



DRAFT

For the social character
mtg. in May

ON MAKING MEANING:
THOUGHTS ON THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT
OF SOCIALLY CONDITIONED FILTERS

Mauricio Cortina

Introduction

In Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis Fromm (1960) pointed out that human awareness requires perceptions to be organized in categories that are comprehensible to the human mind. Fromm thought that some perceptions such as time and space may be universal in humans, but other categories are less general and differ from culture to culture. As Fromm put it "experience can enter into awareness only under conditions that it can be perceived, related and ordered in terms of a conceptual system and its categories. The system is in itself the result of social evolution" (p.98). Every society Fromm thought, by its practice of living, by its predominant mode of relatedness, of feeling and perceiving develops a system of categories that determine the prevailing forms of awareness. This system works like a "**socially conditioned filter**; experience can not enter awareness unless it can penetrate this filter" (p. 90 Fromm's italics).

Fromm described three types of filters. Filters imposed by language, filters imposed by logic (by which he meant the



explanatory and epistemological systems commonly accepted in any given society) and filters imposed by social and cultural norms. The first two categories are intuitively self evident. To illustrate the third category of socially conditioned filters Fromm gave an example of a tribe of warriors where members make a living by looting and killing. If a particular individual in such a culture felt a revulsion toward these activities, most likely he would not allow this feeling to become fully conscious for fear of being humiliated or ostracized. Instead this individual may develop a psychosomatic symptom that will give unconscious expression to the conflict. Conversely in a peaceful and loving community, a cruel or sadistic individual would have to hide and/or repress the impulses in order to avoid being ostracized.

Modern societies, are complex. Social groups organized around class, educational level, ethnicity or religion can have different ways of perceiving, feeling and thinking that may--or may not--conform to predominant social views and values. Social groups may develop a common set of values, prejudices and expectations (some of which are unconscious) that are adaptive to their socio-economic conditions. Fromm's (1941, 1955, 1973), Fromm and Maccoby's (1970) concept of social character describes a syndrome of character traits shared by a large class or group within a given society that have developed in relation to social and economic conditions. Social character is also influenced by class, education, ethnicity and religion but is a more general



concept.

The concept of social character helps explain how character structure becomes adapted to meet social and economic needs. Hopes, fears, prejudices and expectations are molded by society beginning in childhood. Emotional strivings and interpersonal patterns are formed in childhood by adapting to the immediate environment of the family. In turn the family acts as the "psychic agent of society" (Fromm 1947, p. 68) transmitting to the child the beliefs, expectations, hopes and fears of society at large, particularly emotionally based attitudes that reflect parental social character.

Fromm's functional approach to character and his emphasis on the human need to develop "a frame of orientation and devotion" (a cognitive, spiritual and emotional map of the world) (Fromm 1973) evaluated and selected through socially conditioned filters is clearly compatible with modern developmental and cognitive theories (see below)¹. Fromm's model of human nature and motivation is holistic and assigns a central role to the need to develop a coherent view of the world ("a need for unity") that integrates cognitive maps of the world with values and emotional strivings (passions in Fromm's terminology). The universal need for meaningful explanations of the world that provide a sense of identity and purpose occupy center stage in Fromm's vision of the human condition.



There is a growing recognition among many disciplines of the importance of narrative structures in human development, structures that provide meaning and purpose in life (Bruner 1990). Within psychoanalysis, there are those who see the essence of clinical work as a hermeneutical discipline, extracting meanings within the psychoanalytic dialogue that provide the basis for coherent life narratives (Gill 1987, Schafer 1992). For developmental psychologists, approaching development from a holistic perspective (Santostefano 1995, Sroufe 1996) the child's growing capacity to evaluate transactions with the interpersonal and material world in meaningful categories represents one of the hallmarks of development. Structures of meaning both modulate and promote development (Sroufe 1996). Models of brain development are emerging that see social experience as molding the architecture of the brain (Cicchetti and Tucker, 1994, Edelman 1987, Schore 1994).

A note on the philosophy of knowledge.

Main (1993) observes that the search for meaning--as reflected in internal coherence and consistency in narratives--is often contrasted with a search for external correspondence. The hermeneutical and constructivist perspectives are sometimes offered as an alternative to a naive realism or "objectivism" (Lesser 1996). See Mitchell's (1993) discussion of the issues. In the extreme, the position asserts that any attempt to develop



such a correspondence to reality is illusory or irrelevant. (Spence 1982, Ricoeur 1977). Sass and Woolfolk (1988) provide an incisive critique of Spence's influential work, noting that by creating a false dichotomy between structures of meaning and historical actuality, Spence ironically ends of embracing a strictly empiricist model of science. This Humean model assumes that facts exist in isolation, divorced from the interpretations we develop to understand the world. Main, using empirical data, elegantly refutes this view using her work on attachment. Main scores the adult interviews (adult attachment interviews or AAI) using criteria based on Grace's text analysis ("coherence of discourse"). The AAI interview probes for memories of how adult individuals were treated as children and the impact they think this experience had in their development. While the typology that emerges is interesting in itself, what is remarkable is that the AAI predicts with 75% to 80 % accuracy the type of attachment pattern these adults were observed to exhibit five years earlier with their 12 month old infants using Ainsworth's strange situation technique. There is now a study showing that the AAI predicts attachment patterns with children before birth (Fonagy et al. 1991). A meta-analysis by Van IJzendoorn of sixteen studies among different socio-economic groups and cultures support these findings (Main 1993). Main's research broadens the hermeneutic circle of meaning by "stepping outside the text to find consistency with behavior observed years previously in an entirely different setting" (Main 1993, p. 259).



Plainly, the meaning adults and children make of their experience points to a reality that is at once beyond their subjective perspective but is incorporated into it. As Bowlby insisted, internal reality however constructed or distorted, has a correspondence to real experience. The correspondence may not be linear, but has enormous impact on adaptational capacities and developmental processes. A position consistent with this perspective is Orange's (1991, 1995) perspectival realism, Bernstein's practical realism (as quoted in Mitchell 1993) and Fromm's (1962) dialectical humanism. The position adopted here is sympathy with these views and philosophically embraces pragmatism. The truth of any statement, theory or belief system depends on its usefulness in making sense of experience, not on its correspondence with any ultimate reality divorced from our ability to understand and evaluate it. The correspondence we seek should be of heuristic value, a truth rooted in our biological origins, history and culture. There may be many realities beyond our comprehension. However for human purposes, out of mind is out of sight.

Plan of work.

Starting with some evolutionary considerations, I compare Fromm's approach with selected contemporary models of the mind to update Fromm's brilliant but somewhat sketchy observations in regard to social filters. While in full sympathy with Fromm's normative and



humanistic approach to social psychology, following Maccoby (1983) I am critical of Fromm's (1962) more mystical belief of the unconscious as repository of "universal man", free from deforming social restrictions². No matter how liberated, humans are always embedded in history and choices are constrained by material necessity. Nonetheless, Fromm's approach--minus this utopian belief--continues to offer a very useful theoretical framework from which to analyze the formation and function of social filters. Building on Bacciagaluppi (1994) I will show the value of Fromm's approach using data from cross cultural studies of attachment patterns in infancy in the U.S., Germany and Japan. While it is generally recognized that rate differences in attachment patterns are influenced by culture, we hypothesize that the mechanism by which cultural norms are transmitted is through the mediating role of parent's social character--in their function as "psychic agents of society".

