
This book consists of a number of papers bearing on psychoanalytic theory, in particular on psychoanalytic ego psychology, published by Hartmann between 1939. In order to see the developing formulations Hartmann made in ego psychology, it would perhaps be best to review the papers in chronological order; however, I intend to first summarize those papers which appear to have the more important bearing on our interest in ego psychology at the moment. In his introduction to these papers, the author comments on the fact that it was Freud's work on the ego in the 1920s and the 1930s that opened the door to the present emphasis on the importance of the ego in the total personality. It is via the study of the ego and its functions that psychoanalysis will reach its aim of becoming a general psychology. For a long time, the study of drives and their development was the core of psychoanalytic psychology, and it was later added the study of the defensive functions of the ego. "A next step pointed to extending the analytic approach to the manifold activities of the ego which can be subsumed under the concept of the 'conflict-free sphere.' However, the ego functions so described can under circumstances become secondarily involved in conflicts of various kinds. On the other hand, they often do exert an influence on the conditions and outcomes of conflicts. This means that our attempts to explain concrete situations of conflict will often have to consider also the nonconflictual elements" (p. x). Direct observation of child development by analysts has been valuable in the broadening of the psychoanalytic approach. "This clearly presupposes a theory of adaptation (and of integration), which in turn means also a theory of object relationships and social relationships in general" (p. x). Hartmann points to Freud's paper on "Analysis Terminable and Interminable" in which Freud suggested that the ego, as well as the id, might have a hereditary core. Again we see here how much this one statement by Freud in only one of his papers is emphasized. Indeed it is vitally necessary to ego psychology, for it is the foundation stone on which the entire development of ego psychology appears to rest. In light of Freud's more consistent views of the ego, however, it is indeed a weak foundation. I am certain that this view of hereditary influences on the ego will be mentioned time and again through these papers. In light of this statement by Freud, Hartmann then goes on: "I think we have the right to assume that there are, in man, inborn apparatuses which I have called primary autonomy, and that these primary autonomous apparatuses of the ego and their maturation constitute one foundation for the relations to external reality. But it seems to me that Hartmann neglects to emphasize the other foundations, in particular, that of drive-relatedness. Among these factors originating in the hereditary core of the ego, there are also those which serve postponement of discharge, that is, which are of an inhibitory nature. They may well serve as models for later defenses" (x-xi). He then goes on that "...many, though not all, ego activities can be traced genetically to determinants in the id or to conflicts between ego and id. In the course of development, however, they normally acquire a certain amount of autonomy from these genetic factors. The ego's achievements may under some circumstances be reversible, but it is important to know that in normal conditions many of them are not. The degree to which its activities have become functionally independent from their origins is essential for the undisturbed functioning of the ego, and so is the degree to which they are protected against regression and instinctualization. We speak of the degrees of this independence of the ego as the degrees of secondary autonomy. This view...certainly does not imply any neglect of the genetic point of view, which is fundamental in psychoanalysis. But it means a differentiation in our approach to the processes of mental development; and it means a clearer differentiation between the concepts of function and of genesis which is particularly necessary in the psychology of the ego." (xii). Ego psychology is important for a general psychology "...not only because it adds certain layers of motivation to others long since known in psychoanalysis. It is important also because on this level has analysis come to a fuller understanding of the ways in which the various layers interrelate." (xii).
The study of the ego has suggested a broadening of the concept of structure, and one now speaks of "structures on the ego" and "structures in the superego."

"This refers, in contrast to 'flexibility,' to a 'relative stability' of functions, as it is clearly observable, e.g., in the automatons" (xii).

"Freud has repeatedly stated that the ego works with desexualized energy. It seemed reasonable, to me as to other analysts, to broaden this statement to include also energies derived from aggression which, through the mediation of the ego, can be modified in a way analogous to desexualization. The term neutralization refers, then, to the process by which both libidinal and aggressive energies are changed away from the instinctual and toward a noninstinctual mode—or to the results of this change" (xii-xiii). He points out that the meaning of the term "neutralization" is different from the term "neutral energy" that Freud referred to in The Ego and the Id. Hartmann also posits different stages or degrees of neutralization, i.e., transitional states between instinctual and fully neutralized energy. Rapaport did the same in his monograph.

"Once the ego has developed into a separate system of personality, it has accumulated a reservoir of neutralized energy, which means that the energies required for its functions need not depend entirely on ad hoc neutralization. This is part of its relative independence from immediate inside or outside pressures, and this relative independence is part of a general trend in human development. It is likely that part of the energy which the ego uses is not derived (by way of neutralization) from the drives but belongs from the very first to the ego, or to the inborn precursors of what will later be specific ego functions. We may speak of it as primary ego energy" (xiii-xiv). This seems very similar to White's concept of independent ego energies. Hartmann goes on to state that no one has as yet given a systematic presentation of ego psychology and that the textbook on ego psychology remains to be written. I should think that when it is, the concept of independent ego energies will play an even more important role than neutralization in the theory. Hartmann adds that the concern with theory does not mean a neglect of "...the clinical foundations of psychoanalysis, nor does the emphasis on ego psychology imply an underrating of other aspects of analytic theory" (xiv), but I don't believe it! "Some authors have suggested that one develop a theory of the ego which disregards the basic insights we owe to Freud into the psychology of instinctual drives and into their interactions with ego functions. I would consider such an attempt as definitely unpromising" (xv), but, as I said, such is his attempt. Yet he keeps throwing in a sentence here and there trying himself firmly to the theories of Freud.


This is a short succinct paper which I feel falls a bit short of its intended mark. Perhaps it is because this was one of the first attempts to elucidate on such technical implications. It is interesting to note that Hartmann speaks of clinical, technical, and theoretical elements, but I am not certain as to his difference between clinical and technical. "As to the relation of technique and theory, whenever a lack of integration occurs, both aspects are likely to suffer. ...A defect in integration of both sides may also be due to one of these aspects outdistancing the other in the course of analytic development. Elsewhere I have tried to demonstrate that the lag is, for the time being, rather on the side of technical theory than on the side of technical insight. The reverse obtained when Freud introduced the systematic analysis of resistances, without at first realizing all its implications for ego psychology. Today we actually know much more than we are able to use technically in a rational way. Genuinely technical discoveries—as was abreaction, and as was analysis of resistances—we do not find in the latest phase of analysis; but the body of systematic psychological and psychopathological knowledge has been considerably increased. However, an equilibrium is likely to be re-established...For some time, at least one trend in the analyst's interest in technical problems has been following the lead and gradually assimilating the advances in psychoanalytic psychology and psychopathology: ego psychology" (144).
"... considering the interaction of what we may call the aspect of rational planning in our work with its unconscious elements, we cannot fully subscribe to what Ferenczi emphasized more than twenty years ago: the essential importance of keeping psychoanalytic technique flexible, especially when we are trying to establish what technique may gain from additional scientific insight; also in teaching one must avoid giving the student the impression that actually a complete set of rules exists which just his lack of experience prevents him from knowing. Neither shall we forget the besides the guidance by insight of our technique, every analyst's work with every single one of his patients has also a truly experimental character. There is a continuous sequence of trials and errors.... The technical implications of ego psychology point first and foremost to what a closer insight into defense has taught us about the understanding and handling of resistances; but the ego being what it is, it also means progress in ways of understanding and dealing with the reality aspect of our patients' behavior. Tracing neurotic anxiety to real anxiety was one decisive step and obviously an outgrowth of the fact that Freud was turning his interest to the clinical implications of ego psychology. Clearly an outcome of this is the way Anna Freud approaches and deals with conflict with reality (the ego and mechanisms of defense), which she constitutes as a field of concern to analysis equal to the conflicts of the ego with the id and with the superego. Thus the way was opened to a better understanding of adaptation and its role in the neurotic as well as in them so-called normal individual. Here, too, there are many practical implications, and we do not feel that we can handle a patient's neurosis without dealing with its interaction with normal functioning. We feel that in order to fully grasp neurosis and its etiology, we have to understand the etiology of health, too. It is true that some degree of realization of all this has always been present in analysis, but the shift of accent is considerable enough to be noteworthy. That in analysis we are dealing with a patient's total personality has become actually true only since this shift in thinking, and in the corresponding technique, was realized. Likewise, the consideration of those interdependencies which we find between conflict and the nonconflictual sphere of the ego points in the same direction" (144–145).

"...we may say that technical progress might depend on a more systematic study of the various functional units within the ego. To study the ego's relations with the id or the superego, that is of the intersystemic conflicts and correlations, we shall have to add a more detailed study of the intrasystemic correlations. I spoke of one such unit within the ego: the nonconflictual sphere. But we have to view it constantly in relation to the units of functioning that represent the countercathexes, or the dealing with reality, or the unconscious automatized patterns, or that special functional control and integration that we know under the name of synthetic, or better, organizing function... What do we mean when we say that we help the patient's ego; or, strengthen his ego? This certainly cannot be adequately described by referring only to the redistributions of energy between the id and the ego, or between the superego and the ego; shifts from certain spheres of the ego to other functional units within the ego are involved. No definition of ego strength would I consider complete which does not refer to the intrasystemic structures, that is, which does not take into account the relative preponderance of certain ego functions over others; for instance, whether or not the autonomous ego functions are interfered with by the defensive functions, and also the extent to which the energies of the various ego functions use are neutralized." (146).

"In technique the concept of stratification [conscious, preconscious, unconscious] proved very useful and still is, in so far as making unconscious processes conscious by way of the preconscious is clearly one main and constant factor
responsible for our therapeutic results. However, based on the concept of layers and on resistance analysis—maybe because technique at time too violently encroached upon theory—the concept of historical stratification was developed by Wilhelm Reich, and with it a picture of personality that is definitely pre-structural, in terms of the development of psychoanalytic psychology. Nunberg had early warned against this simplification. Fenichel, too...realized some of its shortcomings and held that certain character disturbances show spontaneous chaotic situations in analysis; and that displacements of the psychic layers may be brought about by the patient's current life, as well as by instinctual temptations or reinforcement of anxiety. I may add that the factors counteracting the establishment of a clear-cut picture of historical stratification seem to be much more numerous” (147).

"Freud found that just to give the patient a translation of the derivatives of his unconscious was not enough. The next step was characterized by a more exact insight into the dynamic and economic problems of resistance, and by laying down accordingly Mi rules for the 'what,' 'when,' and 'how much' of interpretation; supplementation...He advised the analyst not to select particular elements Mi problems to work on, but to start with whatever presents itself on the psychic surface, and to use interpretation mainly for the purpose of recognizing the resistance and making it conscious to the patient" (147). "Soon this discussion came under the impact of the delineation of units of function (id, ego, superego), that is, of the structural aspect. Here, once more a fruitful interdependence of theory and practice became apparent. The unconscious nature of resistance...became a cornerstone in the development of Freud's later formulations of the unconscious aspects of the ego" (148-149). "First of all, ego psychology meant, and means, a broadening of our field of view. 'Good' theory helps us to discover the facts (for instance, to recognize resistance as such) and it helps us to see the connections among facts. This part of our psychology also gives a deeper understanding of the forms and mechanisms of defense, and a more exact consideration of the details of the patient's inner experience and behavior; corresponding to this, on the side of technique, is a tendency toward more concrete, more specific interpretation" (149). "One problem connected with this development is...speech and language. Freud found that in the transition from the unconscious to the preconscious state, a cathexis of verbal presentations is added to the thing-cathexis. [As I recall, this was in his paper on 'The Unconscious'; however, as Kris has pointed out, in the Outline changed his point of view, so that unconscious contents could become conscious without necessitating the connection of verbal memory traces...also he always said that affect becomes conscious directly, as opposed to ideas.] Later, Nunberg...described the role of the synthetic function of the ego in this process toward linking and assimilation. One may add that the function of the verbal element in the analytic situation is not limited to verbal cathexis and integration, but also comprises expression. This, too, contributed toward fixing the previously unconscious element in the preconscious or conscious mind of the patient. Another structural function of the same process is due to the fact that the fixing of verbal symbols is in the development of the child linked with concept formation and represents one main road toward objectivation; it plays a similar role in the analytic situation. It facilitates the patient's way to a better grasp of physical as well as psychic reality. Besides, the action of speaking has also a specific social meaning inasmuch as it serves communication and in this respect becomes the object of the analysis or transference. There is also, of course, in speech the aspect of emotional discharge or abreaction. Finally, the influence of the superego on speech and language is familiar to us, especially from psychopathology. This is to say that the different aspects of speech and language, as described by psychologists and philosophers, become coherent and meaningful if viewed from the angle of our structural model, and that in this case actually all the structural implications have today become relevant for our handling of the analytic situation. In trying to clarify the technical aspects of the problems involved, we are actually following the lead of structural psychology” (149-150).
"The necessity for scrutinizing our patients' material as to its derivation from all the psychic systems, without bias in favor of one or the other, is nowadays rather generally accepted as a technical principle. Also we meet many situations in which even the familiar opposition of defense and instinct is losing much of its absolute character. Some of these situations are well rather well known, as is the case in which defense is sexualized or—equally often—'aggressivized' (if I may use the expression); or instances in which an instinctual tendency is used for defensive purposes. Most of these cases can be handled according to general rules derived from what we know about the dynamics and economics of interpretation as, for instance: resistance interpretation precedes interpretation of content, etc. In other cases these rules do not prove subtle enough; unexpected and sometimes highly troublesome quantitative or qualitative side effects of interpretations may occur. This, then, is a problem that clearly transcends those technical situations I have here as illustrations. If such incidental effects occur, our dosage or timing may have been wrong. But it may also be—and this is the more instructive case—that we have missed some structural implications though correctly following quantitative economic principles. It may be that we have considered this quantitative aspect of a resistance only and have not considered precisely enough how the same quantity may involve the various functions of the ego and the superego in a different degree" (150-151).

"One day we shall probably be able to formulate more systematically the rational element of our technique, that is 'planning' the predictable outcome of our interventions, with respect to these structural implications. This will depend in part on progress in a familiar field of analytic research: a deeper understanding of the choice and of the quantitative aspect of defense mechanisms, of their chronology, typical and individual, but above all else, of their genetic and economic interrelatedness with other functions of the ego. To touch at least on one of the genetic problems involved, we can assume that many defense mechanisms are traceable to primitive defense actions against the outside world, which in part probably belong to the ego's primary autonomy, and that only later, in situations of psychic conflicts, do they develop into what we specifically call mechanisms of defense. Also, we can say of many of them that after having been established as such, they become in a secondary way invested with other functions (intellectualization, for example). This makes for a complicated overlapping of their role as resistances with various other functions they represent. It is because of this, that if we want to analyze defenses in a rational way, we have to consider their structural, their intersystemic and intrasystemic ramifications, beyond the aspect of resistance they offer to analysis. This is, of course, known in principle, but in a way our knowledge in this respect is not always specific enough. Genetically, some of the pertinent questions of structural psychology can be viewed from the angle of what, borrowing a term from biology, I called 'change of function.' It is part of what I now call 'secondary autonomy.' It means relative functional independence may be more or less complete. In some cases it is practically irreversible under the conditions of 'normal' everyday behavior. But we know from experience that even in many of these instances reversibility can be observed under special conditions, as in dreams, in neuroses and psychoses, and in analysis. It is because of this that the development of secondary autonomy can be made fruitful for the study of those phenomena of overlapping and of ramification which I have just mentioned" (152).

