



Footnotes

Chapter IV

¹A personal letter to the author from Fromm, October 14, 1972.
See appendix.

²Ibid.

³Erich Fromm, Beyond the Chains of Illusion (New York, 1962),
p. 12.

⁴Ibid., p. 26.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid., p. 13.

⁷Ibid., p. 16.

⁸Ibid., p. 17.

⁹Erich Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man (New York, 1961), p. vi.

¹⁰Ibid., p. v.

¹¹Ibid., p. 66.

¹²Ibid., pp. 64, 66; cf. Fromm, Beyond the Chains of Illusion,
p. 25.

¹³Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man, p. 80.

¹⁴Sidney Hook, From Hegel to Marx (Ann Arbor, 1962), p. 60.

¹⁵Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man, p. vi.

¹⁶Erich Fromm, "Foreword," Karl Marx: Early Writings, trans. and
ed. Tom B. Bottomore (New York, 1963), p. i.

¹⁷Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man, p. 80.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Ibid.



²¹Ibid., pp. 81-82.

²²Ibid., p. 82.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Quoted in Robert C. Tucker, The Marxian Revolutionary Idea (New York, 1969), p. 182.

²⁶Fromm, "Foreword," Karl Marx: Early Writings, pp. iv-v.

²⁷Tucker, op. cit. (above, note 25), pp. 182-183.

²⁸Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man, p. 83.

²⁹Ibid., p. 5.

³⁰Ibid., p. 3.

³¹Ibid.

³²Ibid., p. 5.

³³Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, Parts I and III, ed. R. Pascal (New York, 1949), p. 14.

³⁴Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man, p. 9.

³⁵"He [Marx] attacks Bauer and his associates for being content to 'proceed from the postulates of philosophy' (i.e., truth, freedom, justice, etc.) instead of criticizing existing social conditions." R. Pascal, "Introduction," The German Ideology, Parts I and III, by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, (New York, 1949), p. xi.

³⁶Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man, p. 13.

³⁷Ibid., p. 15.

³⁸Ibid., p. 12.

³⁹Ibid., p. 13.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 16.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 19.

⁴²Fromm, Beyond the Chains of Illusion, pp. 34-35.



- ⁴³ Karl Marx: Early Writings, trans. and ed. Tom B. Bottomore (New York, 1963), p. 105.
- ⁴⁴ Bertell Ollman, Alienation: Marx's Concept of Man in Capitalist Society (Cambridge, England, 1971), p. 67.
- ⁴⁵ Erich Fromm, "The Application of Humanist Psychoanalysis to Marx's Theory," Socialist Humanism, ed. Erich Fromm (New York, 1965), p. 243.
- ⁴⁶ Hook, op. cit. (above, note 14), pp. 35-36.
- ⁴⁷ Fromm, "The Application of Humanist Psychoanalysis to Marx's Theory," Socialist Humanism, pp. 240-241.
- ⁴⁸ Marx, "Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy," quoted in Fromm, Beyond the Chains of Illusion, p. 103.
- ⁴⁹ Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man, p. 21.
- ⁵⁰ Fromm, Beyond the Chains of Illusion, p. 109.
- ⁵¹ Ibid., p. 110.
- ⁵² Karl Marx: Early Writings, p. 44.
- ⁵³ Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man, pp. 63-64.
- ⁵⁴ Marx and Engels, op. cit. (above, note 33), p. 19.
- ⁵⁵ Ibid.
- ⁵⁶ Ibid.
- ⁵⁷ Ibid.
- ⁵⁸ Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man, p. 23.
- ⁵⁹ Ibid.
- ⁶⁰ Ibid., pp. 23-24.
- ⁶¹ Ibid., p. 24.
- ⁶² Marx and Engels, op. cit. (above, note 33), p. 198.
- ⁶³ Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man, p. 25.
- ⁶⁴ Karl Marx, Capital, I (New York, 1936), p. 668n.
- ⁶⁵ Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man, p. 27.



- 66 Ibid.
- 67 Ibid., p. 26.
- 68 Ibid., p. 29.
- 69 Ibid., p. 30.
- 70 Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man, p. 134.
- 71 Ibid., p. 132.
- 72 Ibid., p. 33n.
- 73 Ibid., p. 37.
- 74 Marx, Capital, I, p. 197.
- 75 Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man, pp. 41-42.
- 76 Ibid., p. 43.
- 77 "Images of Socialism," Voices of Dissent (New York, 1958). p. 31.
- 78 Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man, p. 47.
- 79 Ibid., p. 44.
- 80 Fromm, Beyond the Chains of Illusion, p. 48.
- 81 Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man, p. 49.
- 82 Karl Marx: Early Writings, pp. 82-83.
- 83 Ibid., p. 73.
- 84 Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man, p. 53.
- 85 Ibid., p. 50.
- 86 Karl Marx: Early Writings, p. 76.
- 87 Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man, p. 63
- 88 Ibid., p. 60.
- 89 Ibid., p. 62.



⁹⁰Ibid., p. 68.

⁹¹Ibid.

⁹²Cf. Pascal, op. cit. (above, note 35), p. ix.

⁹³Fromm, "Foreword," Karl Marx: Early Writings, p. iii.

⁹⁴Ibid.

⁹⁵Donald Drew Egbert and Stow Persons, "Terminology and Types of Socialism," Socialism and American Life, ed. Donald Drew Egbert and Stow Persons, I (Princeton, N.J., 1952), pp. 13-14.

⁹⁶Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man, p. 69.

⁹⁷Ibid., p. 79.



CHAPTER V

FROMM'S PROPHETIC MISSION

The completion of the prophet's genesis is achieved in his mission. What began with his initial transformation by re-birth and was given direction and purpose by his vision, comes to maturity in the carrying out of his mission. Mission implies a sender as well as the one who is sent. The prophet is driven by his inner urges to speak out what he has seen and what the people must know. Like a Joan of Arc, he must be faithful to his "voices." Anyone with the prophet's sensitivity who has heard the word of his God cannot fail to respond in carrying out his vocation.

This chapter will discuss three features of Fromm's prophetic mission: (1) Fromm's own description of the general features of the prophetic mission, (2) the evolution of Fromm's particular mission, (3) some comments on the effects of his mission.

General Features of the Prophetic Mission

In his typically introspective style, Fromm has described the prophetic mission as it is exercised by not only himself, but by any social prophet. The prophet's primary purpose is to protest by giving witness to the meaning of his vision. Fromm makes this general purpose more specific by adding that this protest has the further purpose of "awakening" his slumbering audience. The cause of this "sleep" is



illusion, which numbs men's reason, clouds their imagination, and perverts their desires.

The problem Fromm sees for the prophet is that "never has the knowledge of the great ideas produced by the human race been as widespread in the world as it is today, and never were these ideas less effective than they are today."¹

From this analysis of the problem, it is evident that Fromm judges the prophet's mission to be essentially rhetorical--to give effectiveness to knowledge. However, the traditional teaching methods of schools and churches have done little to change men's lives. While principles of love, brotherhood, and the preservation of life are given continuing stress, at the same time unrestricted egotism, hysterical nationalism and the insane mass slaughter of war continue, seemingly, to go unchecked. Fromm explains the reason for this discrepancy.

Ideas do not influence man deeply when they are only taught as ideas and thoughts. Usually when presented in such a way, they change other ideas; new thoughts take the place of old thoughts; new words take the place of old words. Why should it be different? It is exceedingly difficult for a man to be moved by ideas, and to grasp a truth. In order to do that, he needs to overcome deepseated resistances to inertia, fear of being wrong, or of straying away from the herd. Just to become acquainted with other ideas is not enough, even though these ideas in themselves are right and potent. But ideas do have an effect on man if the idea is lived by the one who teaches it; if it is personified by the teacher, if the idea appears in the flesh.²

This opinion that ideas must be lived to be effective reflects the practice of the Hebrew prophets and their symbolic acts. Bruce Vawter observes: "The prophets' lives and deeds could be as filled with



prophecy as their words, for the biblical mind made no real distinction between the two."³ The dramatic effect of example adds another dimension of proof to the prophet's proposal, for it demonstrates to an audience that what is asked of them can be done because it is done.

Prophets do not arise by accident or even by their own wish—"It is the historical situation which makes prophets."⁴ This statement of Fromm's betrays a theory based on the principle that the organic function of society has within it a self-purifying force which by continuing vigilance corrects the evolution of man to his goal of discovering his humanity.

Fromm places the prophetic mission in a setting of conflict. While the prophet's role is to bring life to the world, to stimulate men to change their lives to seek life and to have it more abundantly, the conflict arises over the perpetuation of the prophetic message, and here Fromm introduces the devil factor of the priest. Prophet and priest are, in Fromm's opinion, dialectically opposed.

Prophets appear only at intervals in the history of humanity. They die and leave their message. The message is accepted by millions, it becomes dear to them. This is precisely the reason why the idea becomes exploitable for others who can make use of the attachment of the people to these ideas, for their own purposes—those of ruling and controlling. Let us call the men who make use of the ideas the prophets have announced the priests. The prophets live their ideas. The priests administer them to the people who are attached to the idea. The idea has lost its vitality. It has become a formula. The priests declare that it is very important how the idea is formulated; naturally the formulation becomes always important after the experience is dead; how else could one control people by controlling their thoughts, unless there is the "correct" formulation? The priests



use the idea to organize men, to control them through controlling the proper expression of the idea, and when they have anaesthetized man enough they declare that man is not capable of being awake and of directing his own life, and that they, the priests, act out of duty, or even compassion, when they fulfill the function of directing men who, if left to themselves, are afraid of freedom. It is true not all priests have acted that way, but most of them have, especially those who wielded power.

There are priests not only in religion. There are priests in philosophy and priests in politics. Every philosophical school has its priests. Often they are very learned; it is their business to administer the idea of the original thinker, to impart it, to interpret it, to make it into a museum object and thus to guard it. Then there are the political priests; we have seen enough of them in the last one hundred and fifty years. They have administered the idea of freedom, to protect the economic interests of their social class. In the twentieth century the priests have taken over the administration of the ideas of socialism. While this idea aimed at the liberation and independence of man, the priests declared in one way or another that man was not capable of being free, or at least that he would not be for a long time. Until then they were obliged to take over, and to decide how the idea was to be formulated, and who was a faithful believer and who was not. The priests usually confuse the people because they claim that they are the successors of the prophet, and that they live what they preach. Yet, while a child could see that they live the opposite of what they teach, the great mass of people are brainwashed effectively, and eventually they come to believe that if the priests live in splendour they do so as a sacrifice, because they have to represent the great idea; or if they kill ruthlessly they only do so out of the revolutionary faith.⁵

The ultimate sin of the priests is their lust for power. Their critical weakness is their lack of imagination and their inability to live the ideas of the prophet. To compensate for their weakness they resort to the alienation of language and the bureaucratization of the



imagination. In an effort to control they dogmatize with special attention to rigid formulae. Such dogmatizing permits them to channel thinking and to invoke sanctions against heresy. When thinking is ossified through protective formulae and ideas are treated as museum pieces, men are anaesthetized and abdicate the freedom of thought. Politically, the priesthood stands as the guardian of vested economic interests. Philosophically, the priesthood imparts, interprets, and eventually kills the life of the seminal thought of the original thinker--change, development, refinements are all forbidden.

The glaring inconsistencies of priestly words and priestly behavior are rationalized for a half-slumbering populace. Thus, for example, the Pope, who claims to be the Vicar of Christ, can live amid all the opulence of an oriental monarch, while Jesus lived in poverty and constant contact with the people--"The Son of man has no place to lay his head."⁶ "The Son of man did not come into the world to be served, but to serve and to give his life as a ransom for money."⁷ The same priestly inconsistency was practiced by the Stalinists who could kill so ruthlessly in the name of revolutionary faith.

Leszek Kolakowski describes priesthood not only as a function but as an existential reality:

Priesthood is not merely the cult of the past as seen through contemporary eyes, but the survival of the past in unchanged shape. It is thus not only a certain intellectual attitude to the world, but, indeed, a form of the world's existence, namely, a factual continuation of a reality which no longer is. In the attitude of the jester, on the other hand, there materializes that which is only a possibility and which, in him, becomes real before it becomes factual. For our thought of reality is also part of it, no worse



than the other parts.

We declare ourselves in favor of the philosophy of the jester, that is, for an attitude of negative vigilance in the face of any absolute. We do not do this because we want to argue; in these matters, a choice is an appraisal. We declare ourselves in favor of the non-intellectual values inherent in an attitude the perils and absurdities of which we know. It is the option for a vision of the world that provides prospects for a slow and difficult realignment of the elements in our human action that are most difficult to align; goodness with universal toleration, courage without fanaticism, intelligence without apathy, and hope without blindness. All other fruits of philosophy are of little importance.⁸

Leland M. Griffin also points to the dialectical tension between prophet and priest: "while it is true, as 'prophets' know, that 'man is the only creature who refuses to be what he is' (Camus)—it is also true, as 'priests' learn, that man is inevitably bound to remain what he is."⁹

For prophecy to be heard effectively, it must be shored up by a group or movement. Fromm recognizes this practical necessity as he describes Bertrand Russell's prophecy:

Bertrand Russell has recognized that the idea, even if embodied in one person, gains social significance only if it is embodied in a group. When Abraham argued with God about Sodom's fate, and challenged God's justice he asked that Sodom be spared if there were only ten just men, but not less. If there were less than ten, that is to say, if there were not even the smallest group in which the idea of justice had become embodied, even Abraham could not expect the city to be saved. Bertrand Russell tries to prove that there are the ten who can save the city. That is why he has organized people, has marched with them, and has sat down with them and been carried off with them in police vans. While his voice is a voice in the wilderness it is, nevertheless, not an isolated voice.¹⁰



Since Fromm defines the purpose of the prophetic mission as clearly rhetorical, the obvious question is to whom does he direct his message. John Schaar suggests Fromm is really addressing two audiences.¹¹ Because Fromm's proposal calls for specific concrete reforms of the entire capitalistic system, he speaks to one audience, an elitist group who have either escaped alienation or have overcome it as he has. To them he presents social action programs which supposedly they are capable of implementing. Fromm's other audience consists of the vast numbers of the "alienated crowd." His message to them is his covenant of hope, the promise of the sane society that will allow them to become healed.

The Evolution of Fromm's Mission

The prophet's mission arises out of the historical situation as an answer to particular social ills. The changes for which he has protested testify to the practical function of his principle that protest must meet the needs of the immediate situation. As previously mentioned, Fromm's visions in Freud and Marx came as the direct results of his own psychological quest for answers to problems. His first mature interest was his professional involvement in psychoanalysis. For ten years he accepted the dogmas of the psychoanalytic priesthood, but at the age of thirty-five his prophetic insight led him to reject what he considered to be the dogmatic and ritualistic adherence to sterile Freudian doctrines. His rejection of the movement's authoritarian leadership was perhaps in part prompted by his psychological study of the authoritarian personality.¹² The political climate of Germany around 1930



stimulated him to question whether the majority of the German population who then opposed Nazism, would fight for their democratic ideals if a fight would ever become necessary. His premise was that it is one thing to have an opinion which is subject to change, and another to have a conviction which is rooted in one's essential value system and much less subject to change. Fromm's work did much to stimulate the classic work of T. W. Adorno, et al., The Authoritarian Personality (1950).

