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be termed the "Naturalistic Fallacy". Here are three proposed interpretations:

> "1) The Naturalistic Fallacy is the fallacy of defining goodness which is undefinable.
> 2) The Naturalistic Fallacy is not just the fallacy of defining good which is undefinable, but defining it in terms of natural properties and thus implying that it itself is not a natural property.
> 3) The Naturalistic Fallacy is the fallacy of defining goodness in terms of some property, say happiness, and at the same time arguing that happiness is good, as though this were an important verbal contention."[47]

It is difficult to tell which of these three interpretations Moore is explicating when he speaks of the Natrualistic Fallacy.[48] Further, I don't think any of these possible interpretations of the fallacy provide a conclusive or fatal argument to the naturalistic stance.

On examining the first interpretation we see that Moore, if this were, indeed, the interpretation he propounded, would be excluding a large class of possible definitions composed of ethical terms. There is the possibility of defining one ethical concept in terms of another ethical concept without committing the Naturalistic Fallacy. For instance one could say that "good" menas "what ought to be desired."[49] Surely, Moore cannot categorically state that there is no possible definition of good. On this ground, of defining one ethical

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[47]Jonathan Harris, "Ethical Naturalism," op. cit., p. 75.

[48]Ibid., p. 69.

[49]Ibid., p. 70.

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concept in terms of another ethical concept, I think Moore's assertion that "good" is unanalysable must be challenged.

One might try to escape the above criticism by adopting the second interpretation saying that the Naturalistic Fallacy lies in the defining of "good" in natural properties and thus implying that it itself is a natural property. However, I don't think Moore, or any other proponent of the Naturalistic Fallacy would want to limit their criticism of definitions of good to purely natural properties. For instance, in defending good as a simple, unanalysable quality, Moore would discount any definition given in metaphysical terms. An example of this type of definition would be "good" meaning "desired by one's true self".[50] It seems that the Naturalistic Fallacy is designed to attack more than just definitions of ethical concepts in terms of natural properties but rather to attack all definitions of ethical terms. On the basis of the metaphysical example given above, the second interpretaion of the Naturalistic Fallacy is unacceptable.

The third interpretation seems to be a version of the open question argument in disguise. The third interpretation of the Naturalistic Fallacy is that one defines goodness in terms of some property, say happiness, and at the same time, asserts that happiness is good as though this were an important verbal contention. This interpretation is criticized by Jonathan Harris as follows:

"Although Moore certainly would regard

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[50]Jonathan Harris, "Ethical Naturalism", op. cit., p. 70.

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> the sort of definition mentioned in the third statement above [the definition of goodness as happiness] as committing the Naturalistic Fallacy, it appears that he would have regarded a theory as committing this fallacy even if the theory only defined goodness in terms of some natural property and did not also say that those things which possessed the property were good."[51]

It seems to me that Harris is saying that it may not be proper to apply the open question argument to definitions of good. He is saying that Moore would declare that he found the Naturalistic Fallacy when he asked, for instance, is happiness good?, when this assertion was not put forth by the definer and need not be asked. In other words, when someone would define good as meaning "happiness" they do not mean for the definition to become reciprocal. I must disagree with Harris' criticism of the third interpretation for the very nature of a definition would seem to indicate that if "good" means possessing a certain property, then, of course, the statement that things which possess this property are good must be true.

My own criticism of the third interpretation is that it provides no fatal argument to the naturalist. Just as can be said of the usage of the open question argument, the questions and this third interpretation of the Naturalistic Fallacy at best show why all the naturalistic definitions hitherto proposed do not work. They do not show that natural-

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[51]Jonathan Harris, "Ethical Naturalism", op. cit., p. 70.

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istic definitions are impossible.[52]

In view of these arguments I find that the Naturalistic Fallacy as presented by Moore does not present an air-tight case against the naturalistic standpoint. At best, Moore's fallacy could be extended to be termed the "Definist Fallacy", thus escaping some of the criticism given for the first and second proposed interpretations of his Naturalistic Fallacy.[53] If the fallacy were to be a mistake of all definists, then perhaps the first and second interpretations of Moore's fallacy would be less easy to dispose of as being inadequate and exclusive, proven by offering counter-examples of definitions composed of ethical and metaphysical terms.

