females—disregarding for the moment their innate disposition—anxiety neurosis occurs in the following cases: (a) As virginal anxiety or anxiety in adolescents. A number of unambiguous observations have shown me that anxiety neurosis can be produced in girls who are approaching maturity by their first encounter with the problem of sex, by any more or less sudden revelation of what had till then been hidden—for instance, by witnessing the sexual act, or being told or reading about these things. Such an anxiety neurosis is combined with hysteria in an almost typical fashion. (b) As anxiety in the newly-married. Young married women who have remained anaesthetic during their first cohabitations not seldom fall ill of an anxiety neurosis, which disappears once more as soon as the anaesthesia gives place to normal sensitivity. Since most young wives remain healthy where there is initial anaesthesia of this kind, it follows that, in order that this kind of anxiety shall emerge, other determinants are required; and these I will mention later. (c) As anxiety in women whose husbands suffer from ejaculatio praecox or from markedly impaired potency; and (d) whose husbands practise coitus interruptus or reservatus. These cases (c) and (d) belong together, for on analysing a great number of instances it is easy to convince oneself that they depend simply on whether the woman obtains satisfaction in coitus or not. If not, the condition for the genesis of an anxiety neurosis is given.... (e) Anxiety neurosis also occurs as anxiety in widows and intentionally abstinent women, not seldom in a typical combination with obsessional ideas; and (f) As anxiety in the climacteric during the last major increase of sexual need. Cases (c), (d), and (e) comprise the conditions under which anxiety neurosis in the female sex arises most frequently and most readily, independently of hereditary disposition" (99-101).

He then goes on to discuss the sexual determinants of anxiety neurosis in men, all of which, he says, have their analogies in women: "(a) Anxiety of intentionally abstinent men, which is frequently combined with symptoms of defence (obsessional ideas, hysteria). The motives which are responsible for intentional abstinence imply that a number of men with a hereditary disposition, ecentrics, etc., enter into this category. (b) Anxiety in men in a state of unconsummated excitation (e.g., during the period of engagement before marriage), or in those who are (from fear of the consequences of sexual intercourse) content themselves with touching or looking at women. This group of determinants—which, incidentally, can be applied unaltered to the other sex (during engagements or relations in which sexual intercourse is avoided)—provides the purest cases of the neurosis. (c) Anxiety in men who practise coitus interruptus. As has been said, coitus interruptus is injurious to the woman if it is practised without regard to her satisfaction; but it is injurious to the man, if, in order to obtain satisfaction for her, he directs coitus voluntarily and postpones emission.... (d) Anxiety in senescent men. There are men who have a climacteric like women, and who produce an anxiety neurosis at the time of their decreasing potency and increasing libido. [Footnote by Strachey that here seems to be Freud's first published use of the term 'libido'.] Finally, I must add two other cases which apply to both sexes: (a) People who, as a result of practising masturbations, have become neurasthenics, fall victim to anxiety neurosis as soon as they give up their form of sexual satisfaction. Such people have made themselves particularly incapable of tolerating abstinence.... (b) The last of the aetiological
conditions I have to bring forward appears at first sight not to be of a sexual nature at all. Anxiety neurosis also arises— and in both sexes—as a result of the factor of overwork or exhausting exertion—as, for instance, after night-watching, sick-nursing, or even after severe illness" (101-102).

"I will confine myself here...to the single aetiological factor of coitus interruptus and to bringing out certain observations which confirm it. (a) So long as an anxiety neurosis in young married women is not yet established, but only appears in bouts and disappears again spontaneously, it is possible to demonstrate that each such bout of the neurosis is traceable to a coitus which was deficient in satisfaction. Two days after this experience—or, in the case of people with little resistance, the day after—the attack of anxiety or vertigo regularly appears, bringing vertigo in its train other symptoms of the neurosis. All this vanishes once more, provided the marital intercourse is comparatively rare. The point being that excitement is built up during intercourse, but there is no satisfaction—no outlet—no climax—and the woman is frustrated and dissatisfied. If, as a physician who understands this aetiologie, one arranges, in a case in which the neurosis has not yet been established, for coitus interruptus to be replaced by normal intercourse, one obtains a therapeutic proof of the assertion that I have made. The anxiety is removed, and—unless there is fresh cause for it of the same sort—it does not return. (2) In the anamneses of many cases of anxiety neurosis we find, both in men and women, a striking oscillation in the intensity of its manifestations, and, indeed, in the coming and going of the whole condition. One year, they will tell you, was almost entirely good, but the next was dreadful; on one occasion the improvement seemed to be due to a particular treatment, which, however, turned out to be quite useless at the next attack; and so on. If we enquire into the number and sequence of the children and compare this record of the marriage with the peculiar history of the neurosis, we arrive at the simple solution that the periods of improvement or good health coincided with the wife's pregnancies, during which, of course, the need for preventive intercourse was no longer present. The husband benefited by the treatment after which he found his wife pregnant. (3) The anamnesis of patients often discloses that the symptoms of anxiety neurosis have at some definite time succeeded the symptoms of some other neurosis—neurasthenia, perhaps—and have taken their place. In these instances it can quite regularly be shown that, shortly before this change of the picture, a corresponding change has occurred in the form of the sexual noxa. Observations of this sort, which can be multiplied at will, positively thrust a sexual aetiologie on the doctor for a certain category of cases....

Speaking of those cases where the aetiological conditions seems to be from overwork of illness, etc., he says: I think that in these instances the effect is not explained by the ostensible aetiologie. One is not necessarily 'overworked' by study, and a healthy mother as a rule reacts only with normal grief to the loss of a child. Above all, however, I should have expected the student, as a result of his overwork, to acquire cerebral neurasthenia, and the mother, as a result of her bereavement, hysteria. That both should have been overtaken by anxiety neurosis leads me to attach importance to the fact that the mother had been living for eight years in conditions of marital coitus interruptus, and that the student had for three years had an ardent love-affair with a 'respectable' girl whom he had to avoid making pregnant. These considerations lead us to the conclusion that the specific sexual noxa of coitus interruptus, even when it is not able on its own account to provoke an anxiety neurosis in the subject, does at least dispose him to acquire it. The anxiety neurosis breaks out/soon as there is added to the latent effect of the specific factor the effect of another, stock noxa. The latter can act in the sense of the specific factor quantitatively but cannot replace it qualitatively. The specific factor always remains decisive for the form taken by the neurosis....In addition, these latter remarks contain an assumption which is not in itself improbable, to the effect that a sexual noxa like coitus interruptus comes into force through summation. A shorter or longer time is needed—depending on the individual's disposition and any other
inherted weaknesses of his nervous system—before the effect of this summation becomes visible. Those individuals who apparently tolerate coitus interruptus without harm, in fact become disposed by it to the disorders of anxiety neurosis, and these may break out at some time or other, either spontaneously or after a stock trauma which would not ordinarily suffice for this; just as, by the path of summation, a chronic alcoholic will in the end develop a cirrhosis or some other illness, or will, under the influence of a fever, fall a victim to delirium (103-106).

In the third section of this paper, Freud presents the "First steps towards a theory of anxiety neurosis——... What we have so far said about anxiety neurosis already provides a few starting points for gaining an insight into the mechanism of this neurosis. In the first place there was our suspicion that we had to do with an accumulation of excitation; and then there was the extremely important fact that the anxiety which underlies the clinical symptoms of the neurosis can be traced back to no psychical origin. Such an origin would exist, for instance, if it was found that the anxiety neurosis was based on a single or repeated justifiable fright, and that that fright had since provided the source for the subject's readiness for anxiety. But this is not so. Hystasia or a traumatic neurosis can be acquired from a single fright, but never anxiety neurosis. A further point of departure is furnished by the observation, not so far mentioned, that in whole sets of anxiety neurosis is accompanied by a most noticeable decrease of sexual libido or psychical desire, so that on being told that their complaint results from 'insufficient satisfaction', patients regularly reply that that is impossible, for precisely now all sexual need has become extinguished in them. From all these indications—that we have to do with an accumulation of excitation; that the anxiety which probably corresponds to this accumulated excitation is of somatic origin, so that what is being accumulated is a somatic excitation; and, further, that this somatic excitation is of a sexual nature and that a decrease of psychical participation in the sexual process goes along with it—all these indications, I say, incline us to expect that the mechanism of anxiety neurosis is to be looked for in a deflection of somatic sexual excitation from the psychical sphere, and in a consequent abnormal employment of that excitation" (107-108).

"I will now attempt to discover whether the aetiological conditions for anxiety neurosis which I set out above [in Section 2 of this paper] exhibit the common character that I have just attributed to them. The first aetiological factor that I postulated for men was intentional abstinence. Abstinence consists in the withholding of the specific action which ordinarily follows upon libido. Such withholding may have two consequences. In the first place, the somatic excitation accumulates; it is then deflected into other paths, which hold out greater promise of discharge than does the path through the psyche. Thus the libido will in the end sink, and the excitation will manifest itself subcortically as anxiety. In the second place, if the libido is not diminished, or if the somatic excitation is expended, by a short cut, in emissions, or if, in consequence of being forced back, the excitation really ceases, then all kinds of things other than an anxiety neurosis will ensue. Abstinence, then, leads to anxiety neurosis in the manner described above" (109-110). Then Freud takes up the other etiological conditions described in Section 2 and shows how the same principle of deflected somatic excitation is the cause for the anxiety neurosis. Here, I want to quote again a part of Strachey's introduction to this paper. He says: "He had not wholly adopted the hypothesis of there being unconscious mental processes....Thus in the present paper he distinguishes between 'somatic sexual excitation' on the one hand and 'sexual libido, or psychical desire' on the other. (See quote from pp. 107-108 just above.) 'Libido' is regarded as something exclusively 'psychical' though, again, no clear distinction seems yet to have been made between 'psychical' and 'conscientious'. It is interesting to notice that Freud in the abstract of this paper which Freud himself wrote only a couple of years later (1897), p. 251 below, he evidently already accepts the view of libido as something potentially unconscious and writes: 'Neurotic anxiety is
transformed sexual libido.' But in whatever terms he expressed this theory, it was one which he held till very late in life, though with a number of qualifying complications. For a long series of changing opinions lay ahead, some account of which will be found in the Editor's Introduction to the last of his major works on the subject, Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926). I have quoted this introduction at length on pp. 1-4 of this review. [10] (pp. 88-89). I have quoted this section again here because it makes clear that Freud, at least in this early work, saw libido as something psychical, and somatic sexual excitation as something different from libido. But yet it does seem as though the two are intertwined, i.e., that the libido as something psychical is the cause of the increase of the somatic excitation. The anxiety is due to a deflected somatic excitation, originating from an analogous source of excitation which is external" (111-112 JT MS. 

In his last section, of less interest here, Freud takes up the question of the relation of anxiety neurosis to other neuroses: "For the purpose of analysing mixed neuroses' I can state this important truth: Wherever a mixed neurosis is present, it will be possible to discover an intermixture of several specific aetiologies...it appears that we must further distinguish the aetiological conditions for the onset of the neuroses from their specific aetiological
factors. The former—for example, coitus interruptus, masturbation or abstinence—are still ambiguous, and each of them can produce different neuroses. Only the aetiological factors which can be picked out in them, such as inadequate disburdening, psychical insufficiency or defence accompanied by substitution, have an unambiguous and specific relation to the aetiology of the individual major neuroses" (113-114).

There is not a great deal added to this paper, as far as Freud's concept of anxiety itself is concenred, by the one which follows this one: "A reply to criticisms of my paper on anxiety neurosis", also written in 1895, vol. 3. Here are a few of the more pertinent quotes from this paper: In briefly re-viewing his earlier paper, Freud says: "I arrived at the proposition: anxiety neurosis is created by everything which keeps somatic sexual tension away from the psychical sphere, which interferes with its being worked over psychically. If we go back to the concrete circumstances in which this factor becomes operative, we are led to assert that (sexual) abstinence, whether voluntary or involuntary, sexual intercourse with incomplete satisfaction, coitus interruptus, deflection of psychical interest from sexuality, and similar things, are the specific aetiological factors of the states to which I have given the name of anxiety neurosis" (124)...."If anyone wants to prove to me that in these remarks I have unduly neglected the significance of the stock aetiological factors, he must confront me with observations in which my specific factor is missing—that is, with cases in which anxiety neurosis has arisen after a psychical shock although the subject has (on the whole) led a normal vita sexualis" (128)...."When I consult my experience...I cannot find that there is any antithetic relation as regards anxiety between hereditary disposition and the specific sexual factor. On the contrary, the two aetiological factors support and supplement each other, The sexual factor is usually only operative in those who have an innate hereditary taint as well; heredity alone is usually not able to produce an anxiety neurosis, but waits for the occurrence of a specific amount of the specific sexual noxa. The discovery of the hereditary element does not, therefore, exempt us from searching for a specific factor. On its discovery, incidentally, all our therapeutic interest as well depends. For what can we do therapeutically about heredity as an aetiological element? It has always been there in the patient and will continue to be there until the end of his life. Taken by itself, it cannot help us to understand either the episodic onset of a neurosis or the cessation of a neurosis as a result of treatment. It is nothing but a precondition of the neurosis—an inexpressably important precondition, it is true, but nevertheless one which has been over-estimated, to the detriment of therapy and theoretical comprehension" (138).

