among Spanish students as well as in A. Lange’s (1971) investigation of religious practices and social attitudes in Amsterdam. Allport’s worldwide influence will doubtless remain pervasive for many years to come.

ERICH FROMM: THE HOPE OF A HUMANISTIC FAITH

Like other committed Christian psychologists, Allport found in the intrinsic–extrinsic distinction a tentative answer to the age-old problem of distinguishing genuine piety from false or deteriorated forms. Erich Fromm was also challenged by this problem, though as a Jewish psychoanalyst who had given up all religious practice by his late twenties, he approached it from a rather different angle. The distinction he came to draw between authoritarian and humanistic religious traditions provides a unifying thread in much of his work and offers us yet another perspective on human piety.

Erich Fromm (1900—1980) grew up an only child in an orthodox Jewish home in Frankfurt, Germany. Descended from a long line of rabbis and deeply impressed by the traditional rabbinical values of learning, and of loving and just relations, he felt himself a stranger in a world governed by wealth and power. The hatred and nationalism he witnessed during World War I helped to solidify what became for him a lifelong commitment to the quest for peace and international understanding. Although he had abandoned religious observance in early adulthood, he was profoundly and lastingly influenced by the prophetic writings of the Hebrew Bible and especially the humanistic principles and values of his Talmudic teachers, all of whom were strictly observant rabbis (Landis and Tauber, 1971).

Fromm’s humanist–socialist view was secondarily shaped by the writings of Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud. The humanistic and revolutionary spirit of Marx (in contrast to the vulgar Soviet misinterpretations of the recent past) seemed to Fromm a contemporary manifestation of the radical humanism expressed in the messianic vision of the Hebrew prophets (Landis and Tauber, 1971, p. xi). Freud he valued, in spite of important limitations, for a number of fundamental discoveries: the discrepancy between what we think and who we are; the intensity of the boy’s attachment to his mother; the phenomenon of transference, a powerful factor not only in therapy but also in social, political, and religious life; the self-“love” of narcissism; the dynamic structure of passions that forms a person’s character; the significance of early childhood; the art of dream interpretation; and his vision of the life and death instincts (Fromm, 1980). Fromm trained as an orthodox psychoanalyst after completing a PhD in philosophy, and it was only gradually that his own distinctive perspective emerged, after he emigrated to the United States in 1934. The writer of a number of highly readable (if sometimes repetitive) books that contain as much social criticism and moral philosophy as they do psychology, Fromm has much to say on the nature of human piety.

The Human Situation

Usually classified among the neo-Freudians who transmuted psychoanalysis by combining it with the outlook of twentieth-century social psychology, Fromm exhibits elements of the existential–phenomenological view as well, especially when he writes of the human situation. Cast by chance into a particular time and place, we enter this world faced by a fundamental split in our nature. Like other
embodied creatures who are part of the natural world, we are subject to immutable natural laws. But the instinctual harmony that characterizes animal existence is disrupted in us by the evolutionary appearance of self-awareness, reason, and imagination. A part of nature, we have at the same time transcended it, exchanging the irretrievable state of original oneness for a sense of anxious homelessness and a realization of the limitations of our own lives. Existence has itself become an inescapable problem that demands of us a solution (Fromm, 1947, 1956).

The split in human nature manifests itself in several "existential dichotomies": living existence and its perpetual defeat by death; the promise of human potential and the insufficiency of time for its realization; the fundamental aloneness in an indifferent universe and a simultaneous relatedness to one's fellow human beings. Unlike the many historical contradictions in individual and social life—the contrast, for example, between the abundant means for material satisfaction and our present inability to limit their use to constructive ends—the existential dichotomies are forever insoluble (Fromm, 1947).