Another approach can be taken to a criticism of the viewpoint of the naturalist. This method is embodied in the slogan "you can't get 'ought' from 'is'."

The slogan is supposedly derived from a passage in Hume's Treatise where he says that no set of descriptive statements can entail an evaluative statement without the addition of at least one evaluative premise.[54] Karl Popper also enunciates the slogan - "Perhaps the simplest and most important point about ethics is purely logical. I mean the impossibility to derive [sic] nontautological ethical rules - imperatives;

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[52]Raziel Abelson and Kai Neilsen, "History of Ethics", The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, op. cit., p. 102.

[53]Ibid., p. 101.

[54]John R. Searle, "How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is'", Philosophical Review, LXXIII, January 1964), p. 43.

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principles of policy; aims; or however we may describe them - from statements of facts."[55]

It is certainly dangerous to assert that one can never get an "ought" from an "is". For the mere purpose of discrediting the dogma, the following argument may be presented:

> "Vivesection causes gratuitous suffering to animals.
> Therefore, if nothing that causes gratuitous suffering ought to be done, vivesection should not be done."[56]

In this example an additional evaluative premise has been incorporated into the conclusion so the argument is indeed of the form in which the only premise is factual and the conclusion, evaluative. This however, merely provides an exception to the dogmatic statement of the problem we are dealing with. Here is another example. It is not presented as a logical argument but as a sequence of statements that could supposedly be drawn from each other:

> "1) Jones uttered the words 'I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars.'
> 2) Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars.
> 3) Jones placed himself under (undertook) an obligation to pay Smith five dollars.
> 4) Jones is under an obligation to pay Smith five dollars.
> 5) Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars."[57]

Here, the progression from a factual statement leads to a final ethical statement derived from the factual situation. The step from 1) to 2) is supposedly dependent on certain

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[55]Max Black, op. cit., p. 165.

[56]Ibid., p. 167.

[57]John R.Searle, op. cit., p. 44.

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conditions. For instance, we are to suppose such things as Jones made this statement in the presence of Smith, both speaking English, both conscious, both speaking seriously. Whatever the conditions are, they are certainly empirically identifiable. The remaining steps, from 2) to 3), 3) to 4), and 4) to 5), are to follow each other by definition, that is, they are considered to be tautological. Searle, the author of this example, says that the optional condition can be added to these three transitions - the condition that "all things are equal."[58]

The most obvious criticism of this progression illustrating that it is supposedly possible to derive an "ought" from an "is" is that there is an ethical principle assumed. This additional assumption is that promises ought to be kept. Searle's defense against this criticism is that "to recognize something as a promise is to grant that, other things being equal, it ought to be kept."[59] He calls a promise an "institutional fact and the assumption that promises are to be kept a rule of the institution. "To state such an institutional fact is already to invoke the constituted rules of the institution."[60]

I don't think this is an adequate explanation for the idea of "promises ought to be kept" inserted into the original statement. "Promises ought to be kept" is certainly an evaluative statement and entails an ethical concept. This fact cannot be

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[58]John R. Searle, op. cit., pp. 45-46.

[59]Ibid., p. 50.

[60]Ibid., p. 57.

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avoided by labeling it as an institution. For that matter, the promise may be an institution, but that does not release it from its moral or ethical character. Searle says that the steps in his derivation follow largely by definition. This may be true but there is an underlying supposition that the definition includes an evaluative, ethical concept that a promise is an obligation and as an obligation it ought to be fulfilled. There is no way of escaping the fact. Therefore, I think that Searle has failed to provide an example of how to get an "ought" from an "is".

James and Judith Thomsom have raised a different type of criticism of Searle's derivation that can only help to support my denial of the effectiveness of his example. They challenge Searle's optional premise for the move from 2) to 3), 3) to 4), and 4) to 5). That is, the premise that all other things are equal.[61] They (the Thomsons) offer two interpretations of Searle's optional premise and reject both of them. The first interpretation is that "all other things are equal" is equivalent to saying that "none of us can give a reason why Jones won't keep his promise." This is a weak interpretation of questionable value because of course, just because no one can give a reason why Jones shouldn't keep his promise doesn't mean that there is no reason. The other interpretation is that "there is nothing sufficient to make it false that Jones ought to pay". This certainly escapes the criticism made of the first interpretation,

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[61] James and Judith Thomsom, "How Not to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is'", Philosophical Review, LXXIII (October 1964), p. 512.