Here are a few brief quotes from The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), vol. 5, which bear on this topic, although there is nothing really new in Freud's ideas on anxiety here. The following footnote about the experience of birth being the prototype for anxiety was added in 1909. I repeat it here, although, as I have written previously, everything that Freud has to say about this relationship was already covered in my paper on this topic. "It was not for a long time that I learned to appreciate the importance of phantasies and unconscious thoughts about life in the womb. They contain an explanation of the remarkable dread that many people have of being buried alive; and they also afford the deepest unconscious basis for the belief in survival after death, which merely represents a projection into the future of this uncanny life before birth. Moreover, the act of birth is the first experience of anxiety, and thus the source and prototype of the affect of anxiety" (400-401). Perhaps there is something new in this, for my impression in his earlier paper was that the intensification of bodily reactions in sexual intercourse was the prototype of the anxiety reaction (attack). In his paper on the anxiety neurosis, vol. 3, p. 111, he wrote: "The view developed depicts the symptoms of anxiety neurosis as being in a sense surrogates of the omitted specific action following on sexual excitation. In further support of this view, I may point out that in normal copulation too the excitation expends itself, among other things, in accelerated breathing, palpitation, sweating,
Back to The Inter, of Dreams: "It is, I may say, a matter of daily experience that sexual intercourse between adults strikes any children who may observe it as something uncanny and that it arouses anxiety in them. I have explained this anxiety by arguing that what we are dealing with is a sexual excitement with which their understanding is unable to cope and which they also, no doubt, repudiate because their parents are involved in it, and which is therefore transformed into anxiety. At a still earlier period of life sexual excitations directed towards a parent of the opposite sex have not yet met with repression and, as we have seen, are freely expressed" (585). And referring to a case of a child who developed anxiety: "There is really very little difficulty in inferring: (1) that the boy had masturbated when he was younger, that he had probably denied it, and that he had been threatened with severe punishment for his bad habit...; (2) that with the onset of puberty the temptation to masturbate had revived with the tickling in his genitals; but (3) that a struggle for repression had broken out in him, which had suppressed his libido and transformed it into anxiety, and that the anxiety had taken over the punishments with which he had been threatened earlier" (586).

From Delusions and Dreams in Jensen's Gradiva, *written* 1906, published 1907, vol. 9: Freud is discussing a dream which he defines as an anxiety-dream. "Its content was frightening, the dreamer felt anxiety while he slept and he was left with painful feelings afterwards. Now this is far from convenient for our attempt at an explanation; and we must once again borrow heavily from the theory of dream-interpretation. We are warned by that theory not to fall into the error of tracing the anxiety that may be felt in a dream to the content of the dream, and not to treat the content of the dream as though it were the content of an idea occurring in waking life. It points out to us how often we dream the most ghastly things without feeling a trace of anxiety. The true situation, we learn, is quite a different one, which cannot be easily guessed, but which can be proved with certainty. The anxiety in anxiety-dreams, like neurotic anxiety in general, corresponds to a sexual affect, a libidinal feeling, and arises out of libido by the process of repression. When we interpret a dream, therefore, we must replace anxiety by sexual excitement. The anxiety that originates in this way has—not invariably, but frequently—a selective influence on the content of the dream and introduces into it ideational elements which seem, when the dream is looked at from a conscious and mistaken point of view, to be appropriate to the effect of anxiety. As I have said, this is not invariably so, for there are plenty of anxiety-dreams in which the content is not in the least frightening and where it is therefore impossible to give an explanation on conscious lines of the anxiety that is felt" (60-61). Here, too, we see the explanation for the cause of anxiety to be the one given in his papers on anxiety neurosis, i.e., that anxiety arises out of libido via repression. I believe he kept to this idea until he amended it in *Inhibt, Symp., & Anx.*, in 1926. I might point out here another aspect of Freud's theory on anxiety which he changed in later writings. In his early works, he saw anxiety arising as a result of repression, i.e., repression produced anxiety; in his later works, beginning with *Inhibt, Symp., & Anx.*, he corrected this view in that: "It was anxiety which produced repression and not, as I formerly believed, repression which produced anxiety" (Inhibt, Symp., & Anx., vol. 20, 1926, pp. 108-109). A quote from an earlier view is found in "Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices," 1907, vol. 9, in which, when speaking about a reaction-formation, he says: "In the course of the repression of this instinct a special conscientiousness is created which is directed against the instinct's aims; but this psychical reaction-formation feels insecure and constantly threatened by the instinct which is lurking in the unconscious. The influence of the repressed instinct is felt as a..."
temptation, and during the process of repression itself anxiety is generated, which gains control over the future in the form of expectant anxiety. The process of repression which leads to obsessional neurosis must be considered as one which is only partly successful and which increasingly threatens to fail" (124).

Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy, 1909, vol. 10
This is a case history of a five year old boy who developed a phobia of horses and who was analysed by his father when the phobia appeared. Hans, the little boy, had a habit of fondling his "widdler" (penis) when he was in bed, and his mother warned him that he should not put his hand there. Much of the anxiety seems traced back to castration anxiety. Freud points out that in the beginning, Hans's anxiety "...was, like every infantile anxiety, without an object to begin with: it was still anxiety and not yet fear. The child cannot tell (at first) what he is afraid of; and when Hans, on the first walk with the nursemaid, would not say what he was afraid of, it was simply that he himself did not yet know. He said all that he knew, which was that in the street he missed his mother, whom he could coax with, and that he did not want to be away from her. In saying this he quite straightforwardly confessed the primary meaning of his dislike of streets. Then again, there were the states into which he fell on two consecutive evenings before going to sleep, and which were characterized by anxiety mingled with clear traces of tenderness. These states show that at the beginning of his illness there was as yet no phobia whatever present, whether of streets or of walking of even of horses. If there had been, his evening states would be inexplicable; for who bothers at bedtime about streets and walking? On the other hand it becomes quite clear why he so feared in the evening, if we suppose that at bedtime he was overwhelmed by an intensification of his libido--for its object was his mother, and its aim may perhaps have been to sleep with her" (25-26).

"His anxiety, then, corresponds to repressed longing. But it was not the same thing as the longing: the repression must be taken into account too. Longing can be completely transformed into satisfaction if it is presented with the object longed for. Therapy of that kind is no longer effective in dealing with anxiety. The anxiety remains even when the longing can be satisfied. It can no longer be completely retransformed into libido; there is something that keeps the libido back under repression. This was shown to be so in the case of Hans on the occasion of his next walk, when his mother went with him. He was with his mother, and yet he still suffered from anxiety--that is to say, from an unsatisfied longing for her. It is true that the anxiety was less; for he did allow himself to be induced to go for the walk, whereas he had obliged the nursemaid to turn back. Nor is a street quite the right place for 'coaxing', or whatever else this young lover may have wanted. But his anxiety had stood the test; and the next thing for it to do was to find an object. It was on this walk that he first expressed a fear that a horse would bite him. Where did the material for this phobia come from? Probably from the complexes, as yet unknown to us, which had contributed to the repression and were keeping under repression his libidinal feelings towards his mother. That is an unsolved problem, and we shall now have to follow the development of the case in order to arrive at its solution. Han's father has already given us certain clues, probably trustworthy ones, such as that Hans had always observed horses with interest on account of their large widdlers, that he had supposed that his mother must have a widdler like a horse, and so on. We might thus be led to think that the horse was merely a substitute for his mother. But if so, what would be the meaning of his being afraid in the evening that a horse would come into the room? A small boy's foolish fears, it will be said. But a neurosis never says foolish things, any more than a dream. When we cannot understand something, we always fall back on abuse. An excellent way of making a task lighter. There is another point in regard to which we must avoid giving way to this temptation. Hans admitted that every night before going to sleep he amused himself with playing with his penis. 'Ah!' the family doctor will be inclined to say, 'now we have it. The child masturbated: hence his pathological anxiety.' But gently. That the child was getting pleasure for himself by masturbating does not by any means explain his anxiety; on the contrary, it makes it
more problematical that ever. States of anxiety are not produced by masturbation or by getting satisfaction in any shape. Moreover, we may presume that Hans, who was now four and three-quarters, had been indulging in this pleasure every evening for at least a year... And we shall find that at this moment he was actually engaged in a struggle to break himself of the habit—a state of things which fits in much better with repression and the generation of anxiety" (26-27).

Here is an example from the case history: XXXX Hans says to his father therapist, in response to an interpretation XXXX "...Why did you tell me I'm fond of Mummy and that why I'm frightened when I'm fond of you?" Then Freud comments: "Here the little boy was displaying a really unusual degree of clarity. He was bringing to notice the fact that his love for his father was wrestling with his hostility towards him in his capacity of rival with his mother; and he was reproaching his father with not XXXX having yet drawn his attention to this interplay of forces, which was bound to end in anxiety. His father did not entirely understand him as yet, for during this conversation he only succeeded in convincing himself of the little boy's hostility towards him, the existence of which I had asserted during our consultation. The following dialogue, which I nevertheless give without alteration, is really of more importance in connection with the progress of the father's enlightenment than with the little patient." Therapist's comment here.

"Unfortunately I did not immediately grasp the meaning of this reproach. Because Hans is fond of his mother he evidently wants to get me out of the way, and he would then be in his father's place. This suppressed hostile wish is turned into anxiety about his father, and he comes in to me in the morning to see if I have gone away. Unfortunately at the moment I did not understand this, and said to him: 'When you're alone, you're just anxious for me and come in to me.' Hans: 'When you're away, I'm afraid you're not coming home.' Therapist-father: 'And have I ever threatened you that I shan't come home?' Hans: 'Not you, but Mummy. Mummy's told me she won't come back.' (He had probably been naughty and she had threatened to go away.) Therapist: 'She said that because you were naughty.' Hans: 'Yes.' Therapist: 'So you're afraid I'm going away because you were naughty' that's why you come in to me.' When I got up from table after breakfast Hans said: 'Daddy, don't trot away from me!' I was struck by his saying 'trot' instead of 'run', and replied: 'Oho! So you're afraid of the horse trotting away from you.' Upon which he laughed." Freud then comments: "We know that this portion of Hans's anxiety had two constituents: there was fear of his father and fear for his father. The former was derived from his hostility towards his father, and the latter from the conflict between his affection, which was exaggerated at this point by way of compensation, and his hostility. His father proceeds: 'his is no doubt the beginning of an important phase. His motive for at the most just venturing outside the house but not going away from it, and for turning round at the first attack of anxiety when he is half-way, is his fear of not finding his parents at home because they have gone away. He sticks to the house from love of his mother, and he is afraid of my going away because of the hostile wishes he nourishes against me--for then he would be the father" (44-45).

The remainder of these comments are taken from Freud's discussion of the case. "One day while XXXX Hans was in the street he was seized with an attack of anxiety. He could not yet say what it was that he was afraid of; but at the very beginning of this anxiety-state he betrayed to his father his motive for being ill, the advantage he derived from it. He wanted to stay with his mother and to coax with her; his recollection that he had also been separated from her at the time of the baby's birth may also, as his father suggests, have contributed to his longing. It soon became evident that his anxiety was no longer reconvertible into longing; he was XXXX afraid even when his mother went with him. In the meantime indications appeared of what XXXX it was to which his libido (now changed into anxiety) had become attached. He gave expression to the quite specific fear that a white horse would bite him" (114-115).
"I think it not unlikely that the extensive and detailed character of the analysis may have made it somewhat obscure to the reader. I shall therefore begin by giving a brief résumé of it, in which I shall omit all distracting side-issues and shall draw attention to the results as they came to light one after the other. The first thing we learn is that the outbreak of the anxiety-state was by no means as sudden as appeared at first sight. A few days earlier the child had woken from an anxiety-dream to the effect that his mother had gone away, and that now he had no mother to coax with. This dream alone points to the presence of a repressive process of ominous intensity. We cannot explain it, as we can so many other anxiety-dreams, by supposing that the child had in his dream felt anxiety arising from some somatic cause and had made use of the anxiety for the purpose of fulfilling an unconscious wish which would otherwise have been deeply repressed. We must regard it rather as a genuine punishment and repression dream, and, moreover, as a dream which failed in its function, since the child woke from his sleep in a state of anxiety. We can easily reconstruct what actually occurred in the unconscious. The child dreamt of exchanging endearments with his mother and of sleeping with her; but all the pleasure was transformed into anxiety, and all the ideational content into its opposite. Repression had defeated the purpose of the mechanism of dreaming. But the beginnings of this psychological situation go back further still. During the preceding summer Hans had had similar moods of mingled longing and apprehension, in which he had said similar things; and at that time they had secured him the advantage of being taken by his mother into her bed. We may assume that since then Hans had been in a state of intensified sexual excitement, the object of which was his mother. The intensity of this excitement was shown by his two attempts at seducing his mother (the second of which occurred just before the outbreak of his anxiety); and he found an incidental channel of discharge for it by masturbating every evening and in that way obtaining gratification. Whether the sudden change-over of this excitement into anxiety took place spontaneously, or as a result of his mother's rejection of his advances, or owing to the accidental revival of earlier impressions by the 'precipitating cause' of his illness...—this we cannot decide; and, indeed, it is a matter of indifference, for these three alternative possibilities cannot be regarded as mutually incompatible. The fact remains that his sexual excitement suddenly changed into anxiety" (118-119).

"It is especially interesting...to observe the way in which the transformation of Han's libido into anxiety was projected on to the principal object of his phobia, on to horses. Horses interested him the most of all the large animals; playing at horses was his favourite game with the other children. I had a suspicion—and this was confirmed by Han's father when I asked him—that the first person who had served Hans as a horse must have been his father; and it was this that had enabled him to regard Fritzl as a substitute for his father when the accident happened at Graunden. When repression had set in and brought a revulsion of feeling along with it, horses, which had till then been associated with so much pleasure, were necessarily turned into objects of fear" (126-127).