To avert the eventuality of madness—a specifically human danger—which can result from the experience of uprootedness, helplessness, and isolation, the individual requires some frame of orientation and an object of devotion. These needs are among the most powerful sources of energy in human beings and can be met in various ways. The singleness of common answer to the orientational need is submission to a strong leader, such as a priest, king, or god. Endowed with extraordinary qualities, the leader is presumed to have both the knowledge and the intention to do what is best for the group. To secure an object of devotion that satisfies the deeply felt need for relatedness to the world beyond themselves, human beings have most frequently reaffirmed the "primary ties" of childhood—to mother and father, to soil, ancestors, and race, and, in more complex societies, to religion, nation, and class. In returning to nature or to submissive dependence on an authority figure, in order to feel at home in the world, a person pays a tremendous price: the blockage of the full development of human capacities—to reason, love, and create (Fromm, 1947, 1968).

Two Types of Religion
Fromm (1950, p. 21) defines religion as "any system of thought and action shared by a group" that provides the individual with a frame of orientation and an object of devotion. From his perspective, then, no one is without a religious need, though the means by which it is satisfied may have none of the outward appearances of traditional religious forms. Such traditional forms may also serve as a veneer that disguises and contradicts the more primitive and neurotic religion underneath. "The question is not religion or not but which kind of religion"—either a religion that contributes to the realization of human potentialities or one that stifles them (p. 26). These two types—the humanistic and the authoritarian—constitute what Fromm considers the most fundamental distinction within the diversity of religious types. They also provide us with another way of thinking about religion's ambiguous relation to humanitarian attitudes.

Authoritarian Religion: The essential element in religion of the authoritarian type, says Fromm, is self-deprecating surrender to a power that transcends humankind. Its principal virtue is obedience; its cardinal sin is disobedience—not because of the deity's moral qualities but simply because it has controlling power. In the authoritarian posture, individuals completely surrender to the
higher power, exchanging worth, independence, and integrity for the feelings of
belonging and being protected. Calvin's theology provides Fromm with a theistic
example, and National Socialism and other authoritarian political systems, with
secular illustrations. The controlling ideals of authoritarian religion, whatever its
form, are frequently so vague and distant that they rarely touch the everyday
lives of real people. Nonetheless, they serve to justify whatever means are nec-
essary for exerting control (Fromm, 1950).

Humanistic Religion: The center of humanistic religion is humankind and
its strengths. "Man's aim in humanistic religion," says Fromm, "is to achieve the
greatest strength, not the greatest powerlessness; virtue is self-realization, not
obedience." A person's own capacities for thinking and feeling, not assent by fiat
to someone else's propositions, serve as the foundation for faith, and religious
experience is "of oneness with the All, based on one's relatedness to the world as
it is grasped with thought and with love." Rather than the sorrow and guilt of the
authoritarian type, the prevailing mood is one of joy. In the theistic forms of
humanistic religion, God is a symbol of the powers that may be realized in
human lives, rather than of force and domination over them. Fromm discerns
the humanistic spirit in early Buddhism and Taoism; in the teachings of the
Hebrew prophet Isaiah and of Jesus, Socrates, and Spinoza; in certain mystical
trends in the Jewish and Christian traditions; and in the religion of Reason of the
French Revolution (p. 37).

To help us understand the dynamics of authoritarian religion, Fromm (1950)
reiterates a view that Marx borrowed from Feuerbach. Persons of an authori-
tarian outlook, Fromm says, project their most valuable human qualities onto
God, progressively impoverishing themselves as a result. Whereas God has be-
come a being of love, wisdom, and justice, they have become nothing. Alienated
in this way from themselves, they can recover their humanity only through the
mercy or grace of God. In becoming slavishly dependent on God, they have lost
a sense of their own capacities to love and to reason—and with it, their faith in
themselves and one another. Feeling empty and sinful, they act without love in
their daily affairs.

In humanistic religion, on the other hand, God is a symbol of the higher self,
of what a person may or ought to become. Although the aims of humanistic
religion—"overcoming the limitations of an egotistical self, achieving love, ob-
jectivity, and humility and respecting life so that the aim of life is living itself, and
man becomes what he potentially is"—are evident in the great Western and
Eastern traditions alike, Fromm (1960, p. 80) considers Taoism and Buddhism,
because they are not "burdened with the concept of a transcendent father-
savior," to possess a superior rationality and realism. Fromm's admiration of Zen
Buddhism in particular is evident not only in his essay on psychoanalysis and Zen
Buddhism (1960), but also in frequent references elsewhere to Zen Buddhist
principles.