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that it states there is rather than one of us knows, but if we use this premise in the derivation in any of the steps between 2) and 5) we see that we are, in effect, adding an evaluative premise that is not purely factual. This interpretation of Searle's optional premise requires that the relative worth and importance of counter-arguments to the keeping of the promise must be weighed and analyzed. Certainly this involves the application of ethical concepts and principles thus disqualifying Searle's derivation as an illustration of deriving "ought" from "is".

Returning to our definition of Ethical Naturalism, that it is a meta-ethical theory holding that ethical judgments can after all, be confirmed, ethical questions answered, by observations and inductive reasoning of the very sort that we use to confirm statements in the empirical sciences,[62] I think that Moore's criticisms offered in the form of the open question argument and the Naturalistic Fallacy are incocnclusive and offer no fatal objection to the naturalist. It cannot be denied that the use of the open question argument and the Naturalistic Fallacy can cast some serious doubts on the validity of the ethical naturalist's claims. However, in the final analysis, the open question argument and the Natrualistic Fallacy cannot categorically do away with all proposed definitions and it remains for us to explore the connotations of each particular definition.

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[62] Richard B. Brandt, op. cit., p. 152.

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Now that we have gained an understanding of the viewpoint of an ethical naturalist and the criticisms that stand against him, we are ready to examine the naturalism of Erich Fromm. First of all we shall examine Fromm's empirical evidence for the standards for the well-being of man that were discussed in Part One.

Some of these standards for the well being of man were a true freedom of the individual, mature love for those around us, hope, faith, and courage. This is what we shall term the "good" for Fromm. The man living a life where he is truly free, and loves and hopes is living a "good" life. These are all things that are entailed in Fromm's definition of the good. Fromm's definition is termed a naturalistic definition because it derives almost completely from empirical evidence.

First, Fromm asserts that man develops a structure to underlie and guide his life. There are many of these workable structures observable in man's societal systems and each structure is a composite of mutually complementing attitudes, beliefs, and ideals. Each structure incorporates certain values and orientations. It is essential to realize that these structures are a part of an individual's personality or character and must be dealt with as wholes rather than arbitrary composites of assorted values and attitudes. An example is the biophilous or life-loving person whose character structure encompasses life-promoting, active, and peaceful attitudes and values.[63]

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[63]Erich Fromm, The Revolution of Hope, p. 96.

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I agree with Fromm in his assertion that an individual's attitudes and values are part of an empirically recognizable character structure in each individual. It certainly can be empirically supported that individuals develop coherent and indentifiable character structures. This may be giving the benefit of the doubt to some people whose value systems may not be wholly consistent and may not seem to present an identifiable structure as such, but even these are at least governed by dominant forces or considerations and certain basic and fundamental values.

To uphold Fromm's statement that the well-being of man is empirically determinable, we must show that it is possible through empirical means to show which of the character structures identified by Fromm is superior and thus necessary for the well-being of man. At this point, any decision as to which of the systems of man is superior necessarily involves an evaluation. Some standard or value judgment must be applied. The empirical world can offer no guidance. Fromm submits that one need accept a single evaluative premise to proceed with the task at hand. The premise is that "it is desirable that a living thing should grow and produce the maximum of vitality and intrinsic harmony, that is, subjectively, of well-being."[64] Fromm asserts that if one accepts this evaluative premise, then empirical evidence can be reexamined and the superior character structure that promotes life and peaceful activity can be identified.

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[64]Erich Fromm, The Revolution of Hope, p. 96.

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We have said before that naturalistic definitions cannot be summarily disposed of and must be considered as individual attempts and assessed in the light of their individual merits. In examining Fromm's definition we must determine the validity of Fromm's evaluative premise and whether, if justified, this premise is sufficient ground for the empirical evidence observed by Fromm to lead him to his conclusions about the well-being of man. Labeling Fromm as an ethical naturalist does not establish either that his definition of the "good" for man is right or wrong. We are equipped to investigate his naturalism armed with the criticisms, both positive and negative, we have discussed earlier.