I repeat here what I think I have already noted in my review of Freud's concept of aggression: "Alfred Adler, in a suggestive paper, has recently developed the view that anxiety arises from the suppression of what he calls the 'aggressive instinct', and by a very sweeping synthetic process he ascribes it to that instinct the chief part in human events, 'in real life and in the neuroses'. As we have come to the conclusion that in our present case of phobia the anxiety is to be explained as being due to the repression of Han's aggressive propensities (the hostile ones against his father and the sadistic ones against his mother), we seem to have produced a most strikingly precise of confirmation of Adler's view. I am nevertheless unable to assent to it, and indeed I regard it as a misleading generalization. I cannot bring myself to assume the existence of a special aggressive instinct alongside of the familiar instincts of self-preservation and of sex, and on an equal footing with them. [Freud, of course, change his views in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 1920]. It appears to me that Adler has mistakenly promoted into a special and self-subsisting instinct what is in reality a universal and indispensable
attribute of all instincts—their instinctual and 'pressing' character, what might be described as their capacity for initiating movement. Nothing would then remain of the other instincts but their relation to an aim, for their relation to the means of reaching that aim would have been taken over from them by the 'aggressive instinct'. In spite of all the uncertainty and obscurity of our theory of instincts I should prefer for the present to adhere to the usual view, which leaves each instinct its own power of becoming aggressive; and I should be inclined to recognize the two instincts which became repressed in Hans as familiar components of the sexual libido (140–141).

This concludes the excerpts on the case of "Little Hans."

(continued)
Freud’s concept of Anxiety (continued)

In one of his Five Lectures on PsychoAnalysis, written 1909, published 1910, Vol. 11, Freud is discussing anxiety-dreams and he writes: "...I must warn you not to let yourselves be put out by the objection that the occurrence of anxiety-dreams contradicts our view of dreams as the fulfillments of wishes. Apart from the fact that these anxiety-dreams, like the rest, require interpretation before any judgement can be formed on them, it must be stated quite generally that the anxiety does not depend on the content of the dream in such a simple manner as one might imagine without having more knowledge and taking more account of the determinants of neurotic anxiety. Anxiety is one of the ego's reactions in repudiation of repressed wishes that have become powerful; and its occurrence in dreams as well is very easily explicable when the formation of the dream has been carried out with too much of an eye to the fulfilment of these repressed wishes" (36-37).

'Wild' Psycho-Analysis, 1910, vol. 11. Freud is discussing the case where a woman of about 40 came to see him complaining of an anxiety-state. She had seen a physician who told her the cause of her anxiety was a lack of sexual satisfaction (she had recently been divorced), and was told by that physician that there were only three ways for her to recover: to return to her husband, to take a lover, or to obtain satisfaction from herself. The physician said that he gave this advice based on Freud's discoveries. Freud then goes into a discussion of such 'wild' psycho-analysis which is based on misunderstanding of both the scientific theories as well as the technical rules of psychoanalysis. He does admit that he is using this case as an example, even though it could easily be a case in which a patient (suffering from a neurosis) distorts what was told to her by her physician. The section pertinent to our interest in anxiety follows: "Some nervous states which we call the 'actual neuroses', such as typical neurasthenia and pure anxiety neurosis, obviously depend on the somatic factor in sexual life, while we have no certain picture as yet of the part played in them by the psychical factor and by repression. In such cases it is natural that the physician should first consider some 'actual' therapy, some alteration in the patient's somatic sexual activity, and he does so with perfect justification if his diagnosis is correct. The lady who consulted the young doctor complained chiefly of anxiety-states, and so he probably assumed that she was suffering from an anxiety neurosis, and felt justified in recommending a somatic therapy to her. Again a convenient misapprehension! A person suffering from anxiety is not for that reason necessarily suffering from anxiety neurosis; such a diagnosis of it cannot be based on the name (of the symptom); one has to know what signs constitute an anxiety neurosis; instead of what signa and be able to distinguish it from other pathological states which are also manifested by anxiety. My impression was that the lady in question was suffering from anxiety hysteria, and the whole value of such nosographical distinctions, one which quite justifies them, lies in the fact that they indicate a different aetiology and a different treatment. No one who took into consideration the possibility of anxiety hysteria in this case would have fallen into the error of neglecting the mental factors, as this physician did with his three alternatives" (224-225).

Here is a short quote from The Claims of Psycho-Analysis to Scientific Interest, 1913, vol. 13: "It is true that psycho-analysis has taken the individual mind as its subject, but in investigating the individual it could not avoid dealing with the emotional basis of the relation of the individual to society. It has found that the social feelings invariably contain an erotic element—an element which, if it is overemphasized and then repressed, becomes one of the marks of a particular group of mental disorders. Psycho-analysis has recognized that in general the neuroses are asocial in their natures and that they always aim at driving the individual out of society and at replacing the safe monastic seclusion of earlier days by the isolation of illness. The intense feeling of guilt which dominates so many neuroses has been shown to be a social modification of neurotic anxiety" (188).
Anxiety, vol. 16.

In reading the excerpts from this lecture, it must be kept in mind that some of what Freud says here was subjected later to some important and fundamental revisions in Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety (1926). His final views on the causes, kinds, and nature of anxiety will be found in my review of that work and those that followed afterwards, as in the New Introductory Lectures (1933).

"It is possible at the start to work upon the subject of anxiety for quite a time without thinking at all of neurotic states. You will understand me at once when I describe this kind of anxiety as 'realistic' anxiety in contrast to 'neurotic' anxiety. Realistic anxiety strikes us as something very rational and intelligible. We may say of it that it is a reaction to the perception of an external danger—that is, of an injury which is expected and foreseen. It is connected with the flight reflex and it may be regarded as a manifestation of the self-preservative instinct.

On further reflection we must tell ourselves that our judgment that realistic anxiety is rational and expedient calls for drastic revision. For the only expedient behaviour when a danger threatens would be a cool estimate of one's own strength in comparison with the magnitude of the threat and, on the basis of that, a decision as to whether flight or defence, or possibly even attack, offers the best prospect of a successful issue. But in this situation there is no place at all for anxiety; everything that happens would be achieved just as well and probably better if no anxiety were generated. And you can see, indeed, that if the anxiety is excessively great it proves in the highest degree inexpedient; it paralyses all action, including even flight. Usually the reaction to danger consists in a mixture of the affect of anxiety and defensive action. A terrified animal is afraid and flees; but the expedient part of this is the 'flight' and not the 'being afraid'." (393-394). "Thus one feels tempted to assert that the generation of anxiety is never an expedient thing. It may perhaps help us to see more clearly if we dissect the situation of anxiety more carefully. The first thing about it is preparedness for the danger, which manifests itself in increased sensory attention and motor tension. This expectant preparedness can be unhesitatingly recognized as an advantage; indeed, its absence may be made responsible for serious consequences. From it there then proceeds on the one hand motor action—flight in the first instance and at a higher level active defence—and on the other hand what we feel as a state of anxiety. The more the generation of anxiety is limited to a mere abortive beginning—a signal (this idea of a 'signal' plays a central role in Freud's later accounts of anxiety)—the more will the preparedness for anxiety transform itself without disturbance into action and the more expedient will be the shape taken by the whole course of events. Accordingly, the preparedness for anxiety seems to be to be the expedient element in what we call anxiety, and the generation of anxiety the expedient one. I shall avoid going more closely into the question of whether our linguistic usage means the same thing or something clearly different by 'Angst' (anxiety), 'Furcht' (fear) and 'Schreck' (fright). I will only say that I think 'Angst' relates to the state and disregards the object, while 'Furcht' draws attention precisely to the object. It seems that 'Schreck', on the other hand, does not have a special sense; it lays emphasis, that is, on the effect produced by a danger which is not met by as preparedness for anxiety. We might say, therefore, that a person protects himself from fright by anxiety." (394-395).

"By 'anxiety' we usually understand the subjective state into which we are put by perceiving the 'generation of anxiety' and we call this an affect.........an affective state would be constructed in the same way as a hysterical attack and, like it, would be the precipitate of a reminiscence. A hysterical attack may thus be likened to a freshly constructed individual affect, and a normal affect to the expression of a general hysteria which has become a heritage" (395-396).
"We believe that in the case of the affect of anxiety we know what the early impression is which it repeats. We believe that it is in the act of birth that there comes about the combination of unpleasurable feelings, impulses of discharge and bodily sensations which has become the prototype of the effects of a mortal danger and has ever since been repeated by us as the state of anxiety.... We shall also recognize it as highly relevant that this first state of anxiety arose out of separation from the mother.... We cannot say what has become the prototype of the state of anxiety in the case of creatures other than mammals. And in the same way we do not know either what complex of feelings is in such creatures the equivalent to our anxiety" (396-397). It is interesting to note (both here and in my more complete review on the birth trauma as the prototype for anxiety) that Freud emphasizes the separation from the mother as being so important.... BUT yet in his writings, the fear of the father (castration complex) is of paramount importance in the Oedipus situation and the ensuing neuroses.

If we now pass over to consider neurotic anxiety, what fresh forms and situations are manifested by anxiety in neurotics? There is much to be described here. In the first place we find a general apprehensiveness, a kind of freely floating anxiety which is ready to attach itself to any idea that is in any way suitable, which influences judgment, selects what is to be expected, and lies in wait for any opportunity that will allow it to justify itself. We call this state 'expectant anxiety' or 'anxious expectation'.... A striking amount of expectant anxiety, however, forms a regular feature of a nervous disorder to which I have given the name of 'anxiety neurosis' and which I include among the 'actual' neuroses. A second form of anxiety in contrast to the one I have just described, is bound psychically and attached to particular objects or situations. This is the anxiety of the extremely multifarious and often very strange 'phobias'.... A first attempt at finding one's way about in this confusion suggests a division into three groups. Some of the dreaded objects and situations have something uncanny about them for normal people as well, some relation to danger; and such phobias, therefore, do not strike us as unintelligible, though their strength is greatly exaggerated. Thus most of us have a sense of repulsion if we meet with a snake.... We may refer to the second group the cases in which a relation to danger is still present, though we are accustomed to minimize the danger and not to anticipate it. The majority of situation phobias belong to this group. We know that there is more chance of an accident when we are on a railway-journey than when we stay at home--the chance of a collision.... (etc.).... What in general appears to us strange in these phobias of neurotics is not so much their content as their intensity. The anxiety of phobias is positively overwhelming. And sometimes we get an impression that what neurotics are afraid of are not at all the same things and situations which may in certain circumstances cause anxiety in us too and which they describe by the same names. We are left with a third group of phobias, which is quite beyond our comprehension. When a strong, grown-up man is unable owing to anxiety to walk along a street or cross a square in his own familiar home-town, when a healthy, well-developed woman is thrown into insensate anxiety because a cat has brushed against the edge of her dress or because a mouse has run across the room, how are we to relate these things to the danger which they obviously constitute for the phobic subject? In the case of such animal phobias there can be no question of an exaggeration of universal human antipathies, since, as though to demonstrate the contrary, there are numerous people who cannot pass by a cat without coaxing it and stroking it. The mouse that these women are so much afraid of is also (in German) one of the chief terms of affection; a girl who is delighted when her lover calls her one will often scream with terror when she sees the pretty creature which bears that name. In the case of the man with agoraphobia the only explanation that we can reach is that he is behaving like a small child. A child is actually taught as part of his education to avoid such situations as dangerous; and our agoraphobia will in fact be saved from his anxiety if we accompany him across the square. The two forms of anxiety that I have just described--the freely floating expectant anxiety and the sort which is bound to phobias--are independent of each other. One is not a higher stage, as it were, of the other; and they only appear simultaneously in exceptional cases, and, so to speak, accidentally. The most
powerful general apprehensiveness need not be expressed in phobias; people whose whole existence is restricted by agoraphobia may be entirely free from pessimistic expectant anxiety....I must add that we class all these phobias as anxiety hysteria; that is to say, we regard them as a disorder closely related to the familiar conversion hysteria" (397-400). An aside comment seems called for here, Freud broke neurosis down into two major groups: the actual neuroses which were conditions with a purely physical and contemporary causation—as in masturbation, which does not, like coitus, discharge sufficient libido. In Freud's papers, especially his early ones, masturbation figures chiefly on account of its relation to the 'actual neuroses' and in particular as a cause of neurotic anxiety—so says Strachey in his introduction to Freud's paper "Contributions to a discussion on masturbation", 1912, vol. 12E. It was in this paper that Freud makes his contribution to the effects of masturbation, because afterwards, he talks about masturbation primarily inx relation to the dread of castration. 'Under actual neurosis', Freud included (a) neurasthenia and (b) anxiety neurosis. He later added (c) hypochondria. His second major grouping for the neuroses was psychoneuroses (the transference neuroses). Under this heading he included (a) hysteria, which as I understand it, includes anxiety hysteria, conversion hysteria, and phobias, and (b) the obsessional neurosis. Now in his paper on Obsessions and Phobias, 1895, (see page 5 here), he includes phobias under the anxiety neurosis. But, above, he includes phobias under anxiety hysteria. In other words, in his early writings it appears as if he saw phobias as part of the 'actual neuroses', but in his later writings, he saw phobias as part of the 'psychoneuroses'. I have not researched this problem enough right now, so I am unclear as to where Freud differentiated between anxiety hysteria and anxiety neuroses, except for the fact that the former is part of hysteria and so an 'psychoneurosis' (psychically determined) and the latter is caused by somatic conditions (dammed-up libido) and thus an 'actual neurosis'. These points may be academic, but I find their unraveling to be interesting.