Returning to the problem of incidental effects of interpretation, Hartmann writes: "...we assume that the process set in motion by a stimulus (interpretation being only one instance in question) produces not only, so to speak, 'local' reactions. It goes beyond the stimulated 'area,' changing the balance of mental energies and affecting a variety of aspects of the dynamic system. This process activates or sets in a state of preparedness elements functionally and genetically connected with it; its appeal often reaches from one system into the others, and its unconscious side effects may transcend the barriers
of countercathexis. It would, however, be rash to assume that these 'connections' can always be fully understood in terms of the principles of mere associationism. In contrast to the associationist approach, we imply the presence not only of dynamic but also of structural factors. Also, psychoanalysis, while often using the language of associationism, has from the very first differed from it and does so even more since principles of organization and structure have explicitly become an essential part of our theory. What I have in mind could be designated briefly as the 'principle of multiple appeal.'...A somewhat similar physiological conception has been advanced by brain physiologists, some of whom use the term 'resonance effect.' I also want to mention that Federn, to some extent, thought along similar lines in trying to prove his point that there is, in the brain, conduction not based on neural pathways—which, however, has no immediate bearing on our problem." (152-153).

In summarizing this short paper, he writes: "In comparing theoretical and technical development, I believe that the lag today is rather on the side of technique. In the process of gradual replacement of the older layer concepts by structural concepts, not all the implications have so far been realized. One example is given of how gradual realization of structural thinking has evolved and helped toward a better understanding and a better utilization of analytic material, in discussing the structural implications of speech and language in analysis. On the technical side, our technique of interpretation has so far been better understood and made more explicit in its dynamic and economic than in its structural aspects. Certain incidental effects of interpretation which, though familiar to all of us, have not yet been taken sufficiently into account by our theory or technique, need closer investigation. In concluding, I try to show that it may prove useful to view certain related problems of psychoanalytic psychology from the angle of a 'principle of multiple appeal.'" (153-154)

I am impressed with a certain sterility about this paper. I am not certain if it was meant to offer suggestions as to how to proceed in analysis keeping in mind the conceptions he has previously offered about such things as the conflict-free sphere of the ego, the autonomous ego, primary autonomy, secondary autonomy, and ego apparatuses, but if this was an aim of this paper, it was not fulfilled. But perhaps this is because in Hartmann's view, "technical implications of ego psychology" may not be the equivalent of "implications of ego psychology as the technique of psychoanalytic therapy"—but I am unsure about this. The lack of concreteness here may simply be due to the fact that the study of the ego and its view as proposed by Hartmann has little to offer to treatment technique. Anna Freud's emphasis, on the other hand, does in that she attends to the unconscious defense mechanisms and their operations, and thus enables the psychoanalyst to become aware of and deal more adequately with them in the therapy situation. I am again impressed in this paper by Hartmann with the major de-emphasis on instinctual drives and their importance and influence on the ego and its functioning.

(continued)

Again Hartmann points out that as early as in the 1890s, Freud spoke of ego in a sense that foreshadowed his later formulations when he introduced his structural theory.

"The term 'ego' is often used in a highly ambiguous way, even among analysts. To define it negatively, in three respects, as against other ego concepts: 'ego,' in analysis, is not synonymous with 'personality' or with 'individual'; it does not coincide with the 'subject' as opposed to the 'object' of experience; and it is by no means only the 'awareness' or the 'feeling' of one's own self. In analysis, the ego is a concept of quite a different order. It is a substructure of personality and is defined by its functions....Here I shall mention only some of the most important ones. You know that among them Freud has always emphasized those which center around the relation to reality...The ego organizes and controls motility and perception--perception of the outer world but probably also of the self (while we think that self-criticism, though based on self-perception, is a separate function which we attribute to the superego); it also serves as a protective barrier against excessive external and, in a somewhat different sense, internal stimuli. The ego tests reality. Action, too, in contradistinction to mere motor discharge, and thinking, which according to Freud is a trial action with small quantities of psychic energy, are functions of the ego. In both is implied an element of inhibition, of delay of discharge. In this sense many aspects of the ego can be described as detective activities; they promote a more specific and safer form of adjustment by introducing a factor of growing independence from the immediate impact of present stimuli. In this trend toward what we may call internalization is also included the danger signal, besides other functions that can be described as being in the nature of anticipation. I also want to remind you here of what Freud thought about the relation of the ego to time perception. From what I just said it already appears that a large sector of the ego's functions can also be described from the angle of its inhibiting nature...Another set of functions which we attribute to the ego is what we call a person's character. And still another one that we can conceptually distinguish from those mentioned so far are the coordinating or integrating tendencies known as the synthetic function. These, together with the differentiating factors, we can comprise in the concept of an organizing function; they represent one level (not the only or the earliest one) of mental self-regulation in man. With all of these functions of the ego we are in continuous contact in our clinical as well as in our theoretical thinking" (114-115).

"...Freud's outline of the ego is richer in motifs and dimensions than its elaboration so far in psychoanalytic literature. Of course, there is the obvious reason that certain aspects of the ego are more specifically accessible to the psychoanalytic method than others. We have only to think of the psychology of conflict or of the psychology of defense. On the other hand, there are fields of ego functions of which one is used to think as the exclusive domain of direct observation, or of experimental methods, though we should realize that these fields too will have to be reconsidered from the angle of psychoanalytic psychology...Historically the study of the ego had different meanings at different times, according, for instance, to the preponderance of certain technical over certain theoretical questions or vice versa. On the other hand, though it appears from his writings that he was rather opposed to considering analysis as a psychological 'system,' at least in its present state, Freud unquestionably had all these aspects in mind, and one of his aims, particularly in his ego-psychological work, was to constitute analysis as the basis of a general psychology. Also, the trend toward developing psychoanalytic psychology beyond its medical origin, including in its scope a growing number of aspects of normal as well as pathological behavior, is clearly inherent in ego psychology today. The techniques of adjustment to reality and of achievement emerge in a more explicit way, and some errors in
perspective that are bound to occur in viewing them only from the pathological angle can be corrected" (116). "This trend should not be interpreted as a tendency away from the medical aspects of analysis or, for that matter, from its biological or physiological aspects. This point deserves emphasis, because in its beginnings Freud's ego psychology was misunderstood by many, analysts and nonanalysts, as a parting with his original ideas on the biological foundation of analysis. Actually, the opposite comes closer to the truth: it is, in certain respects, rather a rapprochement. No doubt the continuity with biology has, in analysis, first been established in the study of the instinctual drives. But ego psychology, by investigating more closely not only the ego's adaptive capacities but also its 'aesthetic,' 'integrating,' or 'organizing' functions—that is the centralization of functional control—has extended the sphere in which a meeting of analytic with physiological, especially brain-physiological, concepts may one day become possible" (117).

"Most attempts to explain the origin of the infant's relation with reality have relied heavily on the drive for self-preservation. I should prefer a formulation which does not speak of self-preservation as a result of an independent set of drives, but rather stresses the roles which libidinal and aggressive tendencies play in it, in addition to the physiological mechanisms, and above all the role of the ego and of those autonomous preparatory stages of the ego which I shall soon discuss. We all agree that, in his development toward reality, the child has to learn to postpone gratification; the recognition, by the child, of constant and independent objects in the outside world already presupposes a certain degree of this capacity. But for the acceptance of reality also the pleasure possibilities offered by the developing ego functions are essential as well as love and other rewards from the side of the objects and, in a later stage, gratifications due to the renunciation of instinctual satisfaction.... Some aspects of early ego development appear in a different light if we familiarize ourselves with the thought that the ego may be more—and very likely is more—than a developmental by-product of the influence of reality on instinctual drives; that it has a partly independent origin—apart from those formative influences which, of course, no analyst would want to underestimize; and that we may speak of an autonomous factor in ego development in the same way as we consider the instinctual drives autonomous agents of development. Of course, this is not to say that the ego is a definite psychic system is inborn; it rather stresses the point that the development of this system is traceable not only to the impact of reality and of the instinctual drives but also to a set of factors that cannot be identified with either one of them. This statement also implies that not all the factors of mental development present at birth can be considered part of the id—which is, by the way, included in what I have said elsewhere in introducing the concept of an undifferentiated phase. What, in the history of psychoanalytic theory, had for a long time militated against the acceptance of this position is, above all, the fact that we were so much used to thinking in terms of the id being older than the ego. The latter hypothesis also has an aspect which refers to phylogenesis. However, I should like to suggest that we try to reformulate it even as to this implication. I should rather say that both the ego and the id have developed, as products of differentiation, out of the matrix of animal instinct. From here, by way of differentiation, not only man's special 'organ' of adaptation, the ego, has developed, but also the id; and the estrangement with reality, so characteristic of the id of the human, is an outcome of this differentiation, but by no means a direct continuation of what we know about the instincts of lower animals. As to the ontogenetic aspect, more important for the problems under discussion here, there is no doubt, though it has not been generally realized, that Freud has come to develop his theory in a direction which modifies his previous stand, at least in one essential aspect. I am quoting from his 'Analysis Terminable and Interminable' which might prove to be the most far-sighted of his last papers: 'We have no reason to dispute the existence and importance of primary congenital variations in the ego.... When
we speak of 'archaic heritage' we are generally thinking only of the id and we apparently assume that no ego is yet in existence at the beginning of the individual's life. But we must not overlook the fact that id and ego are originally one, and it does not imply a mystical over-valuation of heredity if we think it credible that, even before the ego exists, its subsequent lines of development, tendencies and reactions are already determined." (119-120).

"We come to see ego development as a result of three sets of factors: inherited ego characteristics (and their interaction), influences of the instinctual drives, and influences of outer reality. Concerning the development and the growth of the autonomous characteristics of the ego we may make the assumption that they take place as a result of experiences (learning), but partly also of maturation—parallel to the assumption I more familiar in analysis that processes of maturation intervene in the development of the sexual drives (for instance, in the sequence of libidinal organizations), and in a somewhat different way also in the development of aggression...The problem of maturation has a physiological aspect. Speaking of this aspect we may refer to the growth of whatever we assume to be the physiological basis of those functions which, looked at from the angle of psychology, we call the ego; or we may refer to the growth of such apparatus which sooner or later come to be specifically used by the ego (e.g., the motor apparatus used in action). However, the role of these apparatus for the ego is not limited to their function as tools which the ego at a given time finds at its disposal. We have to assume that differences in the timing or intensity of their growth enter into the picture of ego development as a partly independent variable; e.g., the timing of the appearance of grasping, of walking, of the motor aspect of speech. Neither does it seem unlikely that the congenital motor equipment is among the factors which right from birth on tend to modify certain attitudes of the developing ego. The presence of such factors in all aspects of the child's behavior makes them also an essential element in the development of his self-experience" (121).

"The autonomous factor of ego development...may or may not, in the course of development, remain in the non-conflictual sphere of the ego. Concerning their relation with the drives—which does not necessarily coincide with their relation with conflict—we know from clinical experience that they may secondarily come under the influence of the drives, as is the case in sexualization or aggressivization....The autonomous factors may also come to be involved in the ego's defense against instinctual tendencies, against reality, and against the superego. So far we have in analysis mainly been dealing with the intervention of conflict in their development. But it is of considerable interest not only for developmental psychology but also for clinical problems to study the converse influence too: that is, the influences which a child's intelligence, his perceptual and motor equipment, his special gifts, and the development of all these factors have on the timing, intensity, and mode of expression of these conflicts. We know infinitely more, in a systematic way, about the other aspect, the ego's development in consequence of its conflicts with the instinctual drives and with reality. I have only to remind you of the classical contribution of A. Freud in this field. Here I want to touch upon only one side of this complex problem. Through what one could call a 'change of function,' what started in a situation of conflict may secondarily become part of the non-conflictual sphere. Many aims, attitudes, interests, structures of the ego have originated in this way. What developed as a result of defense against an instinctual drive may grow into a more or less independent and more or less structured function. It may come to serve different functions, like adjustment, organization, and so on. To give one example: every reactive character formation, originating in defense against the drives, will gradually take over a wealth of other functions in the framework of the ego. Because we know that the results of this development may be rather stable, or even irreversible in most normal conditions, we may call such functions autonomous, though in a secondary way (in contradistinction to the primary autonomy of the ego I discussed before)" (122-123).
"There are many points concerning the origin of defense mechanisms that we have not yet come to understand. Some elements, according to Freud, may be inherited; but he, of course, does not consider heredity the only factor relevant for their choice or for their development. It seems reasonable to assume that these mechanisms do not originate as defenses in the sense we use the term once the ego as a definable system has evolved. They may originate in other areas, and in some cases these primitive processes may have served different functions, before they are secondarily used for what we specifically call defense in analysis. The problem is to trace the genetic connections between those primordial functions and the defense mechanisms of the ego. Some of these may be modeled after some form of instinctual behavior: introjection, to give but one example, probably exists as a form of instinct gratification before it is used in the service of defense" (124). "...I would like to draw attention not only to those 'innate tendencies conveyed through the id' but also to the at least equal importance of those tendencies that do not originate in the id but in the autonomous preliminary stages of ego formation. It might well be that the ways in which infants deal with stimuli—also those functions of delaying, of postponing discharge mentioned before—are later used by the ego in an active way. We consider this active use for its own purposes of primordial forms of reaction a rather general characteristic of the developed ego." (145).

"We speak of a narcissistic type of personality, of narcissistic object choice, or a narcissistic attitude toward reality, of narcissism as a topographical problem, and so on. The aspects of topography and cathexis are fundamental in analytic theory. In his paper 'On Narcissism,' speaking of the relation of narcissism to autoerotism, Freud said that, while autoerotism is primordial, the ego has to develop, does not exist from the start, and therefore something must be added to autoerotism—some new operation in the mind—in order that narcissism may come into being. A few years later (1916-17), he stated that 'narcissism is the universal original condition, out of which object-love develops later,' while even then 'the greatest volume of libido may yet remain within the ego.' At the time when Freud wrote his paper 'On Narcissism,' just the bare outlines of structural psychology had become visible. In the following decade during which the principles of ego psychology were laid down, we find a variety of formulations that I cannot all quote in detail. In some, reference is made to the ego as the original reservoir of libido, but in The Ego and the Id (1923) Freud made it explicit that it was not the ego but the id he had in mind when speaking of this 'original reservoir'; the libido accured to the ego by identification was termed 'secondary narcissism.' The equivalence of narcissism and libidinal cathexes of the ego was and still is widely used in psychoanalytic literature, but in some passages Freud also refers to it as a cathexis of one's own person, of the body, or of the self. In analysis a clear distinction between the terms ego, self, and personality is not always made. But a differentiation of these concepts is essential if we try to look consistently at the problems involved in the light of Freud's structural psychology. But actually, in using the term narcissism, two different sets of opposites often seem to be fused into one. The one refers to the self (one's own person) in contradistinction to the object, the second to the ego (as a psychic system) in contradistinction to other substructures of personality. However, the opposite of object cathexis is not ego cathexis, but cathexis of one's own person, that is, self-cathexis; in speaking of self-cathexis we do not imply whether this cathexis is situated in the id, ego or superego. This formulation takes into account that we actually do find 'narcissism' in all three psychic systems; but in all of these cases there is opposition to (and reciprocity with) object cathexis. It therefore will be clarifying if we define narcissism as the libidinal cathexis not of the ego but of the self...Often, in speaking of ego libido, what we do mean is not that this form of energy cathects the ego, but that it cathects one's own person rather than an object representation." (120-127).
"In the course of that development of analytic theory which led Freud on the one hand to reformulate his ideas on the relations between anxiety and libido, and on the other hand to constitute the ego as a system in its own rights, he came to formulate the thesis that the ego works with desexualized libido. It has been suggested that it is reasonable and fruitful to broaden this hypothesis to include besides desexualized also desaggressivized (sic) energy in the energetic aspect of ego functions. Aggressive as well as sexual energy may be neutralized, and in both cases this process of neutralization takes place through mediation of the ego (and probably already through its autonomous forerunners too). We assume that these neutralized energies are closer to one another than the strictly instinctual energies of the two drives. However, they may retain some of the latter's properties. Theoretical as well as clinical considerations speak in favor of assuming that there are gradations in the neutralization of these energies; that is to say, not all of them are neutral to the same degree...To be able to neutralize considerable amounts of instinctual energy may well be an indication of ego strength. I also want to mention, at least, the clinically well-established fact that the ego's capacity for neutralization is partly dependent on the degree of a more instinctual cathexis being vested in the self." (128-129).

