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Arnold, Magda B. Emotion and Personality (Vol. 1. Psychological Aspects.) New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1960.

There are two volumes in this series. Vol. 1 is concerned with the psychological aspects of emotion and personality and Vol. 2 is concerned with the neurological and physiological aspects. I have concentrated on Vol. 1 in excerpting pertinent sections; however, I am xeroxing the concluding chapter of Vol. 2 ("Some Positive Human Emotions") and attaching it to the end of this summary. In regard to the question as to whether different emotions are represented physiologically by different bodily reactions, Arnold is ~~on~~ on the side of Funkenstein (see my report on his Mastery of Stress which I gave you some time ago) in that she agrees with him that such differences exist. It still seems a question as to what evidence one wishes to stress in making his point, however, since there are others who believe that ~~there is no question of physiological distinctions~~ the question of physiological distinctions among various emotional states remains an open one (for e.g., see my review of Schachter's article on "Determinants of emotional state"--I also took up these opposing viewpoints in my review of Funkenstein's work.)

Feeling as mental element

When we attempt to define feeling from direct experience, to distinguish it from emotion, we find first that most feelings are experiences of mild intensity while emotions imply that we are strongly moved. We might suspect that there is merely a distinction of degree and not of kind. But on closer examination we find that there is a qualitative difference also. Emotions vary in kind: there is fear, anger, joy, love, or hate. Feelings are positive or negative, pleasant or unpleasant. Emotions themselves can be either pleasant or unpleasant, without losing their distinctive emotional quality. Both fear and anger may be unpleasant, but however much they are reduced in intensity, fear will still be fear and anger will remain anger. They will never blend into one diffuse feeling of unpleasantness. But if the feeling of unpleasantness is increased in intensity, it will eventually become pain (a piercing sound, a bright light, increasing pressure). If pleasantness is increased, it will become pleasure....Accordingly, the extremes of pleasant feelings may be called pleasure, those of unpleasant feelings, pain. Increased unpleasant feelings are never felt as fear or anger or hate. Emotions may be like feelings in that both indicate something is agreeable or attractive, and something else is disagreeable and unattractive. But they are unlike feelings in that emotions are going out to some object while feelings merely indicate our reactions to a particular aspect of an object or a situation. Feelings can vary while the emotion remains the same: anger expressed without any fear of retaliation may be rather pleasant; anger unexpressed is extremely unpleasant. Requited love is pleasant, love unrequited, most disagreeable. If we agree that feelings include pleasantness and unpleasantness, then we must conclude that they are distinct from emotions....If feeling is used to indicate awareness of some bodily or psychological state which I experience directly, that state itself can be felt as either pleasant or unpleasant. If it is neither, it will be reported as indifferent. In every case pleasantness and unpleasantness refer to the way in which this state is felt: how it feels to have a sensation or an emotion, to make a deliberate effort, or to engage in psychological or physical activity. Eventually, what produces a pleasant or unpleasant state of mind is itself called pleasant or unpleasant. Following common usage, we can use the term 'feeling' to indicate a state of mind. Emotions can now be distinguished from feeling. While an emotion indicates my attitude to an object (I want a thing or fear it), feelings refer to one of its aspects. When I say, 'The taste of ~~the~~ wine is pleasant,' I mean that I like the taste, though I do not necessarily want or take wine. But when I say that I like wine, it means that I will take it when it is offered. If I say that quinine is unpleasant, I mean that I dislike its taste though I may willingly take it as a remedy for malaria. When I find something pleasant, I regard a particular feature or quality of the object. When I like something, I usually react to the whole object. Emotion always focuses on the object, while feeling reveals my momentary state of mind. Thus we say, 'I love my wife (or husband)' but 'Love is pleasant.' In the first phrase, we indicate that we are occupied with another person; in the second, that we are occupied with our own feeling state" (19-21).

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Feeling as reaction to sensory experience

In a concluding statement ~~xxx~~ about what feeling is, the author writes: "...feeling is neither a mental element nor an organic sensation, nor can it be equated with the felt experience of various pressure patterns. Feeling is a direct experience and ~~not~~ a construct nor an inference. It is a conscious reaction to our experience of things (including our body) and reflects the effect of such experiences on us. Any sensation may be indifferent, pleasant, or unpleasant. In fact, one ~~xxxxxxx~~ and the same sensation may at first be pleasant, then become indifferent, and finally be definitely unpleasant. Hence feeling is not only different from sensation but also indicates how the sensation affects us. Feeling may persist ~~x~~ even after the object that aroused it has disappeared; hence the effect of a sensation can outlast it. Not only sensations but emotions also may be either pleasant or unpleasant, though they ordinarily are so engrossing that we do not stop to see how they affect us" (70).