Appraising the environment. Some evolutionary considerations.

As Lazarus (1991) observes, we would not be so successful as a species if our knowledge and appraisals of the environment were not a reasonably good fit between our perceptions and the environmental realities that confront us. This statement remains true as long as our evaluations are made within a range of conditions similar to those in which we evolved--what Bowlby (1969) called our environment of evolutionary adaptedness. For



the most part this meant living in small bands of hunters and gatherers. These conditions go as far back as 4 to 6 million years ago when our hominid ancestors first emerge, to our direct descendent line, homo erectus (appearing some 2.0 million years ago) to the appearance of modern humans--some 125,000 to 100,000 years ago. These same conditions of survival did not change substantially until the advent of the agricultural revolution 12,000 to 10,000 years ago when dramatic social and technical inventions begin to transform human existence. Sedentary communities were established. Trading and bartering began to replace hunting and gathering as main economic activities.

Through human history and particularly in Western societies, there has been a tendency toward developing modes of production increasingly removed from a direct contact with nature. Societies become more complex in response to technical, economic and cultural change. Under these continuously evolving conditions, not only can we not take for granted that appraisals of culturally created environments will be accurate, but we also can not assume that socio-economic transformations will be best suited for human living or that emotional responses to these changes will be adaptive.

As human societies become more complex, so does the need to develop more sophisticated mental representations of the social environment (Cosmides 1989). By necessity information will be



selected and filtered if for no other reason than to provide structures of meaning that remain comprehensible--and hence adaptive--on a human scale. Without this filtering and selecting of information into meaningful categories we can not develop coherent mental structures or plans of action that are effective (Bowlby 1980). But the selective nature of the information we process creates trade offs. While socially conditioned filters are necessary for survival, a point that Fromm (1962) overlooks when he speaks of the unconscious as a repository of "universal man" (free from the effects of socially distorting filters). Nonetheless, Fromm is correct in pointing out the distorting effects of socially conditioned filters that limit the possibilities of human understanding and freedom, perspective that is missing, but not inconsistent, with Bowlby's ethological approach.

As we have moved further away from our environment of evolutionary adaptedness the possibilities for misunderstanding, distortion, and manipulation of our **socio-cultural** environment increase significantly. What we select and filter out of consciousness may seriously hinder the development of more humane and effective plans of action. Needless to say this as a very large subject that needs to be broken down in pieces to be of any use.

Before examining some examples of socially conditioned filters



influencing parental care and how these filters are transmitted during development, there is a need to update some of Fromm's concepts. What is the nature of these structures of meaning? What role do emotions and cognitions play in the structuring of meaning? What is the relationship between the socially conditioned filters, structures of meaning and defensive processes?

The unity of development: emotion, reason and meaning.

Efforts to define, conceptualize and understand the role and function of emotions in human development have a long and complex history. A summary of this history is beyond the scope of this article. I find the discussion of the many issues that are involved in Campos (1994), Damasio (1994), Lazarus (1991), Ekman and Davidson 1994, Izard (1994) and Sroufe (1996) very useful. The position adopted in this article closely follows Sroufe (1996) and Lazarus (1991). Sroufe presents a compelling case for integrating important contributions from distinguished scholars and researchers from a developmental/organizational perspective. Lazarus like Sroufe sees emotion as providing a fundamental role of mediating and monitoring a person's transaction with the environment. A few remarks about some of the conceptual issues involved may be helpful.

One important issue has to do with the weight different



conceptual models give to affect or cognition in the development of emotion and the direction of causality. Does the activation of affect trigger a cognitive appraisal or are cognitive appraisals necessary conditions before there can be an affective response? What is the function of emotions and are emotions the source of motivation? Most theories that see emotions as having important biological and adaptational functions build on Darwin's classical (1872/1955) study of emotions and facial expressions. Darwin studied the expression of emotions by observing infants and psychiatrically disturbed patients and by using cross-species and cross-cultural comparisons. The last few decades have seen a resurgent interest in Darwin's strikingly original methods of investigation. Many studies have confirmed the near universality of facial expression across cultures that accompany basic emotions such as disgust, fear, interest, surprise, joy or anger (Ekman 1986). These studies closely follow Darwin's emphasis on the communicative function of emotions. This view does not preclude or deny that cognitive appraisals are important, but researchers who take this position think of basic emotions as hard-wired. For example, the feeling of disgust usually follows a simple perception and does not require sophisticated cognitive appraisals. "Primary" emotions are thought of as following this pattern. The chain of events can be schematized as follows Sroufe (1996 p. 13):

event-simple perception or cognition- facial change- feelings-



behavior.

Tomkins (1960), Nathanson (1993) and to some extent Izard (1977) are representatives of this position. Moreover, Tomkins and his followers not only see basic emotions as the source of motivation, but equate motivation with basic affects (a position that I disagree with, but cannot take up here).

More cognitively oriented theorists (Ellsworth and Smith 1988, Lazarus 1991, Roseman 1984) ascribe more importance to the appraisal or evaluation of an event before an emotion can be activated. Their sequence of events leading to emotion can be schematized as follows:

event--immediate intuitive appraisal--arousal (autonomic response)--feeling state--further cognitive processing and/or behavioral response (Sroufe 1996, p. 13).

Another important issue has to do with the role autonomic reactions such as heart rate or blood pressure have in triggering an affect. All researchers agree that autonomic activation is an integral component of an emotional response. The question is whether autonomic activation (and stimuli to the central nervous system emanating from visceral interoceptors) precede an emotional response or vice versa--again the question of the direction of causation . William James championed the belief that



an autonomic activation triggered emotion. Furthermore, James thought that every emotion was associated with a distinctive patterning, an autonomic signature of sorts. Each patterning was then experienced as a specific emotion (see Damasio's 1994, somatic marker hypothesis for a modern extension of this Jamesian view).

To tackle the last issue first, it seems that the most sound position to take in light of contradictory research findings and modern conceptions of emotions as dynamic systems (Shore 1994) is that "autonomic reactions are activated as part of the emotional reaction, rather than as leading to it" (Sroufe 1996, p. 19). The significance of this position will become clearer shortly. For now it is important to emphasize that autonomic reactions are interpreted in the context of the meaning these reactions have for a particular individual. Autonomic responses per se do not an emotion make. Emotions integrate autonomic, body based components of emotion with cognitive structures (Lazarus 1991).