Faith as Having or Being
Paralleling Fromm’s distinction between authoritarian and humanistic religions
is a further, more recently elaborated contrast—between faith shaped by the
having mode of existence and faith in the being mode. The having mode, which
has its origins in the impulse for survival, centers on acquiring and owning
private property as well as such nonmaterial possessions as one's own ego, other
persons, reputation, and knowledge. Because the having mode is grounded in
relations of power and aggression and necessarily excludes others, it fosters greed, envy, and violence. It also transforms the possessor, for if I rest my sense of identity on what I have, I become a thing possessed by it in turn. Moreover, because no object is permanent, my possessing of it is merely transitory and thus in reality I have nothing.

The being mode centers not on things but on experience; it is correspondingly less easily described. To enter into the mode of being, a person must become free from the illusions and blinders that are integral to “characterological having,” in contrast to the “existential having” required for survival. The fundamental characteristic of being, according to Fromm, is free and purposeful activity that makes use of human powers and animates whatever is touched. The being mode, which owes its strength to the need for union with others, implies self-transcendence, growth, selflessness, interestedness, and love. Because both tendencies—having as well as being—are present in each individual, the values and norms of a society will determine which will become dominant.

**Having Faith:** In the having mode, faith consists in the confident possession of formulations accepted from a powerful bureaucracy as ultimate and true. The certainty that distinguishes the having mode derives not from independent use of our own reason—for that has been surrendered—but from the seemingly unshakable power of the bureaucracy. Once a symbol for the highest within us, God in the having mode becomes an idol, a thing of our own making to which we surrender certain of our own qualities, such as intelligence, physical strength, power, and fame. Not only are we dependent on the idol, but by identifying with these partial, having-oriented aspects, we lose our totality and cease to grow (Fromm, 1976, 1966, p. 44). Unmistakable in the having mode, then, are the contours of authoritarian religion.

**Being in Faith:** In the being mode, faith is not primarily a set of beliefs but an inner orientation or attitude. Rather than a faith that we have, it is a faith that we are in—toward ourselves and others, as well as toward God. This faith, too, implies certainty, but one derived from our own subjective experience of the other’s character, not submission to dogmatic authority. In the being mode, faith in God “is vouched for by inner experience of the divine qualities in oneself; it is a continuous, active process of self-creation—or, as [Meister] Eckhart puts it, of Christ’s eternally being born within ourselves” (Fromm, 1976, p. 43). In the mode of being we may recognize the qualities of humanistic religion.

**Correlates of the Having Mode of Faith:** The predominance of the having mode in Western culture and thus of authoritarian religion makes understandable the persistent finding of a correlation between piety and prejudice. Fromm’s distinctions may also provide a basis for rethinking the specific findings obtained with Allport’s Religious Orientation Scale. Eugene Tate and Gerald Miller’s (1971) indiscriminately antireligious subjects, so classified because they tended to disagree with both intrinsic and extrinsic items on the RO Scale, were distinguished from the three religious groups by giving higher rankings to Freedom, Mature Love, Self-Respect, and Independent, all values of Fromm’s humanistic, being-oriented piety. Although their relatively low rankings of A World at Peace and True Friendship, on the other hand, suggest that they do not fully represent the type, the “indiscriminately antireligious,” as identified by the RO Scale, do tend to be among the least prejudiced.

A careful reading of the RO Scale (see Table 5.6) reveals that items in both the extrinsic and the intrinsic subscales are expressed in the language of the having...
mode. The very idea of assessing piety as a quality that we possess independent of our way of being appears to be a product of the having orientation. Thus Fromm’s distinction seems not only to raise doubts about the RO Scale in particular but also to call into question the whole enterprise of searching for piety’s correlates. These “correlates” themselves, Fromm would argue, not the veneer of professed piety, are the truest measure of a person’s religious faith.