Fromm's introduction of an evaluative premise is not necessarily a fatal criticism of his naturalistic position. The addition of this premise does not necessitate a departure from his naturalistic stance. The premise seems almost obvious. It does not seem acceptable at all to take the opposite point of view and accept a premise of necrophilous values and believe that the good for man lies ultimately in the destruction of his life and society. Surely life by its nature reproduces, flourishes, tries to overcome obstacles, and adapts and changes so that it can still live. If Fromm's evaluative premise is to be denied we must be ready to believe that it is best that life should wane and there be suffering and need and in the end, death for all living creatures. We certainly cannot plead that this premise has empirical warrant, but it is a premise so basic to life and so basic to all that man does that it

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surely can be accepted as it stands - as a statement of what it means to be alive in the world, striving to continue living and to make a better life. To allow Fromm to incorpoarte this premise in his naturalistic definition does not in any way weaken his position. Fromm's thought and his definition of the good for man are still thoroughly based in an observation of the world and an understanding of the nature of life. His position remains that of the ethical naturalist.

Now Fromm must deal with the classic criticisms of his naturalistic position. We can employ the open question argument by taking a "good" quality and asking whether something that possesses this quality is good.[65] A possible question would be - vivesection is life-promoting (for those who benefit from the ensuing research), but is it good? For many, this question would be obviously open. The question is easily held to be intelligible and can be significantly asked. In granting that the question may be open, what do we establish? As we stated earlier, we do not determine that the proposed definition of good is wrong, rather, we establish that the definition of good that Fromm proposes not only allows, but requires that men engage in weighing various life-promoting procedures against others. Not only must life-promoting procedures be weighed against each other, but the value of various lives must be weighed. If the question about vivesection is to be asked, we must be ready to answer armed with a means for determining whether it is more desirable to promote the life of an animal or the human lives that would presumably benefit from the

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[65] William K. Frnakena, Ethics, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 82.

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ensuing research. This problem of weighing one life against another must be faced and dealt with. The open question argument, in bringing this problem to light, does not invalidate Fromm's definition of good as that which promotes life. It merely indicates that there are still many areas where judgments must be made and introduces an element of the dialectic. The open question argument may be employed successfully without invalidating the definition. We will return later to this problem of weighing one life against another.

Fromm's definition cannot be dismissed as merely reforming. Some may argue that this is the case as it is easily seen that there is much disagreement in the world about what is really good. Fromm admits that there are varying character structures in the world and also that there are some individuals who are not firmly committed to any particular structure. This accounts for the disagreements over what is "good" for man. What Fromm's definition provides is an empirically defensible guideline based on a single evaluative premise.

On these same grounds, we can say that the Naturalistic Fallacy does not strike down Fromm's definition. The fallacy as interpreted as any attempt at a definition of good cannot be considered. As discussed earlier, there are possibly acceptable definitions of "good" and the problem of defining it should not be categorically dismissed as impossible. The interpretation of the Naturalistic Fallacy that states that the problem is in the defining of "good" in terms of natural properties and thus implying that "good" is a natural property must also be

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discounted as Fromm's good is not defined in terms of natural properties but rather in terms of empirically identifiable character structures. The third interpretation of the Naturalistic Fallacy (see page 27) in its similarity to the open question argument also proves to be an inconclusive argument against the ethical naturalist.

In examining the definitional process it is important to note the values and inadequacies of the guidance provided by ordinary usage.[66] Fromm recognizes that in usage, and in fact, good is used to mean different things within varying empirically evident character structures. Also, he recognizes the ambiguities given in such a language system as good means different things to different people. Usgae itself is unable to tell us how to resolve the confusions that arise from existing usages that are unclear or actually in conflict.[67] Essentially this is the same problem stated earlier - empirical observation alone cannot tell us which character structures or value systems are superior. The definitional process simply cannot rely on pure observation. The ability to speak a language at all and having the problem of defining a word in usage to begin with shows us that we must have some idea of what it is we are trying to define before we start. By the nature of language itself, we do not usually make up a new word and then

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[66] Frederick Ferré, Basic Modern Philosophy of Religion, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), pp. 30-35.

