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result in a persistent sense of insecurity, impotence, and vulnerability; such an organism thus has a high "paranoid potential" (p. 115). No matter how careful and loving, whatever child-rearing methods are used will add fuel to the fire; neglect, insults, injuries, and life's frustrations will increase the child's paranoia. Projection and scapegoating naturally enough follow. The process is helped along by man's extraordinary mental abilities (again explained biologically, as due to his large brain). He has the "capacity for symbolization and idealization, which enables him to attribute to material possessions a psychological significance which does not belong to their intrinsic nature" (p. 23). So he competes hard even for things he doesn't really need. And he has the imaginative capacity for identification which allows him to enjoy whatever cruelty he visits upon an adversary. So the paranoid person cruelly strikes at his real and imagined enemies, whom he's driven to dominate anyway; and he enjoys himself. Most of us do all this with and to our spouses, children, students, and patients, invoking necessity and self interest. Princes and captains do it to domestic groups (Jews, intellectuals) or each other's armies and citizenries, invoking "the national interest," of course, and "rationally" carrying out the "program" with large bureaucracies and powerful machines.

It is not clear why Storr troubles to claim he rejects the frustration-aggression hypothesis since his whole insecurity-paranoia-destructiveness model is essentially a variant of it. And I missed any analysis of Freud's famous explanation of paranoia as a defense against homosexual impulses, which one would think deserves comment (refutation?). Finally, in my judgment, Storr doesn't very well handle the methodological problems he concedes are inherent in the inferential and awfully rationalistic psychoanalytic approach: the difficulty of extrapolating from single patients to heads of governments, whose behavior is at least partly controlled by history, bureaucratic politics, ideology, and resource constraints; the repeated guessing, imagining, and speculating about what "must" or "may" have been going on in the infant's head, especially if "childhood amnesia" operates to prevent retrieval of early painful feelings; the dilemma of explaining how easily people with no psychiatric symptomatology can be trained to enjoy exercising cruelty; the discounting of post-childhood social and political influences upon behavior.

But it is gratifying to see that even Storr—who has achieved prominence primarily as a spokesman for the instinctivist viewpoint—is working at a synthesis that avoids the now-sterile nature-versus-nurture controversy in favor of an explanation that recognizes that any phenomenon as complex as warfare or genocide must be caused by a variety of factors shifting in importance from case to case. Such a synthesis has recently been most brilliantly carried forward in Erich Fromm's The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, a more thorough and more sophisticated essay than the one under review here.

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The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness.

In The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, Erich Fromm attempts to answer the deeply serious question raised by the ethnologist Tinbergen and others: Why should man be the only species that is a mass murderer, the only misfit in his own society? In attempting to answer this question Fromm considers the ideas of experts from many professions—ethologists, behaviorists, psychoanalysts, neurophysiologists, anthropologists, paleontologists—with ample quotations from each.

Approaching the field of ethnology, Fromm cites the shortcomings of Konrad Lorenz's book On Aggression, pointing out that it overemphasizes the possibility of uncritically using observations of animal behavior, however excellent, to explain human psychology. Lorenz replaces God with the concept...
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largely the result of anxieties and more or less maladaptive defenses against anxieties that are mobilized by the outbreak of interpersonal, interracial, or international hostilities.

Fromm distinguishes “biophilous,” life-preserving aggression, in the service of self-interest and social adaptation, from “necrophilous” aggression, which aims at dehumanizing control and ultimately at annihilation of all and everything that might oppose vital self-interests. There is frequent doubt about whether particular kinds of behavior are necessary or only desirable for the defense of vital self-interests.

Fromm illustrates the thesis of necrophilous, sadomasochistic aggression by biographical sketches of Stalin, Himmler, and Hitler. These personalities were deprived of meaningful relations of mutuality. Barren of interest in their fellow men, their lives were filled with an insatiable greed for the power of self-protection and self-aggrandizement. Such a limitless need for power leads to extermination not only of all persons and communities who by any stretch of imagination could become enemies, but also beyond that, even to devoted compatriots who become suspect; ultimately, in a scorched earth policy of despair, nothing is permitted to survive. These descriptions of unlimited greed for power remind one of Adler’s theories of struggles of superiority and inferiority. Fromm thus sees the greed for omnipotent power as pathological degeneration of motivations in a regressively narcissistic anal (or necrophilous) character, who treats his fellows as lifeless material, who cannot experience the erotic union of man and woman as partnership, but who is engaged in a relentless struggle for superiority. Such competition does not permit constructive collaboration; the super-ego remains defective, unable to control the dangerous excesses of anxiety and destructive defenses.

Fromm expects an amelioration of these symptoms of degeneration from improvements in the sphere of political and social institutions. But he counsels that we must not forget that charity begins at home, in the individual, in the family unit. We need more charity, forgiveness, mutual respect, tolerance of inevitable frustrations, and mutual assistance, for these can lift the anxieties interfering with a fuller development of interhuman solidarity.

EDITH WEIGERT

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This is a wonderful book, filled with bias. It has taught me that such well-written bias can have the impact of penetrating reason, but in the end, sadly, this book must be regarded as an example, rather than an explication, of “The Danger of Words.”

It is an attack. Since the book is erudite, witty, and even humble, this agendum is concealed, but it is nonetheless an uncompromising attack on many of the ideas and activities which are basic to psychiatry. Our nomenclature, the double-blind drug trial, Freud, behavior therapy—all are underoot with machete-like swings of philosophical argument as Drury makes his way to his main target: research. His aim is to show that neurophysiology and experimental psychology cannot explain the mind, cannot answer the question “What manner of creature are we?” and that to believe so is just “plain nonsense” (p. 84).

The book’s cover states that Drury is a consultant psychiatrist in Dublin, and a former student of Wittgenstein’s. A student of Wittgenstein’s, turned psychiatrist. Drury puts much emphasis on this intellectual heritage:

Why then do I now bring these papers together? For one reason only. The author of these writings was at one time a pupil of Ludwig Wittgenstein.... It was the profound influence that Wittgenstein had on me as a student that

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