"The question whether all energy at the disposal of the ego originates in the instinctual drives, I am not prepared to answer. Freud thinks that 'nearly all the energy' active in the psychic apparatus comes from the drives, this pointing to the possibility that part of it may have a different origin. But what other sources of mental energy may there be? Several possible answers come to mind, but obviously this question is hard to decide in the present state of our knowledge. It may be that some of the energy originates in what I described before as the autonomous ego. However, all these questions referring to the primordial origin of mental energy lead ultimately back to physiology—as they do in the case of instinctual energy" (130).

"We return to the ego. Regardless of whether its energetic aspect be wholly or only partly traceable to the instinctual drives, we assume that once it is formed it disposes of independent psychic energy, which is just to restate in other terms the character of the ego as a separate psychic system. This is not meant to imply that at any given time the process of transformation of instinctual into neutralized energy comes to an end; this is a continuous process....In speaking of various shades of desexualization or desaggressivization one has to think of two different aspects. One may refer to different modes or conditions of energy, and this energetic aspect of neutralization may partly coincide with the replacement of the primary by the secondary process, which allows of any number of transitional states. We are used to consider the secondary process as a specific characteristic of the ego, but this excludes neither the use, by the ego, of the primary process nor the existence, in the ego, of differences in the degree to which energies are bound. The second angle from which we have to consider those shades of neutralization is the degree to which certain other characteristics of the drives (e.g., their direction, their aims) are still demonstrable (neutralization with respect to the aims)" (130-131).

"A systematic study of ego functions would have to describe them in regard to their aims...and to the means they use in pursuing them; energetically, to the closeness to or remoteness from the drives of the energies with which they operate; and also to the degree of strucutralization and independence they have achieved....today we no longer speak of 'drives of the ego' in the strict sense, since it was realized that all the drives are part of the system id; this change in theory necessitates a reformulation also of the phenomena Freud has in mind in speaking of 'interests.' Among the self-preservation psychic tendencies, we think functions of the system ego to be of foremost importance—which is not to say, of course, that sexual and aggressive id tendencies, some aspects of the principles of regulation, etc., have no part in self-preservation. The group of tendencies which comprises strivings for what is 'useful,' egoism,
self-assertion, etc., should, it seems reasonable, be attributed to the system ego. Among the factors of motivation, they contribute a layer of their own" (134-135).

"What position can we attribute to these interests in present analytic theory? May I first suggest that we term these and similar tendencies 'ego interests,' thus retaining the Freudian name but also implying that we consider part of what he called 'interests' which we have in mind here as belonging to the system ego. They are interests of the ego; their goals are set by the ego, in contradistinction to aims of the id or of the superego. But the special set of tendencies I am referring to is also characterized by the fact that their aims center around one's own person (self)" (136).

"These ego interests are hardly ever unconscious in the technical sense, as are, among the ego functions, in the typical case, the defenses. They are mostly preconscious and may be conscious—but sometimes we meet difficulties in bringing them into consciousness. This often seems to be so because of their closeness to id tendencies underlying them; but I would not dare to decide whether this is always the case" (136).

"Strivings for wealth, for social prestige, or for what is considered 'useful' in another sense, are genetically partly determined by anal, urethral, narcissistic, exhibitionistic, aggressive, etc., id tendencies, and either continue in modified form the directions of these drives or are the results of reactions against them. Obviously, various id tendencies may contribute to the formation of one specific ego interest; and the same id tendency may contribute to the formation of several of them. They are also determined by the superego, by different areas of ego functions, by other ego interests, by a person's relation with reality, by his modes of thinking, or by his synthetic capacities, etc., and the ego is in a certain measure able to achieve a compromise in which the instinctual elements are used for its own aims. The source of the neutralized energy with which the ego interests operate seems not to be confined to the energy of those instinctual strivings out of which or against which they have developed; other neutralized energy may be at their disposal. This is actually implied in thinking of them as sharing the characteristics of the ego as a functionally and energically partly independent system. We may state that many of them (in different degrees) appear to belong to the field of secondary autonomy. As to the comparative dynamic efficacy of the ego interests, what we know about their energic aspects is too small a basis for any definite conclusion" (137-138).

"I have mentioned ego functions opposing each other. Because these contests are clinically not of the same relevance as those between the ego and the id, or the ego and reality, etc., we are not used to thinking of them in terms of conflict. However, we may well describe them as intrasystemic conflicts and thus distinguish them from those other, better-known conflicts that we may designate as intersystemic. The intrasystemic correlations and conflicts in the ego have hardly ever been consistently studied. A case in question is, of course, the relationship between defense and the autonomous functions which I mentioned before. On considering the question of communication or lack of communication between different areas of the ego, I may also quote Freud's statement that the defenses are, in a sense, set apart in the ego. Contrasts in the ego there are many: the ego has from its start the tendency to oppose the drives, but one of its main functions is also to help them toward gratification; it is a place where insight is gained, but also of rationalization; it promotes objective knowledge of reality, but at the same time, by way of identification and social adjustment, takes over in the course of its development the conventional prejudices of the environment; it pursues its independent aims, but it is also characteristic of it to consider the demands of the other substructures of personality, etc. Of course it is true that ego functions have some general characteristics in common, some of which I mentioned today, and which distinguish
them from the id functions. But many misunderstandings and unclarities are traceable to the fact that we have not yet trained ourselves to consider the ego from an intrasystemic point of view. One speaks of 'the ego' as being rational, or realistic, or an integrator, while actually these are characteristics only of one or the other of its functions. The intrasystemic approach becomes essential if we want to clarify such concepts as 'dominance of the ego,' 'ego control,' or 'ego strength.' All these terms are highly ambiguous, unless we add a differential consideration of the ego functions actually involved in the situations we want to describe" (138-139).

"Strength or weakness of the ego—whether habitual or occasional—has been traced to many factors belonging to the id or the superego and it was pointed out that they are maximally due to the degree to which the ego is not encroached upon by the other systems. However, I would emphasize here that the autonomous aspect of the ego must also be considered. The discussion of a great variety of elements which one has tried to correlate with the degrees of ego strength—like the strength of the drives, narcissism, tolerance or intolerance against unpleasure, anxiety, guilt feelings, etc.—still leaves us with some confusion. Also, as Nunberg said, the answers are valid only for some, narrowly circumscribed, situations. One typical instance of the difficulties involved to which Freud drew attention, is the well-known fact that defense, while demonstrating relative strength of the ego vis-à-vis the drives, may, on the other hand, become the very reason of ego weakness. We have to admit—again as in the case of adaptation—that it seems rather generally true that achievement in one direction may cause disturbance in others. In the present context, I just want to emphasize one approach to the problem; I mean the one of carefully studying the interrelations between the different areas of ego functions, like defense, organization, and the area of autonomy. Whether defense leads to exhaustion of the ego's strength is determined not only by the force of the drive in question and by the defenses at the ego's frontiers but also by the supplies the hinterland can put at its disposal. All definitions of ego strength will prove unsatisfactory as long as they take into account only the relation to the other mental systems and leave out of consideration the intrasystemic factors. Any definition must include, as essential elements, the autonomous functions of the ego, their interdependence and structural hierarchy, and especially whether or how far they are able to withstand impairment through the processes of defense. This is unquestionably one of the main elements of what we mean in speaking of ego strength. It is probably not only a question of the amount and distribution of ego energy available, but also has to be correlated with the degree to which the cathexes of these functions are neutralized" (140-141).

What Hartmann emphasizes in this paper is the intrasystemic aspects of the ego. The overall functioning of the ego is de-emphasized and the ego is viewed in terms of various subsystems and their relation to each other. The relationship of the ego as one system to the id, the superego, and the external world is concomitantly de-emphasized. Here again we can see what ego psychology is all about. Complete attention is focussed on ego operations (whether drive-related or autonomous), ego energies, ego subsystems, and the like, at the expense of a continuing investigation of both id and superego structures.

Hartmann comments on the fact that although Freud's hypotheses are interrelated in a systematic way (there is a hierarchy of hypotheses in their relevance, their closeness to observation, and their degree of verification), it is "...nonetheless true that there exists no comprehensive presentation of analysis from this angle" (269).

"One could not say...that historical studies on specific aspects of analysis abound, even today. But such studies seem to be more needed at the present state of affairs in our field than are summarizing accounts of the main lines of its development, of which there exist quite a few. As to ego psychology, despite the fact that the concept of an ego has been present in analysis since its beginnings, it became a chapter of analysis in its own right comparatively late...Thus for a long time less has been said about the history of the ego psychology, by Freud and by others, than about the history of other chapters of our field. xxxBaxx" (270). In this paper, he speaks not about the future of ego psychology, but about its past history.

"Freud's earliest conception of the ego defines it as an organization with constant cathexis. In the language of physiology, it is a group of neurones, and, where it is psychologically characterized, a group of ideas. We find as early as the 'Project' of 1895 the three approaches to psychology which he was later to call the topographical, the dynamic, and the economic" (272). In this work, "The functions which form the body of the ego concept are set apart from other mental processes. The distinction between primary and secondary process is clearly outlined. One of the functions, defense, became dominant at that time in his clinical research. Other functions studied in this outline--to which all of which Freud's interest returned at various stages of his thinking--include reality testing, perception, memory, thinking, attention, and judgment, among others. The idea of an ego characterized by its functions and its relations to the external world and to other mental processes is present here with the greatest definiteness and has proved to be of lasting value. But, of course, most of the data that were later to fill it with concrete meaning has not yet been discovered; and particularly of the great inner antagonists of the ego, the drives, Freud had in those years only a rather limited knowledge" (272-273).

"A few words about the ancestry of this early ego concept are appropriate here. We know that Freud became familiar with the psychology of Herbart in the gymnasium, though, as Jones says, we have no proof that Freud studied his original writings. At any rate he knew that, according to this author, ideas are the true subject of psychology" (273). "Much broader and more specific...than Herbart's, was, I think, the impact of Meynert on Freud's concept of the ego...Although Meynert's ideas were widely known at the time, they were integrated with clinical experience, freely modified, and assigned their place relative to others in an incomparably broader frame of reference only by Freud. There is but one exception, and that for the first steps only in this momentous transformation and elaboration: that is, Josef Breuer. Freud always admiringly acknowledged Breuer's theoretical contributions to the Studies on Hysteria (1895). Unfortunately for the historian, the respective shares of Freud and Breuer in this essay are not clearly traceable even today. The first layer of Freud's conception of the ego looks, I know, rather forbiddingly 'theoretical,' or maybe 'speculative,' to some and too far removed from clinical usage. This is not quite so; in the 'Project' Freud already allowed an important place to his studies of the dream and of neurosis" (274-276).

"While various functions of the ego are described, more or less occasionally, in the early clinical papers, it is the function of defense that becomes very definitely the focus of interest" (277). "The ego, we remember, was at that time still an organized group of 'ideas.' Certain ideas could be admitted while others were excluded. Although other possibilities were also considered, the assumption
prevailed that this exclusion implied exclusion from consciousness, and thus a
decisive step was taken toward linking the dynamic with the topographical view-
point. Still, it is noteworthy that Freud had already found in 1890 that the
defenses themselves are, or can be, unconscious. It was only much later that
this insight became relevant for a reformulation of his ego psychology" (278).

"The term 'ego' was used at the time in science, and is used also today both out-
side analysis and even inside, in a variety of meanings beyond the one Freud defined.
The expression often points to the subject of experience in contradistinction to
its objects. It is also used to indicate one's own person as against other persons.
For some it is synonymous with what Freud calls the psychic apparatus. Others call 'ego' the awareness (or the 'feeling') of one's own self. Freud did
not use the word in its last-mentioned, that is, in its phenomenological meaning;
for him, the subjective experience of one's self was a function of the ego, but
not the ego. Nor did he accept the meaning I listed first, familiar in epistemology.
Perception and thinking, according to Freud, depend on the ego, but the activities
of the ego can also be objects of perception and thought. But as to some other
meanings of the term, it is obvious that at one time or another they played a
role in Freud's thinking. The ambiguous use of the term, especially its use
to designate not only what we now call the ego as 'system' but at the same time
also the self, and one's own person in contradistinction to others, in-
fluenced Freud's theories only later....." (279).

"Freud's first classical work, The Interpretation of dreams (1900)—in which he
formulated general psychological laws for the first time comprehensively and in
the language of psychology—describes the contributions of the ego to the dream...
These were essential contributions indeed to the psychology of the ego.
But soon afterwards a period of latency, as it were, set in, so far as the develop-
ment of ego psychology was concerned. What were the reasons for Freud's tempo-
rarily receding interest in the ego? Several come to mind, but their respective
influences on the trend of his work at the time are not easy to judge, and
a certain amount of interpretation becomes unavoidable...We know from some
instances, and assume it from others, that his thoughts went through a slow
maturative process, from the moment they occurred to him for the first time until
he gave them their precise explicit place in his work. In some instances the
reasons for such postponements seem easy to grasp, while in others they pose in-
teresting problems...The most obvious reason for his temporary postponement of
ego psychology was no doubt his momentous discoveries of those years in other
fields of analysis. The great superiority of his later ego psychology lies to a
considerable extent in the very fact that his work on the unconscious mind and on
the drives, and his insights into human development, had preceded it" (279-281).
"An accessory reason at that time for Freud's changed attitude toward the study
of the ego was probably that since this concept had originated only partly in
analytic experience, he found it difficult to assign it, certain of its as-
pects, the right place in relation to some of his discoveries in other fields of
mental activity which he owed totally to the psychoanalytic method. And then
it was his avowed endeavor, at least for some time, to study precisely what the
others had neglected. Furthermore, there is no doubt that Freud disliked what
the philosophers had said about the ego and was suspicious of its possible meta-
physical implications" (281-282). "It took more than twenty years after Freud's
early formulation, before ego psychology could be definitely established as a
chapter of psychoanalysis and before the interest of the analyst became equally
distributed between the id, the ego, and the superego. As is the case with the
theory of drives, we can thus describe three consecutive phases in the develop-
ment of Freud's concepts. Neither here nor in instinct theory, though are these
phases sharply demarcated...At the turning point from the first to the second
phase Freud did not explicitly revoke what he had previously stated about the
aspects of the ego closest to the later 'system' ego, but the change in accent
is obvious. Under the impact of the unparalleled series of discoveries on the
unconscious mind, on sexuality and its ontogenesis, and of others, all mainly
in the realm of what was later to be called the id, ego psychology came gradually

to be looked upon by analysts as a field somehow outside real analysis and became quite unpopular... But even in the intervening second stage, when the direct approach to the ego was in the background, changes in the conception of the ego took place as a kind of secondary effect of the developing clinical and theoretical and technical principles" (282-283).

"The introduction of 'reaction formation' and 'sublimation' went a long way toward clarifying the role of the ego, although it was only twenty years later that 'sublimation' was linked in a much broader sense with ego function in general...

...The most penetrating analysis of a psychotic patient in existence, the Schreber case (1911), contains, in line with Freud's style of case history writing, a great wealth of theoretical thinking beyond its clinical contributions. It gives us, among other things, an extremely interesting insight into the interactions of libido and ego. At one point in this paper he noted, in addition to the possible effect of libido disturbances on ego cathexes, the secondary or induced disturbance of libidinal processes as a result of abnormal modifications of the ego. Such formulations were exceptions at the time, but exceptions like this one deserve our interest because they sometimes announce later developments. Like an anticipation of an ego psychology that was still to come is the important paper of the 'Two Principles' (1911), which clearly traces the development of specific ego functions. It represented a major step forward, beyond what Freud had long known about the specific relations of ego and reality. However, from the point of view of explicit conceptualization, with which we are primarily concerned here, the paper mostly deals not with the development of 'the ego' but with the ego drives and the impact of the reality principle on them (in contradistinction to its influence on the sexual drives.) Only later did it become evident that this problem of the relations between dynamics, function, and structure had to be solved in a systematic way. In the second decade of this century the role of the ego as an agent in its own right, in contradistinction to the drives, was at its lowest point. The ego was seen not only as a satellite of the instinctual drives but, at times, as close to an eclipse" (284-285).