[67] Ibid., p. 33.

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manufacture a definition for it. Most definitions are used to clarify the meanings and precise connotations of words already in usage. I agree with Professor Ferré that "we judge definitions on the basis of a set of preliminary ideas on what the definition shall include and exclude."[68] Following this line of reasoning, I think that Fromm's evaluative premise is indeed a justifiable addition to his naturalistic view and is a proper base for defining good. Fromm's evaluative premise that life should be promoted is an appropriate "predefinitional resolution"[69] for the base of his empirically founded definition.

We have now found that Fromm's evaluative premise that "it is desirable that a living thing should grow and produce the maximum of vitality and intrinsic harmony, that is, subjectively, of well-being,"[70] is warranted in and of itself. Also, we have shown that it is a valid addition to Fromm's naturalistic standpoint and does not invalidate the empirical basis for his definitional process. Now we must see if this evaluative premise is a sufficient addition to Fromm's empirical observations to insure the conclusions that he draws about the well-being of man.

Fromm's statement of his single evaluative premise is found in The Revolution of Hope and following the statement of the premise is this : "An examination of the system Man can

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[68]Frederick Ferré, op. cit., p. 43.

[69]Ibid., p. 43.

[70]Erich Fromm, The Revolution of Hope, p. 96.

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show that biophilous norms are more conducive to the growth and strength of the system while necrophilous norms are conducive to dysfunction and pathology."[71]

The question is, how does he get from his evaluative premise to a statement implying that it is human life that we must promote above all else? Returning to the vivesection example - how is one to decide which action to pursue employing Fromm's premise? We have said that we must be armed with means for weighing one life against the other. Is it better to promote the life and well-being of the animal that is soo to be the victim? Or is it better to promote the health and well-being of human kind in general as they will benefit from research done on the animal?

As much as we may try, we cannot ignore the fact that life feeds on life. Man can keep alive only by feeding on animals and plants - living things that must lose their life in order that man might live. Other animals all along the evolutionary ladder are kept alive by devouring other living things. How are we to decide which are to be saved and which are to be eaten? As our cities expand and pollution continues, we rob plants and animals of their lives by the thousands. Even in the ideal society that Fromm projects as a possibility for man of the future, there must be an unavoidable series of deaths, an unavoidable series of life and death decisions in favor of man. Why should the life of man be promoted? If

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[71]Erich Fromm, The Revolution of Hope, p. 96.

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self-preservation is the unquestionable right of man to pursue, surely it is also the unquestionable right of all other living things to pursue.

Fromm's premise is certainly not an arbitrary standard and I think that it properly underlies any definition of what is good for man and can properly be identified as a "predefinitional resolution". However, without further explication, the premise is inadequate to get Fromm to the point of demanding the preservation of human life over others.

Surely the premise fairly represents inherent drives for life and competition that are a part of the nature of life. Life is a process of change and competition and evolution. As it stands, Fromm's position is not complete. There is a gap between his evaluative premise for the promotion of life generally and his insistence that the quality of human life must be improved and preserved at the expense of other lives.

I think that the gap is not unbridgeable. There is a way to get from here to there.

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PART THREE

"Supplementation"

I think that Fromm's system of ethical naturalism presents a real solution for the growing technology in society and its companion growing computerization of life functions. We have discussed the evaluative premise that he adds to his naturalistic position and have found it to be a valid addition to his theory. It is certainly true that it is desirable that life should produce the maximum of vitality and intrinsic harmony that it can.

Now we must deal with the problem of how this premise allows us to act for the preservation of human life over plant and animal life. I do not think that Fromm means to imply that plant and animal life are expendable. I think that he means that for the benefit of all lives involved, it is better to allow man to take the upper hand and guide the competition.

We must realize that we no longer have space or materials for unlimited expansion. We no longer can allow natural competition to take care of the balance of life. Man has created an artificial and unnatural environment that continuing at its present rate of ecological destruction will not provide conditions for any kind of life as we know it.