The Religious scale of the Allport–Vernon–Lindzey Study of Values also partakes of the having mode. Fromm maintains that experience in the mode of being—of creativity, love, joy, or grasping truth—exists only in the “eternity” (i.e., timelessness) of the here and now. The mode of having, on the other hand, exists only in time, especially the past, when a person amassed the objects to which he or she is bound, and the future, the zone of concern for preserving what the person has and for adding to it. Although the nature of bodily existence and the physical world forces us to respect time, only in the mode of having do we submit to it, allowing it to become our master (Fromm, 1976, pp. 127–129). In an investigation employing the Study of Values in conjunction with a questionnaire designed to assess the dimensions of temporal experience, the SV Religious scale proved to be positively related to concern for past and future, and unrelated to the experience of immersion in a fulfilling timeless present. Interestingly, the SV Aesthetic scale did show a significant positive relation to the experience of a timeless here and now, whereas the Economic scale—and, to a lesser degree, the Political scale—showed a negative relation (Wulff, 1970).

Radical Humanism in the Jewish Tradition

The contrasts between authoritarian and humanistic religion, between the modes of having and being, provide the framework for Fromm’s reflections on the history of religion, especially of the Jewish tradition. This perspective, we should note, emerged only after Fromm had practiced for some years as an analyst. Initially, Fromm was a thoroughgoing Freudian, as he demonstrates in his 1927 paper on the Sabbath. In this essay he interprets the rules governing the Sabbath day of rest in Oedipal terms. He views the weekly forbidding of all “work” affecting (mother) nature as penance for the primal crime and as a means of warding off contemporary incestuous longings. It is nonetheless a joyful time, he adds, because it also symbolizes a realization of these longings, through a regressive return to the mother’s womb. Eventually, however, Fromm came to regard incestuous wishes as themselves symbolic—of the human longing for the original harmony with nature. The key to Fromm’s (1951) later understanding of the Sabbath and the intricacies of its ritual can be found in the concept of work and rest that he says underlies the biblical and later the Talmudic tradition.

“Work” is any interference by man, be it constructive or destructive, with the physical world. ‘Rest’ is a state of peace between man and nature” (p. 244). Hence the Sabbath, by disallowing any human interference with the natural process as well as any business transactions, symbolizes a state of perfect harmony with nature and among individuals. More than a mere day of rest, as we tend to think of it today, the Jewish Sabbath stands as a precursor of the salvation and freedom to be attained in messianic time. On the Sabbath, says Fromm (1976, p. 51), “One lives as if one has nothing, pursuing no aim except being, that is expressing one’s essential powers: praying, studying, eating, drinking, singing, making love.” It is a joyful day, for in the timelessness of pure being and harmony, we are at last fully ourselves.

The golden age of messianic time that is anticipated by the observance of the Sabbath stands in a dialectical relation with Paradise before the “fall” (Fromm, 1966). Both represent a state of harmony. The innocent harmony of Paradise reflects humankind’s not yet having been born into awareness and independence, whereas the harmony of messianic time is attained only after the loss of innocence and the achievement of full birth into human existence. Between these beginning and end points of Jewish aspiration, Fromm discerns the unfolding of an evolutionary process—from a primitive authoritarian and ethnocentric outlook to a perspective of radical freedom and universal brotherhood. As the record of this evolution, the Hebrew Bible “is a revolutionary book; its theme is the liberation of man from the incestuous ties to blood and soil, from the submission to idols, from slavery, from powerful masters, to freedom for the individual, for the nation and for all of mankind” (Fromm, 1966, p. 7). As persons living in a time of increasing emancipation from the bondage of tradition, suggests Fromm, we may today be able to understand the Hebrew Bible and the continuing developments of the postbiblical tradition better than in any earlier age. To this task of reinterpretation Fromm brings the perspective of radical humanism, defined as a global philosophy that emphasizes the oneness of the human race and the capacity of humankind to develop its own powers and to achieve independence, inner harmony, and a world of peace (p. 13).