Many of the issues involving the conceptualization of emotion and cognition can be approached from a more integrative perspective when seen developmentally. Take the issue of whether basic emotions (affects) are triggers to complex cognitive evaluations or whether cognitive evaluations are necessary to trigger an emotion. From a developmental perspective, emotions do not appear ready made. Rather what is seen developmentally is that proto-



emotions like weariness, distress or contentment are reflex-like and global and are activated by fluctuations of arousal levels that accompany physiologic states. Context and meaning are relatively unimportant. Nonetheless these early affects serve an essential adaptational function, signifying to caregivers the activation of need states. Once a threshold of arousal is reached the affect will be expressed. Proto-emotions give way to differentiated emotions that are activated in the context of more specific evaluations of the surround. For heuristic purposes the term emotion will be reserved for feeling states that are integrated with cognitive evaluations, structures that provide meaning to events (Lazarus 1991, Sroufe 1966). The term affect will be used as a generic term to refer to undifferentiated emotions (proto-emotions) like contentment, distress or weariness and to differentiated emotions like anger, surprise, joy, shame, pride or guilt. This usage follows Basch (1983) only in that the word emotion is reserved for "developed" emotions. The use of the word "feeling" will denote the subjective component of affects/emotions or physiologic states like pain or hunger rather than to denote an intermediate step between affect and emotion as Basch does.

The development of anxiety/fear may serve as an example (Sroufe 1996). Infants of even a few days show distress following unbroken inspection of a visual object. The nature of the stimuli is irrelevant as long as the infant is captured by the stimuli



("obligatory attention"). By four months, infants can show weariness after prolonged (30 second) exposure to a strangers immobile face or will show a distress reaction to a mother's unresponsive face. The infant is beginning to attribute meaning to the stimuli. But the reaction is still global (weariness/distress) and is based on a slow buildup of tension. By 9 months an infant will respond immediately with the typical reaction of fear when a stranger abruptly attempts to pick her up --even in the presence of mother. This reaction is very specific and sudden--a categorical negative response. An emotion proper.

What has happened? At a level of brain development, by 7 months the frontal lobes are beginning to mature and connections are being formed between the limbic system, particularly the amygdala and the hippocampus (the "emotional brain") and the frontal cortex providing the neurological basis for more sophisticated cognitive abilities and integrations . Mother (and/or father, aunt etc., depending who is the primary caregiver) is becoming a special person and a source of security. Strangers that were greeted just a few months earlier with great interest and delight, are now seen as potential threats. The subjective meaning the infant attributes to events is now an essential part of an emotional reaction. By 18 to 20 months toddlers begin developing the capacity to represent the world symbolically (Piaget 1952) as is evident in the development of pretend after the age of three (Piaget 1962). The reaction of fear can now be triggered by a



signal (Freud 1925). Signal anxiety can become associated to any situation that is reminiscent of the infant's helplessness (Freud's danger situation). "Inexplicable" fears (phobias) may appear in childhood that are symbolic and affective displacements from danger situations. Existential anxiety requires a further development of cognitive capacities involving abstract thinking. Danger situations are now generalized and coordinated with abstract concepts and values (thinking about thinking). With these developments, a mature adolescent or young adult can begin to recognize that life is precarious, to a large extent unpredictable. Death becomes a tangible reality. We are not protected from injustice or tragedies. Existential anxiety begins to be conceived as part of the human condition. Danger and fear have a new meaning structured at a higher level of conceptualization.

Let me take a step further and suggest a thought experiment to illustrate how emotions may be given meaning beyond the immediate context of the family by broad social, economic and religious factors. Let us imagine living in a medieval society and think how an individual in that society may have experienced existential anxiety. It is very unlikely that a medieval serf or a landed aristocrat (despite their enormous differences) would have much reason to experience existential anxiety. The world view of medieval society supported the belief that life was preordained and that everyone's station in society was immutable



(Fromm 1941). Of course, death and sickness caused suffering and fright, but these fears were interpreted within the context of pre-ordained belief systems. Belief systems dominated by the enormous power of the church were in synchrony with a rigid social hierarchy. Life may not have been easy for the serf, but a basic sense of identity was derived from this rigid social order and religious ideology. Fatalism, redemption and the belief in an after life offered an ontological sense of security. Over the course of just a few hundred years, capitalism destroyed the economic, political and religious foundation of medieval society and ushered in a process of constant change (Heilbrunner and Thurow 1994). Whatever illusions remained in the belief of a protective Deity that looked after human affairs were substantially weakened by the radical changes created by technological and economic innovations. Secular and religious belief systems begin to emerge that heighten existential awareness.

Contrast existential anxiety with the fear of a 10 month old who becomes distressed with mother's sudden departure or who clings to mother when alarmed. These reactions are universal and reflect processes of biological adaptations honed in over the course of millions of years. Clearly, the development of cognitive structures and socially conditioned belief systems allows the child--and the adult--to evaluate events with new meanings. But at the same time emotional reactions focus and give salience to



events. As Tomkins (1995) and Lichtenberg (1989) put it, events achieve significance when amplified by affect. Emotions, particularly positive emotions like joy, interest or surprise promote cognitive development by encouraging the child to explore and seek novelty (Emde 1991, Sroufe 1996)). Even negative emotions like fear, shame or guilt can promote development if they are not used to punish or humiliate or if they do not overwhelm the child's capacity to remain organized in the face of strong emotion (Sroufe 1996). It is important for a child to respond to biologically prepared fears, to be able to internalize social norms and feel guilt when these norms are violated. But these emotions must be understood and responded to in the context of a caring and loving environment. A desire to promote socio-emotional development and growing autonomy must take primacy, not parents egocentric needs fears and projections (Lieberman 1993).

We hope this previous discussion shows why the age old traditions that separate emotion from cognition, passion from reason is false or why the popular belief that equates intellect with reason and emotion with irrationality is highly misleading. Only early in normal development are affects devoid of any real meaning--other than as somatic markers to physiologic states. Throughout development affects and intellect (cognition) are gradually interwoven into ever more complex and rich emotional patterns. Cases in which neurologic impairment or psychopathology lead to a separation of affect from intellect through



neurological or psychological impairments demonstrate just how essential their unity is for normal functioning.

Damasio (1994) offers some fascinating vistas of what happens to patients who tragically have damaged their prefrontal cortex or to other brain structures that are essential for integrating body based emotions with reasoning capacities. One telling example is a patient, Elliot, a successful businessman in his thirties who developed a large tumor (a meningioma) that was compressing the prefrontal lobes affecting more the right lobe than the left. The tumor was successfully removed by the surgical team. Although frontal lobe tissue damaged by the tumor was also removed, the operation was a complete success and cured the cancer. Like many patients who suffer damage to their frontal lobes, Elliot's personality changed subtly but profoundly. His intellect and language ability remained intact. He had a flawless memory and his fund of knowledge was impressive. However his abilities to make decisions and plan the future were greatly impaired, typical of lesions involving the right frontal lobe. The puzzle in this case was that these impairments could not be detected by standard neuropsychological or personality tests. Elliot was brilliant by all accounts. What were the basis for these impairments ?

Further investigation revealed subtle changes involving his emotional reactions. Using psychophysiologic experiments in which Elliot was exposed to disturbing visual stimuli, like people



injured in gory accidents, buildings collapsing in earthquakes etc, Elliot was able to recognize that his cool emotional reactions to these images were quite different from what his responses would have been before the illness (a fact that his family and friends had also noticed). Elliot's predicament was to know but not to feel. The lack of intuitive capacity profoundly affected his ability to perform in real life situations. The difference between performing in tests that tap for capacities involving moral and social reasoning and real life situations became evident after Elliot had gone through a series of exhaustive tests, including Kolberg's well known Hianz dilemma that test for moral reasoning. After passing with flying colors, Elliot remarked with a smile "And after all this, I still wouldn't know what to do". In effect, when faced with real life choices, Elliot was completely paralyzed, going through long lists of pros and cons without being able to reach a decision or would make bad decisions despite an excellent fund of knowledge.