"...not long afterward, Freud made an attempt to differentiate those 'other energies active in the ego' from the libidinal ones, at least as to some ego tendencies... He asked: what are the conceptual differences between egoism and narcissism? Egoism, he answered, is the individual's aiming at advantage, while if one says 'narcissism,' one thinks also of the libidinal gratifications which are implied. Narcissism is thus the libidinal complement to egoism. He added that one can go a considerable way in tracing the two separately as motivational forces. With these statements Freud opened a wide field of potential research, but unfortunately he did not conceptualize it in his later, more systematic, exposition of ego psychology" (286).

"I mentioned that in the period we are dealing with the interest in that concept of the ego which, in anticipation of things to come, we may refer to as the beginning of the system concept receded and was overshadowed by the interest in the ego's instinctual and particularly libidinal aspects. But I want to repeat that one part of ego psychology that decisively gained from this phase was the developmental aspect, so far as the development of ego functions follows the lead of the consecutive libidinal phases. I must now speak of a modification of Freud's ego concept which seems to derive from the changed approach to ego psychology during that period. I mentioned that Freud, as did others, sometimes used the term ego in more than one sense, and not always in the sense in which it was best defined. Occasionally before, and more often in the phase I am discussing now, the term ego became interchangeable with 'one's own person' or with 'the self.' In most instances it is clear whether Freud referred to the latter (sometimes also to the image of one's self) or to the former; in some it is debatable. However, this usage rather tends to obscure the fact that in the study of the problems I have in mind here (particularly narcissism) two quite different sets of propositions were involved, the one referring to the functions and cathexes..."
of the ego as a system (in contradistinction to the cathexes of different parts of the personality), the other to the opposition of the cathexis of one's own person to that of other persons (objects). The distinction of the concern for one's own person as against that for the objects, on which the distinction of ego drives and object drives had been based, is clearly not the same as that between the ego on the one hand and the other systems of personality on the other hand. Also, it is clear that ego tendencies are very frequently object directed--to mention another difficulty of the earlier theory. At any rate, the term narcissism was at that time used to cover the libidinal cathexis both of the ego and of one's own person. In this usage originated also the frequently found formulation that at the beginning of life all libido is in the ego, part of which is sent out later to cathex the objects. In this case it seems perfectly clear that what Freud thought of was the cathexis of one's own person preceding that of the objects--if for no other reason than that, at least at the time, he did not think that anything comparable to an ego was present at birth. Later, when the system concept of the ego became dominant, Freud corrected his statement that the ego was the original reservoir of libido in The Ego and the Id, 1923--very characteristically, I should think, in a footnote, as if to indicate that what he said was obvious and did not need any further discussion" (146-147).

"As I have indicated elsewhere, Strachey takes up these divergent views as to whether ego or id is the reservoir of libido in an appendix to The Ego and the Id. Although Hartmann doesn't mention it here, Freud went back again to his earlier view that the id was the reservoir of libido in many ways relating to the nature of many war III, 92-2-3]

"When Freud established ego psychology as a legitimate chapter of psychoanalysis, the ego concept he evolved had, then, a long and eventful history. The reasons which prompted this decisive step in the twenties were of various kinds. There was his technical experience, which led him to an increasing emphasis on resistance and on the relations of resistance with defense; there was certainly also the fact, early noticed but so far not fully accounted for, that defenses were mostly unconscious. Another determining factor was his clinical experience with psychoses and with other, though not psychotic, impairments of the ego; another was the great wealth of phenomena that became accessible through his discovery of the conflicts between ego and superego; there was also the insight into the role of unconscious guilt feeling; the difficulties he encountered in using his earlier theory of anxiety; also the importance of the child's conflicts with reality, sometimes paralleling, or being consecutive to, but sometimes also preceding, the conflicts between ego and id; and a number of other factors I will not mention here. As to theoretical reasons, I suppose one decisive reason must have been his understanding that in order to approach more nearly a systematic presentation of mental phenomena--and the trend toward a general psychology has been inherent in psychoanalysis from its inception--the genetic viewpoint has to be supplemented by a structural approach, though Freud never quite explicitly stated this in a general way...The structural hypotheses intended to account for and to organize his psychological experience, and at the same time to determine the direction of future research, are in many ways more operational, more workable, and also, if we may say so, more elegant than Freud's earlier attempts to cover the same, or partly the same, subjects. As was his wont, not all implications of this new level of his thinking were worked out in a systematic way......" (289+289)

"Without wanting to elaborate the point of earlier models, I mention here that in the later concept as in the earliest, the organization of the ego is strongly emphasized, more strongly than in the intermediate phase. The ego is defined as a system of functions--we could and: again defined in this way" (290). "In the structural phase of his theories, Freud emphasized more definitely than in the preceding decades the biological function of the ego. It is highly characteristic of Freud's approach that in tracing the development of the ego he often tried at the same time to account for its phylogenesis. But another point was to become more important: while the drives had often been referred to before as..."
biological aspect' of personality, now the powerful triad of functions: adaptation, control, and integration (synthetic function), attributed to the ego, underscored its significance as a biological agent. To stress the biological role of the ego is not superfluous even today, as the so-called 'culturalist' theories—ratiocinum et extra--tend, I feel, to underrate this aspect. I may mention here that it became even more accentuated in some of Freud's latest papers....The recognition of the synthetic function (not exclusive of, but in addition to, other regulations) made the ego, which had always been considered an organization, now also an organizer of three systems of personality. This has rightly been compared with Cannon's concept of homeostasis, or described as one level of it. Here a harmonizing factor is added to Freud's predilection, just emphasized by Jones, for basing theories on two opposing forces. There is no longer only 'compromise' as result of opposing forces, but intended harmonization by the ego. And, on the speculative level, we find an analogous tendency in the binding power of _Eros_. The equilibrium in Freud's grasp of reality—a prerequisite of this great sign of courage, objectivity—did not allow his biological approach to the ego to be paid for by a neglect of its social or cultural aspects. We may say that he liked to study cultural phenomena in their biological context or significance, and biological phenomena in relation to the sociocultural environment. What is certainly to be called a biological factor, 'the protracted helplessness and dependence of the young of the human species,' promotes the influence of the environmental factors, alongside the early differentiation of the ego from the id, and this also refers to man's capacity for learning. Also the 'value of the object...is enormously enhanced' (Freud—_Inhib._, _Symptoms_, and _Anxiety_). This conception of ego development is at the origin of much of what Ernst Kris has called 'the new environmentalism' in psychoanalysis. It is the theoretical core for the turning to a closer scrutiny of the impact of object relation on development, and of the ego aspect of object relation, in addition to the earliest consideration of the developmental significance of the libidinal phases. Freud's tracing of internal to external danger situations points in the same direction. All this together opened the way to a fruitful integration of data of direct child observation. This is the second step, after the detailed study of anxiety and defense, which went beyond Freud's earlier expectation that it is primarily through the study of psychoses that essential insights into the functions of the ego will be gained" (290-292).

"The reorientation to the problem of anxiety was, of course, a pivotal point in Freud's third phase of ego psychology: the ego was recognized as the only seat of anxiety, and Freud developed this series: anxiety--danger--helplessness (trauma) ( _Inhib._, _Symptoms_, and _Anxiety_). The varieties of anxiety could be correlated with the dependencies of the ego, from the id, from the superego, from the external world, and the typical sequence of danger situations could be traced....But what I must mention is that Freud's concept of the danger signal again adds a new dimension to his ego concept. The _danger_ signal is certainly the best studied example, and one of the most important, of what seems to be a very general feature of the ego: its capacity for anticipation. This, together with the idea of the ego's command of the pleasure-unpleasure principle, sheds new light also on repression and, in a way, also on the relation of the pleasure and reality principles. These formulations, too, would have been unthinkable on the basis of the preceding _Ego_ theories. Through the danger signal, the ego appears dynamically to be in a more significant role than had previously been attributed to it. Freud drew attention to an underrating of the power of the ego that he had found in analytic writings—while often before he had warned against overemphasizing it. Economically, he spoke of _thought_ processes, and soon afterwards the ego processes in _Ego_ general, working, not with instinctual energy, but with a modified form of energy called sublimated or desexualized. This seems to me in a rather radical re-evaluation of the economic role of the ego. Topographically, the unconscious functioning of important parts of the ego is emphasized, which then allows us definitely to assign the mechanisms of defense their true place in the mental structure. The unconscious nature of the resistances, discovered
long before, can now be systematically accounted for, and ego resistances are clearly set apart from other forms of resistances" (292-293).

"Though they drew, of course, on his psychopathological experience, Freud's structural propositions covered the mental life, and its development, of the normal as well as the pathological individual. It has long since been recognized what the study of the normal owes to pathology, but it is also true that in order to understand neurosis and its etiology, we have to understand more completely the psychology of the healthy person, too. We can say that Freud's understanding of specific ego functions and their normal development, of the normal demarcation lines of the psychic systems, and so on, helped him to achieve a better insight into neurosis also" (293).

"We can say that Freud's structural hypotheses represent the closest and most systematic approximation to his early aim of a general psychology. The implications of this for a synthesis of psychoanalytic thought with other fields of knowledge have so far been only partly realized. Again, Freud's works on the ego in this third phase were considered by some, at least for a time, as excessively 'theoretical,' or at least more theoretical than his earlier ones....About the allegedly speculative character of his ego psychology, Freud wrote in the New Introductory Lectures (1926), that for this impression 'the character of the material itself is responsible, and the fact that we are not accustomed to dealing with it" (293-294).

"Of course, there is also the historical fact that in those years which were, in spite of all, years of greatest creativity, Freud developed three comprehensive theories simultaneously. There was, in addition to his new ideas on psychic structure, the introduction of aggression as a primary drive on the same level as sexuality—neither of these theories is more speculative than are many others in analysis; they are interrelated in more than one way. But there are also the far-reaching biological speculations on Eros and the death instinct. These differ from the two other theories, which are part of empirical psychology, in their sweep, and also in their difficulty of validation. The three theories are not always considered separately, and the speculative character which Freud himself attributed to the Eros-Thanatos theory might have cast its shadow on the two others. It is highly interesting that at the same time when Freud, on the level of biological speculation, tried to account for the 'phenomena of life' by the interplay of the two primordial drives, he accentuated for the purposes of empirical psychology the relative independence of the noninstinctual forces of the ego. Obviously, we are confronted here not only with two different terminologies, but also with two different levels of theory formation. It is not always easy to see clearly what refers to one and what to the other, though their distinction is essential. That the difference between the empirical and the speculative theories of drives should be made apparent by using a different nomenclature was suggested recently by Lampl-de Groot (1956) and by Lantos (1955)." (294-295).

"Though Freud's ego theory in its third phase was incomparably more systematic than his previous approaches to the subject, he was far from considering it as completed. We find additions and reformulations in his last papers, especially in one of his greatest, 'Analysis Terminable and Interminable' (1937), and in the Outline (1940). In these, the concept of the ego is not basically altered, although new dimensions are added to it, and the trend toward attributing to the ego greater independence and greater biological significance is enhanced. I will give two examples: the introduction in the former paper of inherited characteristics of the ego seems a radically new departure, if we compare it with what Freud has said on the subject as late as The Ego and the Id. In the Outline, self-preservation is described as a function of the ego—while it is said that it is neglected by the id; which, by the way, clarifies also the difference between the id of the human being and the instincts of the animals" (295).

The field that the psychoanalytic theory of instincts, or drives, is meant to cover is not too well defined... It seems, therefore, advisable to review, from time to time, the place of this theory in the whole of psychoanalysis, particularly in view of the ways in which analysis has developed so far.... Despite incomplete attempts toward a more or less systematic presentation, we may say that even at present an understanding of analysis is hardly possible without a detailed knowledge of its history" (69). Hartmann's aim in this paper is limited "to a discussion of a few aspects of the theory of instincts... If what we call in analysis actually differs in some respects from most definitions of instinct used by biologists, this is no doubt partly due to the fact that Freud's immediate and main interest was in human psychology, while the observational data of the biologists pertain mainly to other species, particularly lower animals, and their findings and hypotheses are from there extrapolated to human beings. A second reason for such differences, closely related to this first one, we find in the specific methods of approach used here and there" (70-71).

"It would be naive to underestimate the positive contribution which the concept of instinctual drive, as defined by Freud, made to the development of analysis.... While there are quite a few questions in the minds of some analysts and others as to the consistency of Freud's theory of instinctual drives, and as to some of its broader implications, there is hardly a doubt as to the fitness of his concept with respect to the methods he used and the field of observation for which it was devised and which it helped to develop. To avoid misunderstanding, I add that here and in the following considerations, I am referring to the concept of drives which we actually encounter in clinical psychoanalytic psychology, omitting Freud's other, mainly biological oriented set of hypotheses of the 'life' and 'death' instincts whose interplay is meant to explain 'the phenomena of life.' These concepts are of a different order, as Freud clearly recognized, and the corresponding hypotheses have to be proved or disproved biologically; also they could account for only one aspect of the psychological problems under consideration here, and so far have not added much to our understanding of the specific functions of drives (in the psychological sense) in contradistinction to other psychic functions. Freud defined an instinctual drive in the former sense as having an impetus, an aim, an object, and a source. He speaks of an instinct as a demand made on the mental apparatus by the body; however, even at the comparatively early stage of theory formation in which he introduced this formulation [Instincts and their Vicissitudes, 1915], he occasionally looked upon drives not only as factors acting on the mental apparatus 'from without,' but also in a sense as working in the mental apparatus itself. Later he defined their position more closely by including their mental aspect in the functions of the id" (71-72).

"In the field of psychology, the importance of the aims and objects of the drives soon outdistanced by far the importance of their sources, although the sources remain relevant because of their developmental aspects and because insight into the sources may be helpful in classifying the drives. This part of Freud's concept also presents a hope—not the only one—for a future meeting of psychoanalysis with physiology. The interest in the aims became preeminate, particularly because of their wide variability, characteristic of the human species..... The study of the objects of the drives was the first, and still is one basic approach of analysis to the interdependence of individual and environment. It led to a detailed investigation of manifold typical and individual 'situations' in which the person finds himself confronted with reality. Genetically, Freud traced the interrelation of the child's demands on the one hand, through the successive stages of instinctual development." (72-73).

"Though it may already be implied in what I have said, I still want to add explicitly that in order to meet the needs of a dynamic and genetic psychology, it has proved necessary to extend the concept of drives in at least three respects. First, it has to extend beyond them physiological substratum traceable today.

Second; it cannot be limited to the data of external behavior. We must go to the 'sources of inner stability,' as Gardner Murphy has it, who rightly emphasizes that to classify motivation according to external conduct is not too satisfactory, because observable behavior frequently gives no reliable information on which is going on inside. Also, in analysis we are accustomed to basing our conclusions on the interpretation of both internal and external factors.

Third, the concept of drives, which in analysis is necessary not so much to describe as to explain phenomena, has to transcend the phenomenological aspect, which here means the aspect of inner or subjective experience; that is, the conscious phenomena of need, desire, compulsion, etc. Such extensions, though they may seem arbitrary from a more limited approach, are indicated for correlating the variety of aspects psychoanalysis has to take into consideration" (74-75).