What sets man apart from other animals? It is his

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intelligence, his mind. Man can look around him and see where he is headed. He can see what is happening to the world and he can, if he so choses, plan ahead to change the course of his life and the life of others. Man can to a certain extent control the world and how he is affected by it. Man can deal with the environment, he is not totally at its mercy. Of course, man is not in complete control, but man has at his disposal the means to help change the environment, to make it more conducive to life and growth.

Since man does have these analytic capabilities and can do something about the world where he lives perhaps he should be "put in charge" of bettering all life. Through bettering the human situation and working to create a more life-promoting environment for himself, other living things will benefit also. The same conditions that promote human growth will aid plant and animal growth.

For man to live on this earth, his pollution must stop. The rivers and seas must be cleansed and the air must be revitalized. Man cannot expect to continue to live on a filthy and contaminated earth. To promote his own well-being, his own life, man must clean up this filth. This kind of ecological effort will promote man's life, it will give him clean air to breathe and clean water - the same things needed by plants and animals - the same things that all living things need to survive. And at this time man is in the only position to initiate a change. He is the only creature that can start the revolution

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and plan and work to bring these life-promoting changes about.

Man must work to create a society where individuals are not closeted away in their own private and selfish worlds. The mechanization of society must not be allowed to destroy interpersonal relations and the love of a community. Industry must be brought under control so that each individual is not at home only on a few square feet of the factory's floor and man must allow himself to expand his horizons and see and enjoy all the world around him. Man must feel his kinship with all that lives around him. The forests and the undeveloped lands must be respected. They must be respected if man is to respect himself. When man stops seeing his life only in terms of how much he has managed to produce and stops looking at trees for how many board feet of lumber they would yield, then man will promote his life, and be truly alive, free, and loving, and all living things in the world will be free also - free to seek their own life.

Obviously, the earth has a cycle. There is a cycle whereby the living feed off the living and where some life must be given up so that other life may flourish. The cycle as it stands sustains itself. Man has it in his reach to destroy the cycle - to ruin the balance. If he does so, he not only destroys all the other living plants and creatures but he destroys himself. Today man realizes the delicate balance that is found here supporting our life on earth. To save man's life, all life must be saved. Man cannot take

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over and be a glutton of all our natural resources with only himself in mind.

This kind of reasoning is not to be taken as an expediency. I do not mean to say that man must live and since the only way man can live is if the plants and animals live also, so they must live, too. A man following that reasoning is still selfish, still a slave to a system that drives him to coldly calculate his survival - with a maximum of profit and a maximum of production. This is not the way the problem is to be approached. Remember that the revolution is to be in the attitudes and the values of the people. The good for man is not just that he carve out an existence, but that man live in harmony and in a state of well-being - in a community among men and on the earth among life.

Man is responsible for the ecological sickness of the earth. Man planted the germ of the dirty factories and the filth-ridden rivers. Man in his greed set those standards for himself of maximum output and maximum profit. Even as he is responsible for the problem, he is the only living thing that can constructively do something about it. The restoration of life to our planet is the responsibility of man.

The premise that it is desirable for human life to flourish is a part of the premise that all life should flourish. One follows from the other. Fromm never meant to intimate that human life is better than other life. He does not try to make our values focus only on the preservation and improvement of

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human life. He merely recognizes the fact that at this point only humans can do anything about the deterioration of life in general. Only humans can work to make the changes that are necessary for life to flourish at its maximum vitality.

It must not be forgotten that these changes that man could possibly make in the environment are to be a part of the "Revolution of Hope". Recall that the revolution is not only to be in physically changing the living conditions in the world by working against pollution and averting the possibility of a nuclear holocaust, it is to be a revolution of the values and concerns of men. Remember the "Revolution" must be a revolt against cold, impersonal calculations. We must develop mature love and a sense of freedom. We must return to spontaneous activity, to genuine interest and involvement. Man must be working to express himself and to help others - other men and other living creatures. All men must make an effort to break out of the niches they have been walled into by a technological system that looks at them only for how many units of production they can be depended on for. If the revisions and the revampings of society that are necessary for all life to flourish are to be accomplished, they must be done with a revolution of human ideas and values. Humans must strive for their maturity in freedom and love. If the revolution is complete, or even if most of those in the fight are concerned with these things and genuinely try to reach their ultimate humanness, other life will benefit. Other life will not be extinguished in favor of

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human life. We set up no primacy of man over all things. It is imperative that man strive to reach his own ultimacy but this is never at the expense of the ultimate life of other living things, it is done together, one part and parcel of the other.