Having studied more patients like Elliot with damage limited to the ventromedial section of the frontal lobes, Damasio (1994) concludes that while intellectual capacity may be intact, the personal and social impairments are subtle but devastating. Damasio's somatic marker hypothesis calls attention to the importance emotions have in providing salience to the cool but fragile reasoning capacity. Without emotional knowledge (that is body based according to Damasio) reasoning capacity is empty (or



as I would prefer, is meaningless). Reasoning is limited by these impairments to endless cost benefit analyses that are divorced from emotion; reasoning loses its "earthy" quality³. For now, it appears that integrative centers of the brain, like the ventromedial sections of the frontal cortex, are an important part of the neurological basis for making meaningful decisions, decisions that integrate the head and the heart.

A second example involving a functional, psycho-neurotic impairment is also illustrative. An architect in his early 30's (whom I will call David) consults me for a severe depression. As severity of the depression abates (an antidepressant was used), David tells me about fantasies of wanting to hurt or destroy people who he sees as being happy. As we explore the fantasy, David starts to examine his deep sense of social inadequacy. Except for the infrequent rage reactions, particularly directed at his parents, and feeling enormously frustrated and bitter, emotions elude him. To compensate for this lack of emotional responsiveness, David has learned to listen to his friends politely, be helpful and at times imitate appropriate emotional reactions. He is bewildered when he tries to understand what makes people happy. The idea of an intimate relationship seems foreign to him. David is intelligent and articulate. He expresses a profound sense of inadequacy and despair, convinced something is intrinsically wrong with him. He is handicapped by the (relative) inability to use emotions to develop a sense of



purpose and meaning to life. Patients like David, who feel divorced from emotions have been described in the psychoanalytic literature as "false self" presentations (Winnicott 1960), "as if" personalities (Duchsch 1942) and schizoid personalities (Guntrip 1969). The term Alexithymia has been introduced in the psychiatric literature to describe patients with psychosomatic illness and other disorders who are severely limited in the ability to experience and express emotions (Taylor 1984, Zestin et al. 1993). It is not my intention to discuss possible mechanisms that may lead to these types of disorder, but rather to highlight the severe consequences that follow the separation of affect and cognition. An appreciation of normal development is necessary for understanding pathology. Conversely the study of pathology can illustrate the consequences of disrupting normal process woven into seamless patterns that form the structure of life. These structures often remain invisible to the naked eye until they are interfered with by pathological processes (Sroufe and Rutter 1984).

The selection of neuronal networks and schemes

Edelman (1987) has developed an influential model of brain development and the mind that is based on the fact that during early development (particularly early development) there is an exuberance of neuronal connections that are being made and constantly being "pruned" (Brown 1994). This pruning is a process



of natural selection in which neuronal networks that are functionally useful are preserved, whereas connections that are not used during development are lost. This selection process has an "ontogenetic sculpting" effect on the brain that provides specificity to mature brain structures. According to Stern (1994), Cellerier has offered a similar proposal, but in his version the units being selected are mental schemes. The more adaptive schemes are selected because they promote a better fit between the growing infant and the environment. In a very real sense the architecture of the brain is being molded by social experience.

Cicchetti and Tucker (1994) observe that although most of the research in neural plasticity has been on the developing brain, some of the most surprising results are from studies of adult brains. For instance, Cicchetti and Tucker report experiments by Merzenich and associates using multiple electrodes to map the representation of body parts in monkeys somatosensory cortexes. Even simple procedures that modify sensory input like tying two of the monkeys fingers together result in changes in the cortical map of the monkeys brain. The implication of these and other findings is that the adult brain is capable of forming new synapses and neural circuits in response to new sensory information.

Neural circuits are the basis for developing memory systems and



other cognitive structures. This plasticity of the human brain seems to have evolved as a result of a selection process that tinkered with modifications of the rate and timing of development (heterochrony). By greatly prolonging the period in which we develop, we maintain autoplasmic capacities and much greater flexibility in being able to respond to changes of the environment (Gould 1977)⁴ In a very real sense the brain is being constructed (sculpted) by human experience. Structures of meaning that integrate cognitive schemes with feeling states and values are ultimately selected from an enormous diversity of neuronal connections to form specific neuronal circuits.

Socially conditioned filters and defensive processes.

In developing an information processing approach to defense, Bowlby (1980) observed that whether derived from the environment or from the organism, sensory inflow has to go through many stages of selection, interpretation and appraisal if it is to influence behavior or moods. Only initial information requires matching with information stored in long term memory. The vast majority of information is routinely excluded. While most selective exclusion is necessary and adaptive, occasionally for unconsciously motivated reasons, information is excluded from reaching consciousness. In order to distinguish the overwhelmingly adaptive exclusionary processes from the more maladaptive type, Bowlby used the term "defensive exclusion".



Most selection and appraisal processes leading to exclusion that are of interest to clinicians are usually of this kind. Since some of the information defensively excluded may be already stored in long term memory, some degree of amnesia may follow. Information arriving via sense organs may also be excluded and some degree of perceptual blocking may also occur. This latter process has a close similarity to Sullivan's (1953) concept of selective inattention. Sullivan saw these exclusionary processes as monitored and driven by anxiety. However if sensory information proceeds to a phase in which its meaning can be determined, an emotional reaction will become conscious. The sensory inflow does not have to originate from the environment to become conscious, it can also proceed from the organism with a minimal degree of interpretation. In any case, as Susanne Langer (1967) explains in her classical and masterful essay, feelings are a phase of an organismic process (an information gathering process in Bowlby's terms), just as iron becoming incandescently red when heated at high temperatures is a phase in the physics of iron. Being felt is a phase of the process itself, not an added factor. As Bowlby (1969) notes, under normal circumstances feeling, attention and consciousness go together.

I will not elaborate on the thorny problem of (so called) unconscious feelings. Suffice it to say that at least part of the problem can be approached more successfully by adopting Janet's view of dissociative processes--an approach that was also taken



by Sullivan--rather than Freud's view of repression. By postulating a defensive process that separates cognitive appraisals from affective responses it is easier to see how feeling states may be kept out of awareness--except perhaps as signals, as Freud's signal anxiety--even though eliciting conditions should have triggered a full emotional response.

Fromm's concepts of filters fits very well with this model. We only have to interchange the concept of exclusionary processes for filters to establish their identity. As Bowlby mentions, information has to be selected, interpreted and appraised (perceived, related and ordered in Fromm's terms) to establish its significance for the individual before it can become conscious. The only difference in these concepts is that Bowlby is using the concepts of the selection and exclusion of information to account for individual clinical phenomena. Fromm is using the concept of filters to account for the exclusion of information that helps individuals adapt beyond the family to meet pressing socio-economic conditions. In Fromm's terms we must "want to do what we have to do". Socially conditioned filters may serve other purposes that are not directly tied to economic modes of production. What we are able to perceive of the world is dependent on the meaning, or lack of meaning that facts or events have for the human mind. Our mind filters everything we see, think or perceive. As Cosmides (1989) points out, the brain's mechanism for selecting and interpreting the world may have



evolved in order to accommodate the growing social complexity of human interactions. Be that as it may, we can only make sense of the social and material world through categories of thinking, feeling and perceiving that are socially and culturally transmitted.