"In turning to what biologists call an instinct, I limit myself to a few points. In biology too the views on instincts vary rather widely, even among workers in the same field....Many observers of animal behavior like to emphasize the almost complete rigidity of the instincts....Others have modified these views to a certain extent. They observe that 'intelligence' enters instinctual behavior to a certain degree that varies with the species; also, to a slight degree, from one individual to another. There is also some variability according to the nature of the environment; furthermore, a more systematic knowledge has been gained of instinctual behavior in higher animals, particularly the mammals, and of the role of learning, and has contributed toward modifying the views held by the older school of biologists....At this point we meet again a great many diverging opinions. No longer satisfied with the sweeping generalizations encountered in the older literature, it is difficult to find a definition applicable to both lower animals and man. What in man can be compared to 'instincts,' one author states, consists '...far less essentially in the release of appropriate, inborn, mechanized reflexes, far less essentially in any stereotyped means of achieving certain 'ends,' than in the awareness...of those 'ends,' in the interests in and the desires...for them, in the 'innate determining tendencies' evoked...and in the use of intelligence brought to bear in their achievement....In man, indeed, intelligence has largely usurped the functions of specific inherited behavior' (Mayers, 1945).

With this clear and suggestive statement we may easily agree. It is noteworthy that it uses psychological terms; and indeed the use also of psychological methods of investigation has been advocated by many who have studied the problem of the equivalents of instincts in man. Here and there even a few elements of the psychoanalytic theory of drives have been accepted, but to describe the specific position of the drives in human psychology it is not enough to say that there is a difference of degree between instincts and drives; structural concepts are called for" (76-77).

"Even if one could devise a definition which covers everything that biologists, psychologists, psychoanalysts, and philosophers call an instinct, the expectation that this most general concept would be the one best suited, let us say, for the biological or for the analytic approach would have to be proved. Some degree of differentiation, according to the field, might be found useful....Equating instinct and drive, though stimulating in some respects, has proved misleading in other. As to terminology, Freud used the word Trieb, in contradistinction to the word Instinkt, used in biology. Freud's translators did not deem it important to make an analogous distinction. However, it was often said by analysts, as well as by others, that it would help toward clarification if the acceptance of the respective factual and conceptual differences were followed by a terminological differentiation, and it was suggested to speak in analysis of drives, or of instinctual drives or instinctual urges. Accustomed to the older term, we all sometimes use 'instinct' where 'instinctual drive' would be more appropriate. Of course, this terminological habit would have no importance if it were not for its possible theoretical implications" (79).
"Let us view the problem this time from the angle of structural psychology. Psychoanalytic psychology has frequently been considered a psychology of drives only. This opinion, held by many, is incorrect, even more so in the later than it was in the earlier stage of psychoanalytic development. It does not correspond to the psychological theory of analysis to include all aspects of mental functions in the psychology of drives, not even, strictly speaking, in a genetic sense—and in this connection I refer the reader to some statements about an autonomous aspect of ego development in Freud's last writings [Anal. Term. and Intern]. This portion of his work is still partly in that phase of latency through which many of his important discoveries had to pass before being generally recognized, even among analysts. Energetically, we may well say that the id, the realm of the drives, is the most important reservoir of psychic energy; still, we assume that once the differentiation into three mental systems has taken place each one of these systems dispenses psychic energy. We describe the systems also as to the forms and conditions of energy they use. Of the forms and conditions of the energy used, of their origin, and their interchange, suffice it to say that the momentum to activity, the dynamic and energetic aspects apply to all systems of personality, but that we find differences among the id and the ego and the super-ego not only with respect to their organization but also with respect to this momentum. Certainly no thorough insight into psychic structure and into psychic conflicts could have been gained without knowledge of the psychology of the drives. But today we may add the reverse statement: we cannot really understand the functions of these drives without looking at their position in the framework of the psychic structure. Furthermore, the differences between the instincts of lower animals and the drives of man become quite clear only if we take into account what insight into the formation of psychic structure psychoanalysis has developed" (79-80).

"Some years ago (1939) I suggested that it is this very process of structural differentiation to which the differences mentioned between the instinctual behavior of lower animals and the behavior of human beings are mainly due. Obviously many functions, which are taken care of by the instincts in the former, are in man functions of the ego. The characteristic plasticity of man's adaptive behavior, in contradistinction to the relative rigidity of that of lower animals, and his greater learning capacity are outstanding examples of the resulting differences" (81).

"I consider it rather likely that the differentiation of which I spoke/provides us not only with a specific organ of adaptation, the ego; some characteristics of the drives, of the id itself, as we know them in man, may be the result of changes traceable to the same differentiating process. The id, too, does not appear to be a simple extension of the instincts of lower animals. While the ego develops in the direction of an ever closer adjustment to reality, clinical experience shows the drives, the id tendencies, to be far more estranged from reality than the so-called animal instincts generally are, although the instinctual reactions of lower animals are by no means always adaptive....As for the relation of the pleasure principle to self-preservation, one may assume that Freud's statement, '...there is a long way from pleasure principle to self-preservation,' is probably not valid to the same extent in lower animals as it is in human being" (81-82).

"What, then, can we say from our point of view about those psychic functions which actually do serve self-preservation in man? Here we certainly have to mention the drives, sexual as well as aggressive, as they obviously contribute to self-preservation, though it appears that they are much less directly connected with it (and also with preservation of the species) than are the instincts of biology. But I should hesitate to speak of whatever such contributions toward self-preservation there are as constituting an independent and definite drive. Freud at one time made such an attempt and tried to identify this assumed drive with what he called the ego drives, or ego instincts, while
later he included the drives toward self-preservation with the libidinal ones. Actually, in the course of the development of psychoanalytic theory, they gradually more or less lost their status as an independent unit. The tendencies whose aim it is to master the environment and which show a definite relation to self-preservation had a rather indefinite position in the system; today we rather tend to stress the aggressive elements we find in them and the role ego tendencies play in their setup. This may be the place to say a few words about what psychologists call pleasure in functioning (Funktionlust), the pleasure in activities themselves, or in overcoming difficulties, the child's enjoyment in the exercise of a recently learned function (Bühler, 1930), etc., as contrasted with the pleasure we get from the effect of an activity. Its developmentally important role can be traced partly to the fact that through maturation and learning a series of apparatus in the nonconflictual sphere of the ego, and the corresponding activities, become available to the child (Hartmann, 1939).

What is pleasure and what is not parallels at least to some extent the development of the ego, and the potentialities of pleasure gain offered by the evolution of the ego functions play a paramount role in the acceptance of the reality principle. Somewhat similar ideas are expressed in a paper by Hendrick, but I am not convinced that the introduction of what he calls a basic 'instinct to master' is really unavoidable" (83-84).

"It is mainly the ego functions, but also the other factors mentioned, and their interaction with situations the individual has to meet, which we consider when in analysis we speak of self-preservation. To throw all these factors together and to call the sum total a drive for self-preservation does not agree with our concept of drives and obscures rather than clarifies the problem. Whatever the part played by the drives in this setup, there can be no doubt that other important elements participate in it. It is certainly not easy to evaluate the respective strength of the many factors involved. But I should rather agree with what Freud says in his Outline of Psychoanalysis:...: 'The ego has set itself the task of self-preservation, which the id appears to neglect.'" (84-85).

"It is obvious that Freud's approach to the problem of drives has paralleled the growth of psychoanalytic insight and refinement of the method. In the beginning, Freud applied to his material the conventional dichotomy of drives that serve the preservation of the individual (at one point they were identified with the 'ego drives'), and drives that serve the preservation of the species--while being quite aware that this proposition 'is merely a working hypothesis to be retained only so long as it proves useful.' Later, much of what had been called 'ego drives' was ascribed to functioning of the system 'ego,' and all drives were attributed to the system 'id'; also the earlier dualistic theory was gradually abandoned and after some tentative, intermediary, theoretical steps, Freud's main interest was finally centered around another dualism of primary drives, sexuality and aggression" (86).

"Of the psychology of aggression, I will mention only one point which stresses a parallel with libido. While the two drives differ as to the contributions they make to the formation of ego and superego, I think it is true of both drives that their energy can be neutralized in the service of ego and superego. Aggressive energy participates in the development of psychic structure, but the psychic systems, once they are formed, also provide it with specific modes of expression. Reality situations, in man, appeal sometimes to the unmitigated expression of aggression, but in many more cases to its sublimation. Both obviously may be useful for the maintenance of life, but it is of course even more true of aggression than it is of sexuality that its aims often run counter to self-preservation, specifically in the case of that typical expression of aggression, self-destruction. However, if we accept the hypothesis of a neutralized form of aggressive energy working in the ego (which does not represent self-destruction), we can question the far-reaching idea of Freud's which in its strictest sense means that self-destruction is the only alternative to destruction (New Intro. Lec.).

One may say of this idea that, while it occurs historically in the later phases of his thought, it belongs systematically to the prestructural stage of psychoanalytic psychology. May I repeat what I said before: neither the aims of sexuality nor of aggression, as we use these terms today, suffice to account for the mental mechanisms which serve self-preservation in man. But it also has long been recognized that the aims of sexuality are by no means limited to the aim of preserving the species either" (87).

The discussion on the difference between instinct and drive was extended by Hartmann, in an article published with Kris & Loewenstein in 1949: "Notes on theory of aggression." I reviewed this article in my summary of Papers on Psychoanalytic Psychology (pp. 5-7). However, I did not repeat the long quote in that summary on the difference between instinct and drive, since I had already done so in my summary on "Some comments on repression, the oedipus complex, and definition of instincts", page 6.

"Years ago Freud complained that the direct observation of child psychologists are frequently questionable because they describe phenomena not really understood in their relationships and in their dynamic impact—while, on the other hand, the conclusions about childhood which we reach on the basis of analysis with adults have the disadvantage that we gain them only through a complicated system of reconstructions and through many detours of thought. This gap could be closed in part, but not completely, by child analysis" (99-100).

"In the case of analysis, what its method has made accessible to observation, and in many instances made visible for the first time, is centered in the sphere of conflict. Although there actually is constant interaction between conflictual and nonconflictual development, so far analysts have shed less light on the nonconflictual sphere. In stating that the analytic 'method' opens the way to the developmentally central position of conflict, I should actually have referred to three factors, not only to one, although the three are obviously interrelated. There is, besides the method, in the narrower sense in which we use the word, also the analytic situation, which owes many of its possibilities to the fact that, despite its strict circumscription, it is essentially a real life situation, it is meaningful also as part of the therapeutic process. The third contributing factor is the attitude of the analyst toward the psychological data he uncovers. ...I am thinking particularly of the correction of what in other fields is called the 'personal equation,' that is, of the correction of those potential handicaps of observation traceable to the personality of the observer and to his interference in the field." (100-101).

"All three of the factors which I mentioned are characteristic of analysis, but absent in other psychological methods. Direct observation by nonanalysts of necessity missed many central developmental positions and trends, because it tends to scotomize the child's instinctual and other conflicts, and particularly their unconscious aspects. What often appears as a detail hardly understood and seemingly negligible may become all important if viewed from the angle of analysis" (101).

"Gradients of growth, as established by child psychologists, mainly dealt with the maturational aspects and gave only part of the picture. The comparison and cross-checking of data revealed by the two methods promise more complete understanding. Theories of early developmental stages have to be built on data of both reconstruction and direct observation. It is obvious that I conceive of the problem not as one to be approached by just adding reconstructive data to data of direct observation, but rather as one of meaningful interpenetration. How a conflict hardly accessible to the so-called objective methods may influence the intellectual or motor achievements of a child; how, on the other hand, maturational sequences underlying the intellectual or motor achievement may bear on a child's ego development and his ways of solving conflicts—these can best be seen on the basis of such a comparative study. There is another important aspect to this. Such studies will of necessity lead to a growing awareness of the sign- or signal-function which behavior details may have for the observer, that is, to a better or more systematic understanding of how data of direct observation can be used as indicators of structurally central and partly unconscious developments—in a sense that by far transcends the possibilities of sign interpretation accessible to the various methods of testing....To what I said about the selective nature of every approach, I may now add the fact that there is also a temporary limitation to the use of the analytic method. It does not provide us with data (memories) about the undifferentiated phase during which the demarcation lines between the ego and the id, and between the self and the objects, are not yet drawn; and it does not provide us with direct information on the preverbal stage. Direct observation here helps first of all to discard hypotheses which are not consistent with behavioral data. But it is equally relevant in giving positive cues for the formulation of our developmental propositions. Again, the importance
of this factor has to do with the genetic character of so many analytic propositions. Analytic concepts, in striking contradistinction to those of most other branches of psychology, are frequently genetic in nature. They encompass mental phenomena which have a common origin rather than being merely descriptive. For instance, our typologies, oral character, anal character, etc., are defined by the genetic predominance of certain factors but nevertheless may comprise elements that are contradictory in a descriptive sense—greediness and wastefulness, sadism and pity, and so forth. This approach proves superior because it allows us to evaluate the dynamic potentialities of such characteristics, and thus to make more reliable predictions. It is this genetic nature of analytic thinking that finds itself handicapped by the temporary limitations set by the analytic method and which challenges us to extend our insight beyond these borders.

This extension can proceed along the lines of extrapolation of analytic findings to the preverbal stage, which may be described in terms of basic concepts derived from the study of later stages of development; or it can be done by direct but analytically informed observation." (102-103).

"From what I said it is clear that today we attribute a significant position to this comparatively recent direction of research in analysis. We come to the conclusion that psychoanalytic psychology is not limited to what can be gained through the use of psychoanalytic methods; and, second, that the meaning we give to analysis transcends its psychiatric aspects. Analysis is also, and has always been in Freud's work, a general psychology....That the study of normal behavior is an essential element of analysis is particularly clear in that aspect which we are discussing today" (103-104).

"Strictly speaking, how sound our general statements and our predictions can be depends in the last resort here, as in other fields, on how far a general theory can be developed, and this, in the case of analysis, can only mean a theory dealing with normal as well as pathological development. The description of several typical stages of libidinal development, and of their relations to aims, attitudes toward objects, modes of action, etc., was Freud's first approach to finding a frame of reference for a greater variety of data on growth as well as development—after a short, rather 'environmentalist' phase, in which Freud had considerably overemphasized the generality and developmental significance of actual seduction of children by adults. He was able to describe individual deviations in their relations to typical sequences. These stages depend to a certain extent on physiological growth; Freud mentions the development of the teeth, or the anal sphincter muscles, as cases in point. However, while representing steps in maturation, they also show some degree of plasticity vis-a-vis environmental influences, as all Anlage factors do. And beyond this, the meaning of these biological sequences for the sphere of object relations, and the importance of object relations in the biological context—that is, the mutual influence of inner and outer stimuli—have held a central position in analysis from the very first" (104).

"What we imply in speaking of these phases is actually not always really limited to libidinal positions and their derivatives, or to their interactions with the objects or other environmental factors. We are aware that one cannot describe cross-sections of development in terms of the inner and outer vicissitudes of the sexual drives only. It is important to describe them also in terms of the involvements of other, partly independent variables, one being the vicissitudes of the aggressive drives. This already constitutes a material broadening and differentiation of the developmental frame of reference we use. A further step was made possible by a more detailed and more systematic study of the ego. And again, what we find here is the closest interaction with object relations: while the development of object relations is codetermined by ego development, object relations are also one of the main factors that determine the development of the ego...Actually, the new level of ego psychology has proved decisive for analysts' renewed interest in problems of developmental psychology and for a more systematic correlation of reconstructive data with those of direct observation; moreover in regard to practical questions such as prevention or education,
it has demonstrated its ability to overcome certain limitations inherent in the
earlier approach" (105).