"The third form of neurotic anxiety faces us with the puzzling fact that here the connection between anxiety and a threatening danger is completely lost to view. For instance, anxiety may appear in hysteria as an accompaniment to hysterical symptoms, or in some chance condition of excitement in which, it is true, we should expect some manifestation of affect but least of all one of anxiety; or it may make its appearance, divorced from any determinants and equally incomprehensible to us and to the patient, as an unrelated attack of anxiety. Here there is no sign whatever of any danger or of any cause that could be exaggerated into one. We next learn from these spontaneous attacks that the complex which we describe as a state of anxiety is capable of fragmentation. The total attack can be represented by a single, intensely developed symptom, by a tremor, a vertigo, by palpitation of the heart, or by dyspnoea; and the general feeling by which we recognize anxiety may be absent or have become indistinct. Yet these conditions, which we describe as 'anxiety-equivalents', have to be equated with anxiety in all clinical and astrological respects. Two questions now arise. Can we relate neurotic anxiety, in which danger plays little or no part, to realistic anxiety, which is invariably a reaction to danger? And how are we to understand neurotic anxiety? We shall certainly be inclined in the first instance to hold fast to our expectation that where there is anxiety, there must be something that one is afraid of. Clinical observation affords us a number of hints towards understanding neurotic anxiety, and I will give you their tenor:--(a) It is not difficult to establish the fact that expectant anxiety or general apprehensiveness is closely dependent on certain happenings in sexual life, or, let us say, certain employments of the libido. The simplest and most instructive case of this sort occurs in people who expose themselves to what is known as unconsummated excitation—that is, people in whom violent sexual excitations meet with no sufficient discharge, cannot be brought to a satisfying conclusion—men, for instance, while they are engaged to be married, and women whose husbands are insufficiently potent or, as a precaution, perform the sexual act in an incomplete or curtailed fashion. In such circumstances the libidinal excitation vanishes and anxiety appears in its place whether in the form of expectant anxiety or in attacks and anxiety-equivalents,...
The fact of there being a connection between sexual restraint and anxiety states is, so far as I know, no longer disputed even by physicians who have no contact with psycho-analysis.... Of course, the sexual abstinence now so warmly recommended by doctors only has the same importance in generating anxiety states when the libido which is prevented from finding a satisfying discharge is correspondingly strong and has not been dealt with for the greater part by sublimation. Indeed, the decision on whether the outcome is to be illness or not always lies with quantitative factors.... I am far from having told you of all the observations that speak in favour of the genetic relation. I have asserted to exist between libido and anxiety. Among them, for instance, is the influence on anxiety disorders of certain phases of life to which, as in the case of puberty and the time of the menopause, a considerable increase in the production of libido may be attributed. In some states of excitement, too, it is possible to observe directly a mixture of libido and anxiety and the final replacement of libido by anxiety. The impression one gains from all these facts is twofold: first, that what is in question is an accumulation of libido, which is kept away from its normal employment, and secondly, that here we are entirely in the sphere of somatic processes. How anxiety arises from libido is not at first discernible; we can only recognize that libido is absent and that anxiety is observed in its place" (401-403). Here Strachey has a footnote to the effect that the above is to a large extent a summarization of Freud's first paper on anxiety neurosis [which I have quoted on pp. 5-10].

"(b) A second pointer is to be found in the analysis of the psychoneuroses, and especially of hysteria. We have seen that in this illness anxiety often appears in company with the symptoms, but that unbound anxiety appears, too, manifested as an attack or as a chronic condition. Thus, it appears that here my question regarding the difference between anxiety neurosis and anxiety hysteria posed on the top of p. 20 here, is answered. The primary symptom in the former—which is an actual neurosis—lies in the latter—which is a psychoneurosis. Anxiety may be present, but the primary symptom is the one of hysteria.) The patients cannot say what it is they are afraid of, and, by the help of an unmistakable secondary revision, link it to the first phobias that come to hand—such as dying, going mad, or having a stroke. If the situation out of which the anxiety (or the symptoms accompanied by anxiety) arose is subjected to analysis, we can as a rule discover what normal course of psychical events has failed to occur and has been replaced by the phenomena of anxiety. To express it another way: we construct the unconscious process as it would have been if it had not experienced any repression and had proceeded unhindered into consciousness. This process would have been accompanied by a particular affect, and we now learn to our surprise that this affect accompanying the normal course of events is invariably replaced by anxiety after repression has occurred, no matter what its own quality may be. Thus, when we have a hysterical anxiety-state before us, its unconscious correlate may be an impulse of a similar character—anger, jealousy, embarrassment—or, just as easily, a positive libidinal excitation or a hostile aggressive one, such as rage or anger. Anxiety is therefore the universally current coinage for which any affective impulse is often exchanged if the ideational content attached to it is subjected to repression. (c) We make a third discovery when we come to patients suffering from obsessional actions, who seem in a remarkable way exempt from anxiety. If we try to hinder their carrying out of their obsessional actions—their washing or their ceremonial—or if they themselves venture upon an attempt to give up one of their compulsions, they are forced by the most terrible anxiety to yield to the compulsion. We can see that the anxiety was screened by the obsessional action, and that the latter was only performed in order to avoid the anxiety. In an obsessional neurosis, therefore, anxiety which would otherwise inevitably set in is replaced by the formation of a symptom, and if we turn to hysteria we find a similar relation: the result of the process of repression is either a generating of anxiety pure and simple, or anxiety accompanied by the formation of a symptom without anxiety. It would thus seem not to be wrong in an abstract sense to assert that in general symptoms are only formed to escape an otherwise unavoidable generating of anxiety. If we adopt this view, anxiety is placed, as it were, in the very centre of our interest in the problems of neurosis" (403-404).
"The second problem we set ourselves—of establishing a connection between neurotic anxiety, which is libido put to an abnormal employment, and realistic anxiety, which corresponds to a reaction to danger—seems even harder to solve. One might suppose that these were two quite disparate things; and yet we have no means of distinguishing in our feelings between realistic anxiety and neurotic anxiety. We finally arrive at the connection we are in search of, if we take as our starting-point the opposition we have so often asserted between the ego and the libido. As we know, the generation of anxiety is the ego's reaction to danger and the signal for taking flight. If so, it seems plausible to suppose that in neurotic anxiety the ego is making/similar attempt at flight from the demand by its libido, that it is treating this internal danger as though it were an external one. This would therefore fulfill our expectation that where anxiety is shown there is something one is afraid of. But the analogy could be carried further. Just as the attempt at flight from an external danger is replaced by standing firm and the adoption of expedient measures of defence, so too the generation of neurotic anxiety gives place to the formation of symptoms, which results in the anxiety being bound. The difficulty in understanding now lies elsewhere. The anxiety which signifies a flight of the ego from its libido is after all supposed to be derived from that libido itself. This is obscure and it reminds us not to forget that after all a person's libido is fundamentally something of his and cannot be contrasted with him as something external. It is the topographical dynamics of the generation of anxiety which are still obscure to us—the question of what mental energies are produced in that process and from what mental systems they derive. This is once more a question which I cannot promise to answer: but there are two other tracks which we must not fail to follow and in doing so we shall once more be making use of direct observation and analytic enquiry as a help to our speculations. We will turn to the genesis of anxiety in children and to the source of the neurotic anxiety which is attached to phobias." (404-405).

"Apprehensiveness is children is something very usual, and it seems most difficult to distinguish whether it is neurotic or realistic anxiety. Indeed the value of making the distinction is put in question by the behaviour of children. For on the one hand we are not surprised if a child is frightened of all strangers, or of new situations and things; and we account for this reaction very easily as being due to his weakness and ignorance. Thus we attribute to children a strong inclination to realistic anxiety and we should regard it as quite an expedient arrangement if this apprehensiveness were an innate heritage in them. Children would merely be repeating in this the behaviour of prehistoric men and of modern primitive peoples who as a result of their ignorance and helplessness are afraid of every novelty and of many familiar things which no longer cause us any anxiety to-day. And it would fit in perfectly with our expectation if children's phobias, in part at least, were the same as those which we may attribute to the primaeval periods of human development. On the other hand we cannot overlook the fact that not all children are anxious to the same degree, and that precisely children who exhibit a special timidity towards objects and in situations of every kind turn out later to be neurotic. Thus the neurotic disposition betrays itself also by an outspoken tendency to realistic anxiety; apprehensiveness appears to be the primary thing and we reach the conclusion that the reason why children and, later, growing youths and girls are afraid of the height of their libido is because in fact they are afraid of everything. The genesis of anxiety from libido would in this way be depe2014; and if one examined into the determinants of realistic anxiety, consistency would lead one to the view that consciousness of one's own weakness and helplessness—inferiority, according to Adler's terminology—"if it can be prolonged from childhood into adult life, is the final basis of neuroses. This sounds so simple and seductive that it has a claim on our attention. It is true that it would involve a displacement of the riddle of the neurotic state. The continued existence of the sense of inferiority—and thus, of what determines anxiety and the formation of symptoms—seems so well assured that what calls for an explanation is rather how, as an exception, what we know as health can come about. But what is revealed by a careful examination of apprehensiveness in
children? At the very beginning, what children are afraid of is strange people; situations only become important because they include people, and impersonal things do not come into account at all until later. But a child is not afraid of these strangers because he attributes evil intentions to them and compared his weakness with their strength, and accordingly assesses them as dangers to his existence, safety and freedom from pain. A child who is mistrustful in this way and terrified of the aggressive instinct which dominates the world is at a theoretical construction that has quite miscarried. A child is frightened of a strange face because he is adjusted to the sight of a familiar and beloved figure—ultimately of his mother. It is his disappointment and longing that are transformed into anxiety—his libido, in fact, which has become unemployable, which cannot at that time be held in suspense and is discharged as anxiety. And it can scarcely be a matter of chance, either, that in this situation which is the prototype of the anxiety of children there is a repetition of the determinant of the first state of anxiety during the act of birth—namely, separation from the mother. In children the first phobias relating to situations are those of darkness and solitude. The anxiety of children is an incapacity to tolerate a considerable damming-up of libido over any great length of time. You will observe that here once more the constitutional factor comes into its rights—and these, indeed, we have never sought to dispute.

"If, then, there are children who come some way to meet this education in anxiety, and who go on to find dangers in themselves that they had not been warned against, this is sufficiently explained by the fact that they have a greater amount of innate libidinal need in their constitution or have been prematurely spoilt by libidinal satisfactions. It is not to be wondered at if such children include, too, the later neurotics: as we know, what most facilitates the development of a neurosis is an incapacity to tolerate a considerable damming-up of libido over any great length of time. You will observe that here once more the constitutional factor comes into its rights—and these, indeed, we have never sought to dispute. We are only on our guard against those who in its favour neglect all other claims, and who introduce the constitutional factor at points which the combined results of observation and analysis show that it does not belong or must take the last place. Let me sum up what we have learnt from our observation of the apprehensiveness of children. Infantile anxiety has very little to do with realistic anxiety, but, on the other hand, is closely related to the neurotic anxiety of adults. Like the latter, it is derived from unemployable libido and it replaces the missing love-object by an external object or by a situation." (407-408).

"You will be glad to hear that the analysis of phobias has not much more that is new to teach us. For the same thing happens with them as with children's anxiety: unemployable libido is being constantly transformed into an apparently realistic anxiety and thus a tiny external danger is introduced to represent the claims of the libido. There is nothing to be wondered at in this agreement (between phobias and children's anxiety), for the infantile phobias are not only the prototype of the later ones which we call class as 'anxiety hysterias' but are actually their precondition and the prelude to them. Every hysterical phobia goes back to an infantile anxiety and is a continuation of it, even if it has a different content and must thus be given another name. The difference between the two disorders lies in
their mechanism. In order that libido shall be changed into anxiety, it no longer suffers in the case of adults for the libido to have become momentarily unemployable in the form of a longing. Adults have long since learnt how to hold such libido in suspense or to employ it in some other way. If, however, the libido belongs to a psychical impulse which has been subjected to repression, then circumstances are re-established similar to those in the case of a child in whom there is still no distinction between conscious and unconscious; and by means of regression to the infantile phobia a passage is opened, as it were, through which the transformation of libido into anxiety can be comfortably accomplished. As you will recall, we have dealt with repression at great length, but in doing so we have always followed the vicissitudes only of the idea that is to be repressed—naturally, since this was easier to recognize and describe. We have always left on one side the question of what happens to the affect that was attached to the repressed idea; and it is only now that we learn that the immediate vicissitude of that affect is to be transformed into anxiety, whatever quality it may have existed apart from this in the normal course of events. This transformation of affect is, however, by far the more important part of the process of repression. So here we do see Freud's concern with the repression of the affect and not only with the idea. Previously, we have discussed this point and it appeared from his earlier writings that it was the idea, and not the affect, that he was so concerned with when he discussed repression, though, in practice, the concern was with the repressed affect—especially in the days of cathartic treatment. It is not so easy to speak of this, since we cannot assert the existence of unconscious affects in the same sense as that of unconscious ideas. I reviewed these ideas at length in my summary of "consciousness, preconsciousness, and unconsciousness." An idea remains the same, except for the one difference, whether it is conscious or unconscious; we can state what it is that corresponds to an unconscious idea. But an affect is a process of discharge and must be judged quite differently from an idea; what corresponds to it in the unconscious cannot be declared without deeper reflection and a clarification of our hypotheses about psychical processes. And that we cannot undertake here. We will, however, emphasize the impression we have now gained that the generation of anxiety is intimately linked to the system of the unconscious. I have said that transformation into anxiety—i.e., it would be better to say discharge in the form of anxiety—is the immediate vicissitude of libido which is subjected to repression. I must add that that vicissitude is not the only or the definitive one. In the neuroses processes are in action which endeavour to bind this generating of anxiety and which even succeed in doing so in various ways. In phobias, for instance, two phases of the neurotic process can be clearly distinguished. The first is concerned with repression and the changing of libido into anxiety, which is then bound to an external danger. The second consists in the erection of all the precautions and guarantees by means of which any contact can be avoided with this danger, treated as it is like an external thing. Repression corresponds to an attempt at flight by the ego from libido which is felt as a danger. A phobia may be compared to an entrenchment against an external danger which now represents the dreaded libido. The weakness of the defensive system in phobias lies, of course, in the fact that the fortress which has been so greatly strengthened towards the outside remains accessible from within. A projection towards the danger of libido can never succeed thoroughly. For that reason, in other neuroses other systems of defence are in use against the possible generation of anxiety. The content of a phobia has just about as much importance in relation to it as the manifest facade of a dream has in relation to the dream" (408-411).