While most of what is being excluded (filtered) may be adaptive and normal (not defensively excluded in a clinical sense), we should not assume that normality and adaptiveness necessarily go together. Developing socially adaptive emotional patterns and behaviors is the basis for normal development. However occasionally normal emotions and behaviors may not be "adaptive" from a social perspective (Fromm's example of a non-aggressive individual in a tribe of aggressive warriors).

In the next section I will give documented examples of cases which suggest that cultural influences generate different rates of attachment patterns as measured by Mary Ainsworth's strange situation technique. Using Fromm's socio-psychoanalytic concepts I will show how the family, through the social character of parents, act as "psychic agents of society" influencing the range of emotions and behaviors that children will be allowed to express (and eventually to experience) starting from infancy and continuing through childhood.



German and Japanese cases showing the possible effect of parental social character on attachment patterns with their infants.

A brief explanation of the procedure used to score patterns of attachment patterns in a laboratory setting is necessary. Mary Ainsworth's strange situation (SS) technique is a 20 minute laboratory procedure designed to study the effect of increasingly stressful events on 12 to 18 month old infants. The procedure tests infants' abilities to use caregivers as a secure base from which to explore the environment and as a source of security when distressed--the secure base phenomenon. (Ainsworth et al. 1979, Ainsworth 1985). The procedure consists of a series of episodes each lasting three minutes or less starting with observing an infant and the primary caregiver in an unfamiliar room together with attractive toys. In the second episode the infant is introduced to a stranger (usually not stressful in the presence of the caregiver). The stress is increased in the next two episodes by having the caregiver leave the room and then return in the presence of the stranger. Usually the stranger is not effective in alleviating the infants distress. In the following episode the caregiver leaves again, but this time the infant is left alone. In the final episode the caregiver returns. The second departure is usually very stressful on infants and the return is cut short if the researchers or the caregiver think the infant will not settle. The infants' reactions to the caregivers' comings and goings are scored based on the infant's ability to



use the caregiver as a secure base from which to explore in the presence of the caregiver and the ability of the infant to settle upon the caregivers return. Having made extensive and careful naturalistic observation of the secure base phenomena in Uganda and the United States prior to developing this laboratory procedure, Ainsworth developed a classification system of infants attachment behavior in three categories and correlate this classification with her extensive naturalistic observations. This combination of methodologies added great depth to her findings.

Infants classified as secure (called B infants) play freely in the presence of the mother and are friendly to the stranger. However when the mother leaves, the stranger is not able to comfort the infant, who remains distressed. In addition when the infant is left alone and the caregiver returns, secure infants can settle down, and after a brief period of contact with the caregiver are able to return to their exploratory activities. Ainsworth and her collaborators found that in their extensive home observations that the most important characteristic of caregivers with secure infants was their ability to be responsive to infants signals and needs.

"C" infants who form ambivalent attachments (also known in the literature as resistant attachment) to their caregivers are not very relaxed in the new setting even in the presence of the caregiver. C infants are also somewhat wary of the stranger. In



contrast to secure babies, during the reunion episodes the infant is not able to settle. The contact with the caregiver is not effective in relieving their distress. C infants display a combination of behaviors during these reunion episodes, wanting to be comforted by their caregivers and at the same time rejecting the comfort by exhibiting pouty and angry behaviors. Infants who are ambivalent in their attachment were observed at home to have the caregivers who were inconsistent in their care. At times they were able to respond to their infants needs and signals, but in other instances they were observed as being intrusive or ignoring of the baby's communications.

Infants classified as avoidant in their attachment (A infants) were comfortable in the new setting. However unlike B or C babies, they seem to be affiliative toward the stranger. More significantly, during the reunion episodes they ignored their mothers return by distracting themselves with the toys or objects in the room. While it may seem that these infants are very independent, when measures like heart rate are monitored, it is clear that they are very distressed by the caregivers departure. Their exploratory behavior during the reunion episodes is used as a distraction, a behavioral and emotional defense from their desire to be comforted. In home observations, caregivers of avoidantly attached infants were observed to reject their infants bids for attention, particularly when distressed. Many of the mothers seemed to dislike physical contact. The mothers' bodies



were not relaxed during this contact.

Naturalistic cross cultural observations from seven different countries made by mothers, researchers and local "experts" using the Q sort technique point to the universality of the secure base phenomenon--using mother-as a base from which to explore (Posada et al. 1995). However Hinde (1982) believes that it is unlikely that only one strategy would have evolved to regulate attachment and exploration. More likely a variety of strategies would have been selected. One way to think about ABC patterns is as "contingent strategies" that have been selected through evolution in order to maintain flexible responses in infants and children in the face of different social pressures. Secure attachment represents in most circumstances the optimal strategy, balancing secure base behavior with exploration and the desire to seek novelty. The ambivalent strategy heightens the need for security, demanding attention, clinging or becoming helpless at the expense of exploration. The avoidant pattern, focusses infants attention on exploration at the expense of seeking the caregiver as a basis for security.

Most developmentalists consider ambivalent and avoidant attachments as risk factors that are not necessarily maladaptive. In the presence of countervailing "protective" factors such as a harmonious marriage or the development of a sense of efficacy encouraged by caring adults in the family of the community these



insecure (less optimal) forms of attachment can have good outcomes. Cultural factors also play an important role (see below). However in the presence of risk factors such as poverty or parental discord, C and A patterns can become maladaptive. Conversely, secure attachment acts as a protective factor in development, but by no means is a guarantee of mental health (Pianta et al. 1989. For a discussion of risk and protective factors in development see Mastin et al. (1990).

In recent years another type of attachment pattern has been discovered, the disorganized/disoriented "D" pattern (Main and Solomon 1986). This pattern is found in infants and children with histories of maltreatment or in histories where the primary caregiver has sustained a significant loss that has undergone a pathological transformation (Main and Hesse (1990)). Since this pattern represents a behavioral and affective breakdown of "organized" ABC patterns and is a serious risk for pathology, it will not be discussed any further.

Ainsworth's research has not only been a powerful tool to study socio-emotional development (Arend et al 1979, Sroufe 1996), but replication studies in several countries and different economic classes has allowed for interesting cross cultural comparisons (Bacciagaluppi 1994). Following Bacciagaluppi, I will interpret the difference of distribution rates of ABC patterns as based on social character differences. In the U. S., several middle class



studies have replicated Ainsworth Baltimore findings (Campos 1983). I will use Ainsworth's distribution rates as typical of most U.S. middle class and as a source of comparison with middle classes in Bielefeld, north Germany, Regensburg in south Germany (Grossmann et al. 1985) and in Sapporo, Japan (Miyaki, Cehn and Campos 1985). By keeping middle class socio economic status constant, it is possible to interpret some of the striking rate differences as cultural or temperamental in origin. The following table summarizes the findings:

	B	C	A	
	secure (%)	ambivalent (%)	avoidant (%)	
Baltimore, MD, U.S.	57	17	26	N = 26
Bielefeld, Germany	33	12	49	N = 54
Regensburg, Germany	60	6	32	N = 45
Sapporo, Japan	72	28	0	N = 25

As Bacciagaluppi observes, in addition to the SS procedure and home studies, the German study included measures of the role of the infants temperament and cultural considerations Constitutional factors, as measured by the orienting response in newborns, made an independent contribution to the prediction of attachment classification. In the home studies at 10 months the researchers noticed that the quality of the holding differed from the Baltimore study and from the mothers in southern Germany. The mothers in Bielefeld were generally less tender and affectionate.