Fromm's lectures on authoritarian character structure at the International Institute of Social Research stimulated research on the subject by Abraham H. Maslow who acknowledged Fromm's influence in his article, "The Authoritarian Character Structure," in the Journal of Social Psychology.¹³

Fromm's dissenting character guided him in the founding of various psychoanalytic institutes. With his wife, Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, he founded the Frankfurt Psychoanalytic Institute in 1931 while continuing private practice in Berlin. After coming to the United States in 1934, he allied himself with Karen Horney and Harry Stack Sullivan and in 1941 took part in planning the American Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis.¹⁴ He was made an honorary member of the Association, because, lacking a medical degree, he could not be given active membership. Having originally joined the New York Psychoanalytic Institute after coming to America, he with Horney, Sullivan, and Clara Thompson resigned from that group, and formed the American Institute of Psychoanalysis in the fall of 1941. By the spring of 1943 tension between Fromm and Horney became so severe that the



Horney-led faction succeeded in having Fromm's teaching limited to non-technical courses. This rebuff to Fromm caused Clara Thompson and her students to resign the American Institute of Psychoanalysis as a gesture of their support of Fromm. Later that same year the William Alanson White Psychiatric Foundation reorganized its Washington School of Psychiatry to include Fromm and the others who had resigned from the New York Institute and established a New York branch with Clara Thompson as executive director.

In 1946 Fromm became chairman of faculty and chairman of the training committee. During this time he was also teaching at Bennington College from April to October, and he was away from the Institute on frequent lecture tours. Clara Thompson, executive director of the Institute, had lost her two closest friends. Henry Major, her artist lover, died of lung cancer in the fall of 1948, and Harry Stack Sullivan died the following year. The loss of these two friends led her to lean heavily upon Fromm during these trials. Fromm, however, was facing his own problems. His wife, Henny Garland Fromm, had been suffering from severe crippling arthritis, and finally he had to take her to the warm dry climate of Mexico to ease her pain. Not long after that Mrs. Fromm died. The strain over her long illness had left Fromm physically weakened and brokenhearted. He decided to remain in Mexico to regain his own health.

Fromm's protracted stay in Mexico gave him the opportunity of finding a warm reception at the Medical School of the University of Mexico where he was placed in charge of training psychiatrists in psychoanalysis. At this time he also founded the Mexican Psychoanalytic



Institute. He retired from this position in 1965 and now is an honorary professor of the university.

The effects of Fromm's protest are still being felt by the priests of psychoanalysis. The Crisis in Psychoanalysis (1970) strikes a dissenting note in calling for the end of dogmatism and the liberation of the real meaning of Freud's work.

Fromm's University Teaching

Fromm never accepted a full time university faculty position principally because his interests were too varied and demanding to allow him the time to teach. He was lecturer at Columbia University's International Institute for Social Research 1934-39. He lectured at Bennington College from 1941 to 1949. He and anthropologist Ralph Linton jointly conducted a seminar on social character at Yale in 1948-1949. In 1949 he returned to Yale to deliver the Terry Lectures, which later became the basis of Psychoanalysis and Religion (1950). From 1957-1961 he was guest professor at Michigan State University, and since 1962 he has held guest professorship in psychiatry at New York University. Fromm's popularity as a writer had made him much in demand on college campuses. The faculty lectures plus the general lecture circuit consumed half his working year.

Political protest

Fromm's political protest has been expressed in two ways: by his sponsorship of dissenting journals and by the formation of action groups. In all his activities, Fromm has reacted to the historical situation as he perceived it.



Fromm's serious political involvement began in the early 1950's when he joined the Socialist Party. In the fall of 1953 he was one of the founders of Dissent magazine. This socialist journal was edited by writers of diverse backgrounds and interests, and as Irving Howe, an original editor, described it:

The kind of magazine we had in mind was probably without precedent in the history of American radicalism. Though Dissent was to be devoted to democratic socialism, there would be no editorial or "party line" on political topics. Authors would not be printed merely because they were counted among the faithful. Not only were our pages to be open to undogmatic discussions of problems of socialism, but the very idea of socialism was itself to be treated as essentially problematic rather than a fixed piety.¹⁵

Accepting a wide range of topics and avoiding the customary hortatory agitation, the editors hoped to stimulate reader interest, "We therefore felt that our main task was to deal with socialism in the realm of ideas, to make democratic-radicalism seem relevant to at least part of the American intellectual community."¹⁶ Howe estimated that the title, Dissent, was the most attractive aspect of the magazine for both writers and readers.

The idea of socialism, though it might still elicit their assent, seemed distant, abstract, and academic; what interested them most was analysis, reportage, polemic about American society today, eventuating in a sustained radical criticism of its claims and pretensions.¹⁷

In 1957 Fromm became one of the founders of the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE), whose name was suggested by Fromm's The Sane Society. This period was the last years of the Eisenhower administration. Cold War tensions were building as the arms race became more intense. Fromm's concern for American and foreign nuclear policy led



him to join David Riesman in lobbying efforts in Washington and elsewhere between 1958 and 1961.¹⁸

Fromm, along with Norman Thomas, A. J. Muste, and David Riesman, assisted by Robert Gilmore of the New York Friends, was one of the principal founders of the Committee for Correspondence.¹⁹ The group acknowledged that common fear of the wiping out of civilization and life on earth had brought them together. As a group they sought alternatives other than the choice between annihilation or surrender. The purpose of the Committee was summarized in a paper written by Roger Hagan, an editor of the Committee's newsletter. In the paper he called for ". . . a new kind of politics upon the American scene which would 'create a climate of new boldness,' revive the prophetic tradition which has strong roots in this country; and he suggested that the peace movement to be vigorous, must be wedded to this new politics."²⁰

Griffin describes the membership.

The committee's original membership (made up of "leading pacifists," "one or two labor intellectuals," and a "growing group of academicians") included among others, David Riesman, Michael Maccoby, William Davidon, Erich Fromm, Robert Gilmore, H. Stuart Hughes, Sidney Lens, Stewart Meacham, A. J. Muste, Clarence Pickett, Robert Pickus, Mark Raskin, Mulford Sibley, and Harold Taylor.²¹

Through the Committee of Correspondence Fromm became involved in planning the Bear Mountain Conference. This meeting held in upper New York State, March 10-13, 1961, attempted to reach out to a broader spectrum of intellectual convictions than the Committee itself embraced. Again Riesman and Gilmore, along with Hagan, joined Fromm in the



planning.

The conference published a statement under the signature of forty-seven subscribers. Included were Kenneth Boulding, Lewis Coser, W. H. Ferry, Paul Goodman, Michael Harrington, Mark Harris, S. I. Hayakawa, Robert Heilbroner, Hallock Hoffman, Robert Maynard Hutchins, Alexander Meiklejohn, Seymour Melman, Walter Millis, Herbert Muller, Lewis Mumford, Charles Osgood, Marcus Raskin, Kenneth Rexroth, I. A. Richards, and other notable intellectuals.²²

The Committee began a newsletter, "which Riesman put out almost single-handed—using a ditto machine, and taking his material from letters which had flooded in, in reaction to the Bear Mountain Statement."²³ According to Riesman's report, this newsletter "Fromm supported through his writings financially and in every other way."²⁴

Besides Dissent, Fromm sponsored two other radical journals, Studies on the Left (1960) and New Politics: A Journal of Socialist Thought (1961). Both aimed at a limited intellectual audience in whom they hoped to revive radical thought and a belief in the "new politics." New Politics, it should be noted, in its first volume published Lewis Feuer's "What is Alienation? A Career of a Concept,"²⁵ which developed a comprehensive political history of the term. The publication of this article seems to indicate that the editors of New Politics intended "alienation" to be a key concept in reviving radicalism and the new politics.

During the same period, a new movement called "Humanistic Psychology" was being supported by a newly formed association which published a Journal of Humanistic Psychology (1961). Abraham Maslow



was the leading spirit, and Fromm, together with Kurt Goldstein, Karen Horney, and Gordon Allport were among those who inspired Maslow. This movement, although not immediately political, had as its goal the attempt to "open up the vast and crucial inner life of man."²⁶ This orientation was an obvious reaction to the positivist-mechanistic trend in psychology which Fromm opposes so strongly.

Another incident involving Fromm is recalled by Riesman, who remarks about Fromm's courageous stand in the face of formidable opposition:

I recall a Daedalus Arms Control Conference in 1960, where we [Riesman and Fromm] were opposed by such then influential people as Edward Teller, and a number of others who have since changed their positions. Not only was Fromm utterly intrepid in holding on to his views no matter what arguments could be brought against them by extremely intelligent people, but he also would never give up--he always had that basic sanguinity that it made sense to keep trying. This had a great influence on me, and I think on others, too.²⁷

Fromm and Riesman had worked together previously in 1948, joining Norman Thomas, Hannah Arendt, and others in trying to create a bi-national state in Palestine. Fromm's rich understanding of Jewish tradition allowed him to work with Martin Buber and other leading theologians of the new Palestine movement.

In 1960, Fromm drafted Let Man Prevail: A Socialist Manifesto and Program, which defined very succinctly Fromm's analysis of the social ills of capitalism and proposed both short and long range goals for a new humanistic socialism. In the Manifesto Fromm wrote:

Socialists have a vision and say: This is what we want; this is what we strive for; it is not the absolute and final form of life, but it is



a much better, more human form of life.
It is the realization of the ideals of
humanism which have inspired the greatest
achievements of Western and Eastern culture.²⁸

This statement was submitted to the Special Program Committee of the Socialist Party-Social Democratic Federation, a committee charged with re-examining traditional concepts and stimulating new ideas and proposals. The Special Committee registered a mixture of agreement and dissent over Fromm's statement. Darlington Hoopes, National Chairman of SP-SDF, in his preface to the statement published by The Call Association in New York, recommended it to party members and others "for your thoughtful consideration."²⁹

Fromm reflected some years later on his attitude toward the

Manifesto:

I wrote a Socialist Manifesto, which was meant to be a draft for a program of the Socialist Party in the United States at a time when I had hopes that the Socialist Party might come to life again by representing Humanist Socialism.³⁰

However, the hopes of 1960 were not fulfilled: "This hope turned out to be an illusion and in fact I resigned from the party a year ago."³¹ This resignation was in 1971.

Fromm's prophetic mission is exemplified in still another area--the prophetic imprimatur, placing his ethical stamp of approval on books by authoring their "forewords." The particular books for which Fromm has written "forewords" indicate the wide range of his concern and the ethical strength of his name. Included in the list are Patrick Mullanahy's Oedipus Myth and Complex (1948), Helen Walker Puner's revisionist biography, Freud: His Life and His Mind (1950), Maurice R.



Green's Interpersonal Psychoanalysis: The Selected Papers of Clara Thompson (1964). These were all in the field of psychology. Fromm aligned himself with social protest literature, as he wrote the "foreword" to a new edition of Edward Bellamy's Looking Backward (1960) and George Orwell's 1984 (1961) and to James Newman's The Rule of Folly (1962), an angry exposé of the policies of nuclear defense. Fromm's call for radical reform is repeated in the foreword to A. S. Neill's controversial Summerhill: A Radical Approach to Child Rearing (1960), to Tom B. Bottomore's translation of Karl Marx, Early Writings (1964), and to Ivan D. Illich's challenge to school, church, state, and society, Celebration of Awareness: A Call for Institutional Revolution (1971).

Fromm's continuing influence as a critic of American society may be evinced by his April 26, 1973 interview with producer Irv Drasin on the CBS Television Report, "You and the Commercial." Fromm was invited as a critic to analyze value appeals, as well as the social character of the viewers for whom such appeals would be most persuasive. It is significant that the writer-producer-director of the program, rather than Charles Kuralt the regular correspondent, chose to interview Fromm. Fromm elected not to condemn advertising as such, but to point out that advertising which "forces" people to buy what they neither want nor need is only a part of the rules and mechanisms of contemporary production and consumption. By his appearance on national television Fromm sought an audience, not of the "productive intellectuals," but of the passive, receptive, non-productive, alienated majority of modern man.



The Effects of Fromm's Mission

Fromm's writings and activities have generated reactions among his critics ranging from very favorable, near adoration to complete dismissal. The most lengthy and well reasoned rebuttal to Fromm has come from John H. Schaar.³² Schaar's principal criticism of Fromm is that "to tell a man he is perfect, as Fromm does, is to expose him to unnecessary dangers and excite him to catastrophic adventures."³³ He would have preferred Fromm to have placed his admonitions in favor of "prudence, authority, and discipline, as well as love and kindness, and hope."³⁴ Will Herberg calls Fromm "the most influential of the neo-Freudian revisionists" but goes on to judge his whole scheme for a sane society naive and unrealistic.

Joseph Wood Krutch objects to Fromm's philosophizing: "Mr. Fromm, like most psychoanalytic writers, operates on such a high level of abstraction, deals so freely in large concepts that without rejecting the general thesis, the reader sometimes begins to wonder if the labyrinthine structure he builds is not in part--tho only in part--the product of too active a metaphysical fancy."³⁶

Irving L. Horowitz rejects Fromm's generalizations for their lack of academic precision:

There is another style of work in social psychology which had a marked success toward the close of the 1950's. It is the thundering totalism of the alienation school--particularly the work of Herbert Marcuse and Erich Fromm. Marcuse, a severe critic of Fromm, nonetheless shares with him--and with many others from an older generation of the Viennese or Berliner twenties--a snobbish democracy of the educated that never really was. One can never be sure as to when this school is resting on autobiographical honesty--on a system



of self-revelations, which, like many good revelations from Aesop to La Rochefoucauld, tell important truths and make some genuine observations about the world. More often than not, this is not a school of sociologists so much as they are avid and good newspaper readers--able to detect world historic trends and frame them in humanistic terms. The radicalism of this school is, however, slightly soiled by the fact that they have created a world of political devils without political angels. Indeed, it is the latest and greatest form of anti-politique, i.e., "pure negativity." "Man" is alienated, never select portions of the population. "Industrialism" is the culprit, never any specific process of production. "Urbanization" is horrible, cities stink as such, never the poor section of the city. "Nationalism" is horrible, never any one nationalism more so than another. The noisiness of this kind of writing does a great deal to cast doubt on the seriousness of macroscopic approaches. It represents, in fact, a step away from the sobriety and seriousness that characterized such great social psychologists as Hull and Kafka, no less than Mead and Freud.³⁷

Harvey Cox, reviewing You Shall Be as Gods, questions Fromm's theological abilities, calling him an "incorrigibly intrusive man with a congenital insensitivity to the normally respected boundaries between disciplines. His writings have ranged so widely that by now he has trespassed on nearly everybody's turf."³⁸

Judging the same issue of Fromm's catholicity, John Dollard considers it grounds for praise: Fromm "brings to the task a great amount of skill and learning. He is at once sociologist, philosopher, historian, psychologist, economist, and anthropologist--and one is tempted to add, lover of life, poet, and prophet."³⁹ Asher Brynes describes Man for Himself as "magnificent in implication, a new trend



in the study of man makes its first appearance in these pages."⁴⁰

Fromm's influence has reached to political activists like John Gardner, who comments: "I have followed his [Fromm's] work with great interest."⁴¹ Tom Bottomore, British socialist writer, acknowledges Fromm's influence:

It was Erich Fromm who developed some of these notions by bringing together the essays of Socialist Humanism, and I was very glad to be associated with him in this work, which in my view helped to prepare the way for the social movements of the later 1960's, though to some extent they later took different directions. Erich Fromm's influence in this field was considerable; it helped to crystalize for me an alternative kind of socialistic movement, after the disillusioning experience of the 1950's.⁴²

Michael Maccoby at the Institute for Policy Studies writes:

Erich Fromm was my training analyst and my most important teacher. He is a rare combination of a scientist and a master in a non-theistic but religious sense. He taught me a different way of approaching psychological questions, of relating concepts to experience Fromm's influence has led me to see many psychoanalytic and social questions that can be explored and understood. Finally, he has provided a revision of Freud that allows psychoanalysis to overcome its mechanistic theoretical chains and to become relevant to social questions. In my case, the direction of study is the question of the effects of work on character and the possibilities of humanizing work.⁴³

Rollo May, speaking as a fellow psychoanalyst, recalls: "His early work did have a strong influence on me but I have felt that his later work has progressively become more superficial and has not influenced my work."⁴⁴ Daniel Lerner comments:

I guess Fromm and I breathe the same intellectual ozone. While I learned much from his Fear of Freedom, I am not aware of him as an "influence" on me--



much less than other post-Freudians like H. S. Sullivan, H. D. Lasswell, Karen Horney, Erick Erikson. In fact, I rather dislike Fromm's writings of the past decade.⁴⁵

These negative and positive criticisms are recounted here not so much as a complete picture of reaction to Fromm, but rather as a flavor of responses Fromm has generated among his elitist audience. What is important in judging the effectiveness of a prophet's mission is not solely the acceptance of his message, but also the quality of its rejection. If the prophet can jar men's minds enough to force a rebuttal or even a denial, he has at least begun to close the gap of division by making an initial bridging effort.