"We thus find ourselves convinced that the problem of anxiety occupies a place in the question of the psychology of the neuroses which may rightly be described as central. We have received a strong impression of the way in which the generation of anxiety is linked to the vicissitudes of the libido and the system of the unconscious. There is only a single point that we have found disconnected—a gap in our views: the single, yet scarcely disputable fact that realistic anxiety must be regarded as a manifestation of the ego's self-preservative instincts" (411). This concludes this lecture, but Freud answers the question..."
he raised here at the end of his next lecture, no. XXVI, on 'The libido theory and narcissism' as follows: "Let me once more, however, return for a moment to anxiety, and to throw light on a last obscurity that we left there. I have said that there is something that does not tally with the relation (so thoroughly recognized apart from this) between anxiety and libido: the fact, namely, that realistic anxiety in face of a danger seems to be a manifestation of the self-preservative instinct—which, after all, can scarcely be disputed. How would it be, though, if what was responsible for the effect of anxiety was not the ego-instincts but the ego-libido? After all, the state of anxiety is in every instance inexpedient, and its inexpedience becomes obvious if it reaches a fairly high pitch. In such cases it interferes with action, whether flight or defence, which alone is expedient and alone serves the cause of self-preservation. If, therefore, we attribute the affective portion of realistic anxiety to ego-libido and the accompanying action to the self-preservative instinct, we shall have got rid of the theoretical difficulty. After all, you do not seriously believe that one runs away because one feels anxiety? No. One feels anxiety and one runs away for a common motive, which is roused by the perception of danger. People who have been through a great mortal danger tell us that they were not at all afraid but merely acted—for instance, that they aimed their rifle at the wild beast—and that is unquestionably what was most expedient" (430).

Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 1920, vol. 18

''Fright', 'Fear' and 'anxiety' are improperly used as synonymous expressions; they are in fact capable of clear distinction in their relation to danger. 'Anxiety' describes a particular state of expecting the danger or preparing for it, even though it may be an unknown one. 'Fear' requires a definite object of which to be afraid. 'Fright', however, is the name we give to the state a person gets into when he has run into danger without being prepared for it; it emphasizes the factor of surprise. I do not believe anxiety can produce a traumatic neurosis. There is something about anxiety that protects its subject against fright and so against fright-neuroses." (12-23). Editor's footnote, page 13: "Freud is very far indeed from always carrying on the distinction he makes here. More often than not he uses the word 'Angst' to denote a state of fear without any reference to the future. It seems not unlikely that in this passage he is beginning to adumbrate the distinction drawn in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926) between anxiety as a reaction to a traumatic situation—probably the equivalent to what is here called Schreck—and anxiety as a warning signal of the approach of such an event." See also Strachey's comments on Freud's meaning of Angst, Furcht, and Schreck, that I have quoted on pages 4 and 5 in this review.

Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, 1921, vol. 18

In a section on Le Bon's description of the 'group mind,' Freud has something to say about 'social anxiety'. He leads into it as follows: "Le Bon thinks that the particular acquirements of individuals become obliterated in a group, and that in this way their distinctiveness vanishes. The racial unconscious emerges; what is heterogeneous is submerged in what is homogeneous. As we should say, the mental superstructure, the development of which in individuals shows such dissimilarities, is removed, and the unconscious foundations, which are similar in everyone, stand exposed to view. In this way individuals in a group would come to show an average character. But Le Bon believes that they also display new characteristics which they have not previously possessed, and he seeks the reason for this in three different factors. The first is that the individual forming part of a group acquires, solely from numerical considerations, a sentiment of invincible power which allows him to yield to instincts which, had he been alone, he would perforce have kept under restraint. He will be the less disposed to check himself, from the consideration that, a group being anonymous and in consequence irresponsible, the sentiment of responsibility which always controls individuals disappears entirely. From our point of view we must not attribute so much importance to the appearance of new characteristics.
For us it would be enough to say that in a group the individual is brought under conditions which allow him to throw off the repressions of his unconscious instinctual impulses. The apparently new characteristics which he then displays are in fact the manifestations of this unconscious, in which all that is evil in the human mind is contained as a predisposition. We can find no difficulty in understanding the disappearance of conscience or of a sense of responsibility in these circumstances. It has long been our contention that 'social anxiety' is the essence of what is called conscience" (74-75).

In a chapter, in the same work, on "The Church and the Army," Freud writes: "It is not to be expected that the usage of the word 'panic' should be clearly and unambiguously determined. Sometimes it is used to describe any collective fear, sometimes even fear in an individual when it exceeds all bounds, and often the name seems to be reserved for cases in which the outbreak of fear is not warranted by the occasion. If we take the word 'panic' in the sense of collective fear, we can establish a far-reaching analogy. Fear in an individual is provoked either by the greatness of a danger or by the cessation of emotional ties (libidinal cathexes); the latter is the case of neurotic anxiety or anxiety. In just the same way panic arises either owing to an increase of the common danger or owing to the disappearance of the emotional ties which hold the group together; and the latter case is analogous to that of neurotic anxiety" (97).

The Ego and the Id, 1923, vol. 19
"...we see this same ego as a poor creature owing service to three masters and consequently menaced by three dangers: from the external world, from the libido of the id, and from the severity of the super-ego. Three kinds of anxiety correspond to these three dangers, since anxiety is the expression of a retreat from danger."

"Among the dependent relationships in which the ego stands, that to the super-ego is perhaps the most interesting. The ego is the actual seat of anxiety. Threatened by dangers from three directions, it develops the flight-reflex by withdrawing its own cathexis from the menacing perception or from the similarly regarded process in the id, and emitting it as anxiety. This primitive reaction is later replaced by the carrying-out of protective cathexes (the mechanism of the phobias). What it is that the ego fears from the external and from the libidinal danger cannot be specified; we know that the fear is of being overwhelmed or annihilated, but it cannot be grasped analytically. The ego is simply obeying the warning of the pleasure principle. On the other hand, we can tell what is hidden behind the ego's dread of the super-ego, the fear of conscience. The superior being, which turned into the ego ideal, once threatened castration, and this dread of castration is probably the nucleus round which the subsequent fear of conscience has gathered; it is this dread that persists as the fear of conscience. The high-sounding phrase, 'every fear is ultimately the fear of death', has hardly any meaning, and at any rate cannot be justified. This is Stekel's idea. It seems to me, on the contrary, perfectly correct to distinguish the fear of death from dread of an object (realistic anxiety) and from neurotic libidinal anxiety. It presents a difficult problem to psycho-analysis, for death is an abstract concept with a negative content for which no unconscious correlate can be found. It would seem that the mechanism of the fear of death can only be that the ego relinquishes its narcissistic libidinal cathexis in a very large measure—that is, that it gives up itself, just as it gives up some external object on other cases in which it feels anxiety. I believe that the fear of death is something that occurs between the ego and the super-ego" (57-58).

"We know that the fear of death makes its appearance under two conditions (which, moreover, are entirely analogous to situations in which other kinds of anxiety develop), namely, as a reaction to an external danger and as an internal process, as for instance in melancholia. Once again a neurotic manifestation may help us to understand a normal one. The fear of death in melancholia only admits of
one explanation: that the ego gives itself up because it feels itself hated and persecuted by the super-ego, instead of loved. To the ego, therefore, living means the same as being loved--being loved by the super-ego, which here again appears as the representative of the id. The super-ego fulfills the same function of protecting and saving that was fulfilled in earlier days by the father and later by Providence or Destiny. But, when the ego finds itself in an excessive real danger which it believes itself unable to overcome by its own strength, it is bound to draw the same conclusion. It sees itself deserted by all protecting forces and lets itself die. Here, moreover, is once again the same situation as that which underlay the first great anxiety-state of birth and the infantile anxiety of longing--the anxiety due to separation from the protecting mother. These considerations make it possible to regard the fear of death, like the fear of conscience, as a development of the fear of castration. The great significance which the sense of guilt has in the neuroses makes it conceivable that common neurotic anxiety is reinforced in several cases by the generating of anxiety between the ego and the super-ego (fear of castration, of conscience, of death). The id, to which we finally come back, has no means of showing the ego either love or hate. It cannot say what it wants; it has achieved no unified will. Eros and the death instinct struggle within it; we have seen with what weapons the one group of instincts defends itself against the other. It would be possible to picture the id as under the domination of the mute but powerful death instincts, which desire to be at peace and (prompted by the pleasure principle) to put Eros, the mischief-maker, to rest; but perhaps that might be to undervalue the part played by Eros" (58-59).

(continued)
Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 1926, vol. 20

It is in this work that we have Freud's major revisions of his concept of anxiety.

Freud is discussing a 'signal of unpleasure' and how a defense against an unwelcome internal process will be modeled upon the defense adopted against an external stimulus. In cases of external danger, the organism has recourse to an attempt at flight. "Repression is an equivalent of this attempt at flight. The ego withdraws its (preconscious) cathexis from the instinctual representative that is to be repressed and uses that cathexis for the purpose of releasing unpleasure (anxiety)."

The problem of how anxiety arises in connection with repression may be no simple one; but we may legitimately hold firmly to the idea that the ego is the actual seat of anxiety and give up our earlier view that the cathetic energy of the repressed impulse is automatically turned into anxiety. If I expressed myself earlier in the latter sense, I was giving a phenomenological description and not a meta-psychological account of what was occurring" (92-93). "This brings us to a further question: how is it possible, from an economic point of view, for a mere process of withdrawal and discharge, like the withdrawing of a preconscious ego-cathexis, to produce unpleasure or anxiety, seeing that, according to our assumptions, un-pleasure and anxiety can only arise as a result of an increase in cathexis?"

The reply is that this causal sequence should not be explained from an economic point of view. Anxiety is not newly created in repression; it is reproduced as an affective state in accordance with an already existing mnemic image. If we go further and enquire into the origin of that anxiety—and of affects in general—we shall be leaving the realm of pure psychology and entering the borderland of physiology. Affective states have become incorporated in the mind as precipitates of primal traumatic experiences, and when a similar situation occurs they are revived like mnemic symbols. I do not think I have been wrong in likening them to the more recent and individually acquired hysterical attack and in regarding them as its normal prototypes. In man and the higher animals it would seem that the act of birth, as the individual's first experience of anxiety, has given the affect of anxiety certain characteristic forms of expression. But, while acknowledging this connection, we must not lay undue stress on it nor overlook the fact that biological necessity demands that a situation of danger should have an affective symbol, so that a symbol of this kind would have to be created in any case. Moreover, I do not think that we are justified in assuming that wherever there is an outbreak of anxiety something like a reproduction of the situation of birth goes on in the mind. It is not even certain whether hysterical attacks, though they were originally traumatic reproductions of this sort, retain that character permanently" (93-94).

Freud is discussing some aspects of the case of "Little Hans" and of "The Wolf Man": "...the affect of anxiety, which was the essence of the phobia, came, not from the process of repression, not from the libidinal cathexes of the repressed impulses, but from the repressing agency itself. The anxiety belonging to the animal phobias was an untransformed fear of castration. It was therefore a realistic fear, a fear of a danger which was actually impending or was judged to be a real one. It was anxiety which produced repression and not, as I formerly believed, repression which produced anxiety. It is no use denying the fact, though it is not pleasant to recall it, that I have on many occasions asserted that in repression the instinctual representative is distorted, displaced, and so on, while the libido belonging to the instinctual impulse is transformed into anxiety. But now an examination of phobias, which should be best able to provide confirmatory evidence, fails to bear out my assertion; it seems, rather, to contradict it directly. The anxiety felt in animal phobias is the ego's fear of castration; while the anxiety felt in agoraphobia (a subject that has been less thoroughly studied) seems to be its fear of sexual temptation—a fear which, after all, must be connected in its origins with the fear of castration. As far as can be seen at present, the majority of phobias go back to an anxiety of this kind felt by the ego in regard to the demands of the libido. It is always the ego's attitude of
anxiety which is the primary thing and which sets repression going. Anxiety never arises from repressed libido. If I had contented myself earlier with saying that after the occurrence of repression a certain amount of anxiety appeared in place of the manifestations of libido that was to be expected, I should have nothing to retract today. The description would be correct; and there does undoubtedly exist a correspondence of the kind asserted between the strength of the impulse that has to be repressed and the intensity of the resultant anxiety. But I must admit that I thought I was giving more than a mere description. I believed I had put my finger on a metapsychological process of direct transformation of libido into anxiety. I can now no longer maintain this view. And, indeed, I found it impossible at the time to explain how a transformation of that kind was carried out" (108-109).