The authors believe that the greater incidence of avoidant attachment in Northern Germany may reflect differences in child rearing practices. The mothers in northern Germany demand greater self reliance and infants are discouraged from staying close to their mother. These differences most likely reflect cultural influence. It is important to note that in the southern Germany sample the rates of attachment patterns were similar to U.S middle class norms and that the emphasis on self reliance was not as prominent. The northern German sample may represent a character orientation that Fromm described as productive-hoarding (Fromm 1947). This type is independent minded, emotionally restrained and reserved individual whose attitude toward authority reflect a Calvinistic emphasis on obedience--if not submission. These attitudes were historically adapted to meet demands of small business and independent farmers in Europe and North America. The "hoarding" attitude is based on values of hard work and frugality. In contrast, the mothers in southern Germany may share a different social character that is less restrained emotionally and has moved away from the traditional protestant ethic to meet the demands of a more consumer oriented market economy (Note. This is my hypothesis, not the researchers. I need to find evidence for this hypothesis. Are there historical reasons why Germans from the north and south are different? Are Germans from the north more authoritarian? Do social and cultural differences in the north and south lead to a different social character?



Social character embodies a process of adaptation to social and economic conditions that become expressed as systems of belief and emotional attitudes. Social character It is not a clinical concept. Within a particular social character orientation there can be a wide range of healthy and disturbed individuals. The Grossmann's think that the higher percentage of avoidantly attached infants in the northern Germany sample does not necessarily indicate a risk of greater psychopathology for these infants, since the mothers of avoidant infants could just be imposing a cultural ideal of how children should behave. According to this view, the significance of the finding may have a more benign meaning than it has for middle class samples in the United States. This interpretation was supported by the researchers' home observations. In many respects the mothers of avoidant infants were not particularly rejecting of their infants. This interpretation is entirely consistent with social character theory. It is worth quoting their conclusions with respect to the difference in percentages of A patterns between the Bielefeld sample (49%) and the Baltimore sample (26 %):

We interpret this part of our findings with respect to cultural values that we believe to be dominant in North Germany, where people tend to keep a larger interpersonal distance. As soon as infants become mobile, most mothers feel they should be weaned from close bodily contact. To carry a baby who can move on its own or to respond to its



every cry by picking it up would be considered as spoiling. The ideal is an independent, nonclinging infant who does not make demands on the parents but rather unquestionably obeys commands (p. 256).

The researchers quote Lewin's observations that Germans tend to be astounded by the degree of independence and freedom of American children. While these differences may be explained by the persistence of more authoritarian attitudes in northern Germany than in the United States, where both cultural norms meet is in their individualism. This becomes more evident in comparison with a country like Japan.

The rate differential in the Japanese sample can also be interpreted within the framework of social character theory. Here the finding was that there were no avoidantly attached infants, whereas the secure and ambivalent pattern more higher. The researchers raise the question whether the differences are related to cultural factors, temperamental characteristics of the infants or both.

First lets examine pertinent cultural factors. There is significant ethnographic evidence to suggest that Japanese mothers encourage considerable emotional dependence in contrast to the independence normally encountered in the United States. LeVine (1990) cites a study by Caudill and Schooler from the



National Institutes of Health showing statistically that American children by the age of 21/2 and 6 displayed more activity and expressed more positive and negative emotion than their Japanese counterparts. Caudill and Schooler conclude that American children exhibit more independent-related behavior and the Japanese more interdependent behavior or *amae* (the Japanese word for this highly value dependent-like behavior).

In interpreting their results the Japanese researchers note that the Japanese psychoanalyst Doi, describes a two stage process of socio-emotional development in Japan. During early childhood Japanese infants experience a sense of "perfect oneness" with their environment. Longing for mother is not experienced until young children gradually become aware that mother exists as a separate entity (by the end of the first year). The Japanese have a name for this longing, **amae**. Well into childhood, Japanese mothers foster this state of **amae**. A second factor related to the first makes the SS situation very stressful for the average Japanese infant. Japanese mothers and their infants are rarely apart, and mother-child relationships are characterized by a great deal of close physical contact. "Breast feeding, co-bathing, sleeping together, communicating tactually, transporting the child on the mothers back, toilet training the infant by physically holding him or her above the toilet etc." (Miyajima et al. p. 278). Finally it should be noted that in this middle class sample mothers had at least a high school education



and were all planning to stay at home with their infants. These observations are consistent with the ethnographic study led by the Whitings (1963) of child rearing practices in six cultures. One of the sites, Taira, a small village in Okinawa, documented how mothers from Taira rarely left their children alone in early childhood and "discourage expression of self reliant behavior" (p. 473). The fact that these observation were in a rural village in contrast to an urban setting (Sapporo) speaks to how homogenized child rearing practices were in Japan. In addition to these cultural differences, the Japanese research tested the hypothesis that Japanese children are more temperamentally inhibited than Caucasian infants. Constitutional measures did not fully account for the individual differences observed in the Strange Situation, lending weight to the importance of cultural factors in development.

Based on these factors the researchers predicted that they would find a low percentage of avoidantly attached infants in their middle class sample, which indeed was the case. In their conclusions the research team did not consider the higher incidence of C babies as necessarily indicative of greater risk for becoming less competent. Only a follow up study would be able to discern which of the C infants were less socially and cognitively competent in comparison the securely attached infants.



Fromm's socio-psychoanalytic perspective the question is whether the child rearing practices reflect parents social character. In other words, are these practices an adaptation to socio-economic and cultural conditions. As is well known, the Japanese society functions through a complex system of loyalties and mutual obligations that are effective in managing conflict. As a society, Japan functions much more by consensus, in contrast to modern Western societies that are highly individualistic. Doi (1981) believes that the deep sense of loyalty that is maintained in Japanese families by promoting dependent emotional ties is transferred to society as sense of a highly interdependent community and permeates all facets of society. If the high incidence of secure attachment in the Sapporo middle class sample is representative, it would be consistent with Doi's interpretation that the emotional dependency fostered by mothers at home is sensitive and represents an adaptation to Japanese culture. The very low percentage of avoidant attachments are a clear indication of how deviant a premature strategy of developing early "independence" is in Japan. Yet in northern Germany and in many parts of the United States, early independence is greatly encouraged, whereas **amae** type of behavior would be considered spoiling and indulgent.