Fromm's mission has been a lifelong compulsion to humanize society in order to humanize men. Whatever is germane to man has been his subject matter--capitalism and socialism, technology, production and consumption, foreign policy, religion, ethics, education, psychoanalysis, Zen Buddhism, authoritarianism, nuclear war and pacifism, education and creativity.

Schaar closes his generally unfavorable criticism of Fromm with these lines of praise:

Fromm's work has a resonance in this time of small hopes and little beauty because it is a work undertaken in favor of man. Fromm's pages are alive with expressions of love and compassion for all mankind. His work is in the splendid tradition of those who have shown man a vision of life as beauty and creativity.⁴⁶

This is Fromm's mission, to give vision to those blind to their own potential, strength to their apparent weakness, and hope to their haunting doubt. In this, Fromm is prophet.



Footnotes

Chapter V

¹Erich Fromm, "Prophets and Priests," Bertrand Russell: Philosopher of the Century, ed. Ralph Schoenman (London, 1967), p. 67.

²Ibid.

³Bruce Vawter, "Introduction to Prophetic Literature," The Jerome Biblical Commentary, ed. Raymond E. Brown, S.S., Joseph A. Fitzmyer, S.J., and Roland E. Murphy, O. Carm. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1968), p. 236.

⁴Fromm, "Prophets and Priests," p. 68.

⁵Ibid., pp. 68-69. Also see Erich Fromm, You Shall Be as Gods (New York, 1966), p. 77.

⁶St. Lk. 9:58.

⁷St. Matt. 21:28.

⁸Leszek Kolakowski, "The Priest and the Jester," The Radical Imagination, ed. Irving Howe (New York, 1967), p. 111.

⁹Leland M. Griffin, "A Dramatistic Theory of the Rhetoric of Movements," Critical Responses to Kenneth Burke, 1924-1966, ed. William H. Rueckert (Minneapolis, 1969), p. 469.

¹⁰Fromm, "Prophets and Priests," p. 70.

¹¹John Schaar, Escape from Authority (New York, 1961), pp. 260-261.

¹²Erich Fromm, The Dogma of Christ (New York, 1963), pp. 151ff.

¹³XVIII (1943), 401-411.

¹⁴Maurice R. Green, "Her Life," Interpersonal Psychoanalysis: The Selected Papers of Clara Thompson, ed. Maurice R. Green (New York, 1964), p. 364.

¹⁵Irving Howe, "A Few Words about Dissent," Voices of Dissent (New York, 1957), p. 11.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 12-13.



18. Personal letter from Rieszan to the author, August 15, 1972.
See appendix.
19. The name of the group was later changed to "The Council of Correspondence."
20. Barbara Deming, "Courage for the New Age: The Committee of Correspondence," Liberation, VII (November 7, 1963), 15.
21. Leland M. Griffin, "The Rhetorical Structure of 'New Left' Movements," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, L (April 1964), 118.
22. Ibid.
23. Deming, op. cit. (above, note 20), p. 16.
24. Personal letter from Rieszan to the author, August 15, 1972.
See appendix.
25. No. 3 (Spring 1962), 116-134.
26. Herbert Spiegelberg, Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry: A Historical Introduction (Evanston, 1972), p. 167.
27. Personal letter from Rieszan to the author, August 15, 1972.
See appendix.
28. Fromm, Let Man Prevail: A Socialist Manifesto and Program (New York, 1960), p. 35.
29. Ibid., p. 3.
30. Personal letter from Fromm to the author, October 14, 1972.
See appendix.
31. Ibid.
32. Schaar, Escape from Authority (New York, 1961).
33. Ibid., p. 10.
34. Ibid.
35. Will Herberg, "Freud, Religion and Social Reality," Commentary, XXXV (March 1957), 237.
36. Joseph Wood Krutch, New York Times, September 4, 1955, Book Review Section, p. 9.



37 Irving L. Horowitz, *Professing Sociology: Studies in the Life Cycle of Social Science* (Chicago, 1968), pp. 225-226.

38 Harvey Cox, *New York Times*, November 27, 1966, Book Review Section, p. 10.

39 John Dollard, *New York Herald Tribune*, September 4, 1955, Book Review Section, p. 4.

40 Asher Brynes, "The End of Psychological Man Proclaimed," *Saturday Review of Literature*, XXXI (February 7, 1948), 25.

41 Personal letter from Gardner to the author, July 24, 1972. See appendix.

42 Personal letter from Bottomore to the author, July 17, 1972. See appendix.

43 Personal letter from Maccoby to the author, September 10, 1972. See appendix.

44 Personal letter from May to the author, September 19, 1972. See appendix.

45 Personal letter from Lerner to the author, August 1, 1972. See appendix.

46 Schaar, *op. cit.* (above, note 11), p. 322.



CHAPTER VI

FROMM'S CONCEPT OF THE PROPHETIC OFFICE

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze Fromm's concept of the prophetic role in society in order to gain a perspective on the rhetorical dimensions of the prophetic act. A fundamental assumption on which this analysis bases itself is that Fromm's description of the prophetic role reflects his own self-image which identifies with the Hebrew prophetic tradition.

As Fromm views the prophetic role, the root problem with which the prophet deals is that of human existence. To meet human existence as a problem involves establishing levels of abstraction, for the appropriate use of language in designating rhetorical motives. Fromm's statement regarding the problem of human existence may be analyzed at three grammatical levels: the first question lies in the order of essence and speaks in a grammar of idealism. It asks: "What is human existence?" The second question lies in the order of action, speaks in the grammar of pragmatism, and asks: "How can human existence be existentially expressed?" The third question which is in the order of purpose, speaks in the grammar of transcendence and mysticism and asks: "What are the goals of human existence?"

This three part perspective has been drawn up as a framework upon which to develop in the following chapter the rhetorical implications of prophecy.



In discussing the prophetic role Fromm follows his frequently used strategy of transcendence, setting up the scene in cosmic proportions. To understand the prophet's role, Fromm uses three pivotal terms--man, history, and salvation--in a synergistic context of evolutionary revolution. As it turns out, this evolution is both the search for and the answer to the problem of human existence. This is another example of Fromm's dynamic orientation to reality.

This chapter has been divided into five sections. The first analyzes Fromm's description of the genesis of the problem of human existence. The second considers the origins of the prophetic office. The third outlines the prophetic functions. The fourth presents a profile of the prophetic character. The fifth summarizes the prophetic message.

The Genesis of the Problem of Human Existence

Fromm uses the Old Testament to "theologize" his own theory of social action and reform. To accomplish this he has made liberal use of the rhetorical strategy of redefinition, or what is known in theological terminology as biblical accommodation. From the story of Adam and Eve in Paradise he has constructed a systematic philosophy of history on which he bases his rhetorical appeals. In choosing a book considered by many to have been divinely inspired, Fromm builds for himself a mystical setting upon which to generate his revolutionary plea, but in doing so he directly rejects the Bible's divine inspiration: "I do not look at it as the 'word of God,' . . . because I am not a theist."¹ He chooses rather to redefine the Bible as a "revolutionary



book."²

Fromm sets up the problem of human existence by using the story of Adam and Eve's fall as one pole in the dialectical evolution of history. In the first three chapters of the book of Genesis Fromm locates the origins of the human predicament.

In the garden of Eden man existed in what Fromm calls a state of "pre-consciousness" and "pre-individualism."³ Man in his evolutionary cycle was created in a state of harmony with nature, functioning by animal instinct as an integral part of nature. In this state man was actually separate from nature, but lacking awareness, he failed to perceive his separateness. Lacking this awareness and its subsequent individuation, man lacked what Fromm judges to be the essence of human existence.

Man, faced with the command not to eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, stood at the pivotal point in his development. Man chose to disobey Yahweh's command, and, according to Fromm's interpretation, in this act of disobedience man took the fateful step into human existence. This act of disobedience became an act of transcendence,⁴ which signaled the beginning of human freedom. Here was man asserting his individuality by rejecting the direction of authority and selecting his own goals. Fromm's position bears a similarity in form, if not in substance, to the Easter liturgy of the Roman Church where Adam's sin is referred to as "O happy fault that merited so great a Redeemer!"

What were the effects of this transcendent act? First and foremost, in asserting his individuality man broke the original harmony



which he enjoyed with nature. As the Bible expresses it: "Then the eyes of both of them were opened, and they realized that they were naked."⁵ This awareness of nakedness symbolizes man's awareness of his estrangement from nature, animals, and other men. The wholeness of harmony is replaced by conflict and struggle, God's curse upon disobedient mankind. Man's choice to eat of the tree deprived him of the security of animal instinct and forced him to awaken his power of reason and love, to be able to choose between good and evil. From this point on, man is corrupted, and this "corruption lies in the very nature of human existence."⁶

Man by becoming truly human, by exercising freedom, by gaining his powers of reason and love, loses the peace and harmony for which he was created and is punished by being driven out of the garden never to return. The essence of his corruption lies in his estrangement from all of which he was formerly a part. Thus Fromm establishes the thesis of his dialectic of alienation.

What are the implications of the human dilemma which Fromm postulates? First, man cannot return to the harmony of Paradise, for his act of freedom--his saying "no"--has elevated him to a new level of existence from which he cannot retreat. He can go only forward to live out his life of free choice. Second, it should be noted that Fromm explicitly allows for no intervention of a divine action of grace, "for man alone and not God can undo this estrangement and achieve harmony."⁷ Third, Fromm stresses that the key issue in the evolution of man is the development of his relationship with nature. Since man, as Fromm views him, is essentially a self-creating being, he has the same quality



ascribed to him in the Bible—being "created in the image and likeness of God,"⁸ a likeness to Spinoza's God, the Self-caused Being.

For man to be self-creating he must exist as an open system, and, with Marx, Fromm projects his faith in man's perfectibility and progress.⁹ This Pelagian optimism Fromm traces back to the teaching of the Hebrew prophets through Christianity, the Renaissance, and the Enlightenment.¹⁰ Here Fromm differs with Freud's pessimism which saw human evolution as essentially tragic:

Whatever man did, it ended in frustration, if he should return to become a primitive again, he would have pleasure, but no wisdom, if he goes on as a builder of ever more complicated civilizations, he becomes wiser, but also unhappier and sicker.¹¹

A fourth implication of Fromm's explanation of human origins emphasizes the dialectical tension from which he argues for his social revolution. This is the dilemma of man's "passionate striving"¹² to escape from freedom.

His [man's] desire is to give up reason, self-awareness, choice, responsibility, and to return to the womb, to Mother Earth, to the darkness where the light of conscience and knowledge does not yet shine. He wants to escape from his newly gained freedom and to lose the very awareness which makes him human.¹³

Man is saddled with an "existential dichotomy of being within nature and yet transcending it by the fact of having self-awareness and choice." (Italics added.)¹⁴

Fromm considers the dilemma of alienation to be not just an unavoidable problem, but a necessary stage in man's return to his lost paradise. "Only by going through the process of alienation can man



overcome it and achieve a new harmony. This new harmony, the new oneness with man and nature, is called in the prophetic and rabbinic literature 'the end of days,' or 'the messianic time.'¹⁵ But because man is an open system possessing freedom of choice, he has an alternative other than messianism which is self-destruction.

History, according to Fromm, records man's dialectical process of choice, between freedom or slavery, self-creation or self-destruction, activity or passivity, reason and love or irrational hatred, love of life or love of death.

The fifth implication of man's fall is brought out in the symbol of the Covenant, which in the Bible was first established in Noah's pact with Yahweh whereby mankind is placed under Yahweh's protective power. The second Covenant Yahweh made was with Abraham initiating that special relationship in which the Hebrews became God's chosen people. Fromm interprets both covenants as symbolizing an opening up of man's autonomy, with the result that God is transformed from an absolute to a constitutional monarch who can no longer be arbitrary in dealing out man's fate, but who must oblige himself to an absolute respect for all life.¹⁶ With such an interpretation of covenant theology Fromm liberates man from divine control and establishes a presumption in favor of man's choice of life rather than death.

As a final perspective on Fromm's description of the origins of man, it is important to note five philosophical assumptions he makes regarding the development of history. These assumptions create a rhetorical framework which permits him to define specific historical events for his particular rhetorical purposes. First, history is man-centered



because man is the maker of history and not the pawn of fate. Second, history is a dialectical process through which man works out his salvation by his confrontation with and choice between good and evil.¹⁷ Third, suffering is an inescapable element in the dialectical process which presupposes struggle and conflict.¹⁸ Fourth, history knits together a tradition of ideological linkages which contribute to man's salvation. Fifth and last, history has within it the constant germ of hope, leading it into the messianic time.

History, as conceived by Fromm, is determined by a continuing chain of contradictions. Fromm along with Marx has enlarged upon Hegel's historical dialectic which equates the history of the world with the history of ideas. For Hegel each idea affirmed as a truth, prompts a counter idea which seeks to negate it. The conflicting tension between the original idea and its countering negative generates a new idea which was a synthesis of the former two. This new idea is met by a new opposing idea, and so the dialectical process continues through time.

Fromm's philosophy of history is materialistic in the same sense as that of Marx. Fromm stresses those causal factors among human events in their concrete or material form, this in distinction to an historical idealism. To demonstrate his point Fromm refers to economics, politics, and culture in which the contrariety of new productive forces oppose older, established forces. New emerging classes in society as well as new inventive processes determine the course of history.

In much the same sense, Kenneth Burke uses "materialism" as an appropriate term for scene¹⁹ in evolving the dramatistic model to explain motivation. He calls attention to the immediate elements which in the



mind of the historian offer the best interpretation for the causality of the particular human phenomena.

The Emergence of the Prophets

In the general framework of the cosmic picture derived from the Adam and Eve story, Fromm calls for special messengers of God, the prophets, whose role it is to bring God's message to men, which is to say, salvation. Fromm's redefinition of Old Testament theology transforms the concept of "God" as a personal entity to that of the "image of man's higher self, a symbol of what man potentially is or ought to become."²⁰ This interpretation evisions the prophets coming from within the self-directing energies of the human race rather than being sent from "on high."

Moses, the first Hebrew prophet, begins a tradition of prophetic thought which through the centuries evolves through a pattern of redefining, deepening, and clarifying ideas of earlier prophets. The influence of the Hebrew prophets was not confined to their co-religionists, but radiated into Christian and socialist thought. One prophetic concept which Fromm uses in explaining the continuity of the prophetic tradition is the "remnant." The remnant appears as a constant prophetic theme referring to that core of individuals who will remain faithful to the truth of the prophets' words and pass on to their descendants the spirit of the prophetic heritage. The remnant preserves the truth and its germ of hope when the people as a whole have embraced idolatry.

Fromm maintains that often the original prophetic vision has been lost or distorted through the bureaucratization of imagination which is the inevitable result of institutionalizing a vital idea. This has



happened to both Christianity and to socialism. Fromm remains confident, however, that a remnant will remain whose "existence in each generation is necessary for the survival of mankind."²¹ In modern times among those who have formed the remnant, according to Fromm, have been such men as Meister Eckhart, Moses Maimonides, the Renaissance humanists, Spinoza, Marx, Freud, Bertrand Russell, Albert Schweitzer, and today's Marxist humanists, to mention only a small sample. These and others have been voices articulating the message of man's potential call to human wholeness, the answer to the problem of human existence.