The Evolution of God: In the first stage of the evolution recorded in the biblical tradition, God is represented as a ruler with absolute and arbitrary power. His supremacy is soon challenged by the disobedience of the human beings He created. Fearful that they would “become like one of us”—that is, realize the potential divinity within themselves—by eating both of the tree of knowledge and the tree of life, God banished them forever from the Garden of Eden.
From the authoritarian view, Adam and Eve's eviction from Paradise is punishment for the sin of disobedience, which can be overcome only by repentance and renewed submission. Also implied in this story is a radically different meaning, which Fromm says is rooted in the nonauthoritarian mode of being. From this perspective, Adam and Eve's sin is one of unresolved estrangement. In becoming fully human and thus aware of good and evil and of their own separateness from each other, Adam and Eve lost their original oneness and became strangers instead. Facing each other as isolated and selfish human beings who are unable to bridge their separation through love, they are overwhelmed with a deep sense of shame. Their "sin"—it is not called that in the Bible—can be overcome only by "the full unfolding of reason and love, by at-onement" (Fromm, 1976, p. 125).

The first act of disobedience, therefore, marked the beginning of human freedom, of the progressive emancipation from God's supremacy and the gradual realization of the potential Godhood that lies within. In the second stage, beginning with the conclusion of the covenant with Noah and his descendants, in which He promises never again to flood the earth, God is transformed from an absolute ruler into a "constitutional" monarch who is no longer free to rule arbitrarily but is now bound by the principles of justice and love.

The third stage is reached when God reveals Himself to Moses as the nameless God of history. In response to Moses' repeated pleas to reveal His name, rather than merely saying that He is the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, God declares that "I AM WHO I AM. . . . Say this to the people of Israel, I AM has sent me to you" (Exodus 3:14). A free translation of the Hebrew text, says Fromm, would read: "My name is Nameless; tell them that 'Nameless' has sent you" (p. 31). Having a name is the essence of an idol, according to Fromm; yet only things, complete in time and space, can have names. A living God cannot be named, nor can it be represented by any other kind of image.

The evolution of divinity from tribal chief to nameless God culminated fifteen hundred years later in the negative theology of Moses Maimonides. According to Maimonides, the foremost Jewish philosopher of the Middle Ages, the unknowability of God's essence necessarily limits us to negative statements, of what God is not. Only of His action can we make positive attributions. Thus in the Jewish tradition, "There is only one thing that matters, namely, that God is. Little importance is attached to the speculation about God's nature and essence; hence, there has been no theological development comparable to that which grew up in Christianity" (p. 42).

Jewish theology is negative in another, perhaps more fundamental sense. The acknowledgment of God is the negation of idolatry. As a shadow of humankind that is recoverable only through submission, the idol, says Fromm, is incompatible with human freedom and independence. In the biblical and later Jewish tradition, he observes, the prohibition of idolatry—and thus of narcissism, for in effect a person is worshiping the self—ranks in importance with the worship of God. Indeed, he argues that the fight against the attitude of idolatry, which can make even God into an idol, might unify persons of every faith.

In The Art of Loving (1956), Fromm clarifies what it means for truly religious individuals when God becomes the nameless One about whom no one can speak. Such persons will expect nothing from God, will pray for nothing, and will perhaps not even mention God's name. Yet they will have faith in and strive to fulfill the principles that "God" through time has come to represent: love, truth, and
justice. Life is valuable to them only insofar as they have the opportunity to achieve a fuller realization of their human powers, "the only reality that matters." To love God, then, would mean "to long for the attainment of the full capacity to love, for the realization of that which 'God' stands for in oneself" (p. 71).

The Authoritarian Spirit of the Christian West

The humanistic qualities that Fromm discerns in the Jewish tradition are present in the Christian tradition as well, but there, he says, they have encountered more persistent opposition from the authoritarian trend. Judging from the spirit and text of Jesus' teachings, early Christianity was fundamentally humanistic in spirit and demanded total renunciation of the having mode. But once the tradition had passed from the hands of the humble and dispossessed into the grasp of those ruling the Roman Empire and itself became centered in a powerful organization, the authoritarian spirit became dominant, surviving even the emancipation from ecclesiastical authority brought by the Protestant Reformation. The humanistic element nonetheless remained a living force, especially through the teachings of the mystics, most notably those of Meister Eckhart (Fromm, 1941, 1950, 1976).