The receptive social character orientation described by Fromm as responsive, accepting, and devoted--in its positive version--but dependent, passive and submissive--in its negative version--has



some similarities to the descriptions by Doi. What makes the comparison problematic is that the receptive orientation is based on Western standards. Nonetheless it is interesting to mention the exhaustive study of a Mexican village by Fromm and Maccoby (1973). In the study they found that the villagers with a hoarding character orientation were usually independent farmers, and were more likely to be the most enterprising and productive villagers in their community. Villagers with a receptive character orientation were more likely to be passive and submissive. It was among these villagers that the greatest incidence of alcoholism was found. This character orientation was the historical outcome of peones (serfs) who had worked for three centuries in the haciendas owned by the landed class during colonial and post-colonial period. Even after the revolution, when the land of the haciendas was distributed among the peones, receptive peasants were not able to take advantage of the new possibilities.

This suggest an interesting cross cultural interpretation. Within an economically dynamic communal society like Japan, the positive elements of Fromm's receptive character orientation are promoted. In terms of attachment theory, the origin of this character structure can be found in a secure base strategy (mediated by social character) that promotes the development of a certain type of dependence on the mother (as a secure base) over a rugged independence and individualism,. These closely knit emotional



ties foster a strong sense of loyalty and dependence toward the family. These loyalties are then transferred to society, where communal obligations are favored over individualistic pursuit. However in the Mexican village studied by Fromm and Maccoby, heavily influenced by the Western standards of individualism (and a history of colonization), the receptive character is mostly a liability and the independent, individualistic hoarding character orientation is mostly an asset.

Conclusion.

What meaning we extract from experience is only partly conscious. A great deal of the information that is evaluated, selected and filtered remains unconscious, but may continue to have an impact on our conscious life. Mental structures that provide meaning are both cognitive and emotional. Affect and cognition are intertwined through development to form a whole. Emotion mediates our relationship with the environment and provides an intuitive form of knowing that informs many of the transactions with the surround. Child rearing practices are a good example of this intuitive form of knowing. Most of the mental schema that we bring to parenting children reflect to a large extent our experience of how we were parented as children. But parenting does not only reflect the impact of the family environment, in important respects parenting also reflects the values and ideals of society as a whole. I have used Erich Fromm's socio-



psychoanalytic framework to interpret the rate differences of attachment patterns in the United States, Germany and Japan as the expression of parent's social character. Socially conditioned filters influence child rearing practices by means of the cultural norms transmitted by parents. A group of my colleagues in Mexico are currently combining attachment and social character research methodologies to begin to test hypotheses of the relations between social character and attachment patterns in infancy⁵. This work hopes to explore the many ways by which experience is molded by socially conditioned filters.

REFERENCES

Ainsworth, M. D. S., Blehar, M., Waters, E., & Wall, S. (1978).



Patterns of attachment. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Ainsworth, M. (1985). Patterns of Mother-Infant Attachment: Antecedents on Development. Bulletin Of The New York Academy Of Medicine. 61:771-790.

Arend, R., Gove, F.L., & Sroufe, L. A. (1979). Continuity of individual adaptation from infancy to kindergarten: A predictive study of ego resiliency and curiosity in preschoolers. Child Development, 50, 950-959..

Bacciagaluppi, M. (1994). The Relevance of Attachment Research to Psychoanalysis and Analytic Social Psychology. Journal of The American Academy of Psychoanalysis. 22: 465-479.

Basch, F. M. (1991). The significance of a theory of affect for psychoanalytic technique. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association. 39: 291-304.

Bowlby, J. (1969). Attachment. Vol. I. New York: Basic Books.

_____ (1980). Attachment and Loss. Vol III. New York: Basic Books.

Brown, W. J. (1994). Morphogenesis and mental process.



Development and Psychopathology. 6:551–563.

Bruner, I. (1990). Acts of Meaning. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Campos, J. J. Mumme L. D. Kermoian, R & Camps G. R. (1994). A functionalist perspective on the regulation of emotion. In N. A. Fox (Ed.) Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Psychology. 59 (serial No. 240).

Cicchetti, D. Tucker, D. (1994) Development and self-regulatory structures of the mind. Development and Psychopathology. 6:533–549.

Cosmides, L. (1989). The logic of social exchange. Has natural selection shaped how humans reason? Studies with the Wason selection test. Cognition. 31:187–276.

Darwin, C. (1972/1955). Expression of the emotions in man and animals. New York: Philosophical Library.

Damasio R. A. (1994). Descartes' Error. Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain. New York: Grosset/Putnam.

Deutsch, H. (1942). Some forms of emotional disturbance and their relationship to schizophrenia. The Psychoanalytic Quarterly.



11:301–321.

Doi, T. (1981). The Anatomy of Dependence. 2d ed. New York: Harper and Row

Edelman, G. (1987). Nuerodarwinism. New York: Basic Books.

Ekman, P. & Friesen, W. V. (1986). A new pan-cultural expression facial expression of emotion. Motivation and Emotion. 10:159–168.

Ekman, P. & Davidson. J. D. (1994). The Nature of Emotion. New York: Oxford University Press.

Ellsworth, P. C. & Smith, C. A. (1988). Fromm appraisal to emotion. Cognition and Emotion. 12:271–302.

Emde, R. (1991). Positive emotions for psychoanalytic theory: Surprises from infancy research and new directions. Journal of The American Psychoanalytic Association. 39:5–44.

Fonagy, P., Steele, H. & Steele, M. (1991). Maternal representation of attachment during pregnancy predict the organization of infant–mother attachment at one year. Child Development. 62:891–905.



- Freud, S. (1926). Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety. Standard Edition, 20.
- Fromm, E. (1941). Escape From Freedom. New York: Farrar and Rinehart.
- _____ (1955). The Sane Society. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
- _____, Suzuki, T. D., De Marino, R. (1960). Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis. New York:Harper Colophon.
- _____ (1962) Beyond the chains of illusion. My encounter with Freud and Marx. New York: Pocket Books
- _____ (1964). The Heart of Man: Its Genius for Good and Evil. New York: Harper & Row.
- _____ (1973). The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness. Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Premier Books.
- _____ & Maccoby, M. (1970). Social Character in a Mexican Village: A Socio-Psychoanalytic Study. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall.
- Gill, G. M. (1987). The Point of View in Psychoanalysis: Energy Discharge or Person. In J. L. Sacksteder, D. P. Schwartz &



Y. Ajabane, Eds., Attachment and the Therapeutic Process. Essays in the Honor of Otto Allen Will Jr. (pp. 17-42), Madison, CT: International University Press.

Gould, J.S., (1977). Ontogeny and Phylogeny. Cambridge MA: Belknap/Harvard.

Guntrip, H. (1969). Schizoid Phenomena, Object Reactions and the Self. New York: International University Press.

Grossmann, R., Grossmann, K. E., Spangler, G., Suess, G. & Unzner, L. (1985). Maternal sensitivity and newborns orientation responses is related as related to quality of attachment in northern Germany. In E. Bretherton & E. Waters (Eds.) Growing points of attachment theory and research. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development. 50 (1-2 serial No. 209).

Heilbroner, & and Thurow, L. (1994). Economics Explained. New York: Touchstone by Simon & Schuster.

Hinde, R. A. (1982). Attachment: Some Conceptual and Biological Issues. In C. Murrey Parkes & J. Stevenson-Hinde, (Eds.). The Place of Attachment in Human Behavior, (pp.60-79), New York: Basic Books.