I think that Fromm could have made more clear his transition from the evaluative premise to the assertion that we must have a growing and strong system of human life. He does not mean to leave other life out in the cold. If he seems to say that human life is better, it is because human life can deal with the world and has the chance of overcoming the pathology it has created for itself by a revolution in its values and goals. Humans alone have the opportunities to express themselves creatively and make changes in the world for the benefit of all - all mankind and all life.

Returning to the question of vivesection - we are faced with a decision of which shall be deemed the more important - the animal life or the human life. Let us take a specific example - a man has been bitten by a dog. In the area where the incident has occured, there have been several cases of rabies reported. It is not known whether the dog has the disease or not. The disease is fatal unless treated. To determine whether the dog has the disease in a time short enough to insure the saving of the man's life, the dog must be killed and his brain examined. Should the dog be killed to determine if the man is infected with a fatal disease?

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Or should the dog be allowed to live with a possible risk to the man's life?

How are we to decide which is more valuable - the life of the dog or the life of the man? Perhaps this is an unfortunate misstatement of the dilemma. A more proper question would be - which of the two courses would be more life-promoting? Surely, it can be argued that the man as a lone individual would probably have little effect on the course of the "Revolution" we have planned. This would make his life on a par with the dog's. However, let us not forget that we are talking about a fatal, communicable disease. The dog endangers not only the life of this one man he has bitten, but the lives of other men and the lives of other animals. It is not only a question here of one life against another, but the question of many lives against one. The question of time involved here and the nature of the disease, indicate, I think, that the killing of the dog would be the most life-promoting for all involved. Surely, there is always the possibility that the dog does not have the disease and the dog would be killed. But it would not be a needless and unnecessary death. It was a death that seemed to give the most chance for the promotion of life, the most chance for life to flourish.

There is much conflict yet to be resolved. This example of the dog and the man is only a small sample of the problems yet to be confronted and dealt with. I think that there should be no effort to come up with a formula that tells us exactly what to do in all cases. Taking all the circumstances into

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consideration in our example, I feel that it is best that the dog be killed.

There must be opposing tensions. There must be uncertainties and rebuffs. The dialectical interplay of success and failure, of approach and retreat, feeds the growth and development of man. Fromm only provides that man should do those things and seek out those things that promote active, peaceful, loving life. There is much, much conflict yet to be resolved by such a statement. Each individual is still resonsible for deciding, for wondering, for determining what is life-promoting to the greatest extent, whether it be for the present, in the long run, for himself, or for a greater number of people or living things.

Fromm's support for his definition of the good for man is not a blueprint for our action. It is more of a diagnosis of what is the matter with our sick society. It is not up to him or anyone else to tell us exactly what to do to get out of the mess. It is each person's own responsibility. The definition is of value and is worthwhile as it stands.

I think Fromm's definition can withstand the criticism of the open question argument and the Naturalistic Fallacy. All things considered, I think his definitional process is admirable. However, the definition arrived at, it will not implement itself. It is up to the individuals to take up the task and make mistakes, and fall back, and be hurt, and be defeated - time and time again if necessary. After all, if life is to reach its maximum, human life too must reach its peak and human life can reach its peak only through striving for the identity of the

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individual and his union with other men. Human life will reach its ultimacy when man loves and hopes and strives and constantly searches for ways to make his life and his world better and more reflective of the potential that is in every life.

We must take Fromm's diagnosis to heart. We cannot let the disease advance much farther. Man is not in complete control of the situation. What must be done must be done soon. Man must soon become that compassionate and creative creature that we have described. There is no time to waste. And man must always be aware of his relative place in he world and not assume that he must thrive at the expense of all else. All things are intertwined and man must find his place. It will not be shown to him, he must find it. Eric Fromm has participated worthily in the human quest.

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