"We have said that as soon as the ego recognizes the danger of castration it gives the signal of anxiety and inhibits through the pleasure-unpleasure agency (in a way which we cannot as yet understand) the impending cathectic process in the id. At the same time the phobia is formed. And now the castration anxiety is directed to a different object and expressed in a distorted form, so that the patient is afraid, not of being castrated by his father, but of being bitten by a horse or devoured by a wolf. [This has reference to the two case histories mentioned above.] This substitutive formation has two obvious advantages. In the first place it avoids a conflict due to ambivalence (for the father was a loved object, too), and in the second place it enables the ego to cease generating anxiety. For the anxiety belonging to a phobia is condition; it only emerges when the object of it is perceived—and rightly so, since it is only then that the danger-signal is present. There is no need to be afraid of being castrated by a father who is not there. On the other hand one cannot get rid of a father; he can appear whenever he chooses. But if he is replaced by an animal, all one has to do it to avoid the sight of it—that is, its presence—in order to be free from danger and anxiety. 'Little Hans', therefore, imposed a restriction upon his ego. He produced the inhibition of not leaving the house, so as not to come across any horses" (125-126).

"On a previous occasion I have stated that phobias have the character of a projection in that they replace an internal, instinctual danger by fleeing from it and avoiding the perception of it, whereas it is useless to flee from dangers that arise from within. This statement of mine was not incorrect, but it did not go below the surface of things. For an instinctual demand is, after all, not dangerous in itself; it only becomes so inasmuch as it entails a real external danger, the danger of castration. Thus what happens in a phobia in the last resort is merely that one external danger is replaced by another. The view that in a phobia the ego is able to escape anxiety by means of avoidance or of inhibitory symptoms fits in very well with the theory that that anxiety is only an affective signal and that no alteration has taken place in the economic situation. The anxiety felt in animal phobias is, therefore, an affective reaction on the part of the ego to danger; and the danger which is being signalled in this way is the danger of castration. This anxiety differs in no respect from the realistic anxiety which the ego normally feels in situations of danger, except that its content remains unconscious and only becomes conscious in the form of a distortion. The same will prove true, I think, of the phobias of adults, although the material which their neuroses work over is much more abundant and there are some additional factors in the formation of the symptoms. Fundamentally the position is identical. The agoraphobic patient imposes a restriction on his ego so as to escape a certain instinctual danger—namely, the danger of giving way to his erotic desires. For if he did so the danger of being castrated, or some similar danger, would once more be conjured up as it was in his childhood. I may cite as an instance the case of a young man who become agoraphobic because he was afraid of yielding to the solicitations of prostitutes and of contracting a syphilitic infection from them as a punishment" (126-127).
"What we have learnt about anxiety in phobias is applicable to obsessional neuroses as well. In this respect it is not difficult for us to put obsessional neuroses on all fours with phobias. In the former, the mainspring of all later symptom-formation is clearly the ego's fear of its super-ego. The danger-situation from which the ego must get away is the hostility of the super-ego. There is no trace of projection here; the danger is completely internalized. But if we ask ourselves what it is that the ego fears from the super-ego, we cannot but think that the punishment threatened by the latter must be an extension of the punishment of castration. Just as the father has become depersonalized in the shape of the super-ego, so has the fear of castration at his hands become transformed into an undefined social or moral anxiety. But this anxiety is concealed. The ego escapes it by obediently carrying out the commands, precautions and penances that have been enjoined on it. If it is impeded in doing so, it is at once overtaken by an extremely distressing feeling of discomfort which may be regarded as an equivalent of anxiety and which the patients themselves liken to anxiety. The conclusion we have come to, then, is this. Anxiety is a reaction to a situation of danger. It is obviated by the ego's doing something to avoid that situation or to withdraw from it. It might be said that symptoms are created so as to avoid the generating of anxiety. But this does not go deep enough. It would be truer to say that symptoms are created so as to avoid a danger-situation whose presence has been signalled by the generation of anxiety. In these cases that we have discussed, the danger concerned was the danger of castration or something traceable back to castration. If anxiety is a reaction of the ego to danger, we shall be tempted to regard the traumatic neuroses, which so often follow upon a narrow escape from death, as a direct result of a fear of death (or fear for life) and to dismiss from our minds the question of castration and the dependent relationships of the ego. Most of those who observed the traumatic neuroses that occurred during the last war took this line, and triumphantly announced that proof was now forthcoming that a threat to the instinct of self-preservation could by itself produce a neurosis without any admixture of sexual factors and without requiring any of the complicated hypotheses of psycho-analysis. It is in fact greatly to be regretted that not a single analysis of a traumatic neurosis of any value is extant. And it is to be regretted, not because such an analysis would contradict the etiological importance of sexuality—for any such contradiction has long since been disposed of by the introduction of the concept of narcissism, which brings the libidinal cathexis of the ego into line with the cathexes of objects and emphasizes the libidinal character of the instinct of self-preservation—but because, in the absence of analyses of this kind, we have lost a most precious opportunity of drawing decisive conclusions about the relations between anxiety and the formation of symptoms. In view of all that we know about the structure of the comparatively simple neuroses of everyday life, it would seem highly improbable that a neurosis could come into being merely because of the objective presence of danger, without a corresponding tension of the threat-structures of the mental apparatus. But the unconscious seems to contain nothing that could give any content to our concept of the annihilation of life. Castration can be pictured on the basis of the daily experience of the faeces being separated from the body or on the basis of losing the mother's breast at weaning. But nothing resembling death can ever have been experienced; or if it has, as in fainting, it has left no observable traces behind. I am therefore inclined to adhere to the view that the fear of death should be regarded as analogous to the fear of castration and that the situation to which the ego is reacting is one of being abandoned by the protecting super-ego—the powers of destiny—so that it has no longer any safeguard against all the dangers that surround it. In addition, it must be remembered that in the experiences which lead to a traumatic neurosis the protective shield against external stimuli is broken through and excessive amounts of excitation impinge upon the mental apparatus; so that we have here a second possibility—that anxiety is not only being signalled as an affect but is also being freshly created out of the economic conditions of the situation. The statement I have just made, i.e. to the effect that the ego has been prepared to expect castration by having undergone constantly repeated object-losses, places the question of anxiety in a new light. We have hitherto regarded it as an affective signal of danger; but now, since the danger is so often one of castration, it appears to us as a reaction to a loss, a separation" (128-130).
"Anxiety, then, is in the first place something that is felt. We call it an affective state, although we are also ignorant of what an affect is. As a feeling, anxiety has a very marked character of unpleasantness. But that is not the whole of its quality. Not every unpleasantness can be called anxiety, for there are other feelings, such as tension, pain or mourning, which have the character of unpleasantness. Thus anxiety must have other distinctive features besides this quality of unpleasantness" (132).

"Analysis of anxiety-states...reveals the existence of (1) a specific character of unpleasantness, (2) acts of discharge and (3) perception of those acts. The last two points indicate at once a difference between states of anxiety and other similar states, like those of mourning and pain. The latter do not have any motor manifestation; or if they have, the manifestation is not an integral part of the whole state but is distinct from it as being a result of it or a reaction to it. Anxiety, then, is a special state of unpleasantness with acts of discharge along particular paths....We assume...that an anxiety-state is the reproduction of some experience which contained the necessary conditions for such an increase of excitation and a discharge along particular paths, and that from this circumstance the unpleasantness of anxiety receives its specific character. In man, birth provides a prototypic experience of this kind, and we are therefore inclined to regard anxiety-states as a reproduction of the trauma of birth. This does not imply that anxiety occupies an exceptional position among the affective states. In my opinion the other affects are also reproductions of very early, perhaps even pre-individual, experiences of vital importance; and I should be inclined to regard them as universal, typical and innate hysterical attacks, as compared with the recently and individually acquired attacks which occur in hysterical neuroses and whose origin and significance as mnemic symbols have been revealed by analysis. It would be very desirable, of course, to be able to demonstrate the truth of this view in a number of such affects—a thing which is still very far from being the case" (132-133).

"The view that anxiety goes back to the event of birth raises immediate objections which have to be met. It may be argued that anxiety is a reaction which, in all probability, is common to every organism, certainly every organism of a higher order, whereas birth is only experienced by the mammals; and it is doubtful whether in all of them, even, birth has the significance of a trauma. Therefore there can be anxiety without the prototype of birth. But this objection takes us beyond the barrier that divides psychology from biology. It may be that, precisely because anxiety has an indispensable biological function to fulfill as a reaction to a state of danger, it is differently contrived in different organisms. We do not know, besides, whether anxiety involves the same sensations and innervations in organisms far removed from man as it does in man himself. Thus there is no argument here against the view that, in man, anxiety is modelled upon the process of birth. If the structure and origin of anxiety are as described, the next question is: what is the function of anxiety and on what occasions is it reproduced? The answer seems to be obvious and convincing: anxiety arose originally as a reaction to a state of danger and it is reproduced whenever a state of that kind recurs" (134).

"Thus we see that there are two ways in which anxiety can emerge: in an inexpedient way, when a new situation of danger has occurred, or in an expedient way in order to give a signal and prevent such a situation from occurring" (135).

"In his book on the trauma of birth, Rank (1924) has made a determined attempt to establish a relationship between the earliest phobias of children and the impressions made on them by the event of birth. But I do not think he has been successful. His theory is open to two objections. In the first place, he assumes that the infant has received certain sensory impressions, in particular of a visual kind, at the time of birth, the renewal of which can recall to its memory the trauma of birth and thus evoke a reaction of anxiety. This assumption is quite unfounded.
and extremely improbable. It is not credible that a child should retain any but tactile and general sensations relating to the process of birth. In the second place, in considering these later anxiety-situations Rank dwells, as suits him best, now on the child's recollection of its happy intra-uterine existence, now on its recollection of the traumatic disturbance which interrupted that existence—which leaves the door wide open for arbitrary interpretation (135-136).

"I am driven to the conclusion that the earliest phobias of infancy cannot be directly traced back to impressions of the act of birth and that so far they have not been explained. A certain preparedness for anxiety is undoubtedly present in the infant in arms. But this preparedness for anxiety, instead of being at its maximum immediately after birth and then slowly decreasing, does not emerge till later, as mental development proceeds, and lasts over a certain period of childhood. If these early phobias persist beyond that period one is inclined to suspect the presence of a neurotic disturbance, although it is not at all clear what their relation is to the undoubted neuroses that appear later on in childhood. Only a few of the manifestations of anxiety in children are comprehensible to us, and we must confine our attention to them. They occur, for instance, when a child is alone, or in the dark, or when it finds itself with an unknown person instead of one to whom it is used—such as its mother. These three instances can be reduced to a single condition—namely, that of missing someone who is loved and longed for. But here, I think, we have the key to an understanding of anxiety and to a reconciliation of the contradictions that seem to beset it. The child's mnemonic image of the person longed for is not doubt intensely cathexated, probably in a hallucinatory way at first. But this has no effect; and now it seems as though the longing turns into anxiety. This anxiety has all the appearance of being an expression of the child's feeling at its wits' end, as though in its still very undeveloped state it did not know how better to cope with its cathexis of longing. Here anxiety appears as a reaction to the felt loss of the object; and we are at once reminded of the fact that castration anxiety, too, is a fear of being separated from a highly valued object, and that the earliest anxiety of all—the 'primal anxiety' of birth—is brought about on the occasion of a separation from the mother. But a moment's reflection takes us beyond this question of loss of object. The reason why the infant in arms wants to perceive the presence of its mother is only because it already knows by experience that she satisfies all its needs without delay. The situation, then, which it regards as a 'danger' and against which it wants to be safeguarded is that of non-satisfaction, of a growing tension due to need, against which it is helpless. I think that if we adopt this view all the facts fall into place. The situation of non-satisfaction in which the amounts of stimulation rise to an unpleasurable height without its being possible for them to be mastered psychologically or discharged must for the infant be analogous to the experience of being born—and must be a repetition of the situation of danger. What both situations have in common is the economic disturbance caused by an accumulation of amounts of stimulation which require to be disposed of. If this factor, then, which is the real essence of the 'danger'. In both cases the reaction of anxiety sets in" (136-137).

"When the infant has found out by experience than an external, perceptible object can put an end to the dangerous situation which is reminiscent of birth, the content of the danger it fears is displaced from the economic situation on to the condition which determined that situation, viz., the loss of object. It is the absence of the mother that is now the danger; and as soon as that danger arises the infant gives the signal of anxiety, before the dreaded economic situation has set in. This change constitutes a first great step forward in the provision made by the infant for its self-preservation, and at the same time represents a transition from the automatic and involuntary fresh appearance of anxiety to the intentional reproduction of anxiety as a signal of danger. In these two aspects, as an automatic phenomenon and as a rescuing signal, anxiety is seen to be a product of the infant's mental helplessness which is a natural counterpart to its biological helplessness. The striking coincidence by which the anxiety of the
The significance of the loss of object as a determinant of anxiety extends considerably further. For the next transformation of anxiety, viz., the castration anxiety belonging to the phallic phase, is also a fear of separation and is thus attached to the same determinant. In this case the danger is of being separated from one's genitals" (138-139).