- Izard, E & Ackerman, B. (1995). What's New in the New Functionalism ? What's Missing ? . SRCD Newsletter. Winter Issue.
- Langer, S. (1967). Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling. Vol I. Baltimore: John Hopkins University.
- Lazarus, S. R. (1991). Emotion and Adaptation. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Leiberman, A. F. (1993). The emotional life of the toddler. New York: Free Press.
- LeVine, A. R. (1990). Enculturation: A Biosocial Perspective on the Development of the Self. In D. Cicchetti & D. Beeghly (Eds.), The Self in Transition. Infancy to Childhood, (99-137). Chicago: The University of Chicago.
- Lesser, C. R. (1996). "All That's Solid Melts into Air". Deconstructing Some Psychoanalytic Facts. Contemporary Psychoanalysis. 32:5-24.
- Main, M & Hesse E. (1990). Parents unresolved traumatic experience are related to infant attachment status: Is frightened and/or frightening parental behavior the linking mechanism? In Attachment in the Preschool Years: Theory, Research and Intervention, (Ed.), M. t. Greenberg, D. Cicchetti, & M. Comings, (pp. 161-182). Chicago: University



of Chicago Press.

Main, M & Solomon, J. (1986). Discovery of a new, insecure disorganized/disoriented attachment pattern. In Affective Development in Infancy, (Ed.) T. B. Brazelton, & M. Yugman, (pp. 95–124). Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

Mastin, S. A., Best. M. K. & Garmezy, N. (1990). Resilience and development.: Contribution from the study of children who overcome adversity. Development and Psychopathology. 2:425–444.

Mitchell, A. S. (1993). Hope and Dread in Psychoanalysis . New York: Basic Books.

Miyake, J., Chen, S. & Campos J. J. (1985). Infant temperament, mothers mode of interaction and attachment in Japan. An interim report. In E. Bretherton & E .Waters (Eds.) Growing points of attachment theory and research. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development. 50 (1–2 serial No. 209).

Nathanson, L. D. (1992). Shame and Pride. New York: W.W. Norton.

Main, M. (1993). Discourse, prediction and recent studies in



attachment: Implications for psychoanalysis. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association. 41:209–242.

McKinney L. M., McNamara J. K. (1991). Heterochrony. The Evolution of Ontogeny. New York: Plenum.

Orange, M. D. (1992). Constructivism: Commentary on Irwin Hoffman;s "Discussion: Toward a Social Constructivist View of the Psychoanalytic Situation". Psychoanalytic Dialogues. 2:561–565.

_____ (1995). Emotional Understanding. Studies in Psychoanalytic Epistemology. New York: Guilford

Piaget, J. (1952) The Origins of Intelligence in Children. New York: International University Press.

Piaget, J. (1962). Play Dreams and Imitation in Childhood. New York: W. W. Norton.

Pianta, C. P., Sroufe, L. A., & Byron, E. (1989). Continuity and Discontinuity in Maternal Sensitivity at 6, 24, and 42 Months in a High Risk Sample. Child Development. 60:481–487.

Posada, G, Gao, Y., Wu, F., Posada, R., Tascon, M., Schuelmerich, A., Sagi, A., Kondu-Ikemura, K., Halland, W., Synevaag, B (1995).
The Secure Base Phenomenon Across Cultures: Children's



- Behavior, Mother's Preferences, and Experts' Concepts. In E. Waters, B. E. Vaughn, G. Posada & K. Kondo-Ikemura (eds.), Caregiving, Cultural and Cognitive Perspectives on Secure Base Behavior and Working Models. New Growing Points of Attachment Theory and Working Models. Monographs of the Society for Research in child development. 60, Serial 244.
- Ricoeur, P. (1977). The question of proof in Freud's psychoanalytic writing. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association. 25:835-871.
- Roseman, I. (1984). Cognitive Determinants of Emotion. A structural theory. In P. Shaver (ed), Review of personality theory and social psychology: Vol. 5. Emotions relationships and health. (pp. 11-36). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Sass, A. L & Woolfolk, L. R. (1988). Psychoanalysis and the Hermeneutic Turn. A Critique of Narrative and Historical Truth. Journal of The American Psychoanalytic Association. 36:429-454.
- Schore, A. N. (1994). Affect regulation and the origin of the self: The Neurobiology of emotional development. Hillsdale NJ: Erlbaum
- Schafer, R. (1992). Retelling a Life: Narration and dialogue in psychoanalysis. New York: Basic Books.



Spence, D. (1982). Narrative Truth and Historical Truth: Meaning and Interpretation in Psychoanalysis . New York: Norton.

Sroufe, L. A & Rutter, M. (1984). The domain of developmental psychopathology. Child Development. 55:17–29.

Sroufe, L. A. (1996). Emotional development. The organization of emotional life in the early years. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Stern, D. (1994). How to construct a clinically meaningful baby. Infant Mental Health Journal. 15:9–25.

Sullivan S. H. (1953). The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry. New York: W. W. Norton.

Taylor, G.J. (1984). Alexithymia: concepts, measurements, and implications for treatment. American Journal of Psychiatry. 141:725–732.

Tomkins, S. S. (1962). Affect/imagery/consciousness. Vol I. The positive Affects. New York: Springer.

_____ (1995). Exploring affect. The Selected Writings of S. Tomkins. New York: Cambridge University Press.



Winnicott, D. W. (1960). The Maturation Process and The Facilitating Environment. New York: International University Press.

Whiting, B. B. editor (1963). Six Cultures. Studies of Child Rearing. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

Zeitlan, B. S., McNally, J. R. & Cassidy, L. K. (1993). Alexithymia in Victims of Sexual Assault. The American Journal of Psychiatry, 150:661-663.

ENDNOTES

1. When Fromm developed the concept of social filters (a concept implicit in his previous discussions of social character) he was very interested in reading and learning about the neurological basis of consciousness. He was in personal communication with William Wolf and the distinguished mexican neurophysiologist Juan de Dios Hernandez, Fromm remained interested to the end of his life in maintaining a dialogue with neuroscience.

2. The issue is not whether there are universal values that we should support (human rights is a good example) but rather Fromm's relapse into ahistorical category of thinking.

3. Another reason why reason separated from feeling states may be severely impaired is that one of the main functions of emotions is to monitor person-environmental interactions (Campos 1994). Emotion is fundamentally interpersonal and is generated in response to "core relational themes" (Lazarus 1991).

4. The evolutionary process leading to greater flexibility in human development has usually been described as a neotenic process, that is to say a phylogenetic retardation (slowing down) of growth. This evolutionary change has other systemic effects such as late sexual development, embryonic rates of brain development that continue



into the first years of life--leading to bigger brains, fewer offspring and longer life spans. A longer period of development greatly increases the importance of emotional ties in human development and consequently the importance of the process of socialization. McKinney and McNamara (1991) argue that the evolutionary process responsible for these changes is not a retarded development (neoteny) but delayed development (hypermorphosis). Changes in heterochrony involve either changes in rate of development (acceleration or retardation) and timing of development (early onset or late onset). According to McKinney and McNamara, changes attributed to neoteny (retardation of development) are actually caused by a very late onset of development. Humans have the most prolonged period of development of any known species.

5. Principal investigator C. Juarez Hernandez, Efecto de la calidad del cuidado materno en el desarrollo de apego durante el primer año de vida.