"Ego development, like libido development, is partly based on processes of matura-
tion. And in regard to the ego aspect, too, some of us are agreed that we have to
consider it as a partly primary, independent variable, not entirely traceable
to the interaction of drives and environment; also that it partly can become
independent from the drives in a secondary way. That is what I mean by the terms
primary and secondary autonomy in ego development... The point I want to make here
is that the ego as well as the two primary drives appear to be partly independent
variables. But while we may, or even must, isolate one or the other aspect for
purposes of research or of presentation, we shall not forget that only all these
aspects together can provide a picture of an individual's development as we see
it in analysis" (105-106).

"Among the functions of the ego most systematically studied in relation to the
drives and to reality are no doubt the mechanisms of defense (A. Freud, 193b).
Still, certain aspects of their psychology confront us with unsolved problems.
A chronology of defense mechanisms has been attempted, but so far only its bare
outlines are visible; and we know little about the factors which determine the
individual choice of defense methods. Here I only want to point to the possibility
of approaching these problems by observing in children such primitive functions
of the autonomous ego which we may consider the first developmental elements of
what later will be used in the process of defense... It is likely that the methods
by which infants deal with stimuli are later used by the ego in an active way,
and especially for defense. This may add to our understanding of the choice of
defense mechanisms, and maybe also of their chronology. But such autonomous
factors are relevant not only for the understanding of the 'negative' aspects of
defense. Factors in the conflict-free sphere also codetermine other aspects of
the methods by which instinctual stimuli are dealt--their neutralization, their
utilization for a variety of ego functions, and so forth--and thus influence in
many ways individual modes of solving conflicts" (106-107).

**Footnote:** "I want to mention that our clinically necessary and fruitful
focusing on the problems of conflict between the psychic systems often leads
us to confound a part for the whole; e.g., we speak of the involvements of
'the ego' or of 'ego development', where, for the purpose of developmental studies,
a differential consideration of various ego functions would be indicated.
What I say is in a sense already implied in a warning by Freud [Enxi, Sym. & Anx.]
not to confuse the ego and the id as if they were two opposing camps.
Similarly, it would often be feasible and useful to replace the global use of
terms like 'precocious' or 'retarded ego development' by more detailed statements
specifying what ego functions have actually undergone a precocious or retarded
development in relation to the drives and in relation to one another. Influences
acting on the ego's development do not always exert a parallel effect on all of its functions in the sense of
developing or retarding them" (107).

"To what I said before about developmental phases in general, I may add here
that the crucial phases of maturation coincide, as a rule, to a large extent also
with the crucial phases as viewed from the angle of environmental influence. For
the case of libido development, the crucial anal, or the crucial phallic phase has
a maturational aspect, but is equally defined by the prohibitions and demands of
the environment coinciding with it. The same is true of the crucial steps in
ego development. The average interactions of the child's growth and development,
of the psychological characteristics of the relevant figures in his environment,
and of the cultural equipment they use in dealing with the child's needs, result
in the features typical of the phases in question; the concept of the 'phase' here
being used in the broader sense I mentioned before. They are the outcome of a
variety of developmental trends, of their chronology and their intensity, which
on the average converge at a given time and in a specific way, and all of these aspects must be described" (108).

"We should not be too surprised if features we are used to consider as characteristics of a certain phase may occasionally appear earlier; that is, before the main elements of the phase to which we are used to relate these features have become dominant. Thus phenomena may make a precocious appearance, which, as a rule, would be reserved to the influence of the phase-specific conflicts. This may be the case if some aspects of the ego have precociously developed because of some factors in the autonomous sphere, because of early and intense identifications, because of an atypical development of the body ego, or because of a number of other reasons. The particular feature that results may resemble what in other cases is the outcome of later maturational or environmental sequences. Reaction formations, like orderliness or cleanliness, displacements, generalized attitudes, which we are accustomed to find correlated with the anal phase, may then appear before problems of anality have come to dominate the child's life. Empirical evidence in this field is unfortunately scarce so far, but some observations seem to suggest this interpretation" (109).

"The phase concept just outlined contains one fundamental approach of analysis to child psychology. Another one is the principle of phase specificity. Obviously we find 'phallic' experiences also on the oral level, and 'oral' experiences also on the phallic level. But we see, in analysis, quite generally that the importance of factors of any kind which affect development depends to a large extent on the specific phase in which they occur. This, as you know, is also one general principle of development physiology or embryology. Here we find that there is a critical period for every experimental interference" (109-110).

"It appears to me desirable to note clearly the differences between these two possibilities: (1) the case in which phase-specific vulnerability (and its eventual expression in specific symptoms) is mainly determined by what happened in earlier stages; and (2) the case in which both the vulnerability in question and its main determinants are specific of the phase in which they occur. This may help us to distinguish more clearly the specific features of a given phase from its genetic determinants; it may help us to differentiate more clearly the element of genetic continuity from the element of phase specificity. It also should prevent us from describing what is actually a specific disposition of a later phase as characteristics of its genetic antecedents, as is widely done in some analytic writings; the interpretation of very early object relations in terms of specific features of the oedipal phase, or of early prohibiting functions of the ego in terms specific of the superego being cases in point" (110-111).

"I want to mention that, in reaction to our working with many variables and with complicated causal relations, we find today in the periphery of analysis, as in certain trends in child psychology, or, for that matter, in anthropology, a growing number of rash generalizations and simplifying propositions. Out of that great variety of factors which our experience has taught us to consider, one or the other only is selected and is made the basis of 'new' theories. We may refer to such simplifications as 'theories by reduction.' They see one specific phase, or one specific measure of infant training, as the sole causative factor for a character type or for general lack of adjustment. Or they see the fact that the mother has not been constantly 'good' to the infant as responsible for all the ills that can befall a human being. That an infant has or has not been nursed according to certain principles is brought into direct and unilinear causal relation with the later personality type, etc. The elements of the propositions are, if you wish, 'analytic,' but the use made of them is certainly not. Do not misunderstand me. All those factors are relevant and may be isolated for certain purposes. However, what our approach shows us about the whole of a person's development is a rather different picture. We see a complex interdependence of a great variety of developmental factors and a branching out of many alternatives on every subsequent developmental stage" (111-112).
If the infant finds himself in a situation of need, and if attempts toward hallucinatory gratification have proved disappointing, he will turn toward reality, and the repetition of such situations will gradually teach him better to know reality and to strive for those real changes that make gratification possible. That is what Freud says in the 'Two Principles' (1911). It gives us a solid basis and point of departure for the following considerations. In the case described, the first step, the turning toward reality in search of gratification, simply follows the pleasure principle. We attribute to functions of the ego both the cognition and the purposive change of reality involved in the process. But the reality principle, according to Freud, means also that uncertain pleasure is renounced, with the purpose of ascertaining, in a new way, that an assured pleasure will come later. This clearly presupposes two other ego functions of the greatest importance—postponement and anticipation. Thus the question arises how far does the development of ego functions enter as an independent variable into the processes described by Freud? It is true, we are wont to say that the 'demands of reality' are responsible for them. But this is, of course, a metaphorical way of putting the case; it is correct only if we presuppose the existence of something in the individual that speaks out for reality—a tendency toward self-preservation which, in the mental life of man, we attribute mostly to the ego and to its precursors. The question whether the ego plays a primary role in the institution of the reality principle will be answered differently, according to whether we view the ego as an active agent from the beginning, though only in a limited way (as Freud did in later writings), or as something traceable only to the impact of the interaction of reality and drives (as he did earlier). Freud's formulations of the reality principle vary. In quite a few passages he simply states that the institution of the reality principle is due to the influence of the external world on the individual. And often he describes the reality principle just as one form of regulating mental processes and achieving mastery of part of them. In these definitions it is not traced to the activity of specific mental functions or groups of functions. But I can also quote some passages in which he explicitly describes the influence of the ego on its emergence. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) we read that the substitution of the pleasure principle by the reality principle is due to the 'self-preserving instincts of the ego;' in The Question of Lay Analysis (1926) he says that the ego replaces the pleasure principle, which before then had been the only dominating force, by the reality principle. In the New Introductory Lectures (1932) we find a similar statement. These latter descriptions seem to me to be more in line with what we know about the facts, and more in line also with Freud's later formulations concerning the role of the ego" (242-243).

"In our literature two meanings are currently attached to the term reality principle. Used in one sense, it indicates a tendency to take into account in an adaptive way, in perception, thinking, and action, whatever we consider the 'real' features of an object or a situation. But in another, maybe we could say, narrower sense, we refer primarily to the case in which it represents a tendency to wrest our activities from the immediate need for discharge inherent in the pleasure principle. It is in this sense that we speak of the reality principle as the natural opponent, or at least modifier, of the pleasure principle. This poses a problem. One cannot state in a general way that reality-syntonic behavior curtails pleasure. This would be a quite illegitimate generalization, and not only because—as Freud repeatedly emphasized and I have just quoted—behavior under the guidance of the reality principle is aimed at gaining, in a new way, assured pleasure at a later stage, while giving up momentary pleasure. In this case, its timing determines whether or not discharge is reality syntonic. But beyond this consideration of expected or assured gains, there is also the fact that the activities of the functions that constitute the reality principle can be pleasurable in themselves. I remind you at this point of the pleasurable potentialities of sublimated activities. Organized thought or action, in which postponement is the essence, can become a source of pleasure. While this, at first sight,
seems to complicate things, there is no way denying it; indeed, it becomes perfectly clear if we think of the reality principle in terms of ego functions. If I have emphasized here the double meaning of the term reality principle, it was in order to forestall possible misunderstandings; failure to note the double meaning has occasionally led to a misrepresentation of Freud's thinking on the subject. In opposing reality principle and pleasure principle, he certainly did not mean to negate the pleasures we derive from the world outside; and he repeatedly commented on the advantages the ego provides for instinctual gratifications, aside from its different role as an opponent of the drives" (244-245).

"The reality principle includes postponement of gratification and a temporary toleration of unpleasure. Another source of unpleasurable experiences, and an essential one, 'is to be found in the conflicts and divisions that take place in the mental apparatus' (Freud, Beyond the pleas. prin.) in the course of development. That is, what would have been a pleasurable experience under the other conditions--namely, without the differentiation into ego, id, superego--may now be felt as unpleasure... In the case of postponement of satisfaction and temporary tolerance of unpleasure, the pleasant or unpleasant nature of the elements involved is a 'given thing.' But the second case we could state in only a general way by saying that the conditions themselves on which the pleasurable or unpleasurable characters of a situation rest have been changed. There is no other way of accounting for this than, again, to attribute it to the development of the ego (to which, however, we must add here the development of the superego). These developmental changes in the pleasure conditions, consecutive to ego (and superego) development might, in so far as maturation participates in them, be compared to the changes of pleasure conditions induced by the sequence of libidinal phases" (247-248).

"...it is, of course, not the essential characteristics of the pleasure-unpleasure principle by which we define it (that is, the striving for pleasure and avoiding of unpleasure) that change in the course of development; what does change are the conditions of pleasure and unpleasure. The second reflection relevant at this point brings us back to another aspect of the reality principle. I said earlier that in man the pleasure principle is not a very reliable guide to self-preservation. There are, though, exceptions to this rule; the avoidance of pain (Schmerz), e.g., retains its biological significance. As a very important exception, we might also consider what I am discussing just now. In those situations in which pleasure in one system (id) would induce unpleasure in another one (ego), the child learns to use the danger signal (a dose of unpleasure) to mobilize the pleasure principle and in this way to protect himself (Freud, Inhib., Symp., & Anx.). He will not only use this mechanism against danger from within but also against danger from without. The process is directly guided by the pleasure principle; it is really the pleasure principle that gives this move its power. What interests us in this connection is that through a special device an aspect of the pleasure principle itself (avoidance of unpleasure) is made to serve one of the most essential functions we make use of in our dealings with reality. It is a definite step in development to be distinguished from what I called the reality principle in its narrower sense (the so-called modification of the pleasure principle, meaning postponement of discharge, temporary tolerance of unpleasure)--and I may refer you here to what I said, partly with this case in mind, about the necessity to keep apart the two concepts of the reality principle. Genetically, of course, the use of the pleasure principle I am discussing now is also dependent on the development of the ego, as is the reality principle in the narrower sense" (249-250).

"Summarizing this first part of my paper, I may say: we assume that at birth (and actually before) there exist certain predispositions for future ego functions whose growth will later influence the pleasure and reality principles in a variety of ways. Freud assumes that the tendency to pleasure gain is there from the beginning and that at an early stage it predominates over the tendency
to avoid unpleasure. Both together, however, cannot fully account for the institution of the reality principle, in the sense of postponement of discharge and toleration of unpleasure; we have to assume that the development of ego functions enters the process as an independent variable. At this point, objectification and anticipation begin to play a decisive role. What one could call the pleasure-unpleasure balance (that is, the sum total of pleasurable and unpleasurable elements in a situation, an activity, and so on) will now include, beyond the consideration of the present, also the consideration of the future. The question of whether the accent is on pleasure gain or on avoidance of unpleasure remains relevant for the 'acceptance of the reality principle' as a factor not only developmentally but also individually. According to this, quantitatively identical pleasure-unpleasure balances may produce different reactions. The foresight I spoke about includes judgments on the relations of cause and effect, both as to what happens in outer reality and in the child's mind. Structure later induces, as a new element, a change in the pleasure conditions, as described above. At this point the direct use by the ego of the pleasure principle for the mastery of outer and inner reality becomes important in a specific way. And, as a further step, in the case of the danger signal, an unpleasant feeling is intentionally reproduced by the ego for that very purpose" (250-251).

"The reality principle includes both knowledge of reality and acting in regard to it. Biologically speaking, it is part of what we usually term adaptation" (252).

"First of all, in a general way, maximal utilization of one partial function of those that serve adaptation is not always compatible with the optimal functioning of the whole system. Moreover, if we state, let's say, that a certain thought is reality syntonic in a given situation, this may refer to either one of two meanings. It may mean that the thought is true in the sense that it corresponds to reality. On the other hand, it may also mean that its use, in a given reality situation, leads to a successful mastery of this situation....Developmentally speaking, a degree of avoidance of outer reality, of restrictions of insight, or of denials can often be harmless in the child and even, in certain situations, useful, which, as Anna Freud has explained, in the adult would lead to far more serious consequences. As to inner reality, there is no doubt that withdrawal from insight, the restriction of inner reality testing, in the wake of typical repressions, occurs also in normal development. It appears that later, though less incisive, techniques of compromise in the grownup, which neglect some aspects of reality but nevertheless remain adaptive, are partly built on the early models" (253-253).

"I return once more to the problems of development. We take man's unique learning capacity for granted, but we are impressed again by the complex steps, the detours, one might say, the deviant means necessary to achieve 'acceptance of reality.' It has been said that in man 'there is a long way from pleasure-principle to self-preservation' (Freud), and this may be one reason why so much of adaptive behavior has to be wrung from the pleasure principle. We may now add that this is not the only cause of those complexities. We have to face the fact that what is adaptive in one respect may interfere with adaptation in another....An equilibrium between the various adaptive trends will finally, more or less successfully, be established by experience and by the integrative, or synthetic, or organizing function of the ego, which works on several levels and correlates aspects of mental functioning with each other and with outer reality. However, what I want to emphasize next is that there exist similar discrepancies even in regard to the forms of 'knowledge of reality' itself; also that from the beginning the very ways in which the child acquires knowledge of reality are fraught with instigations to distort it" (254).

"The protracted helplessness of the human child causes a situation in which 'the value of the object...is enormously enhanced' (Freud, Inhib., Symp., & Anx.). One may say that in man the human objects are by far the most important sector
of reality. The dependence upon the object, as is well known, becomes an essential factor in the human child's learning about reality. It is responsible also for typical or individual distortions of the picture of reality which the child develops" (255).