"The progress which the child makes in its development--its growing independence, the sharper division of its mental apparatus into several agencies, the advent of new needs--cannot fail to exert an influence upon the content of the danger-situation. We have already traced the change of that content from loss of the mother as an object to castration. The next change is caused by the power of the super-ego. With the depersonalization of the parental agency from which castration was feared, the danger becomes less defined. Castration anxiety develops into moral anxiety--social anxiety--and it is not so easy now to know what anxiety is about. The formula, 'separation and expulsion from the horde', only applies to that later portion of the super-ego which has been formed on the basis of social prototypes, not to the nucleus of the super-ego, which corresponds to the introjected parental agency. Putting it more generally, what the ego regards as the danger and responds to with an anxiety-signal is that the super-ego should be angry with it or punish it or cease to love it. The final transformation which the fear of the super-ego undergoes is, it seems to me, the fear of death (or fear for life) which is a fear of the super-ego projected on to the powers of destiny. At one time I attached some importance to the view that what was used as a discharge of anxiety was the cathexis which had been withdrawn in the process of repression. To-day this seems to me of scarcely any interest. The reason for this is that whereas I formerly believed that anxiety invariably arose automatically by an economic process, my present conception of anxiety as a signal given by the ego in order to affect the pleasure-unpleasure agency does away with the necessity of considering the economic factor. Of course there is nothing to be said against the idea that it is precisely the energy that has been liberated by being withdrawn through repression which is used by the ego to arouse the affect; but it is no longer of any importance which portion of energy is employed for this purpose" (139-140). In regard to this last statement, Strachey has pointed out in his introduction, p.80, that Freud abandoned this last relic of his old theory in his New Intro. Lect. (1933) when he wrote "we shall no longer maintain that it is the libido itself that is turned into anxiety in such cases."

"This new view of things calls for an examination of another assertion of mine--namely, that the ego is the actual seat of anxiety. I think this proposition still holds good. There is no reason to assign any manifestation of anxiety to the super-ego; while the expression 'anxiety of the id' would stand in need of correction, though rather as to its form than its substance. Anxiety is an affective state and as such can, of course, only be felt by the ego. The id cannot have anxiety as the ego can; for it is not an organization and cannot make a judgement about situations of danger. On the other hand it very often happens that processes take place or begin to take place in the id which cause the ego to produce anxiety. Indeed, it is probable that the earliest repressions as well as most of the later ones are motivated by an ego-anxiety of this sort in regard to particular processes in the id. Here again we distinctly distinguishing between two cases: the case in which something occurs in the id which activates one of the danger-situations for the ego and induces the latter to give the anxiety-signal for inhibition to take place, and the case in which a situation analogous to the trauma of birth is established in the id and an automatic reaction of
anxiety ensues. The two cases may be brought closer together if it is pointed out that the second case corresponds to the earliest and original danger-situation, while the first case corresponds to any one of the later determinants of anxiety that have been derived from it; or, as applied to the disorders which we in fact come across, that the second case is operative in the aetiology of the 'actual' neuroses, while the first remains typical for that of the psychoneuroses" (141-142).

"In describing the evolution of the various danger-situations from their prototype, the act of birth, I have had no intention of asserting that every later determinant of anxiety completely invalidates the preceding one. It is true that, as the development of the ego goes on, the earlier danger-situations tend to lose their force and to be set aside, so that we might say that each period of the individual's life has its appropriate determinant of anxiety. Thus the danger of psychical helplessness is appropriate to the period of life when his ego is immature; the danger of loss of object, to early childhood when he is still dependent on others; the danger of castration, to the phallic phase; and the fear of his super-ego, to the latency period. Nevertheless, all these danger-situations and determinants of anxiety can persist side by side and cause the ego to react to them with anxiety at a period later than the appropriate one; or, again, several of them can come into operation at the same time. It is possible, moreover, that there is a fairly close relationship between the danger-situation that is operative and the form taken by the ensuing neurosis" (141-142).

"When, in an earlier part of this discussion, we found that the danger of castration was of importance in more than one neurotic illness, we put ourselves on guard against over-estimating that factor, since it could not be a decisive one for the female sex, who are undoubtedly more subject to neuroses than men. We now see that there is no danger of regarding our castration anxiety as the sole motive force of the defensive process which leads to neurosis. I have shown elsewhere how little girls, in the course of their development, are led into making a tender object-cathexis by the castration complex. In his paper on the consequences of the anatomical distinction between the sexes, 1925, vol. 13 It is precisely in women that the danger-situation of loss of object seems to have remained the most effective. All we need to do is to make a slight modification in our description of their determinant of anxiety, in the sense that it is no longer a matter of feeling the want of, or actually losing the object itself, but of losing the object's love. Since there is no doubt that hysteria has a strong affinity with femininity, just as obsessional neurosis has with masculinity, it appears probable that, as a determinant of anxiety, loss of love plays much the same part in hysteria as in the threat of castration does in phobias and fear of the super-ego in obsessional neurosis" (143).

"What is now left for us to consider is the relationship between the formation of symptoms and the generating of anxiety. There seem to be two very widely held opinions on this subject. One is that anxiety itself a symptom of neurosis. The other is that there is a much more intimate relation between the two. According to the second opinion, symptoms are only formed in order to avoid anxiety: they bind the psychical energy which would otherwise be discharged as anxiety. Thus anxiety would be the fundamental phenomenon and main problem of neurosis. That this latter opinion is at least in part true is shown by some striking examples. (E.g., if an agoraphobic patient is taken out into the open and left alone, he will show anxiety; if an obsessional neurotic is kept from washing his hands--when this is a compulsion--he will show anxiety, etc.)... Since we have traced the generating of anxiety to a situation of danger, we shall prefer to say that symptoms are created in order to remove the ego from a situation of danger. If the symptoms are prevented from being formed, the danger does in fact materialize; that is, a situation analogous to birth is established in which the ego is helpless in the face of a constantly increasing instinctual demand--the earliest and original determinant of anxiety. Thus in our view the relation between anxiety and symptom is less close than was supposed, for we have inserted the factor of the danger-situation between them. We can also add that the generating of anxiety sets symptom-formation going and is, indeed, a necessary prerequisite of it" (144).
Symptom-formation, then, does in fact put an end to the danger-situation. It has two aspects: one, hidden from view, brings about the alteration in the id in virtue of which the ego is removed from danger; the other, presented openly, shows what has been created in place of the instinctual process that has been affected—namely, the substitutive formation" (145).

"Anxiety is the reaction to danger. One cannot, after all, help suspecting that the reason why the affect of anxiety occupies a unique position in the economy of the mind has something to do with the essential nature of danger" (150).

The following excerpts come from Freud's addenda to this paper, particular the section "Supplementary Remarks on Anxiety.": "The affect of anxiety exhibits one or two features the study of which promises to throw further light on the subject. Anxiety [Angst] has an unmistakable relation to expectation: it is anxiety about something. It has a quality of indefiniteness and lack of object. In precise speech we use the word 'fear' (Furcht) rather than 'anxiety' (Angst) if it has found an object. Moreover, in addition to its relation to danger, anxiety has a relation to neurosis which we have long been trying to elucidate. The question arises: why are not all reactions of anxiety neurotic—why do we accept so many of them as normal? And finally the problem of the difference between realistic anxiety and neurotic anxiety awaits a thorough examination. To begin with the last problem. The advance we have made is that we have gone behind reactions of anxiety to situations of danger. If we do the same thing with realistic anxiety we shall have no difficulty in solving the question. Real danger is a danger that is known, and realistic anxiety is anxiety about a known danger of this sort. Neurotic anxiety is anxiety about an unknown danger. Neurotic danger is thus a danger that has still to be discovered. Analysis has shown that it is an instinctual danger. By bringing this danger which is not known to the ego into consciousness, the analyst makes neurotic anxiety no different from realistic anxiety, so that it can be dealt with in the same way" (164-165).

"In some cases the characteristics of realistic anxiety and neurotic anxiety are mingled. The danger is known and real but the anxiety in regard to it is over-great, greater than seems proper to us. It is this surplus of anxiety which betrays the presence of a neurotic element: Such cases, however, introduce no new principle; for analysis shows that to the known real danger an unknown instinctual one is attached" (165-166).

"We can find out still more about this, if not content with tracing anxiety back to danger, we go on to enquire what the essence and meaning of a danger-situation is. Clearly, it consists in the subject's estimation of his own strength compared to the magnitude of the danger and in his admission of helplessness in the face of it—physical helplessness if the danger is real and psychical helplessness if it is instinctual. In doing this he will be guided by the actual experience he has had. (Whether he is wrong in his estimation or not is immaterial for the outcome.) Let us call a situation of helplessness of this kind that has been actually experienced a traumatic situation. We shall then have good grounds for distinguishing a traumatic situation from a danger-situation. The individual will have made an important advance in his capacity for self-preservation if he can foresee and expect a traumatic situation of this kind which entails helplessness, instead of simply waiting for it to happen. Let us call a situation which contains the determinant for such an expectation a danger-situation. It is in this situation that the signal of anxiety is given. The signal announces: 'I am expecting a situation of helplessness to set in', or: 'The present situation reminds me of one of the traumatic experiences I have had before. Therefore I will anticipate the trauma and behave as though it had already come, while there is yet time to turn it aside.' Anxiety is therefore on the one hand an expectation of a trauma, and on the other a repetition of it in a mitigated form. Thus the two features of anxiety which we have noted have a different origin. Its connection with expectation belongs to the danger-situation, whereas its indefiniteness and lack of
object belong to the traumatic situation of helplessness—the situation which is anticipated in the danger-situation. Taking this sequence, anxiety-danger-helplessness (trauma), we can now summarize what has been said. A danger-situation is a recognized, remembered, expected situation of helplessness. Anxiety is the original reaction to helplessness in the trauma and is reproduced later on in the danger-situation as a signal for help. The ego, which experienced the trauma passively, now repeats it actively in a weakened version, in the hope of being able itself to direct its course....what is of decisive importance is the first displacement of the anxiety-reaction from its origin in the situation of helplessness to an expectation of that situation, that is, to the danger-situation. After that come the later displacements, from the danger to the determinant of the danger—loss of the object and the modifications of that loss with which we are already acquainted" (166-167).

"So far we have had no occasion to regard realistic anxiety in any different light from neurotic anxiety. We know what the distinction is. A real danger is a danger which threatens a person from an external object, and a neurotic danger is one which threatens him from an instinctual demand. In so far as the instinctual demand is something real, his neurotic anxiety, too, can be admitted to have a realistic basis. We have seen that the reason why there seems to be a specially close connection between anxiety and neurosis is that the ego defends itself against an instinctual danger with the help of the anxiety reaction just as it does against an external real danger, but that this line of defensive activity eventuates in a neurosis owing to an imperfection of the mental apparatus. We have also come to the conclusion that an instinctual demand often becomes an (internal) danger because its satisfaction would bring on an external danger—that is, because the internal danger represents an external one. On the other hand, the external (real) danger must also have managed to become internalized if it is to be significant for the ego. It must have been recognized as related to some situation of helplessness that has been experienced. Man seems not to have been endowed, or to have been endowed to only a very small degree, with an instinctive recognition of the dangers that threaten him without. Small children are constantly doing things which endanger their lives, and that is precisely why they cannot afford to be without a protecting object. In relation to the traumatic situation, in which the subject is helpless, external and internal dangers, real dangers and instinctual demands converge. Whether the ego is suffering from a pain which will not stop or experiencing an accumulation of instinctual needs which cannot obtain satisfaction, the economic situation is the same, and the motor helplessness of the ego finds expression in psychical helplessness" (167-168).

The Future of an Illusion 1927, vol. 21
Freud is discussing the kind of anaclitic (attachment) object choice made by the infant. "The libido there follows the path of narcissistic needs and attaches itself to the objects which ensure the satisfaction of those needs. In this way the mother, who satisfied the child's hunger, becomes its first love-object and certainly also its first protection against all the undefined dangers which threaten it in the external world--its first protection against anxiety, we may say. In this function (of protection) the mother is soon replaced by the stronger father who retains that position for the rest of childhood. But the child's attitude to its father is coloured by a peculiar ambivalence. The father himself constitutes a danger for the child, perhaps because of its earlier relation to the mother. Thus if fears him no less than it longs for him and admires him" (24).

Civilization and its Discontents 1930, vol. 21
Freud is talking about the origin of the sense of guilt. "At the beginning...what is bad is whatever causes one to be threatened with the loss of love. For fear of that loss, one must avoid it. This, too, is the reason why it makes little difference whether one has already done the bad thing or only intends to do it. In either case the danger only sets in if and when the authority discovers it, and in either case the authority would behave in the same way. This state of mind
is called a 'bad conscience'; but actually it does not deserve this name, for at this stage the sense of guilt is clearly over a fear of loss of love, 'social anxiety" (124-125). "A great change takes place only when the authority is internalized through the establishment of a super-ego. The phenomena of conscience then reach a higher stage. Actually, it is not until now that we should speak of conscience or a sense of guilt. At this point, too, the fear of being found out comes to an end; the distinction, moreover, between doing something bad and wishing to do it disappears entirely, since nothing can be hidden from the super-ego, not even thoughts" (125).

"...conscience (or more correctly, the anxiety which later becomes conscience) is indeed the cause of instinctual renunciation to begin with, but that later the relationship is reversed. Every renunciation of instinct now becomes a dynamic source of conscience and every fresh renunciation increases the latter's severity and intolerance. If we could only bring it better into harmony with what we already know about the history of the origin of conscience, we should be tempted to define a paradoxical statement that conscience is the result of instinctual renunciation, or that instinctual renunciation (imposed on us from without) creates conscience, which then demands further instinctual renunciation" (128-129).

"...the sense of guilt is at bottom nothing else but a topographical variety of anxiety; in its later phases it coincides completely with fear of the super-ego. And the relations of anxiety to consciousness exhibit the same extraordinary variations. Anxiety is always present somewhere or other behind every symptom; but at one time it takes noisy possession of the whole of consciousness, while at another it conceals itself so completely that we are obliged to speak of unconscious anxiety or, if we want to have a clearer psychological conscience, since anxiety is in the first instance a feeling, of possibilities of anxiety" (135). Freud has earlier stated that feelings cannot properly be described as 'unconscious.' Found in "The Unconscious", 1915, vol. 14, p. 177-178, The Ego and the Id, 1923, vol. 19, p. 32-33, and in Inhib., Symp., and Anxiety, 1926, vol. 20, p. 132. Also see my review paper on consciousness, unconscious, and preconscious.