Underlining his belief that prophets are not sent by God as an external source apart from man, Fromm makes the point that historical situations force the emergence of prophets. Fromm finds within mankind the capability to renew itself by generating unique individuals who refurbish the human spirit with the vision of salvation. Fromm remarks concerning the present world situation:

No historical situation could be more conducive to the emergence of prophets than ours. The existence of the entire human race is threatened by the madness of preparing nuclear war. Stone-age mentality and blindness have led to the point where the human race seems to be moving rapidly toward the tragic end of its history at the very moment when it is near to its greatest achievement. At this point humanity needs prophets, even though it is doubtful whether their voice will prevail against that of the priests.²²

The Prophetic Function in History

As stated earlier, the essential function of the prophet, as Fromm sees it, is to answer the question: What is the meaning of human existence? Pointing out more specific functions, Fromm mentions the following:²³ (1) to show man new spiritual goals, which stress a



greater perception of reality as distinguished from the enslavement of illusions; (2) to show man alternatives between which he can choose, reverting to the ultimate choice between life or death and the consequences of each; (3) to protest against all acts and attitudes through which man loses himself and the path to salvation; (4) to propose salvation in social rather than individual terms.

Though the prophets are men of words, they are not uninvolved theorists, but rhetors in the fullest sense of the classical term. Because he sees the prophets as revealers of truth, political activists, and revolutionaries, Fromm states unequivocally the interdependence of rhetorical and pragmatic social action:

The interrelation between concern and knowledge has often been expressed—and rightly so—in terms of the interrelation between theory and practice. As Marx once wrote, one must not only interpret the world, but one must change it. Indeed, interpretation without intention of change is empty; change without interpretation is blind. Interpretation and change, theory and practice, are not two separate factors which can be combined; they are interrelated in such a way that knowledge becomes fertilized by practice and practice is guided by knowledge; theory and practice both change their nature once they cease to be separate.²⁴

A Profile of the Prophetic Character

Having considered the social genesis and the functions of the prophetic role, this analysis now focuses on Fromm's concept of the prophetic character. The term "character" Fromm uses in a particularized sense, namely, that constellation of traits which constitute the inner dynamic principles of behavior determining what ideas an individual chooses to identify with and what degree of involvement these ideas will have upon his life. Fromm understands "character" as an



objective reality in the network of forces interacting to produce behavior. As such it may or may not be known to the individual himself. He distinguishes between character traits and behavioral traits. The former are intrinsic principles of behavior dynamics, while the latter represents the behavior pattern as observed and interpreted by a third party who reflects the subjective interpretation of cultural values and norms of the given society. Fromm's use of the concept of character has an almost Platonic quality resembling the objective world of forms determining the world of sense perception. One can nevertheless appreciate the usefulness of the concept when one remembers the stress Fromm places upon unconscious motivation and the use of such defense mechanisms as rationalization and fantasy.

Assuming that the prophet is a conscience for society and thereby its liberator, Fromm questions what are the particular character traits motivating the prophet in carrying out his particular role. In several places Fromm has outlined quite precisely the constellation of traits uniquely the prophet's. In an address to the Seventh Inter-American Congress on Psychology held in Mexico City in 1961, Fromm developed in great detail the political-psychological concept of the prophetic character as a self-ideal upon which the community of psychologists well might pattern themselves. This profile can be analyzed from two perspectives: first, those traits which impel the prophet into his role of social conscience, and second, those traits which direct the style of the prophetic role.

Conscience, according to Fromm, is "man's own voice, the guardian of our integrity which recalls us to ourselves when we are in



danger of losing ourselves. Sin is not primarily sin against God but sin against ourselves."²⁵ Insofar as man is productive and awake to life, his conscience, as a function of reason, leads him to seek the good and reject evil.

Bearing in mind this notion of conscience, one must postulate as a primary character trait of the prophet a sensitivity to evil, especially as it exists in the abuse of power. The prophet's sensitivity to evil is the product of his heightened spiritual-moral awareness which attunes him to the spirit of the times and to the most fundamental and acute problems of his day. Of course, this sensitivity to evil presupposes its dialectical correlative, a sensitivity to good. The prophets have most frequently condemned evil, not because their role is primarily negative, but because abuses must first be recognized and done away with before positive action can be accomplished.

The prophet's sensitivity to evil in society results from more than an abstract love of good and hatred of evil. A more fundamental source of this sensitivity is the identification which the prophets feel for their fellow suffering men and women. Traditionally, the prophets have spoken out in favor of the "Anawim," Yahweh's poor, the little man who goes unnoticed and who bears the heaviest burden of poverty and injustice. The Anawim are caught up in a maelstrom of suffering. They are poor because they lack power. Lacking power, they are easy victims of injustice, and as injustice works a constant erosion on their lives, they become poorer and more powerless.

Furthermore, the prophetic character impels the prophet into a psychic involvement, as Fromm remarks in reference to the Hebrew prophets:



"What happened to others happened to them. Humanity was not outside, but within them."²⁶ This identification prompted in the prophets an active sense of responsibility—"They were not men who set themselves apart and waited to see what would happen."²⁷ This identification is not an unaffektive rational exercise, but rather a productive orientation to do all that they can in the name of life, voicing political concern against the outrages of injustice and irrationality.

Thus the prophet's role as social conscience is the result of sensitivity, awareness, identification, responsibility, and reverence for life. Now with a focus on the specific prophetic style of social protest, the question arises as to what character traits determine this facet of the prophetic act.

If the prophet is primarily the social conscience of his people, and if he is impelled into this role by the character traits just discussed, then one can justifiably point to one character trait which gives that unique, stylistic quality of prophecy, namely, a compulsion to proclaim the message of his vision. Regarding this point, John McKenzie, Old Testament critic, remarks:

The prophetic word is misunderstood if one thinks of it as merely the experience of hearing; it is the reception of a positive dynamic reality that arises from the power of the person of Yahweh and compels the prophet to speak (Amos 3, 8) The word of Yahweh is a joy and a delight (Jer. 15, 16), a burning fire shut up in the bones of the prophet (Jer. 20, 7-9), a fury he must put out (Jer. 6, 11).²⁸

Fromm speaks of this same compulsion:

His becoming a prophet is simple enough, because the alternatives which he sees are simple enough. The prophet Amos expressed this idea very succinctly:



"The lion has roared, who will not be afraid. God has spoken, who will not be a prophet." The phrase "God has spoken" here means simply that the choice has become unmistakably clear. There can be no more doubt. There can be no evasion. Hence the man who feels responsible has no choice but to become a prophet, whether he has been herding sheep, tending his vineyards, or developing and teaching ideas.²⁹

In some way or other, the prophet is driven to speak because he feels that he has seen the truth and has a responsibility to make that truth heard by others. Here comes into focus what was mentioned in an earlier chapter regarding the prophet's moment of vision. His vision has become so much a part of him that it obsesses him and becomes his whole reason for being. Thus Fromm can say of the prophets: "They lived what they preached."³⁰ An interesting point of etymology points to this compulsive quality in the prophetic character. The Hebrew verb nabi from which the term prophet is derived and which is usually translated "to announce" also has in its intensive form a frequent denotation of "frenzy" or even "lunacy."³¹

The enlightenment which the prophet receives allows him a freedom and independence to divorce himself from archaic fetishes such as "State sovereignty," "national honor," "military victory with honor." Such freedom, for Fromm, constitutes the duty of disobedience.

Disobedience, then, in the sense in which we use it here, is an act of the affirmation of reason and will. It is not primarily an attitude directed against something, but for something: for man's capacity to see, to say what he sees, and to refuse to say what he does not see. To do so he does not need to be aggressive or rebellious; he needs to have his eyes open, to be fully awake, and willing to take the responsibility to open the eyes of those who are in



danger of perishing because they are half asleep.³²

The prophet's freedom also allows him to adopt a "critical mood."³³ Fromm explains: "[The prophet] will be particularly critical when he hears the judgment of the majority, which is that of the market place, of those who have power."³⁴ This critical mood makes the prophet distrustful of the cliché or of so-called "common sense" arguments and reinforces his faith in the powers of reason.³⁵

The prophet's transcendence demands at times great self-sacrifice, even to the point of a willingness to suffer imprisonment, ostracism, or death.³⁶ He is asked to cut the ties with his homeland:

. . . because reason is universal and transcends all national borders, that the philosopher who follows reason is a citizen of the world; man is his object--not this or that person, this or that nation. The world is his country, not the place where he was born.³⁷

This transcendence beyond national and cultural allegiance gives the prophet the freedom to judge every nation and criticize any idea. He can also answer his opponents who accuse him of self-righteous egotism by referring them to the transcendence of his person and the transcendence of his message which is to preach "truth."

In line with this transcendent character of the prophet, Fromm emphasizes the need for selflessness, giving as an example Moses's reaction of shock and refusal at Yahweh's command that he become a prophet.

He, like many of the later Hebrew prophets, does not want to be a prophet. (And, we might add, anyone who wants to be a prophet is not one.) The reasons for this are not difficult to see. A prophet must talk entirely out of inner need to tell



his vision, and only then can his vision and voice be trusted. If, however, he is motivated by the narcissistic wish to be a leader or a savior, the validity of his message and the integrity of his voice are questionable. The absence of narcissistic motivation is one of the chief criteria for the true prophet in the past as well as now, and there is, perhaps, no other reason for their scarcity than this psychological requirement.³⁸

A final characteristic of prophetic transcendence is the particular relationship which the prophet has to power. According to Fromm's description, power never becomes sanctified for the prophet, never becomes the vehicle for purveying truth or moral goodness. The prophet knows that power can kill, compel, or pervert. As he understands the function and abuse of power in society, the prophet rises above the personal moral involvement with power, so that he is able to use it, but never need he become so immersed in the power structure of society, that he identifies the goals of the good society with the extension of power. Those who are impressed with power are caught in a web of idolatry bespeaking a love of death, a fear of freedom, both of which are diametrically opposed to the prophetic vision and mission.

Salvation: The Message of the Prophets

The prophets speak of salvation in several terms, "The End of Days," "The Messianic Time," "The Golden Age." Regardless of the term, the concept is the same, in Fromm's words, the "idea that man must find his goal by becoming fully human."³⁹ Salvation is the antithesis of man's fall from paradise, insofar as it represents a return to man's original state of harmony. Just as the original "sin" was, in Fromm's interpretation, a transcendent act of disobedience, so salvation is



likewise a transcendent act of reinstatement, bringing to completion the dialectical process, but insofar as salvation is dialectical, it remains a constantly on-going process. The full ramification of the dialectical nature of salvation will be explored in the following chapter.

While orthodox Christian theology attributes an essential corruption to human nature as a result of Adam's sin which required the propitiatory sacrifice of Jesus as the Second Adam to save mankind, Fromm's formula for salvation finds no need for such saving grace which transforms the "fallen" nature of man to a new "supernatural" level of existence. Fromm rejects any theory of grace, for man's "corruption," as he defines it does not lie in man's nature but in the "nature of human existence."⁴⁰ The obvious Pelagian corollary of this principle of the denial of grace is that man himself and not God is the agent of his own salvation.

The prophetic vision of salvation, Fromm claims, is one of the most fundamental features of Western thought:

[It is] the faith in human progress and in man's capacity to create a world of justice and peace. This hope has its roots both in Greek and in Roman thinking, as well as in the Messianic concept of the Old Testament prophets. The Old Testament philosophy of history assumes that man grows and unfolds in history and eventually becomes what he potentially is.⁴¹

If then salvation becomes for man the realization of what he is capable of and at the same time a transcendent act of self-creation, the question arises as to the qualities which Fromm envisages in salvation. The most fundamental answer to this question is encompassed



under the term peace. Messianic peace represents the dialectic anti-thesis of alienation, which Fromm interprets as the central issue against which the prophets fought⁴² and the central most corrupting and pervasive problem of modern man. Peace stands for everything which alienation is not. Peace returns man to an at-onement with other men and nature, thus overcoming the separation caused by man's assertion of his individuality in his original "sin" and creating a new higher level harmony. Because man is no longer immersed in struggle and conflict with himself and nature, he possesses a new self-determination, a new freedom in which reason and love are the motivating forces establishing a universal dominion of social justice.

Because peace is the negation of war, in the messianic age life will triumph over death, national hostilities will cease, and religious factionalism will disappear. Peace comes in the fullest positive sense, as the absolute negation of the negative in human existence. Peace produces a "natural" harmony--"Man becomes natural and nature becomes human."⁴³ The dialectic circle has come full swing; the union of man experienced with nature and himself in his pre-individualistic existence is now realized at a new level of oneness with individualization and independence.



Footnotes

Chapter VI

- ¹Erich Fromm, *You Shall Be as Gods* (New York, 1966), p. 7.
- ²Ibid.
- ³Ibid., p. 87.
- ⁴Erich Fromm, "The Prophetic Concept of Peace," *The Dogma of Christ* (Anchor ed., New York, 1966), p. 213.
- ⁵Gen. 3:7.
- ⁶Fromm, "The Prophetic Concept of Peace," p. 210.
- ⁷Ibid., pp. 210-213.
- ⁸Gen. 1:26.
- ⁹Erich Fromm, *Beyond the Chains of Illusion* (New York, 1962), p. 37.
- ¹⁰Ibid.
- ¹¹Ibid.
- ¹²Fromm, *You Shall Be as Gods*, p. 87.
- ¹³Ibid.
- ¹⁴Ibid., p. 88.
- ¹⁵Ibid.
- ¹⁶Ibid., p. 25.
- ¹⁷Fromm, "The Prophetic Concept of Peace," p. 213.
- ¹⁸The coverage of dialectic, especially the elements of struggle and conflict, will be discussed in the following chapter.
- ¹⁹Kenneth Burke, *A Grammar of Motives* (New York, 1945), p. 130.
- ²⁰Erich Fromm, *Psychoanalysis and Religion* (New Haven, Conn., 1950), p. 49.
- ²¹Fromm, *You Shall Be as Gods*, p. 28.



22"Prophets and Priests," Bertrand Russell, Philosopher of the Century, ed. Ralph Schoenman (London, 1967), p. 69.

23Fromm, You Shall Be as Gods, pp. 117-118.

24Fromm, Beyond the Chains of Illusion, pp. 153-154.

25Fromm, Psychoanalysis and Religion, p. 88.

26Fromm, "Prophets and Priests," p. 68.

27Ibid.

28John L. McKenzie, S.J., "Aspects of Old Testament Thought," The Jerome Biblical Commentary, ed. Raymond E. Brown, S.S., Joseph A. Fitzmyer, S.J., and Roland E. Murphy, O. Carm. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1968), p. 744.

29Fromm, "Prophets and Priests," p. 68.

30Ibid., pp. 67-68.

31Rev. William Alexander Leslie Elnslie, "Prophets," Encyclopaedia Britannica (12th ed., Chicago, 1944), Vol. XVIII, p. 586.

32Fromm, "Prophets and Priests," p. 72.

33Erich Fromm, "The Revolutionary Character," The Dogma of Christ (Anchor ed., New York, 1966), p. 164.

34Ibid.

35Fromm, "Prophets and Priests," p. 76.

36Ibid., p. 68.

37Ibid., p. 73.

38Fromm, You Shall Be as Gods, p. 94. Also see "Prophets and Priests," p. 68.

39Ibid., p. 114.

40Fromm, "The Prophetic Concept of Peace," p. 211.

41Erich Fromm, "Afterword," 1984, by George Orwell (Signet ed., New York, 1961), p. 257.

42Fromm, Psychoanalysis and Religion, p. 84.

43Fromm, "The Prophetic Concept of Peace," p. 214.