"There is, then, interference with objective cognizance of the world not only through the action of instinctual needs; it may be handicapped also by ego (and superego) functions, even by functions which in other circumstances can lead to adjustment. And, more specifically, there is the case I am discussing here, namely, the taking over by the individual of the picture of reality accepted and taught by the love objects, but also, in a broader sense, of the picture commonly accepted in the culture to which he belongs. The child learns his approach to reality in constant relation to the adult's approach to it. It adjusts to a world which is not only to a considerable extent man-made, but also man-thought. As a consequence, two different criteria of reality develop, and in the world of every individual both play a role." (257).

"Without entering into the philosopher's discussions of what constitutes reality, a few words about how we use the term in analysis may be to the point here. The criteria chiefly used by Freud are those of science, or more correctly, those that find their clearest expression in science. Science strives for validation of its statements concerning reality, it accepts as 'objective' what is verifiable by certain methods. Intersubjectivity plays a role in scientific validation. But 'conventional' or 'socialized knowledge' of reality means, in contrast to scientific knowledge, often not so much what allows inter-subjective validation, but rather what is intersubjectively accepted, to a considerable extent without validation, or attempt at validation. For the child, this means accepted by the objects closest to him. What the mother, according to objective standards, is 'neurotically' afraid of can (but in this second sense only) mean 'real' danger for the child. Incidentally, there is in this socializing of reality knowledge also a tradition-forming element, besides the one recognized in the superego. In our clinical evaluation of 'realistic' behavior we commonly use both concepts of knowledge; in theoretical discussions we mostly refer to the concept of 'objective knowledge.' How the relations between the two concepts of reality knowledge or, maybe we should say, how the criteria of 'truth' about reality evolve, I cannot discuss here in detail. In his stages of rebelliousness the growing individual also rebels against the commonly accepted view of reality. His tendency toward objective knowledge may also muster the help of instinctual drives. However, after having become more autonomous, it may reach a considerable amount of stability. In certain situations the resistance against group contamination can be considered an indication of ego strength. Actually [Footnote: I need hardly remind you that, on the other hand, the inability to conform is very often a pathological nature.] Actually, many factors would have to be considered if we were to study the various types of independent as contrasted with the various types of conforming behavior. My main point here is only that the preponderance of one adaptive ego function may mean the weakness of another one, equally adaptive in itself. The scientific conception of knowledge of reality will never entirely eliminate the other conception except in the case of the scientist, and, even here, only as long as he does scientific work. It is not to be forgotten that much of our 'knowledge' of reality is of the socially accepted kind, with most of our actions based on it. 'Objective' knowledge does not, of course, have to contradict the accepted picture of reality; but it often does. Perhaps the best example of this second case is psychoanalysis, which put objective knowledge into a field where only socially accepted knowledge had existed, and this interfered with conventional thought in a particularly sensitive area" (257-259).

"There are, then, two pictures of reality opposed to the concept of 'objective' reality, which Freud mostly used: the one, as we know, corresponds to what we usually, in a simplifying way, call magical thinking; the other, to a view in which not validation but inter-subjective acceptance is used as a criterion of
reality. Though the two undoubtedly overlap to some degree, nevertheless their structural and economical differences are very significant. (259).

"I spoke of various functions serving the reality principle, such as cognition and action—both obviously adaptive but also occasionally in contradiction with each other. I added that even for knowledge itself at least two different concepts are developmentally significant. These complexities of the reality principle are more easily understood if we think of them in terms of a variety of partly independent ego functions, of their synergisms and antagonisms, and of various states of intrasystemic equilibria. This necessity for considering the specific functions which determine our relations to reality in addition to the more global concept of the reality principle becomes clearest, of course, where these functions are at least partly opposed to each other. Thus, to make my point I had to emphasize this aspect; I do not overlook or underrate the more familiar situations in which they work together in the service of adaptation" (260).

"Scientific thinking, the purest form of objective thinking, gives us a knowledge of reality which is formally but often also materially different from everyday knowledge. I discussed the case of conventional knowledge, but there is still another aspect to this difference. As an attitude, objective thinking presupposes a certain degree of detachment from immediate experience. Freud described thinking in general as a trial activity with small amounts of cathexis. That is, trial is interiorized. Thinking is a detour activity which requires first some detachment from the outer world, in order better to understand, predict, and master it. This detour is necessary for the efficiency of objectivation. Objective thinking is the more essential in man, because his drives are much further removed from adaptive aims than are the instincts of lower animals. I spoke of detachment from immediate experience. This world of immediate experience, which is what we commonly mean in speaking of 'the world we live in,' is not easy to define. Not speaking scientifically, most people would call it the 'real' world. This poses a number of interesting problems. However, what interests us here is only one aspect, namely, the relation of this world to what I said before about 'reality.' On the one hand, it is obviously not what we call an autistic world. On the other hand, the world of exact science certainly does not simply coincide with that 'world' we are considering now. For one thing, the latter contains the element of quality, of color, sound, touch, and taste, while the world of strict science does not. The biological meaning of quality has been accounted for in various ways" (261).

"Specific factors of coherence and organization have entered our everyday perceptual picture of reality, and this is true also of our thinking about reality. That is, data are assimilated in a way which gives us knowledge of the outside but which also tries to give them a meaningful place with respect to our mental functioning. This is based on the structure of our mental apparatus (it certainly has a physiological aspect too), on conscious, preconscious, and unconscious previous experience, and on present mental activity also... This world we are discussing now, different from the world of science, is clearly an important aspect of our relations with reality and it is, particularly as a developmental problem, a very much worth-while subject also of scientific study. The absence of, or rather restrictions on, the capacity to build this world we know as pathological phenomena. It is seen most frequently in schizophrenics that reality becomes meaningless, reduced to 'pure environment,' that they are deprived of the processes which normally give it a place in one's personal world" (262).

"What is commonly called 'reality' outside of science is formed, then, also by the nature of our mental apparatus in general and by our history. A constant process of taking in--assimilation--and putting out is going on in our minds" (262-263).
"In the grownup, a workable equilibrium is normally established between what we here call 'our world' and the objective knowledge of reality. It is workable if the ego is strong enough not to be impinged upon in its essential functions by the id, and strong enough also not to exhaust itself in its struggles against the drives—that is, if those of its functions which serve reality and synthesis have reached a certain degree of autonomy. Reality testing can then function not only in the narrower sense—the distinction between perception and idea, which is normally established rather early in life—but also in the broader sense I mentioned before. However, it does not, of course, always reach out into strictly 'objective' knowledge but mostly balances one element of the 'world of immediate experience,' in the somewhat hazy sense I use the word here, against others. Thus we have actually two organized systems of orientation, the world of science and the world of a more immediate experience. The principles inherent in these organized systems differ; both are 'selective,' though in a different way. There is also, as I have just said, overlapping. The cues to our actions are widely found in the world of immediate experience. There is no doubt that the evolving of this world, though it falls short of exactly reproducing or corresponding to 'objective reality,' is helpful toward developing our relations to it. By assimilating it, we learn to handle it. The transformation, or molding, of data into this more or less coherent world fulfills, then, a necessary function. Here again, we see a compromise formation between two ways of dealing with reality, each one of which is itself adaptive. The coherence of this 'world' is dependent, among other factors, on the ego's capacities for integration, which in dealing with outer reality at the same time consider the state of the mental systems. This is a contribution of the synthetic function to our approach to outer and inner reality. Nunberg (1930) relates the development of causal thinking to the synthetic function. I may add that causal thinking is only one, though an essential, aspect of the processes I have in mind here" (245-264).

"In the foregoing, I have repeatedly referred to inner as against outer reality. I have now to make clear that inner reality is not quite the same thing Freud has in mind in speaking of 'psychic reality,' a concept he used in his explanation that fantasy activities can have the same motivating power as realistic behavior, and that in parts of our mental apparatus reality testing does not exist. In speaking here of 'inner reality,' I am referring to the fact that in a sense all mental functions, tendencies, contents are 'real'; fantasy activity also is real, though not realistic. That is, to recognize that a fantasy is, as a mental act, real does not mean that its contents reproduce reality" (265-266).

"When first used by Freud, 'sublimation' referred to certain cultural or otherwise highly valued achievements and to their derivatives from instinctual sources, which meant at the time sexual sources. These phenomena were also studied as ways to avoid conflict while still achieving discharge, to escape the necessity of repression; their relations to the reaction formations of the latency period, their role in artistic creation was recognized. Partly realized was also their relation to symptom formation on the one hand and symbolization on the other. All this was described by Freud and other analysts before ego psychology had come to be acknowledged as a chapter of psychoanalysis in its own right. Later studies on sublimation tend to emphasize its relations to the build-up of the ego in general and to specific ego functions. As in the case of narcissism, we find in Freud's later work new ideas on the subject which, however, he has not quite explicitly developed or used for a redefinition of 'sublimation' in terms of his more recent work" (216).

"The most common definition refers to sublimation as a deflection of the sexual drives from instinctual aims to aims which are socially or culturally more acceptable or valued. There may also be a change of objects. In this definition, sublimation is actually a special case of displacement, special in the sense that it includes only those displacements that lead to the substitution of worthy aims. The advantage of this approach was that it clearly stated that the highest achievements of man--art, science, religion--may have and often do have their origin in libidinal tendencies. But some authors...have objected to this definition, pointing out quite correctly that it is always questionable to include value judgements in the definition of a mental process--which, of course, does not mean that the function of valuation cannot be made the object of empirical studies....It was, therefore, a reasonable suggestion to eliminate the element of value judgement and to speak of ego-syntonic aims (Bernfeld). This important emendation still left many questions unanswered. We are used to saying that in sublimation egom aims are substituted for instinctual aims, which may be accompanied by a change of objects. But is it really true that it depends only on the aims (and objects) whether or not we can speak of sublimated activities? Here we meet the problem of the relations between sublimation and sexualization. Some definitions of sublimation leave open the question what the differences between the two processes are; or rather, they forget to make this distinction. Clinically, we know that sexualization of ego functions, beyond a certain limit, interferes with proper functioning, while in a large field of human activities successful functioning depends on sublimation" (216-217).

"One could try to relate the difference between sublimation and sexualization to the preponderance of the secondary or the primary process; to the degree to which the functions in question are, or are not, reality-syntonic; to whether suppression of the function can lead to anxiety; to how likely it is that the ego activity changes into direct instinctual gratification, and so on...it seems that a clear presentation of this problem calls for the introduction of meta-psychological concepts. And for the purpose of this discussion we will retain the fact that basing the concept of sublimation on the aims of behavior only will of necessity fall short of a satisfactory definition. We will also realize that one shortcoming of such a definition that makes no distinction between sublimation and sexualization is caused by its neglect of the considerable differences we find in the stability of ego functions, even of those whose instinctual core is very much alike; differences in resistivity against regression and sexualization--that is, its neglect of what I am used to calling degrees of secondary autonomy of the ego...we may say that the stability of sexualized ego functions and their integration are usually less secure and that they more easily follow the pull of regressive tendencies. Developmentally speaking, one main trend can be characterized as away from instinctualization of ego functions toward greater (secondary) autonomy, that is, better protection against instinctualization and regression" (218).
"I think it should greatly facilitate our understanding if we here introduce some distinctions. Speaking of sublimation: quite apart from the specific process of sublimation...there is a difference between the (sublimated) cathexis of an ego function, on the one hand, and the (sublimated) cathexis of the aims toward which this function is directed, and of the objects through which the aims are achieved, on the other hand. The cathexis of objects of thought or action is not identical with the cathexis of the functions of thought or action. Clinically, we know that aims which presuppose a high degree of sublimation may be retained, though the functions are regressively instinctualized (as in sexualisation). This difference holds good also in another respect: we have to distinguish the pleasurable character of an activity from the pleasurable character of its aims....What I want to note here is that some concepts of sublimation referring only to the aims and not to the functions, which are equally important for our understanding of the ego, are less suitable for the advancement of ego psychology. Even today, we know much more about the origin of specific contents of sublimations, of specific goals, or of interests in a given material or subject, etc., than of the role of sublimation in the build-up of ego functions (though here, too, important work has been done), and the genesis of the process of sublimation is far from being clearly understood....we can establish genetic connections of this kind in much of our clinical material. That the child's conflicts, his instinctual behavior and fantasies, and his anxiety reactions at least codetermine the contents of later sublimation was, of course, an important discovery. If one would say—and it has been said—that sublimation is the repetition of an infantile situation, this is certainly in a way true as far as the contents are concerned, though it does not fully clarify what the particular features of sublimation are" (220-221).

"In The Ego and the Id (1923) Freud equates desexualization and sublimation; and thought processes are quite generally subsumed under sublimation. Somewhat later (1926) he stated—again quite generally—that the ego works with desexualized energy [Inhib., Symp., & Anxiety]....Here the stage is reached at which sublimation, as other psychoanalytic concepts before, refers to a psychological process, this process being a change in the mode of energy, away from an instinctual and toward a noninstinctual mode. This formulation eliminates the doubts concerning earlier concepts of sublimation that did not account for the clinically essential differences between sublimation and sexualization. Moreover, we see the relations between displacement and sublimation in a new light; not only the aims are (usually) changed in sublimation, but also the mode of the cathexis is" (222-223).

"That all ego functions are fed by desexualized or sublimated energy (later we will say: by neutralized energy), is indeed only the last touch Freud gave his gradually evolving ideas on the ego, which step by step emphasized its importance in the mental economy....If we agree with Freud's later proposition, we will tend to see in sublimation not a more or less occasional happening but rather a continuous process, which, of course, does not exclude temporary increases or decreases in sublimatory activities" (224).

"We [Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein] have accepted Freud's idea that sublimation of libido is a process by which the ego is provided with energy appropriate to its special needs; that is, the energies the ego uses for its specific functions are as a rule not instinctual, they are desexualized. But is there a parallel to this with aggressive energy? I assume...that the mode of the aggressive energies too can be changed, in a way comparable to desexualization. It also appears that this desaggressivized energy is no less important for the formation and the function of the ego than is desexualized libido. This, then, implies that self-destruction is not the only alternative to aggression being turned outward; neutralization is another alternative. If desexualization is really correlated with defusion of instincts, the possible dangers inherent in such defusion could still be counteracted, as long as the capacity to neutralize aggression is unimpaired. If we further assume that self-preservation is,
in man, to a considerable degree a function of the ego, we will come to the conclusion that it is actually dependent on neutralization" (226).

"We call neutralization the change of both libidinal and aggressive energy away from the instinctual and toward a noninstinctual mode. The process of neutralization is essential in what we usually call sublimation, and it is mostly this aspect I am dealing with in this paper. But what is the relation of the two terms? There are several terminological possibilities. We may continue to speak of sublimation only in the case where neutralization of libido is involved, because this is the way it was meant by Freud and is still dominant in analytic literature. One may also use the word sublimation for the desinstinctualization of both aggression and libido, making it a synonym of neutralization. An alternative suggestion (Kris) would reserve the term for the change of aims, often associated with neutralization. Again, the term is sometimes used for the nondefensive, in contradistinction to the defensive, ego functions, and for their aims and cathexes. This question of nomenclature cannot be too important in itself and, for the purpose of my presentation, a decision between these alternatives does not seem necessary. What I want to remind you of here is just that much of what I said before about 'sublimation' refers to the process now defined as 'neutralization.' (227)

"Both clinical experience and theory point to the probability that there exists a continuum of gradation of energy, from the fully instinctual to the fully neutralized mode (Hartmann, Kris, Rapaport). If we accept this proposition, the next problem would then be what degrees of neutralization are commonly used for certain ego activities. Individual differences, differences as to situation and developmental level, must of course be considered. But some generalizations may be hypothesized...It is not unlikely that differences between instinctual and neutralized energy go most parallel with the differences between primary and secondary process. This would mean that in this respect, too, transitory phases have to be considered" (228-229).