New Introductory Lectures, 1933, vol. 22

Freud is discussing parental authority and its relation to the development of the superego. "Parental influence governs the child by offering proofs of love and by threatening punishments which are signs to the child of loss of love and are bound to be feared on their own account. This realistic anxiety is the precursor of the later moral anxiety. So long as it is dominant there is no need to talk of a super-ego and of a conscience. It is only subsequently that the secondary situation develops (which we are all too ready to regard as the normal one), where the external restraint is internalized and the super-ego takes the place of the parental agency and observes, directs and threatens the ego in exactly the same way as the parents did with the child" (62). This is from his lecture, no. XXXI, on XXXX "The dissection of the psychological personality." What follows is taken from Lecture XXXII, "Anxiety and instinctual life."

"I devoted a lecture (the twenty-fifth) to anxiety in my previous series; and I must briefly recapitulate what I said in it. We described anxiety as an affective state—that is to say, a combination of certain feelings in the pleasure-unpleasure series with the corresponding innervations of discharge and a perception of them, but probably also the precipitate of a particular important event, incorporated by inheritance—something that may thus be likened to an individually acquired hysterical attack. The event we look upon as having left behind it an affective trace of this sort is the process of birth, at the time of which the effects upon the heart's action and upon respiration characteristic of anxiety were expedient ones. The very first anxiety would thus have been a toxic one. We then started off from a distinction between realistic anxiety and neurotic anxiety, of which the former was a reaction, which seemed intelligible to us, to a danger—that is, to an expected injury from outside—while the latter was
completely enigmatic, and appeared to be pointless" (81-82). "In an analysis of realistic anxiety we brought it down to the state of increased sensory attention and motor tension which we describe as 'preparedness for anxiety'. It is out of this that the anxiety reaction develops. Here two outcomes are possible. Either the generation of anxiety—the repetition of the old traumatic experience—is limited to a signal, in which case the remainder of the reaction can adapt itself to the new situation of danger and can proceed to flight or defence; or the old situation can retain the upper hand and the total reaction may consist in no more than a generation of anxiety, in which case the affective state becomes paralyzing and will be inexpedient for present purposes. We then turned to neurotic anxiety and pointed out that we observe it under three conditions. We find it at first as a freely floating, general apprehensiveness, ready to attach itself temporarily, in the form of what is known as 'expectant anxiety', to any possibility that may freshly arise—-as happens, for instance, in a typical anxiety neurosis. Secondly, we find it firmly attached to certain ideas in the so-called 'phobias', in which it is still possible to recognize a relation to external danger but in which we must judge the fear exaggerated out of all proportion. Thirdly and lastly, we find anxiety in hysteria and other forms of severe neurosis, where it either accompanies symptoms or emerges independently as an attack or more persistent state, but always without any visible basis in an external danger. We then asked ourselves two questions: 'What are people afraid of in neurotic anxiety?' and 'How are we to bring it into relation with realistic anxiety felt in the face of external dangers?' Our investigations were far from remaining unsuccessful: we reached a few important conclusions. In regard to anxious expectation clinical experience revealed that it has a regular connection with the libidinal economics of sexual life. The commonest cause of anxiety neurosis is unconsummated excitation. Libidinal excitation is aroused but not satisfied, not employed; apprehensiveness then appears instead of this libido that has been diverted from its employment. I even thought I was justified in saying that this unsatisfied libido was directly changed into anxiety" (82).

"In the course of these investigations our attention was drawn to a highly significant relation between the generation of anxiety and the formation of symptoms—namely, that these two represent and replace each other. For instance, an agoraphobic patient may start his illness with an attack of anxiety in the street. This would be repeated every time he went into the streets again. He will now develop the symptom of agoraphobia; this may also be described as an inhibition, az restriction of the ego's functioning, and by means of it he scares himself anxiety attacks" (83).

"At the conclusion of my earlier lecture on anxiety I myself expressed the opinion that, although these various findings of our enquiry were not mutually contradictory, somehow they did not fit in with one another. Anxiety, it seems, is so far as it is an affective state, is the reproduction of an old event which brought a threat of danger; anxiety serves the purposes of self-preservation and is a signal of a new danger; it arises from libido that has in some way become unemployable and it also arises during the process of repression: it is replaced by the formation of a symptom, is, as it were, psychically bound—one has a feeling that something is missing here which would pull all these pieces together into a whole. Ladies and Gentlemen, the dissection of the mental personality into a super-ego, an ego and an id, which I put before you in my last lecture, has obliged us to take our bearings afresh in the problem of anxiety as well. With the thesis that the ego is the sole seat of anxiety—that the ego alone can produce and feel anxiety—we have established a new and stable position from which a number of things take on a new aspect. And indeed it is difficult to see what sense there would be in speaking of an 'anxiety of the id' or in attributing a capacity for apprehensiveness to the super-ego. On the other hand, we have welcomed a desirable element of correspondence in the fact that the three main species of anxiety, realistic, neurotic and moral, can be so easily connected with the ego's three dependent relations—to the external world, to the id and to the super-ego. Along with this view, moreover, the function of anxiety as a signal announcing
a situation of danger (a notion, incidentally, not unfamiliar to us) comes into prominence, the question of what the material is out of which anxiety is made loses interest, and the relations between realistic and neurotic anxiety have become surprisingly clarified and simplified. It is also to be remarked that we now understand the apparently complicated cases of the generation of anxiety better than those which were considered simple" (85).

"It was not the repression that created the anxiety; the anxiety was there earlier; it was the anxiety that made the repression" (86). ". . . But we have not made any mention at all so far of what the real danger is that the child is afraid of as a result of being in love with his mother. The danger is the punishment of being castrated, of losing his genital organ... Above all, it is not a question of whether castration is really carried out; what is decisive is that the danger is one that threatens from outside and the child believes in it" (86).

"Fear of castration is not, of course, the only motive for repression; indeed, it finds no place in women, for though they have a castration complex they cannot have a fear of being castrated. Its place is taken in their sex by a fear of loss of love, which is evidently a later prolongation of the infant's anxiety if it finds its mother absent.... Do not reject the idea that these determinants of anxiety may at bottom repeat the situation of the original anxiety at birth, which, to be sure, also represented a separation from the mother. Indeed, if you follow a train of thought suggested by Ferenczi, you may add the fear of castration to this series, for a loss of the male organ results in an inability to unite once more with the mother (or a substitute for her) in the sexual act" (87).

"If we dwell on these situations of danger for a moment, we can say that in fact a particular determinant of anxiety (that is, situation of danger) is allotted to every age of development as being appropriate to it. The danger of psychical helplessness fits the stage of the ego's early immaturity; the danger of loss of an object (or loss of love) fits the lack of self-sufficiency in the first years of childhood; the danger of being castrated fits the phallic phase; and finally the fear of the super-ego, which assumes a special position, fits the period of latency. In the course of development the old determinants of anxiety should be dropped, since the situations of danger corresponding to them have lost their importance owing to the strengthening of the ego. But this only occurs most incompletely. Many people are unable to surmount the fear of loss of love; they never become sufficiently independent of other people's love and in this respect carry on their behaviour as infants. Fear of the super-ego should normally never cease, since, in the form of moral anxiety, it is indispensable in social relations, and only in the rarest cases can an individual become independent of human society. A few of the old situations of danger, too, succeed in surviving into later periods by making contemporary modifications in their determinants of anxiety. Thus, for instance, the danger of castration persists under the mark of syphilidophobia" (88).

"I hope you have not lost the thread of what I am saying and remember that we are investigating the relations between anxiety and repression. In the course of this we have learnt two new things: first, that anxiety makes repression and not, as we used to think, the other way round, and [secondly] that the instinctual situation which is feared goes back ultimately to an external situation of danger" (89). "The next question will be" how do we now picture the process of a repression under the influence of anxiety? The answer will, I think, be as follows. The ego notices that the satisfaction of an emerging instinctual demand would conjure up one of the well-remembered situations of danger. This instinctual cathexis must therefore be somehow suppressed, stopped, made powerless. We know that the ego succeeds in this task if it is strong and has drawn the instinctual impulse concerned into its organization. But what happens in the case of repression is that the instinctual impulse still belongs to the id and that the ego feels weak. The ego thereupon helps itself by a
technique which is at bottom identical with normal thinking. Thinking is an experimental action carried out with small amounts of energy, in the same way as a general shifts small figures about on a map before setting his large bodies of troops in motion. Thus the ego anticipates the satisfaction of the questionable instinctual impulse and permits it to bring about the reproduction of the unpleasurable feelings at the beginning of the feared situation of danger. With this the automatism of the pleasure-unpleasure principle is brought into operation and now carries out the repression of the dangerous instinctual impulse" (89-90).

"...we should distinguish clearly what happens in the ego and what happens in the id when there is a repression. We have just said what the ego does: it makes use of an experimental cathexis and starts up the pleasure-unpleasure automatism by means of a signal of anxiety. After that, several reactions are possible or a combination of them in varying proportions. Either the anxiety attack is fully generated and the ego withdraws entirely from the objectionable excitation; or, in place of the experimental cathexis it opposes the excitation with an anticathexis, and this combines with the energy of the repressed impulse to form a symptom; or the anticathexis is taken up into the ego as a reaction-formation, as an intensification of certain of the ego's dispositions, as a permanent alteration of it. The more the generation of anxiety can be restricted to a mere signal, so much the more does the ego expend on actions of defense which amount to the psychical binding of the repressed (impulse), and so much the closer, too, does the process approximate to a normal working-over of it, though no doubt without attaining to it" (90).

"Now let us go back to the id. It is not so easy to guess what occurs during repression in connection with the instinctual impulse that is being fought against. The main question which our interest raises is as to what happens to the energy, to the libidinal charge, of that excitation--how is it employed? You must recollect that the earlier hypothesis was that it is precisely this that is transformed by repression into anxiety. We no longer feel able to say that. The modest reply will rather be that what happens to it is probably not always the same thing. There is probably an intimate correspondence which we ought to get to know about between what is occurring at the time in the ego and in the id in connection with the repressed impulse. For since we have decided that the pleasure-unpleasure principle, which is set in action by the signal of anxiety, plays a part in repression, we must alter our expectations. That principle exercises an entirely unrestricted dominance over what happens in the id. We can rely on its bringing about quite profound changes in the instinctual impulse in question. We are prepared to find that repression will have very various consequences, more or less far-reaching. In some cases the repressed instinctual impulse may retain its libidinal cathexis, and may persist in the id unchanged, although subject to constant pressure from the ego. In other cases what seems to happen is that it is totally destroyed, while its libido is permanently diverted along other paths. I expressed the view that this is what happens when the Oedipus complex is dealt with normally--in this desirable case, therefore, being not simply repressed but destroyed in the id. I have commented to you previously on the fact that this aspect of Freud's view on repression of an instinctual impulse has never been attended to sufficiently, or emphasized to any degree, in the psychoanalytic literature. The idea that an impulse can be totally destroyed and its libido liberated for other uses is a most interesting one to be thought through in all its implications. Clinical experience has further shown us that in many cases, instead of the customary result of repression, a degradation of the libido takes place--a regression of the libidinal organization to an earlier stage. This can, of course, only occur in the id, and if it occurs it will be under the influence of the same conflict which was introduced by the signal of anxiety. The most striking example of this kind is provided by the obsessional neurosis, in which libidinal regression and repression operate together" (91-92).
"We must not exaggerate the separation between (the ego and the id) too much, and we must not be surprised if the ego on its part can bring its influence to bear on the processes in the id. I believe the ego exercises this influence by putting into action the almost omnipotent pleasure-unpleasure principle by means of the signal of anxiety. On the other hand, it shows its weakness again immediately afterwards, for by the act of repression it renounces a portion of its organization and has to allow the repressed instinctual impulse to remain permanently withdrawn from its influence. And now, only one more remark on the problem of anxiety. Neurotic anxiety has changed in our hands into realistic anxiety, into fear of particular external situations of danger. But we cannot stop there, we must take another step—though it will be a step backward. We ask ourselves what it is that is actually dangerous and actually feared in a situation of danger of this kind. It is plainly not the injury to the subject as judged objectively, for this need be of no significance psychologically, but something brought about by it in the mind. Birth, for instance, our model for an anxiety state, can after all scarcely be regarded on its own account as an injury, although it may involve a danger of injuries. The essential thing about birth, as about every situation of danger, is that it calls up in mental experience a state of highly tense excitation, which is felt as unpleasure and which one is not able to master by discharging it. Let us call a state of this kind, before which the efforts of the pleasure principle break down, a 'traumatic' moment. Then, if we take in succession neurotic anxiety, realistic anxiety and the situation of danger, we arrive at this simple proposition: what is feared, what is the object of the anxiety, is invariably the emergence of a traumatic moment, which cannot be dealt with by the normal rules of the pleasure principle" (93-94).

"It is only the later repressions that exhibit the mechanism we have described, in which anxiety is awakened as a signal of an earlier situation of danger. The first and original repressions arise directly from traumatic moments, when the ego meets with an excessively great libidinal demand; they construct their anxiety afresh, although, it is true, on the model of birth. The same may apply to the generation of anxiety in anxiety neurosis owing to somatic damage to the sexual function. We shall no longer maintain that it is the libido itself that is turned into anxiety in such cases. But I can see no objection to there being a twofold origin of anxiety—one as a direct consequence of the traumatic moment and the other as a signal threatening a repetition of such a moment" (94-95).

This concludes this review of Freud's concept of anxiety.