CHAPTER VII

AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROPHETIC

RHETORIC OF DIALECTIC

This study has for its basic purpose the analysis of the function of the term alienation in the context of the prophetic rhetoric of dialectic which, this study has assumed, is the idiom of persuasion operative in Fromm's social criticism. Alienation, like all dialectical terms, derives its meaning from its relation and reference to its term of opposition. In Marcuse's words: "The dialectical analysis rather reveals one category as another, so that the other represents its unfolded content—unfolded by the contradictions inherent in it."¹

The immediate purpose of this chapter is twofold: first, to develop a rhetorical model appropriate to dialectic, and second, to choose categories to incorporate into such a model. Kenneth Burke's terms have furnished these categories whose function is the selection, classification, and evaluation of particular rhetorical elements. Since every rhetorical critic must analyze from a given perspective, the model and its categories will establish such a perspective. Ultimately, of course, the goal of this study is to discover the artistic rationale which directs Fromm's symbolic action of social prophecy.

The schemata of the rhetorical process presented here has as its purpose: (1) to give order and understanding to human verbal



behavior, (2) to focus selectively upon certain dimensions of the communicative process--while admitting the necessary incompleteness of the analysis, (3) to describe certain functions of the rhetorical process, and (4) to create a map which is an admittedly simplified metaphor of the rhetorical territory of social criticism.

Basic Assumptions

In such a venture as this, the implicit assumptions upon which theory building is done, as well as the appropriate caveats, should be made explicit at the outset.

1. The matter and form of this model have been to a great extent suggested by the present author's reading of Fromm.
2. The medium of this theory building is metalanguage which represents abstractions about abstractions. In this regard Burke points out that the critic's concern is "with the analysis of language rather than with the analysis of 'reality!'"²
3. The previous point suggests the following attitudes toward language:
 - a) Discourse is symbolic action.
 - b) Discourse is a dynamic synergistic process, which is amply demonstrated by Burke's discussion of the ratios available through the manipulation of the pentad.³
 - c) Discourse as an art betrays the rationale of the artist whose system of values, attitudes,



and meanings is subject by this fact to examination by the rhetorical critic.

- d) Naming is hortatory in two ways. First, by the fact that to specify a thing by name functions both negatively and positively, i.e., it points out what it is and what it is not. In this sense it channels the audience's thinking in one direction rather than in another.⁴ Second, naming is hortatory in that names do not fully express the thing signified and must invoke a persuasive tone "to take up the slack."⁵ Fromm is aware of this problem of language when he speaks of the alienation of a concept from experience. Yet the problem, as Fromm sees it, is inherent in a "tendency in human thought to strive for systematization and completeness. (One root for this tendency probably lies in man's quest for certainty" ⁶ Considering the basic epistemology of the problem, Fromm comments:

When we know some fragments of reality we want to complete them in such a way that they "make sense" in a systematic way. Yet by the very nature of the limitations of man we always have only "fragmentary" knowledge, and never complete knowledge. What we tend to do then is to manufacture some additional pieces which we add to the fragments to make of them a whole, a system. Frequently the awareness of the qualitative difference between the "fragments" and "the additions" is missing because of the intensity of the wish for certainty.⁷



e) Paralleling the preceding point, Burke observes that all terms are ambiguous, and "accordingly, what we want is not terms that avoid ambiguity, but terms that clearly reveal the strategic spots at which ambiguities necessarily arise."⁸ Symbols transmitting as they do values, perspectives, order, relations, etc., must share the ambiguity characteristic of the whole human condition. Thus clarity can at times produce an invalid simplification.

4. Just as the rhetor must be appreciated as an artist, so the role of the rhetorical critic must likewise be viewed as artistic, for of necessity the critic will inject part of himself in his artistic creation, i.e., his values, attitudes, and meanings. As all art is subjective, so all criticism is subjective, in the sense that it is the product of a personal perspective, and thereby bears the unique configuration of the critic-artist. In this regard Berlo points out that:

. . . meanings are not in messages, that meaning is not something which is discoverable, that words do not really mean anything at all, that dictionaries do not and cannot provide us with meanings. It will be argued that meanings are in people, that meanings are covert responses contained within the human organism.⁹

5. A basic problem in rhetorical analysis lies in the nature of communication. The precision available to the physical scientist studying quantifiable matter, which



Burke labels as existing in the order of "motion and perception,"¹⁰ does not exist for the rhetorical critic, who must work with the qualitative reality of abstraction, which Burke describes as existing in the "order of action and idea."¹¹

6. A further problem exists in the very nature of knowledge itself. If one accepts the premise that reality is a dynamic process, all knowing is to a degree "distortive," for to know means that the individual must in some way incorporate the dynamic flow of reality into himself. This requires a "freezing" of the flux of reality. One can study one frame of a motion picture, but in doing so one is no longer looking at a motion picture but rather at a "still" picture which as a different medium offers a different message. A similar problem exists in the use of cadavers for the study of anatomy and physiology, in which case a dead body is the subject of study to obtain data relevant to the human living body. The distortive effects of death need not be underlined.

Burke remarks on this problem of terms: "Even if any given terminology is a reflection of reality, by its very nature as a terminology it must be a selection of reality; and to this extent it must function also as a deflection of reality."¹²



Fromm also discusses the problem of the inadequacy of language:

As with every other human experience, words are insufficient to describe the experience. In fact, most of the time words do the opposite: they obscure it, distort it, and kill it. Too often, in the process of talking about love or hate or hope, one loses contact with what one was supposed to be talking about. Poetry, music, and other forms of art are by far the best-suited media for describing human experience because they are precise and avoid the abstraction and vagueness of worn-out coins which are taken for adequate representations of human experience.¹³

7. Social criticism and planning viewed here in their rhetorical aspects are assumed to be a unique literary genre requiring the student of both rhetoric and criticism to recognize differentiating qualities of the genre and to design his theories with a strict attention to the specific modality of this literary form.
8. A final assumption comes by way of apology and admonition, namely, that all theorizing or model building can never be considered a finished work, but must ever remain open-ended to allow for further nuances, redirection, and refinement.

The Interrelation of Rhetoric Dialectic, and Prophecy

With the above assumptions set forth, a correlation of the three key terms paramount in this chapter must now be made. The social criticism of Fromm has been labeled a prophetic rhetoric of dialectic,



and from this the question arises how precisely do the three modes of communication--prophecy, rhetoric, and dialectic--interact.

The first clarification that should be made relates to their formal-logical (definitional) relationships, since, as has been stated earlier, the present work is one of metalanguage functioning in the order of action and idea. Primary attention should be given to the concept of "rhetoric," for in a logical context it represents the material or generic element. The term "dialectic" represents an internal-formal element specifying a particular strategic pattern functioning within the genus of rhetoric. The term "prophetic" denotes a further specification of the term rhetoric, as an external-formal element describing the functions of scene, agency, and purpose.

A second clarification may be obtained here by viewing the act of social criticism from the perspective of the Burkeian pentad. In such a context the act of social criticism takes place in the scene of social revolution,¹⁴ a term which may denote either violent or non-violent striving for social change, or which might best be equated with the term "social movement." The agent who acts out his criticism of society is defined here as the social prophet who chooses political rhetoric as his agency for the purpose of directing the pattern of alternatives available in determining the future.

The core term of the composite concept of a "prophetic rhetoric of dialectic" is, as has been stated, "rhetoric," which Burke defines functionally as the "use of words by human agents to form attitudes or to induce actions in other human agents."¹⁵ He notes further that it



is the "use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols."¹⁶ Donald Bryant's definition of rhetoric as the "rationale of informative and suasive discourse both spoken and written,"¹⁷ stresses the essentially methodological character of rhetoric. As symbolic behavior can be considered the quality differentiating man from other animals, so one might define man as homo rhetoricus, man the social artist who both finds and makes community by his communication, "adjusting ideas to people and people to ideas."¹⁸

Leland M. Griffin sets the definitional scene by observing that man "moves, and is moved, through speech—through the rhetorical power of the word, the persuasive power of language (for rhetoric is the essentially human mode of striving). He is moved by words of meaning, value, and desire; words that draw him a fronte, futuristically."¹⁹ What should be noted in Griffin's description of rhetoric is the quality of striving which allows for a neat interlocking of rhetoric and dialectic. It should be noted here that the following material has found in Professor Griffin's article both a source of intuition and much of its organizational rationale.

If one accepts the notion of rhetoric as the essentially human mode of striving, as the unique power given to words to voice the inner cry of human desire, one can easily add the dialectical dimension to the concept of rhetoric by calling attention to the function of contradiction and conflict as means to the ends of becoming and transforming. Hegel stated the principle that contradiction is the "source of all movement and life; only insofar as it contains a contradiction,



can anything have movement, power or effect."²⁰ Marcuse's observation adds another dimension:

The dialectic developed out of Hegel's view that reality was a structure of contradictions The first concept Hegel introduces as the unification of contradictions is the concept of life Hegel conceived life as mind, that is to say, as a being able to comprehend and master the all-embracing antagonisms of existence. In other words, Hegel's concept of life points to the life of a rational being and to man's unique quality among all other beings In life, "the particular . . . is at the same time a branch of the infinite tree of Life; every part outside the whole is at the same time the whole, Life." Each living individual is also a manifestation of the whole of life, in other words, possesses the full essence or potentialities of life.²¹

What Hegel saw in the context of a logical idealism, Marx and those who have followed his thought have translated to the social, and hence, rhetorical arena.

If one accepts the Hegelian principles of contradiction as the source of movement and change and life as its unifying factor in rational human existence, one might validly look for a primary exemplar of contrariety. The present study, presuming rhetoric to be an essentially human function, has chosen as the primary exemplar of dialectical opposition the elemental psychological awareness within the individual of the opposition between a sense of "self" and a sense of "other."

This fundamental psychological tension has been developed in great detail by Ronald D. Laing, who states:

Man is always between being and non-being, but non-being is not necessarily experienced as personal disintegration. The insecurity attendant upon a precariously established personal unity is one form of ontological insecurity, if this term is used to denote the insecurity inescapably within



the heart of man's finite being

 . . . man, as a person, encounters non-being,
 in a preliminary form, as partial loss of the
 synthetic unity of self, concurrently with the
 partial loss of relatedness with the other, and
 in an ultimate form, in the hypothetical end-state
 of chaotic nonentity, total loss of relatedness
 with self and other.²²

Laing would thus place this fundamental tension between self and other in the ultimate ontological contrariety of being and non-being. Following the insights of Marcuse and Laing, this study hypothesizes: (1) that there is within man an innate, primal consciousness of a contradiction between the "self" and "other" which is everything extrinsic to the perceived self; (2) that this contradiction creates for the individual, and society as well, an awareness of human existence as a dialectical dilemma; (3) that this dilemma can be solved by a reconciliation of opposites which offers an explanation for human motivation since the self is always implicated in goal-need satisfaction.

The Dialectical Mind

At this point it seems appropriate to describe the characteristics of the dialectical mind, the assumptions and attitudes which underlie the premise of contradiction as the prime human motive. In developing this perspective three variables will be discussed: the nature of man, the character of history (time), and the meaning of meaning.

The nature of man

For Burke man is:

1. The symbol-using (symbol-making, symbol-misusing) animal.
2. Inventor of the negative (or moralized by the negative),



3. Separated from his natural condition by instruments of his own making,
4. Coated by the spirit of hierarchy (or moved by the sense of order),
5. And rotten with perfection.²³

Assuming that man experiences himself as a "self" apart from the total "otherness" of reality and further assuming that man's most intimate strivings are for communion with the "otherness" of reality, then one sees the inevitability of man seeking some form and expression of this striving, which history has shown to be the use of symbols as a means of bridging to the "otherness" of the world outside the "self."

As striving is predicated on the existence of deprivation, which is predicated on the existence of negation, so man in his sense of "self-separated" has invented the negative, and further is moralized by it, which is to say, that the conflict between wanting and not having prescribes the modes of man's conduct. Marcuse comments on this moral force:

Hegel saw in the "power of negativity" the life element of the Spirit and thereby of Reason. This power of Negativity was in the last analysis the power to comprehend and alter the given facts in accordance with the developing potentialities by rejecting the "positive" once it had become a barrier to progress in freedom. Reason is in its very essence contra-diction, opposition, negation as long as freedom is not yet real. If the contradictory, oppositional, negative power of Reason is broken, reality moves under its own positive law and, unhampered by the Spirit, unfolds its repressive force Today, the Spirit seems to have a different function: it helps to organize, administer, and anticipate the powers that be, and to liquidate the "power of Negativity." Reason has identified itself with reality: what is actual



is reasonable although what is reasonable has not yet become actuality.²⁴

While man is moralized by the negative, he is conversely goaded toward a sense of order, the relation of part to part, of part to whole, a sense of piety--"what goes with what."²⁵ Man seeks the propriety of dialectical relations which give him a sense of solidarity with his world, which give him meaning and the subsequent security of knowing where he is and where he is going. Hierarchy allows man to deal rationally with his motives, that is to say, in a patterned set of expectancies by which his world becomes manageable.

Richard Weaver notes the dialectic appeal of hierarchy when he states:

We have shown that rhetorical force must be conceived as a power transmitted through the links of a chain that extends upward toward some ultimate source. The higher links of that chain must always be of unique interest to the student of rhetoric, pointing, as they do, to some prime mover of human impulse.²⁶

Because the motive of hierarchy represents a constant thrust forward and upward, man so moved feels a need to seek the ultimate, to thirst for godliness, for perfection. Such a search works its rotting ways, for as man ascends the ladder of his hierarchical ambitions, he fashions new gods to be worshipped, new necessities of power and status, each setting boundaries which constrain and at the same time beckon him to exceed them. In the idolatrous service of his gods, man separates himself from himself. The more he seeks to satisfy himself, the less is he satisfied. The less is he aware of himself as a "self," the greater is the opposition he senses between the "self" and the "other."



Man, as conceived of by Burke, is obviously in a state of constant becoming, constant conflict, for man himself is an ambivalence, a focal point a quo experiencing himself in the existential moment and a focal point ad quod in his striving for transcendence and transformation through the motive of hierarchy. Man in his ambivalence of becoming, hovering between being and non-being, experiences the sense of void, incompleteness, alienation which produce within him a gnawing frustration. Frustration builds anxiety, and anxiety its proper guilt. This then is the human dilemma, the dialectical dilemma, man pressed into conflict, faced with inevitable frustration, burdened with anxiety, and haunted by guilt. To homo dialecticus the prophet speaks the word of salvation.

The character of history

History according to the dialectical mind is the product of interacting polar forces, antagonistic to each other, yet which operate in a context of lineages and appropriate linkages. History is essentially contextual, having a "before" and an "after" tracing a time continuum. The role of symbols in perpetuating this time continuum is essential, for though their values change from period to period, the presence of symbol qua symbol remains the same. This notion of the function of symbols in history is somewhat akin to Alfred Korzybski's idea of man as a time-binder.

In no more obvious place can one see the dialectical continuum of history working than in man's quest for order, which functions in an ascending value pattern toward an absolute. Although dialectic in its formal historical aspect is devoid of either optimism or pessimism



regarding the quality of human development, Marx and Fromm have viewed the historical progress of man as pregnant with the possibilities for human perfection.

The progression through contradiction which is dialectical history is based upon the metaphysical assumption that the existence (esse) of an entity is for that entity an interaction between itself and its opposite. The new product of this interaction combines the qualities of both polar elements, though not equally, for one element will always have a dominant influence in the process of change.

Change through contradiction should not be thought of as linear, but as a "spiral form of development," as Bertell Ollman²⁷ has observed. Progress in its spiral form is "not uniform or free of all retarding effects and influences."²⁸ Viewing the successive stages of a being as reactions to previous stages, Ollman notes:

The reaction to a reaction ("the negation of the negation"), however, brings us back to where we began, but for Marx and Engels this is a return with a difference As stage "three" bears a remarkable resemblance to stage "one," "spiral development" serves as a striking metaphor for what has taken place.²⁹

The validity of development through contradiction and through a spiral form Ollman bases on what he terms the "mutual penetration of polar opposites,"³⁰ such as good and bad, love and hate, positive and negative. With Engels he agrees that here "qualities which 'appear' opposite and distinct are in reality joined by internal relations; they are not logically independent of one another."³¹ This point simply restates the essential dialectical outlook on reality as a series of interrelating elements, interacting in a progressive state of constant flux, where the physical dialectic of the material world and the social



dialectic of history are inseparable. Ollman carries the point one step further, however, noting that the "truth of any contrasting observation depends on the angle or point of view of the observer."³² This remark stands to verify the cliché "depending on whose ox is being gored."