"May I repeat what I said before: that, aside from primary autonomous ego functions, and before the ego has been established as an organization, primordial aims and functions come under the influence of libidinal and aggressive cathexes. In the course of development, their cathexes will be neutralized, and they will gain a certain degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the instinctual drives, which happens in constant interdependence with processes of maturation. Secondary autonomy is certainly dependent on neutralization. But it would be erroneous to assume that every--maybe transitory--cathexis of a function with neutralized energy constitutes autonomy in the sense I use that term (that is, stability of an ego function, or, more precisely, its resistivity to regression and instinc
tualization). Once the ego has accumulated a reservoir of neutralized energy of its own, it will--in interaction with the outer and inner world--develop aims and functions whose cathexis can be derived from this reservoir, which means that they have not always to depend on ad hoc neutralizations. Stating this more completely and with reference to the relationships of the ego and the id (here I do not want to broaden this statement to include interactions with the superego), we may say: the ego accepts some instinctual tendencies and helps them toward gratification, without change of aims or of the mode of energy involved. In other cases, it will substitute ego aims for aims of the id. This can be done in a variety of ways. The ego aims may lie in the direction of id tendencies; they may be opposed to them (counter-cathexis); the third group are those nondefensive aims the ego, as I just said, sets itself in the course of development. Ego aims will normally be fed by neutralized energy and achieve a certain amount of secondary autonomy. But ego aims may, under certain conditions, also be cathexed with instinctual energy--the case we call sexualization and aggressivization. In the first case, in which these aims use neutralized energy, the energy is either drawn from ad hoc acts of neutralization, or provided by the reservoir of neutralized energy at the ego's disposal. We see that the ego gradually gains a comparative independence from immediate outside or inside pressure, a fact that one
is used to considering (though usually not in this terminology) as a general
trend in human development. Thus we may say that while displacements partly
determine the directions neutralization takes, it/also true that neutralizations
can lead to displacements, because, as a rule, different degrees of neutraliza-
tion are not equally well suited for all aims and functions of the ego" (229-230).

"It is well known that in sublimation (neutralization) the ego allows a certain
amount of discharge of the original tendencies, provided that their mode (and,
often, their aims) have been modified. Pleasure gain by sublimation has often
been emphasized by Freud and others. The amount of energy that can be discharged
this way varies in the estimate of different analysts. The fact itself that sublimation provides us with an outlet, in a different mode,
of instinctual impulses has been made the basis for its distinction from reaction
formation" (231-232).

"It sometimes appears from analytic writings that sublimation is used as a word
for the nondefensive achievements of the ego...which points to the dynamically speak-
correct opposition of defensive and nondefensive ego functions....Still it
may be that counter-cathexes can be characterized as also energically differing
from other ego functions, which may, at least partly, explain why, according
to Freud, they are 'set apart' in the ego. As I mentioned before, it is likely
that defense against the drives (counter-cathexis) retains an element (flight)
that allows of their description as being mostly fed by one mode of aggressive
energy, and that this mode is not full neutralization. In this sense, counter-
cathexis in repression appears to be a good example to be contrasted, also as to
the energy it uses, with the nondefensive ego functions" (232).

"The comparative rigidity of the cathexis of some ego functions, as against the
comparative ease with which the cathexis of others is changed, is a
scarcely explored chapter of psychoanalysis. We have learned from Freud the
differences in mobility between primary and secondary processes, and also that,
as a rule, secondary processes are characteristic of the ego functions [footnote
here refers to ego functions use of primary process-Kris]. However, we see that
there are differences in mobility also between various ego functions. We could
try to correlate these differences with degrees of neutralization, and this might
actually be part of the truth—but maybe not the whole truth" (233).

"So far, in opposing defensive and nondefensive ego functions, I have only scant-
tily referred to the fact that there is a defensive aspect to neutralization (or
sublimation) too. Sublimation has often been described as a defense mechanism,
and it is true that it represents one of the most efficient means to deal with
'danger' threatening from the drives. Thus it can be used as defense, though
it is not always and often not only defense, as it takes care, econ-
ically speaking, of the nondefensive functions of the ego too. I may add that even
where it serves defense, sublimation is hardly a 'mechanism' in the usual sense.
If we compare it with other defensive measures, there is also this difference
that the change of instinctual to neutralized energy forms at least one
element of its definition, thus setting sublimation apart from other defense
methods, the concept of none of which refers to a change in the mode of energy.
We may say that the process of neutralization in itself, and in general, can
cserve defensive purposes, far beyond the more special case in which certain
shades of neutralized aggression are used in counter-cathexis" (234-235).

"From what I said, it already clearly appears that neutralization (the change of
purely instinctual striving into a mode of energy more appropriate to the func-
tions of the ego, together with the delay of immediate instinctual discharge,
the control by the ego) plays a decisive part in the mastery of reality. The
formation of constant and independent objects, the institution of the reality
principle, with all its aspects, thinking, action, intentionality, all depend
on neutralization. According to Hart (1948), it is a compromise between instinct
and reality (see also Hendrick). As I said before, if we accept Freud's statement that self-preservation, in man, is mostly taken care of by the ego, we come to understand neutralization also as a powerful help to this central biological aspect of man, not as its opponent as it has occasionally been described. Besides reality testing and the mechanisms of adaptation, the integrating (or synthetic, or organizing) functions share in the maintenance of self-preservation; and they too are not purely instinctual in character but mostly belong to those that work with neutralized energy, though they may be in part genetically traceable to the instincts, as are other neutralizations" (235-236).

"Here I want to add a few words to what was also hinted at before: the possibility that there exist other, noninstinctual sources of neutralized energy. Most of the energy active in the psychic apparatus originates, according to Freud, in the drives. But a later hypothesis of his which may be relevant for this question assumes that there exists a hereditary core not only of instinctual but also of ego functions. I have developed some implications of this idea in my work on the primary autonomy of the ego...which prepares the ground for the possibility just presented: namely that part of the mental energy—how much or how little we can hardly estimate—is not primarily drive energy but belongs from the very first to the ego, or to the inborn precursors of what will later be expanded specific ego functions, and maybe also the those apparatus that gradually come under the influence of the ego and in turn influence its development. It is true that such a hypothesis, though appealing on many grounds, cannot today be proved. But this is equally true of the hypothesis that really all mental energy stems from the drives. Both assumptions lead ultimately back to physiology" (236).

"As mentioned before, it is difficult to ascertain when neutralization starts in the child. It has often been traced to early frustrations and renunciations. Hart (1948) has particularly emphasized that renunciation which comes from love is more likely to promote neutralization than the one which comes from fear. The child's siding with reality demands and the early identifications are no doubt an important step in the use and spreading of neutralization. At any rate, we have to assume that neutralization starts very early, if we follow the lead of Freud's later definition which seems to me the most logical one. It must start even before the ego as a definite system is established and before constant objects are constituted—because it is likely that these achievements already presuppose some degree of neutralization. This also implies that neutralization cannot be assumed to be initiated by the superego, though its secondary relations to the superego are clinically and developmentally of paramount importance" (238).

"To summarize: while conceptualization of 'sublimation' has changed, the most important single factor among several that at one time or another entered its definition is the process of desinstinctualization (neutralization). In adopting a broad concept of neutralization I follow Freud's later formulations on desexualization. It opens the way to many problems essential for the meta-psychology of the ego and of ego-id relationships. Because of obvious reasons, the earlier concepts have not become, and could not become, equally meaningful in this respect. In studies of 'sublimation,' situations that give rise to neutralization, or the genetic determinants of its contents, or the mechanisms that are often connected with it, etc., are sometimes not clearly set apart from the process itself, a neglect which has often led to ambiguities. In this paper I have suggested that we consider, besides the general character of the process, the twofold (or probably trifold) origin of neutralized energy in the two drives (probably also in the ego); the capacity to neutralize which varies individually, according to the developmental level, to the situation, etc.; the incentives to neutralization, under the pressure of the id, under the direction of the ego (and later of the superego); the ontogenesis of neutralization; the neutralized cathexis of aims of the ego, as opposed to that of ego functions; the role of neutralization in the defensive as well as the nondefensive ego functions and the difference of cathexis of these two sets of functions; the
gradations or shades of neutralization, in particular with respect to the various functions they serve; the partly different use of neutralized libido and neutralized aggression; the correlation of neutralization with secondary ego autonomy...

The accent was on the importance of Freud's later concept of desinstinctualization for the psychology of the ego, and, on the other hand, on how our understanding of some aspects of sublimation (neutralization) can benefit by the introduction of ego-psychological propositions" (239-240).


"...when what appears to be the same 'subject' is approached by both sciences (psychoanalysis and sociology), the relevant factors may not be the same, the centers of fruitful interest do not necessarily coincide. The psychoanalyst, for his purposes, may put certain features that interest sociologists into parentheses; sociologists in some fields of social studies may make valid predictions with no consideration of the total personalities of individuals. Such predictions will most likely be correct where social action is predominantly determined by the conscious or preconscious ego, as in rational action, or in action involving such ego interests as we plausibly may assume are present in the average member of a group. An obvious example is economic theory. But there are other social actions and functions where one cannot rely on such simple psychological models if one wishes to make valid predictions. These models will prove a source of failure for the sociologists in matters where functions of the personality other than rational or ego interests come into play in a way which is dynamically relevant and likely to differ from individual to individual." (90-91).

"A mutual reinterpretation of analytic data by sociology, and sociological data by psychoanalysis, presupposes some previous agreement between the two on a definite theory of social action that would make correlation possible. At the beginning of his clear and comprehensive outline, Parsons states that both sociological and analytic theory have a common ground in the frame of reference presented by the theory of social action; yet there is a disproportion or lack of symmetry; social action may be the most basic concept of sociology but it is not the most basic in psychoanalysis, nor is action in general. In psychoanalysis, structurally and genetically, action is derived from more fundamental human properties. No completely systematic analytic theory of action has been achieved or presented up to now, although analytic contributions to the theory of action are important enough to suggest that the sociological theory of action will need and include many aspects of analytic theory, even beyond those that Parsons has recognized as common to both fields" (91-92). (Parsons, T. Psychoanalysis and social structure. Psychoanal. Quart., 19, 1950. Also Parsons, T. and Shils, E. Toward a general theory of action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951.)

"Action, in analysis, is primarily defined by its position in the structure of the personality and the contributions made to its various aspects by the psychic systems. But action is also viewed genetically, and described in relation to the energy factor involved, its motivation, the motor (or other) means of attaining its goal, and with respect to reality" (92).

"Actions in various forms (rational and irrational, utilitarian, moral, reality syntonic, and reality dystonic) can all be studied by analysis in their interrelations and assigned their proper places in the structure of the personality. And the question of the mutual relevance of psychological and sociological data can be solved only by the use of a pluridimensional theory and structural concepts. A point worth emphasizing is that most of what we know in analysis has been gained from a study of social action. Analysis studies human conduct in relation to an environment. In contrast to some other schools of psychology, psychoanalysis includes within its scope of interest the structure of reality. Since human being are by far the most important of real objects, the structure of reality most interesting to analysts is the structure of society. Society is not a projection of unconscious fantasies, though it offers many possibilities..."
for such projection and their study reveals to us the influence of unconscious factors on men's attitudes to society. We must accept social reality as a factor in its own right; certainly most analysts do not attempt to interpret human behavior exclusively in terms of unconscious drives and fantasies. This 'reality aspect' is an intricate topic and has manifold connotations; we are quite aware that the same institution can be used to provide an outlet for a great variety of tendencies. From these considerations, it appears that the intimate analytic study of an individual's interaction with his social environment can be included among the methods of sociology. Analysis has taught us as much about the various family structures as it has about biological human needs. The attention of analysts has been directed to the object relationships of childhood, for these are infinitely more important to the development of personality than those of later life; the general and legitimate prevalence of the genetic point of view among analysts has reinforced this attitude. This is a second point, besides the general theory of action, where psychoanalytic data and hypotheses are indispensable to sociology but in which there has been a divergence of interest between the two fields. This statement in no way denies that our patients' current social environment constantly enters the analytic picture. It simply explains why this aspect has been less energetically studied, and why our knowledge about the current milieu appears less clearly in our largely genetic psychological concepts" (92-93).

"To heed Parson's warning, I repeat that between personality types and institutional structure there is no simple correspondence" (94).

"Modifiability, replaceability, and similar qualities explain why the external behavior and part of the motivation of individuals (who belong to different personality types according to one of the usual typologies) will more frequently be equal in regard to a given institutional structure than we might expect on the basis of such typological diagnosis only—granted that the relation of reality is unimpaired. These qualities tell us more of such possible behavior and motivation than could be learned from a purely typological diagnosis" (94).

"Thus far, I have referred only to such contributions to sociology as may be gathered from the analyst's couch. What the analyst garners from the analytic situation in regard to conscious and unconscious motivation, psychological mechanisms, and attitudes to social reality, he may try, as many analysts have tried, to apply elsewhere in dealing with social phenomena. This 'application' of analysis, as it is often called, to the interpretation of myths or other anthropological data, for example, at first served to demonstrate the presence of certain contents of the id, discovered in analysis proper, in many different ages and forms of civilization. To this same sphere was extended our gradually growing knowledge of the ego's mechanisms of defense. Reconstructions of the past of mankind dealt with prehistoric rather than with historic times. It is not necessary to trace the development of this branch of psychoanalysis; it suffices to say that in his second decisive contribution to this field, the description and explanation of group psychology in terms of structural psychology (1921), Freud again chose for his subject a type of behavior not limited to a definite historical epoch of social organization (Grp. Psych. and the Anal. of the Ego)" (95).

"From this we may see that to deal with specific social structures in specific historical situations our approach cannot only be through an understanding of the unconscious contents and mechanisms; it must be supplemented by a study of their interrelation with the reality aspects of behavior and with the institutional setup. An interpretation, for instance, of group formation in a totalitarian society of our day would not be limited to the categories used by Freud. This is not to imply that an analytic approach to such fields is doomed to failure, but the approach must be modified in the direction of that mutual interpretation of psychological and sociological problems previously discussed. Parsons has sounded..."
a warning also against attempting too 'direct' an explanation of sociological phenomena by the use of psychological categories, and I partly agree. Undoubtedly the work in many of these fields needs a sounder methodological foundation. In approaching problems outside clinical psychoanalysis, many appear to forget what an analyst would hardly forget in his clinical work: we cannot understand human beings independently of the reality in which they live" (95-96).

"Another difficulty is exemplified, for example, in much of the voluminous anthropological literature currently devoted to the investigation of 'national character.' In tackling the infinitely complex phenomena of Western civilizations, into which we have incomparably more detailed extra-anthropological insight than into any primitive culture, the application of the usual methods of anthropology often resembles somewhat a willful turning of a scientific economy of plenty into one of scarcity. From our point of view, the data actually used remain ambiguous so long as they cannot be analyzed with regard to motivational structure, dynamics, orientation to reality, to social reality itself, and to their history. Obviously a concept of 'national character,' as of character in general, should include much more than statements concerning actual behavior; it should, we have a right to expect, tell us about the potentialities of behavior in relevant intrapsychic and external situations. As previously stated, descriptive typologies do not sufficiently reveal such potentialities, for which we should need such dynamic and genetic typologies as are employed in analysis. Though not genetic in our sense, the studies of 'national character' that are based on the investigation of typical childhood situations and emphasize such matters as differences in child rearing represent considerable progress. While not covering all aspects of the problem, Kardiner's concepts of basic personality types appears to be useful in some respects" (96-97).

Footnote to this latter section refers to the article by Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein "Some psychoanalytic comments on culture and personality" published in 1951. I reviewed this article at length in my summary on Papers in Psychoanalytic Psychology by Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein. The paper contained a fairly lengthy attack on some of Fromm's concepts and it appears that this is being hinted at in the paragraph above.