The supposed Christian conversion of Europe under Constantine and in the centuries following was for the most part a sham, according to Fromm, for it led to no corresponding changes in social character. The victorious pagan hero who conquers, exploits, and destroys, not the self-sacrificing Christian martyr, remains to this day the prevailing model in both Europe and North America, as evinced, for example, in the popularity of the Olympic Games. Luther's elimination of the motherly element from the church, and thus of unconditional love and cooperation with nature, was among the factors preparing the way for the new paganism that today threatens to destroy humankind. Under a Christian facade and in diametric opposition to it arose the "industrial" and "cybernetic" religions, the industrial centering on the valuing of work, profit, and power, and the cybernetic on the worship of the machine. Industrial religion had its basis in the authoritarian—obsessive—hoarding character that emerged in the 1500s and remained dominant until the end of the nineteenth century. Gradually replacing this social character, and incorporating certain of its elements, is a new one, the marketing character, which represents human beings as commodities to be exchanged on the "personality market." Persons of this characterological type are profoundly alienated—from themselves, their work, other human beings, and nature. Although they have little personal interest in philosophical or religious questions and are so emotionally stunted that they cannot distinguish between genuinely religious persons and those who fake religious emotion for political ends, they are in their own way religious. They worship the machine and, by serving it, imagine themselves to have become godlike. Having in actuality become the impotent slaves of technique, these proponents of cybernetic religion have been transformed into worshipers of the goddess of destruction (Fromm, 1976).

Toward a Social Character of Being

Is there hope for averting catastrophe by fostering a more fitting religious outlook that corresponds to a new and benign social character? Fromm thinks so, however slim its chances of realization from an objective point of view. The founders of such an outlook span the millennia—from the Buddha to Eckhart to
Marx and Albert Schweitzer. According to Fromm’s interpretation, these seminal thinkers share certain essential elements: “their radical demand for giving up the having orientation; their insistence on complete independence; their metapsychical skepticism; their godless religiosity; and their demand for social activity in the spirit of care and human solidarity” (Fromm, 1976, p. 163).

The realization of a new character structure founded in the mode of being will depend, according to Fromm, on the devotion of the best minds to the development of a new “humanistic science of Man” and an effective governmental system, based in participatory democracy, for promoting the vision of a saner and healthier society. The marketing character must be replaced by the productive, loving character and cybernetic religion by a new radical humanistic spirit—a “religiosity” without dogmas and institutions and permeating the whole of social life. Such a religiosity, he says, would foster a new, more mature sense of relatedness to nature and other human beings as well as the optimal development of the human capacities for reason, courage, compassion, and love. Fromm’s view is a new vision, a synthesis of the late medieval City of God and its antithesis, the contemporary Earthly City of Progress. Fromm sees this synthesis as the only alternative to chaos; he calls it the City of Being (p. 202).

**Confirmation Through Factor Analysis:** Although Fromm’s radical humanistic formulations have inspired little empirical research in the psychology of religion, at least one study, carried out independently of his thinking, offers partial support for his basic typology. From interviews of a representative sample of 142 ministers, priests, and rabbis, Jack Shand (1961) obtained 2400 items, later classified into 180 subgroups, defining the term religious. A single word or phrase was selected to represent each subgroup, and then a representative sample of Chicago-area clergy was asked to sort these 180 expressions on an 11-point scale according to the degree that each item characterized a “religious” person. Factor analysis of these ratings yielded two basic conceptions of what it means to be religious, one “fundamentalist” and the other “humanistic”; several subtypes of each were also identified.