In addition to the variable of viewpoint, Ollman stresses the complexity of multiple linkages which are involved in the notion of polar contrariety. Besides the opposition which each element of a contradiction possesses, "each component of reality is itself a relation whose development is a function of the particular configuration of circumstances in which it stands."³³

Burke, while discussing the circularity of causal patterns present in differing ratios of the pentad, cautions his readers regarding the possibility of "total acts" which might produce "total transformations."

In reality, we are capable of but partial acts, acts that but partially represent us and that produce but partial transformations. Indeed, if all the ratios were adjusted to one another with Edenic symmetry, they would be immutable in one unending "moment." Theological notions of creation and recreation bring us nearest to the concept of total acts.³⁴

The meaning of meaning

The reader will have noted by now that one cannot cleanly delineate the nature of man, history and meaning, as if they were isolable acts, and even to attempt to do so would be contrary to the dialectical perspective itself. For this reason, elements of this discussion may seem, and indeed be, repetitious, but this would be seemingly unavoidable.

As man is a symbol-using animal, so is he a maker of meaning.
As man is a dialectical animal, encircled by conflict, frustration, anxi-



ety, and guilt, so is he a striver, seeking reconciliation, substance, salvation. In his striving man symbolizes reality in the manner in which he experiences it, which is to say, that his meanings will reflect and be congruent with his experience. Thus Burke can define reality as "what things will do to us or for us" and as the "expectation of comfort or discomfort, propriety or risk."³⁵

But man cannot be content simply to use symbols, he must engage in "symbol tinkering."³⁶ To fix for himself a world of meaning, "one must erect a vast symbolic synthesis, a rationale of imaginative and conceptual imagery that 'locates' the various aspects of experience. This symbolism guides social purpose: it provides one with 'cue' as to what he should try to get, how he should try to get it, and how he should 'resign himself' to a renunciation of the things he can't get."³⁷ Such symbolic tinkering in terms of dialectic deals with the "possibilities of linguistic transformation,"³⁸ which reflects man's need to discover a substratum upon which to build his acceptance of change, a logical basis for the dialectical paradox.

Burke has found in the concept of "substance" the basis for paradoxical continuity.³⁹ Insofar as man is goaded by a sense of order and is thus rotten with perfection, he must be a seeker of substance, for substance is "act," and dialectically man is potentiality, relationship, possibility, desire--striving for actuality, synthesis, and fulfillment. He must negate the negative of his own invention, he must close the distance between self and other, he must find his own substance, dramatize his pious acts, and in doing so experience the consubstantiality which his being calls out for. His rhetorical appeal



will be for identification, of "self" with "self," of "self" with "other."

Substance then becomes identified with meaning, for a thing to have meaning it must have substance, must be in actu. When man receives life, he receives substance incompletely as he receives life incompletely. The process of living means the completing of one's substance, of striving for act. Such a search for meaning takes place intrinsically as men work out what they are in themselves; also it takes place extrinsically as they seek consubstantiality in the social scene.

Substance becomes the ground of meaning, for it is the measure of what a thing is and what it is not. Burke assigns four characteristics to dialectical substance:

1. Contextual—in that a thing exists in a setting or scene which offers the determination of figure and ground.⁴⁰
2. Familial—in that a thing is derived and thus has an ancestry, both on the vertical and horizontal dimensions.⁴¹
3. Directional—in that a thing possesses an inner principle of being motivating and directing it.⁴²
4. Geometric—in that a thing exists in itself and as part of its background, thus it has a "participation in context."⁴³

Substance, as Burke views it, offers the ideal term for dialectical meaning, for it signalises growth and change through determination. And here the paradoxical ideal unfolds. The more a thing



possesses substance, the more is it in act. The more it is in act, the more real, and thus the more alive. But the paradox strikes at the heart of the metaphysics of act, for, as was said, to be in act is to be determined, and all determination is negative.⁴⁴ From what has been developed here, it must be concluded that the meaning of dialectical meaning is founded on the principle of contrariety exemplified in man's hierarchical strivings.

In concluding this section on meaning, it should be pointed out that man in his evolving search for transformation through the experience of substance and consubstantiality seeks an equilibrium which will offset the antagonistic forces which pull at him. Seeking equilibrium, man seeks meaning, for it is in a balanced and predictable reality that man can isolate the value and importance of the things about him, as well as of the elements of himself of which he is aware. A final Burkeian observation may integrate the divergent and abstract ideas presented here. "Wherever there is persuasion there is rhetoric. And wherever there is 'meaning,' there is 'persuasion.'"⁴⁵ Thus meaning can be equated with reality, which becomes the structured expectation of "what things will do to us or for us."⁴⁶ Where man finds "substance," he finds reality, and the "real" is persuasive to the degree that it projects values (meanings) directing his behavior toward acceptance or rejection, the ultimate acts of dialectic.

The Functions of Dialectic

Ollman in describing Marx's dialectic distinguishes three functions: first and foremost, dialectic is a "way of viewing things as moments in their own development in, with, and through other things";



secondly, it represents Marx's "approach to the study of problems which concentrates on looking for relationships, not only between different entities but between the same one in time past, present, and future"; finally, it is Marx's method of exposition which determines his organizational patterns as well as his choice of terms, thus reflecting his outlook.⁴⁷

This analysis of the dialectical character of Fromm's prophetic rhetoric seeks to point up the three functions mentioned by Ollman with particular emphasis on dialectic as outlook and as a method of exposition and persuasion.

The primary perspective assumed in this study regarding the function of dialectic is that dialectic offers to the prophet a method of designating meaning, and as such a method of persuasion. The levels at which dialectic designates meaning may be distinguished as follows:

1. The metaphysical level--method of analyzing and explaining the highest level of abstraction, existence as such, ens ut ens.
2. The epistemological level--method establishing categories which are inferential acts ordering reality in a knowable whole. Epistemology functions on its metaphysical bases.
3. The psychological level--method of relating and coping with oneself and the world about one in terms of oneself.
4. The pragmatic level--method by which one formulates problems and the answers to those problems.



5. The theological level--method by which one questions final causes and reaches for ultimates.

The Dialectical Model

Having stated the functions of dialectic by way of orientation and perspective, this study now moves to consider the essential schemata appropriate to a rhetorical dialectic. If dialectic is the study of becoming and transforming, the mode of this process may be examined by reference to three basic dimensional elements.

The reality dimension

The reality dimension, which focuses on the present experiential moment, stresses what is in terms of potentiality, incompleteness, the pain and frustration of unrealized dreams. In a word, it speaks to the point of essence, and as such establishes the primary pole in the dialectical relationship. Karl Mannheim comments on "reality building":

. . . every idea must be tested by its congruence with reality. Meanwhile, however, our conception of reality itself has been revised and called into question. All conflicting groups and classes in society seek this reality in their thoughts and deeds, and it is therefore no wonder that it appears to be different to each of them. If the problem of the nature of reality were a mere speculative product of the imagination, we could easily ignore it. But as we proceed, it becomes more and more evident that it is precisely the multiplicity of the concepts of reality which produce the multiplicity of our modes of thought, and that every ontological judgment that we make leads inevitably to far-reaching consequences.⁴⁸



Fromm speaks of the dialectical nature of change relating to an initial experience of suffering:

Indeed, historical change and revolution seem like a logical paradox; the enslaved man has no concept of freedom--yet he cannot become free unless he has a concept of freedom. The biblical story gives an answer to this paradox. The beginning of liberation lies in man's capacity to suffer, and he suffers if he is oppressed, physically and spiritually. The suffering moves him to act against his oppressors, to seek the end of the oppression, although he cannot yet seek a freedom of which he knows nothing. If man has lost the capacity to suffer, he has also lost the capacity for change. In the first step of revolution, however, he develops new powers which he could not have had while he lived as a slave, and these new powers eventually make it possible for him to achieve freedom.⁴⁹

The value-imperative dimension

The value-imperative dimension, which focuses on the future as the fulfillment of a present wish, stresses in its first phase what can be in terms of the actualization of essence and the acquisition of substance. It moves into a second phase by bringing the audience to an awareness and conviction that what can be must be. The movement from the first to the second phase is the crucial task for the prophet, for if the audience is allowed to remain in a state of fantasy over unfulfilled ambitions for change, the appeal is only chiliastic and thus non-productive in terms of present social change. Fromm takes note of this problem: "In the process of liberation, how-



ever, he [man] is in danger of falling back into the old pattern of slavery."⁵⁰ If, however, the envisioned scheme proposed by the prophet becomes a personal imperative for the individual and society as a whole, then the appropriate dialectical tensions can function effectively. The value-imperative dimension functions as the polar opposite of the reality dimension and speaks to the point of existence as contrasted with essence, which pertains to the reality dimension. In Burke's terminology this would be an appeal to perfection and hierarchy.

The tension-inducing dimension

The tension-inducing dimension emphasizes the tension, conflict, and struggle which bring the two polar elements of what is (reality dimension) and what must be (value-imperative dimension) into sharp interacting contradiction. Marcuse comments on the dialectical tension:

Dialectical thought understands the critical tension between "is" and "ought" first as an ontological condition pertaining to the structure of Being itself. However, the recognition of this state of Being--its theory--intends from the beginning a concrete practice.⁵¹

This dimension speaks to the point of opposition through contrast, comparison, sameness and difference, always with a value orientation—"What is the meaning, the relationship, the benefit or harm that this entity has for the audience?"



Tension as it is observed in the physical world is the exertion upon an object by forces pulling in opposite directions. In its psychological meaning, tension is the experience of an individual as he is confronted with motives which run in opposite and mutually exclusive directions. Psychologists thus speak of conflicts, involving approach-avoidance, approach-approach, or avoidance-avoidance. The dialectical conflict which pertains to the tension-inducing dimension is built upon deprivation as developed through the awareness of the reality dimension. However, deprivation which is merely the lack of satisfaction of a need is insufficient as a proper dialectical motive. It must be raised to the level of frustration which carries deprivation one step further to the degree that the individual experiences himself directed toward a necessary goal from which he is thwarted.

The tension between "what is" and "what ought to be" admits of degrees which are a function of seven variables outlined by James Coleman:⁵² (1) duration of stress, (2) degree of ego-involvement touched by the stress, (3) complexity of demands and pressures required in attaining the goals, (4) degree of desirability of the goals, (5) degree of familiarity of the stress, (6) suddenness of the onset of the stress, (7) personal interpretation given the stress pattern---assumptions and atti-



tudes involved. This might be summarized by the formula: the stronger the drive, the more intense the striving, the more severe the frustration. Morgan's observation also is relevant here, especially with regard to the effectiveness of style in portraying the goals to an audience: "The more clearly the goal is in mind, the greater the frustration."⁵³

After this description of the three elements of the dialectical model, the next step is to examine the interaction of the three in order to see how they operate as a method of becoming and transforming. Toward this goal Burke suggests that the

. . . study of symbolic action in particular literary works should begin with the charting of "equations." That is: When you consult a text, from which you hope to derive insights as regards our human quandaries in general, you begin by asking yourself "what equals what in this text?" and then, next, "what follows what in this text?"

The study of such "equations" is a way of yielding without demoralization. One cannot know in advance what the "equations" are to be (what "hero" is to equal, what "villain" is to equal, what "wisdom" is to equal, etc.) Yet in one's search for such "equations" which the author himself spontaneously exemplified rather than upheld as conscious doctrine, one is guided by method. Accordingly, such analysis is no mere surrender, though it does set up a preparatory stage in which one wholly "yields" to the text.⁵⁴

Key terms and their equations

In developing the kinds of equations Burke calls for, it is necessary to select various key terms which function as motives in analyzing rhetorical patterns. The description of the nature of man given by Burke and Griffin which was discussed in the previous chapter



furnishes the necessary background for developing key terms and their equations.

Fromm himself sets up a fundamental equation pertinent to the dialectical process:

The task of the dialectical thinker is "to distinguish the essential from the apparent process of reality, and to grasp their relations." [Quotation from Marx] Or, to put it differently, it is the problem of the relationship between essence and existence. In the process of existence, the essence is realized, and at the same time, existing means a return to the essence.⁵⁵

Here Fromm is restating Ollman's principle of the "spiral form of development" using the key terms of essence and existence. These two terms symbolize primarily at the ontological level, but can be translated for rhetorical purposes to the psychological, pragmatic, and theological levels in order to appreciate their fuller import.

Griffin furnishes another key term, struggle, as he observes:

Man is a being by nature divided, designed for striving, "endowed for struggle" ("if they do not struggle, they rot, which is to say that they struggle in spite of themselves.") Man is an acter, a maker, a mover; a being who lives by striving, and who "can be expected to err as long as he keeps striving" (er irrt der Mensch so lang er strebt). Man is a being who lives by language; who moves and is moved by words; who rises and is redeemed, or fails and falls, through words. Man is a being who lives by purpose or meaning, value, and desire; a being who yearns in this "imperfect world," for a world of perfection ("the conformity of reality to its concept").⁵⁶

From this perspective of the human dilemma as struggle, man faces the choice between growth or decline, allowing for no limbo, no reprieve from striving except a resignation into stagnation and death.

A third key term, order, mentioned earlier in the context of



the "dialectical transcending of reality through symbols,"⁵⁷ must also be explored with a special attention to the implications of transcendence which lies at the heart of the dialectical appeal in a striving for salvation.

Terms in the order of essence.—Essence symbolizes the fundamental motive for the reality dimension of the dialectical model described earlier, for essence implies potentiality, the capability of an entity to be what it should. As a dialectical term it involves its counter terms, esse, or existence, as potency is opposed to act. Essence functions rhetorically with a strong emphasis on striving, for to name an essence is to imply incompleteness, unrealizedness, vacuum, division, and eventually frustration and pain. The prophet with "somewhat Olympian attitude,"⁵⁸ is able in the reality dimension of his strategy to assign essences, designating "what is" and "what is not." These designations determine the potentialities of both the present and the future and give the prophet a potent tool for advocating change.

Marcuse develops the notion of essence as a principle of unity and identity in the dialectical process:

Essence denotes the unity of being, its identity throughout change. Precisely what is this unity or identity? It is not a permanent and fixed substratum, but a process wherein everything copes with its inherent contradictions and unfolds itself as a result. Conceived in this way, identity contains its opposite, difference, and involves a self-differentiation and an ensuing unification. Every existence precipitates itself into negativity and remains what it is only by negating this negativity. It splits up into a diversity of states and relations to other things, which are originally



foreign to it, but which become part of its proper self when they are brought under the working influence of its essence. Identity is thus the same as the "negative totality," which was shown to be the structure of reality: it is the "same as Essence." Thus conceived, the essence describes the actual process of reality.⁵⁹

Marcuse continues by establishing the epistemological distinctions which must be made between "appearance" and "true potentiality," for an audience may well prove resistive to ideas that at first sight may seem "unworkable."

The Doctrine of Essence seeks to liberate knowledge from the worship of "observable facts" and from the scientific common sense that imposes this worship The real field of knowledge is not the given fact about things as they are, but the critical evaluation of them as a prelude to passing beyond their given form. Knowledge deals with appearances in order to get beyond them The knowledge that appearance and essence do not give is the beginning of truth. The mark of dialectical thinking is the ability to distinguish the essential from the apparent process of reality and to grasp their relation. (Italics added.)⁶⁰

The dialectical rhetorician builds on this liberating of knowledge through the doctrine of essence to counteract audience prejudice based on "common sense."

In Burkeian terms, essence is an "aspect of efficiency," which allows the designator of "reality" to make certain emphases and certain deletions in his design. Further, reality building will employ alienation⁶¹ to sever prior linkages, assemble new clusters of symbols⁶² to form new linkages, invoke a new code of legality⁶³ establish perspectives by congruity,⁶⁴ prescribe rituals of re-birth⁶⁵ with their appropriate secular prayer,⁶⁶ proscribe certain symbols of authority by debunking and prescribe new symbols of authority by mergers. In his



use of all these motives, the dialectician's one purpose is that of redefinition in crisis proportion,⁶⁷ for he must establish in the reality dimension an attitude of discontent with, and rejection of, the present order to induce tension and struggle which will draw his audience to the opposing pole of existence, actualization, in the value-imperative dimension.

These strategies create in the audience feelings of discontent and frustration over their deprivation. This deprivation must be perceived in a precise degree so that the audience can sense in their not-having a frustration which draws them toward having. If the degree of deprivation is perceived too intensely, hope and striving will seem useless, and the audience will be overcome with a resignation to a fate which seems inevitable, thus blocking the direction of persuasion toward change. If, however, the audience becomes aware of essence as a dialectical potentiality, they must also feel a sense of anxiety and guilt over an essence truly present, but unrealized. Thus guilt becomes a guiding principle of change along the continuum of conflict between despair and hope.

Terms in the order of existence.—In this context existence is understood in the scholastic sense, as the fulness of actuality of an entity's essence, thus synonymous with the Scholastic term, esse. For the Schoolmen, God was defined as actus purus, esse primum, ens perfectissimum, the being whose essence is his existence. All created beings, being less than God, were understood as capable of growth and change by the fact that they possessed potentiality. An entity's perfection is measured by the degree to which it fulfills its



potentiality. When essence is understood as a negation, existence then becomes an act of negation of negation, or put positively, the completion of the innate form of an entity. All of this is said at the metaphysical level; for the purpose of rhetorical analysis it must be translated to the psychological and pragmatic levels.

Psychologically, when a being experiences himself fulfilled, he has reached a moment of harmonious rest when the struggle for becoming has ended. Beyond this, there is the sense of unity, wholeness, satisfaction, and quiet. In such a state of completion, man is thus perfected and becomes like to God. Though this kind of progression may be described philosophically, as a matter of human experience it is non-existent, and the possibility of its ever becoming a reality is a matter of philosophical conjecture. The question is raised here, not for the purpose of posing an answer pro or con, but to point up Burke's reference to man's rottenness with perfection, that man's being draws him to a quest for perfection, for godliness, which experience would seem to teach is doomed to failure. However, the compulsion does exist, and upon its tensions the prophet builds his rhetorical appeals. As Griffin has summarized so well:

Man's movements, in time, come to an end. And they come to an end in tragedy--for tragedy involves defeat, "the failure of our ends," the ultimate death of the "good."

Yet if his movements are tragic, the fate of man himself is comic--for tragedy also involves triumph, "the beyond of resurrection," and ultimate "prosperous end." And if the wheel forever turns, it is man who does the turning--forever striving, in an "imperfect world," for a world of perfection. And hence man, the rhetorical animal, is saved: for salvation lies in the striving, the struggle itself.⁶⁸



Terms in the order of transcendence and order.--When one introduces the notion of order, there is immediately implied the idea of arrangement of elements according to a principle or principles which determine the pattern and relationship of the elements, so that they form a unity of some kind. Here the ordering principle is the ascending degree of participation in the perfection of essence. Burke sees the principle of perfection as "central to the nature of language as motive. The mere desire to name something by its 'proper' name, or to speak a language in its distinctive ways is intrinsically 'perfectionist.'"⁶⁹ Accepting the Aristotelian concept of entelechy which predicates the desire in every being to seek its own perfection, Burke insists that there is a "principle of perfection implicit in the nature of symbol systems; and in keeping with his nature as symbol-using animal, man is moved by this principle."⁷⁰

In defining order as the arrangement of parts secundum aliquid, one necessarily acknowledges the prior existence of disparate and hence divided elements. Elements thus ordered become a hierarchy as well as a whole, and precisely in the nature of hierarchy lies the root of the motivating force of order. Disparate and divided men seek in identification the compensation for their state of isolation. Identification offers a possibility of bridging the dialectical gap by means of a common ground of substance and further affords a basis for understanding which, at the psychological level, creates a sense of unity, consubstantiality, and grounding in the human social experience.

This "terministic compulsion" or "hierarchical psychosis"⁷¹ finds its foundation in the "essence of man to desire,"⁷² but because man is likewise capable of becoming sated, his striving for perfection



becomes involved in mystery which creates a situation of "development towards ever 'higher' degrees of ordination . . . infinite in their range."⁷³ Man rotten with perfection seeks a "dialectical transcending of reality through symbols" which "is at the root of this mystery."⁷⁴ Part of this mystification is the creation of god-terms as the ultimates of the dialectical process.⁷⁵ In pursuit of ultimates the prophet proposes terms which "so lead into one another that the completion of each order leads to the next."⁷⁶ In an escalating movement from moment to moment, each instance is strategically appropriate and directional as the hierarchical pattern of upward movement possesses a mystical paradox, representing at the same time being and non-being, uniquely tailored to the particular circumstances.⁷⁷

As has been stated earlier, there is a critical moment in the dialectical process when the prophet must shift his motive appeal from what can be (value-potential) to what must be (value-imperative), and to this point Burke directs his attention:

In any event, it is obvious that the transformation from the merger of the representative role to the division of the anti-thetic role represents a change of principle. A critical point has been passed; a new quality of motivation has been introduced. The moment of crisis in transcendence involves a new motive discovered en route.⁷⁸

This shift from open potentiality to direct imperative is the crux of the dialectical burden. The motives range in the areas of piety, "sense of what properly goes with what,"⁷⁹ and of guilt concerning the impiety of one's awareness of imperfection. Marcuse takes note of the quality of guilt in dialectic:



Hegel's dialectic is permeated with the profound conviction that all immediate forms of existence--in nature and history--are "bad," because they do not permit things to be what they can be. True existence begins only when the immediate state is recognized as negative, when beings become "subjects" and strive to adapt their outward state to their potentialities.

The full significance of the conception just outlined lies in its assertion that negativity is constitutive of all finite things and is the "genuine dialectical" moment of them all. It is "the innermost source of all activity, of living and spiritual self-movement." The negativity everything possesses is the necessary prelude to its reality. It is a state of privation that forces the subject to seek remedy. As such, it has a positive character.

The dialectic process receives its motive power from the pressure to overcome the negativity. Dialectics is a process in a world where the mode of existence of men and things is made up of contradictory relations, so that any particular content can be unfolded only through passing into its opposite.⁸⁰

The need to overcome negativity invokes the "purifying power of language"⁸¹ which quiets the guilt and satisfies the piety in the process of dialectical redemption.

This redemption defined by theological ultimates takes the form of "repossessing the world," which speaks to the issue of essence in terms of "getting one's due":

A rationale of history is the first step whereby the dispossessed repossess the world. By organizing their interests and their characters about a purpose as located by the rationale, they enjoy a large measure of repossession (a spiritual property that "no one can take from them,") even though they are still suffering under the weight of the bureaucratic body of oppressing society By a rationale of history, on the other hand, they own a "myth" to take up the slack between what is desired and what is got.⁸²

This "slack" presents one of the "ills of interregnum" and is



cured in part by the prophet's stylistic skills in creating an acceptable fantasy for his audience so that the picture of history comes together in such a vivid vision of hope that the faithful do not lose heart. John Kenneth Galbraith comments on this stylistic solution to the "ills of interregnum": "To proclaim the need for new ideas has served, in some measure as a substitute for them."⁸³ Karl Mannheim has addressed himself to the same problem in his discussion of social transformation from "unorganized insecurity to organized insecurity."⁸⁴

The quest for ultimates in the process of transcendence also involves courtship, the "use of suasive devices for the transcending of social estrangement,"⁸⁵ with special attention to its mystical qualities so necessary when "different kinds of beings communicate with each other."⁸⁶

Burke offers a summary of the rhetorical use of tension and conflict as a means of transformation toward human godliness:

The stimulus towards transcendence, or symbolic bridging and merging, arises from the many kinds of conflict among values implicit in a going social concern. Such conflicts are heightened to the point of crisis, necessitating scrupulous choices between acceptance and rejection of authority symbols, in proportion as a given order or rights and purposes attains efficient bureaucratic embodiment.⁸⁷

The Prophetic Dimension of a Rhetoric of Dialectic

In the earlier discussion which centered on the making of the prophet, the three transforming "moments," re-birth, vision, and mission, were described as parts of the prophet's personal renewal of values, attitudes, meanings, and goals. This genesis of the prophet



is essentially preparatory to the prophetic act, and its discussion in the earlier chapter was meant as a background for a better understanding especially of rhetorical ethos. The present section deals with an immediate rhetorical analysis of those elements of the prophetic role which are peculiar to it.

In delineating the prophetic dimension of a rhetoric of dialectic, Burke's pentad has been chosen as the "generating principle of investigation."⁸⁸

The scene

The scene in which the prophet functions should be distinguished between that which the prophet discovers existent and that which he wishes to generate. "Scene," as described here, refers to the communication situation in which the prophet wishes to work and which he endeavors to create.

For prophecy to be effective, there must first and foremost be an awareness in the audience of a crisis situation, for crisis adds to the prophetic message a dynamic sense or urgency, and urgency is imperative if the prophet is to succeed in social reformation. Both crisis and urgency point to the nowness of the situation: "now" becomes the focus for awareness and subsequently for action. In the prophetic scene the "now" which is projected by the prophet is unique and pivotal, for, as the prophet describes it, the present moment possesses an unusually great potential for achievement, if the prophet's message is heeded. Conversely, of course, if this moment, so pregnant with possibility, were neglected through a rejection of the prophetic message, then the loss would be commensurate with the



possible gain. The prophet's reference to a crisis situation is essentially a fear appeal, yet it opens up to the audience the alternative of a positive plan for social reform. Thus Fromm notes that the prophets "did not threaten, but they showed the alternatives with which man was confronted."⁸⁹

The prophetic scene, because it is concerned with the present and the future of society, must deal "with politics, radical or otherwise."⁹⁰ The political scene may be graphed on a two coordinate system—the vertical axis of history which presents the time continuum of events, and the horizontal axis of the present moment which represents the scope of political involvement. This comparison is suggested by Fromm's comment that the prophetic act implies a "concern with history and, using the word in its widest sense, a political concern."⁹¹ Thus, in Fromm's mind, the prophet's mission as "addressed" is concerned with the present and future, but nevertheless reaches back through past tradition for its substance and validation.

The political axis of the present encompasses a cosmic sweep. "'Political' here means that they [the prophets] are concerned with historical events affecting not only Israel but all the nations of the world. It means, furthermore, that the criteria for judging historical events are spiritual-religious ones: justice and love."⁹²

The dialectical implications of the prophetic scene should be noted. First, as a crisis situation, there exists an imperative of "Now or never!" Further, this crisis situation sets up a condition of available alternatives: either great gain or great loss. And finally, by plotting the present in its cosmic political scope against the his-



torical past and future a dialectical relationship is established in the time order.

The agent

The prophets, contrary to popular usage of the term, do not have as their primary role predicting the future; rather "they see the present reality free from the blindfolds of public opinion and authority" and they

. . . express the voice of their conscience--of their "knowing-with"--to say what possibilities they see and to show the people the alternatives and to warn them. This is all they aspire to do. It is up to the people to take their warning seriously and to change their ways, or to remain deaf and blind--and to suffer.⁹³

The prophets, as has been noted earlier, speak as the social conscience. Deriving his notion of "conscience" from its Latin roots, cum sciens (with knowing) Fromm rejects the authoritarian function of conscience as an "internalized voice of an authority whom we are eager to please and afraid of displeasing."⁹⁴ The social conscience, as well as the personal conscience, respects the freedom of the audience.

Prophetic language is always the language of alternatives, of choice, and of freedom; it is never that of determinism, for better or worse. The shortest formulation of prophetic alternativism is the verse in Deuteronomy: "I put before you today life and death; and you chose life!"⁹⁵

Because Fromm sees the prophet as one who can discern "true reality," he can speak of conscience as:

. . . the voice of our total personality expressing the demands of life and growth. "Good" for the humanistic conscience is all that furthers life; "evil" is all that arrests and strangles it. The Humanistic conscience is the voice of our self which



summons us back to ourselves, to become what we potentially are. The person whose conscience is essentially autonomous does the right things not by forcing himself to obey the voice of the internalized authority, but because he enjoys doing what is right, even though often he will need some practice in following his principles before he can fully enjoy his action. He does not do his "duty" by obeying an authority, but he is "responsible" because he "responds" to the world of which he is a part as an alive, inwardly active human being.⁹⁶

The prophet, as the voice of social conscience, speaks to society in the name of life--its promotion, growth, and fulfillment. When he must censure, he names the appropriate devil-terms which retard life and promote death. The social conscience must speak to society not in authoritarian dicta, but in the free expression of man's awareness of himself and of his alternative options.

Secondly, as the agent of the prophetic act, the prophet is a nehbi, a spokesman, here not in the strict Hebrew sense of Yahweh's nehbi, but rather as the secular prophet speaking in behalf of man's ultimate transformation. As a social mediator, the prophet voices a rhetoric of transcendence in an idiom of ultimates appropriate to the given moment directing men upward to their salvation. As Burke comments: "In an ultimate dialectic, the terms so lead into one another that the completion of each other leads to the next."⁹⁷ Because the prophet is a nehbi of the Ultimate, he possesses a particular mystique. The present discussion now turns to the question of prophetic ethos.

Aristotle's position that "we might almost affirm that his character [ethos] is the most potent of all the means to persuasion,"⁹⁸ states what subsequent experience has taught rhetoricians, namely, that the way in which an audience perceives a man's personality⁹⁹ as to



expertness, trustworthiness, and intention becomes the prime determinant of his effectiveness as a communicator. For the prophet ethos is no less important than for any other communicator.

Ethos for the prophet interacts with the scene, for the particular prophetic qualities of expertness, trustworthiness, and intention relate primarily to the crisis nature of the prophet's presentation of scene. If there is any one outstanding facet of the prophetic character, it is assertive boldness. Because the prophet describes the crisis scene in such vivid contrast of extremes, for him to then proceed to offer salvation-terms demands an astounding self-reliance and confidence. The prophet can present himself boldly because of "propriety," he speaks as the "man of the hour," equipped with his unique piety. He senses in his own role as spokesman, a power that reaches beyond his own person. Presenting a motive of ultimate transcendence, he is, on the one hand, a product of the situation¹⁰⁰ and, on the other hand, a perpetuator of a tradition. This quality is reflected in Abraham Heschel's description of the prophet as a "person who suffers from a profound maladjustment to the spirit of society, with its conventional lies, with its concessions to man's weakness."¹⁰¹ The prophet's rhetoric is truly dialectical, for as an agent he is one completely apart from his society by virtue of his vision, and yet he remains one of his own people speaking words of strong identification with the anawim.

The ethos of mystique which is inherent in the maverick quality of the prophet affords him unique credentials, based in part on pure assertion, in part on the nature of the need, and in part on the nature



of the message. Meschel describes this mystique:

The prophet claims to sense, to hear, and to see in a way totally removed from a normal perception, to pass from the actual world into a mysterious realm and still be able to return properly oriented to reality and to apply the content of his perception to it. While his mode of perception may differ sharply from the perception of all other human beings, the ideas he brings back to reality become a source of illumination of supreme significance to all other human beings.¹⁰²

The quality of trustworthiness comes to the prophet also by assertion, but besides this, there is a quality of "honesty by association," which is to say that the prophet by the nature of his moralizing and by the god-term value of "reformer" and "revolutionary" finds justification for his role. The fearlessness of his person and the "purity" of his message are witnessed by the prophet's attacks upon kings, false prophets, and whole nations.¹⁰³

If the prophet has been able to create in his audience a sense of crisis, he can use the subsequent fear situation to present himself as a man of conflict and revolution, rejecting what John Kenneth Galbraith has called "conventional wisdom"¹⁰⁴—those ideas that concur with established values because they are acceptable. From their acceptability comes familiarity, stability, predictability, and social esteem. Galbraith notes further that the prophet has the factors of time and the changing views of his audience as underpinnings for his anti-establishment rhetoric.