The essential correspondence between Shand’s and Fromm’s types is suggested by the characteristics of being religious that were given the highest ratings by each group of clergy identified through factor analysis. A religious person, according to the humanistic clergy, is one who “is seeking the truth”; “has a deep human sympathy and understanding”; “has a spirit of brotherhood in all human relations”; “is interested in any cause that advances human welfare”; “has a love of others”; “wants to make the world a better place to live in”; “has a sense of purpose to life”; “has a feeling of . . . at-homeness in the universe”; and “is interested in world peace.” In addition, theistic humanists give similarly high ratings to “is conscious of God’s presence in all life” and “has a deep faith in God.” The fundamentalist clergy, on the other hand, characterized the religious individual as a person who “believes that Jesus Christ is the Son of God”; “believes in . . . the Scriptures”; “has repented his sins”; “has assurance of salvation”; “has a personal relationship to God”; “has hope for the future after life”; “has peace of conscience”; “comes to public worship regularly”; “has a love of God”; and “fears God.” Broen’s (1957) Fundamentalism–Humanitarianism factor, which emphasizes human sinfulness and fear of a righteously punitive God at one pole and the human capacity for independent actualization of inherent goodness at the other, also substantiates Fromm’s distinction without the investigator’s having sought explicitly to test it.
We must be cautious, of course, in attributing the dynamics of Fromm's authoritarian religion to any specific individual of fundamentalist orientation—or, indeed, in assuming their absence among humanists. For groups of persons, however, as we saw in Chapter 5, measures of doctrinal orthodoxy consistently show a positive relation to scales of authoritarianism. Furthermore, if the eminent biblical scholar James Barr (1980) is correct, this relation is not merely an artifact of biased research instruments. Himself a former conservative evangelical, Barr maintains that the Fundamentalist outlook actually produces authoritarian personality traits: "Young evangelical Christians, open, free and delightful, are often quickly reduced through the life of their society and the pressure of their doctrine to a strained, suspicious and exclusivist frame of mind" (p. 69). This pattern, he adds, should be familiar to anyone who is well acquainted with the movement.

The problems of adjustment that are frequently experienced by former fundamentalists prompted lawyer Richard Yao in 1985 to found Fundamentalists Anonymous (FA), a support group that now has dozens of chapters across the United States. Himself a former Baptist Fundamentalist who later earned a master's degree in divinity at Yale, Yao (1987) delineates a complex of symptoms he calls the "shattered faith syndrome": chronic guilt, anxiety, and depression; low self-esteem; loneliness and isolation; distrust of other people or groups; aversion to any structure or authority; bitterness and anger over lost time; distressing recurrences of the fundamentalist consciousness; lack of basic social skills; and, in some instances, sexual difficulties, including guilt and anxiety about sex if not actual sexual dysfunction. Typically unable to talk about their past, former fundamentalists are encouraged to share their experiences, outside the FA group as well as within it. Noting the similarity between the symptoms described by Yao and the distress syndrome that accompanies other major life transitions and crises, psychologist Gary Hartz (1987) observes that the heart of crisis intervention is empathic support, which is precisely what Fundamentalists Anonymous offers.

ABRAHAM MASLOW AND THE RELIGION OF PEAK EXPERIENCES

Among humanistically oriented psychologists, Fromm's views continue to have considerable appeal. They serve Sidney Jourard (1974), for example, as the foundations of his own discussion of healthy and unhealthy forms of religion, and they are also featured in Meadow and Kahoe's (1984) survey volume. Another psychologist stimulated by Fromm's work was Abraham Maslow (1908-1970), a highly influential humanistic psychologist who placed his own thinking on religion in direct line with James's Varieties and Fromm's Psychoanalysis and Religion. In contrast to Fromm, Maslow gave little systematic attention to religion in his various writings. Although he possessed, like Fromm, a messianic vision and was himself a Jew, he shared none of Fromm's enthusiasm for the Hebrew Bible and the rabbinical tradition—if indeed he was familiar with them at all. Yet because Maslow has played a far more prominent role in the humanistic movement in American psychology, his views on religion are probably better known. They surely have inspired more research.

Maslow grew up in Brooklyn, New York, the shy, solitary child of uneducated and struggling Russian immigrants. A proudly militant atheist from his early