The enemy of conventional wisdom is not ideas, but the march of events. As I have noted, the conventional wisdom accommodates itself not to the world that it is meant to interpret, but to the audience's view of the world. Since the



latter remains with the comfortable and the familiar, while the world moves on, the conventional wisdom is always in danger of obsolescence. This is not immediately fatal. The fatal blow to the conventional wisdom comes when the conventional ideas fail signally to deal with some contingency to which obsolescence has made them palpably inapplicable.¹⁰⁵

The rhetorical demand placed on the prophet in terms of Galbraith's analysis is to focus on contingencies where the obsolescence of the conventional wisdom is most vulnerable, and this, of course, is done by elaborating the unworkability of the present system and stressing the crisis quality of the scene.

The final element of ethos, intention or concern for the audience's welfare, is also produced by the prophet's moralistic stance as well as by the universality of his message. His message is in behalf of all men, but especially the powerless, the neglected, those most sinned against by society's injustice and hatred. The "hero" value of this role of liberator and savior presents an undeniable identification with the audience and their welfare.

Act

This third part of the pentad, act, answers the question what is done? The prophetic act is essentially "religious," because it first of all offers men goals to strive for and also offers them a means of measuring the success of their self-actualizing. This refers to the distinction made earlier of essence and esse, in which "form is the actus, the attainment which realizes matter."¹⁰⁶ Act is related to the agent who acts, which is to restate the scholastic axiom, "Agere sequitur esse," ("A thing acts insofar as it participates in existence.")



Thus the prophetic act is religious in the sense that it is an effort at binding together what has been separated and which has in its essential constitution a striving toward a goal from which it is presently separated. Stated in another way, the prophetic act, as religious, is a species of dialectic, for it works toward a synthesis of actualization of being in the process of becoming.

The agency

When one questions the agency of an act or agent, one is searching in the area of modality, and modality reflects style to a great extent. For this reason agency will be considered here essentially in its stylistic value as strategy.

Heschel speaks of "God raging in the prophet's mouth."¹⁰⁷ Isaiah refers to the prophet's mouth as a "sharp sword," and a "polished arrow in God's quiver."¹⁰⁸ Such militant metaphors regarding style express the boldness characteristic of the prophet, which still must be, as Burke contends, a "form of ingratiating."¹⁰⁹

One would expect from the mouth of a liberator in the setting of a crisis scene a bold penetrating style, for, as has been mentioned in a previous section, style seeks to cure the "ills of interregnum." Because salvation, the promised land, has not been attained, the prophet has the stylistic problem of generating hope and keeping it alive. For this purpose he speaks in hyperbole, "one octave too high."¹¹⁰ The prophet's style is vivid and frequently repetitious. His recurring epigrams provide his audience with slogans which are easy to remember. He uses style to simplify and solidify acceptance of his message and



to provide for his audience the security of the familiar. A use of very concrete and homely examples also gives an immediacy to his message which off-sets some of the "foreign" quality of the "secret" of the salvation mystery.

While the prophet will use a very direct and vivid style for the sake of identification, his style will also often employ generalization, abstraction, and paradox. Confident in the power of his vision, the prophet can be apodictic in his presentation of alternatives, dogmatic and uncompromising in his redefinition of god and devil terms. Secular prayer becomes for the prophet an important stylistic strategy, for by assigning essences to things he is able to coach attitudes, which is part of the prophetic function of interpreting a world orientation for his audience.¹¹¹ "Secular prayer' involves character building in that one shapes his attitudes, the logic of his life, by the co-ordinates he chooses, and one shapes his actions with reference to the judgments that follow from the co-ordinates."¹¹²

Any moralist, such as a prophet, must necessarily adopt an iconoclastic tone in approaching the values of the society he judges, and thus he engages in debunking. Robert F. Murphy speaks to this point, remarking: "'Truth' is reached only by challenging the given and fixed and transcending it."¹¹³ Part of this transcending will involve universalizing problems and accentuating crisis. In order to break down resistance to change and to open the range of possibilities in the minds of his audience, the prophet must question much of "commonsense reality" and cliches and maintain a skepticism toward cultural norms. All of this he does in an effort to create unrest and discontent with the pre-



sent system.

Burke presents his description of debunking:

He [the prophet] discerns evil. He wants to eradicate this evil. And he wants to do a thorough job of it. Hence, in order to be sure that he is thorough enough, he becomes too thorough. In order to knock the underpinnings from beneath the arguments of his opponents, he perfects a mode of argument that would if carried out consistently also knock the underpinnings from beneath his own argument. But at this important juncture he simply "pulls his punch," refusing to apply as a test of his own position the arguments by which he has dissolved his opponents's position. If anyone is to say "tu quoque," he leaves it to his opponents to do so. And he makes the application of the "tu quoque" test more difficult for his opponents by unconscious subterfuges on his part, involving ambiguities that are hard to discover.¹¹⁴

The use of ambiguity which Burke notes as part of debunking forms the nucleus of symbolic clusters, involving such categories as mystification, merger of opposites, pious linkages, courtship and transcendence.

The prophet must of necessity be very conscious of his style, yet avoid a "self-conscious" style. His style must have an authoritative ring to it which gives credibility to his message by reaching beyond his personal ethos to the "divine" source from which he speaks, for always he is a nehbi. He has been to the mountain, he knows the truth and bears witness to it.

In concluding a description of prophetic agency in terms of its stylistic qualities, one finds that the whole idiom reduces itself to the manipulation of symbols to induce acceptance and rejection in the audience. The prophet as moralist, as well as dialectician; begins with the problem of evil; as Burke elaborates:



In the face of anguish, injustice, disease, and death one adopts policies. One constructs his notion of the universe or history, and shapes attitudes in keeping. Be he poet or scientist, one defines the "human situation" as amply as his imagination permits; then, with this ample definition in mind, he singles out certain functions or relationships as either friendly or unfriendly. If they are deemed friendly he prepares himself to welcome them; if they are deemed unfriendly, he weighs objective resistance against his own resources, to decide how far he can effectively go in combating them.¹¹⁵

Acceptance and rejection as essential strategies in a dialectical rhetoric create a dynamic tension which centers on the one basic element in society which the prophet designates as the central problem of evil. Because this central problem is cast in dialectical terms, the audience in rejecting the devil-terms must implicitly involve themselves in the acceptance of its opposite, the corresponding god-terms. Every element of prophetic style aims at awakening in the audience the realization of the existence of the devil-terms, and from there to argue their rejection in favor of the acceptance of the god-terms.

The purpose

Since the ultimate purpose of the prophet, as had been said, is to liberate and, in doing so, to save his audience, the question here arises regarding his rhetorical purpose. In his rhetoric of transcendence, the prophet preaches a "covenant of hope," couched in terms of ultimates, addressed to an audience burdened with frustration. Made aware of their plight, the audience is offered the possibility of "repossessing the world," which means coming to their due, their birthright. The description of the "good society" pictured by the prophet is futuristic as it is likewise salvific. The problem faced by the prophet is



how to make the audience partake of his vision.

The prophet has selected a new vocabulary of value terms which allows him to redirect the problems of society so that they focus on one central problem, as was noted previously in discussing agency. This central problem allows the prophet to rephrase all of society's problems in terms for which there is a solution.¹¹⁶ The "solution" which is salvation inevitably asks from the audience a "conversion," mapped out in the prophet's terms of acceptance and rejection. He appeals to identification, courtship, mystery, hierarchy, order, and bridging--all to create a sense of symbolic re-birth.

There exists, however, a gap between the present frustration-discontent awareness and the future fulfillment of the prophetic vision of salvation. This is the void of the "ills of interregnum," and the cure exists in the prophet's socioanagogic interpretation of his vision: "The socioanagogic sense denotes how the things of books and of the book of Nature 'signify what relates to worldly glory.'"¹¹⁷ Also to repeat Galbraith's axiom: "To proclaim the need for new ideas has served, in some measure, as a substitute for them."¹¹⁸ Thus, the prophet's words themselves take on for the audience the beginning of the wish-fulfillment. This surrogate quality of prophetic writing evidences a kind of word-magic. In the reading of the prophet the audience senses the religious experience, the ritual, described earlier. The audience of readers are aware, perhaps unconsciously, that they are in "communion" with all the other "faithful" who are privileged to share in the "Secret of Salvation." This sense of communion gives them reassurance and supports their dreams, for they realize that others are being evangelized



at the very same time. Thus, they can begin to experience salvation in those very first moments of conversion. The act of conversion and the act of hope themselves become the beginning of salvation.

Marcuse speaks of this dialectic paradox of striving:

The identity of essence and existence, per-contra, can only result from the enduring effort of reason to create it. It comes about only through a conscious putting into action of knowledge, the primary condition for which is the abandonment of common sense and mere understanding for "Speculative thinking."¹¹⁹

This "Speculative thinking" which Marcuse mentions is the prophet's rejection of "conventional wisdom" and the projection of his "Covenant of Hope."

Fromm's understanding of the problem of rhetorical purpose leads him to speak of hope as a "psychic concomitant to life and growth . . . an intrinsic element of the structure of life, of the dynamic of man's spirit The vision of the present in a state of pregnancy not a prediction of the future."¹²⁰ Fromm's focus on the nowness of hope refers back to what was said earlier regarding scene, and here in a discussion of purpose it reflects a direct attempt to solve the rhetorical problem of audience disenchantment with the prophet's futuristic vision.

This chapter has attempted to discuss the fundamental implications of a prophetic rhetoric of dialectic, first, in order to create a body of rhetorical theory, and second, to provide an analytical basis for the examination of social criticism in a literary genre described as "prophetic" and "dialectic." For the purpose of orientation, the chapter began with an outline of assumptions underlying the material



to follow in the chapter. There was a discussion of the interrelation of rhetoric, dialectic, and prophecy at the definitional level. Next, the dimensions of the dialectical mind were traced in terms of the nature of man, the character of history, and the meaning of meaning. The possible functions of dialectic were described, followed by a delineation of a dialectical communications model, involving three dimensions: the reality dimension, the value-imperative dimension, and the tension-inducing dimension. Key terms and their equations were developed with special attention to their dialectic reference. The chapter closed with an elaboration of the specifically prophetic characteristics of the rhetoric as seen from the perspective of Burke's pentad.

What remains now in the closing three chapters of this study is the actual analysis of Fromm's prophetic rhetoric, implementing the three dimensions of the dialectical model, with the concept of alienation as the key strategic term.



Footnotes

Chapter VII

- ¹Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution (New York, 1954), p. 131.
- ²Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (New York, 1954), p. 317.
- ³See Burke, A Grammar of Motives, pp. 15ff.
- ⁴See Kenneth Burke, Language as Symbolic Action: Essays on Life, Literature, and Method (Berkeley, Cal., 1968), p. 12.
- ⁵Burke, A Grammar of Motives, p. 54.
- ⁶Erich Fromm, You Shall Be as Gods (New York, 1966), p. 20.
- ⁷Ibid.
- ⁸Burke, A Grammar of Motives, p. xiii.
- ⁹David Berlo, The Process of Communication (New York, 1960), p. 175.
- ¹⁰Kenneth Burke, "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," Modern Philosophies and Education, Fifty-Fourth Year Book of the National Society for the Study of Education, ed. Nelson B. Henry (Chicago, 1955), Pt. I, p. 260.
- ¹¹Ibid., pp. 259-260.
- ¹²Burke, Language as Symbolic Action, pp. 4-5.
- ¹³Erich Fromm, The Revolution of Hope: Toward a Humanized Technology (New York, 1968), p. 11.
- ¹⁴Fromm, You Shall Be as Gods, p. 113.
- ¹⁵Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (New York, 1955), p. 41.
- ¹⁶Ibid., p. 43.
- ¹⁷Donald C. Bryant, "Rhetoric: Its Function and Scope," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXIX (December 1953), 407.
- ¹⁸Ibid., p. 413.
- ¹⁹Leland M. Griffin, "A Dramatistic Theory of the Rhetoric of Movements," Critical Responses to Kenneth Burke, 1924-1966, ed. William H. Rueckert (Minneapolis, 1969), pp. 457-458.



²⁰Quoted in Harry W. Laidler "European Socialism since 1848," Socialism and American Life, ed. Donald Drew Egbert and Stow Persons (Princeton, N.J., 1952), I, p. 57.

²¹Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, pp. 37-38.

²²Ronald D. Laing, Self and Others (Pelican ed., Middlesex, England, 1969), p. 51.

²³Burke, Language as Symbolic Action, p. 16.

²⁴Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, pp. 433-434.

²⁵Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose, rev. ed., (Los Altos, Cal., 1954), p. 74.

²⁶Richard M. Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric (Gateway ed., Chicago, 1960), p. 211.

²⁷Bertell Ollman, Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society (Cambridge, England, 1971), p. 58.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Ibid., p. 55.

³¹Ibid.

³²Ibid.

³³Ibid., p. 57.

³⁴Burke, A Grammar of Motives, p. 19.

³⁵Burke, Permanence and Change, p. 22.

³⁶Kenneth Burke, Attitudes toward History, 2nd ed. (Beacon ed., Boston, 1961), p. 179.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Burke, A Grammar of Motives, p. 402.

³⁹See Burke, A Grammar of Motives, p. 405.

⁴⁰Burke, A Grammar of Motives, p. 24.

⁴¹Ibid., pp. 26, 29.



- 42 Ibid., p. 31
- 43 Ibid., p. 29.
- 44 See Burke, A Grammar of Motives, p. 25.
- 45 Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 72.
- 46 Burke, Permanence and Change, p. 22.
- 47 Ollman, Alienation, p. 52.
- 48 Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, trans. Louis Wirth and Edward Shils (Harvest ed., New York, 1936), pp. 98-99.
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- 50 Ibid.
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- 56 Griffin, "A Dramatistic Theory of the Rhetoric of Movements," p. 457.
- 57 Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 275.
- 58 Burke, Attitudes toward History, p. 253.
- 59 Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, p. 146.
- 60 Ibid., pp. 145-146.
- 61 See Burke, Attitudes toward History, pp. 216ff.
- 62 Burke, Attitudes toward History, p. 232.
- 63 Ibid., p. 291.
- 64 Ibid., p. 308.
- 65 Ibid., p. 317.



- ⁶⁶Ibid., p. 321.
- ⁶⁷See Leland M. Griffin, "The Rhetorical Structure of the 'New Left' Movement: Part I," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, LVIII (April 1964), 115.
- ⁶⁸Griffin, "A Dramatistic Theory of Rhetorical Movements," p. 472.
- ⁶⁹Burke, Language as Symbolic Action, p. 16.
- ⁷⁰Ibid., p. 17.
- ⁷¹Ibid., p. 19.
- ⁷²Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 276.
- ⁷³Ibid.
- ⁷⁴Ibid.
- ⁷⁵See Weaver, op. cit. (above, note 26), p. 212.
- ⁷⁶Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 189.
- ⁷⁷Ibid., p. 190.
- ⁷⁸Burke, A Grammar of Motives, pp. 420-421.
- ⁷⁹Burke, Permanence and Change, pp. 74-75.
- ⁸⁰Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, p. 66.
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- ⁸²Burke, Attitudes toward History, p. 315.
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- ⁸⁴Karl Mannheim, Man and Society in the Age of Reconstruction: Studies in Modern Social Structure, trans. Edward Shils (Harvest ed., New York, 1940), pp. 129ff.
- ⁸⁵Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 208.
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- ¹¹⁷Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 220.
- ¹¹⁸Galbraith, op. cit. (above, note 83), p. 9.
- ¹¹⁹Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, p. 46.
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