"When we find motor activities pleasant, our feeling is based on the realization that these activities go on smoothly, without effort. Dancing, running, skating, or swimming are pleasant only as long as we are rested and vigorous. With fatigue, they become decidedly unpleasant, ~~(for instance, a person who has exercised until he is exhausted)~~ ~~xxxxxxx~~ Similarly, thinking is pleasant when thoughts flow easily and lead to satisfactory conclusions. Imagination is pleasant (for instance, for a creative writer when images and scenes come easily so that the story is almost writing itself). These psychological activities are impeded when their results are meager and unsatisfactory....Theories of feeling as the experience of enhanced or impeded functioning date back to Aristotle. Later versions, which have been suggested by several psychologists, usually imply that pleasantness or pleasure builds up vital energy and that unpleasantness or pain depletes it. The meaning advocated here is far simpler: any function, sensory, psychological, or physiological, may be enhanced or hindered under certain conditions and thus functioning may be made easy or difficult. When functioning is easy and effortless, it will be pleasant. When it is made difficult, it will be unpleasant" (71).

"Granted that unpleasantness is a reaction to impeded functioning...there must be some recognition or appraisal of functioning before unpleasantness can actually be experienced....It would seem, then, that we have to postulate some function that will mediate such an appraisal. The estimate of what is favorable or unfavorable must be direct and immediate, as direct as sense perception, for it is not a deliberative or reflective judgment. The traditional philosophy has called this sense-like process the 'estimative sense' and has considered it one of the internal senses, together with memory and imagination. Since it is necessary to ~~not~~ postulate such a sense-like process of appraising to account for the facts, we are justified in proposing it as a hypothetical construct. This appraisal is not only direct and immediate; it is also intuitive and unwitting. We are unaware that we have made such a judgment, a fact that may speak against our inference that it occurs. [It has been pointed out] that we are not immediately aware of the working of any of our functions. We are directly aware only of the results of such functioning. We are aware of our movement, but not of the working of our muscles that has brought it about. We are aware of what we see or hear or think, but not of the way in which we see, hear, or think. Similarly, we are not aware of the way in which this appraisal is performed. We only know the results, feelings of pleasure or pain, of pleasantness or unpleasantness. When we reflect upon our ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ experience of pleasantness and unpleasantness, we are aware of appraising this thing as good (pleasant), that as bad (unpleasant); and we often assume that such evaluation is the result of our feeling experience. But the process of appraisal seems to be inherent in the feeling experience, just as the process of sensing is inherent in the experience of sight or sound or touch. Reflection on the feeling experience merely makes such appraisal explicit. Our appraisal evaluates that aspect of the object that is sensed by us, an aspect which affects us over one particular sense modality. It is the objective quality that is appraised; but it is the sense function that is either enhanced or impeded" (72-73).

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Some of the appraisals are reflective as well as intuitive. We may be unpleasantly aware of the difficulty of thinking or writing, the sparse flow of ideas and images. But we are also dissatisfied with the kind of ideas produced with such effort, and eventually decide that we are not up to any serious work today. The sheer awareness of the difficulty in getting ideas is intuitive and results in unpleasantness. The judgment that these ideas are inadequate is reflective. This may be accompanied by another intuitive judgment that such poverty of ideas is bad, which will arouse annoyance, depression, or despair, depending on what we think can be done about it....We can now define feeling as a positive or negative reaction to some experience. Pleasure and pleasantness are positive reactions, varying only in intensity. They can be defined as a welcoming of something sensed that is appraised as beneficial and indicates enhanced functioning. Pain and unpleasantness are negative reactions, varying in intensity and can be defined as a resistance to something sensed that is appraised as harmful and indicates impaired functioning. What is pleasant is liked, what is unpleasant, disliked....Feelings are reactions to experience. This is in most cases sensory experience, but may be the immediate awareness of thinking, imagining, understanding. The type of feeling, whether pleasantness or unpleasantness, will depend on the appraisal of experience as good or bad for us. The quality of pleasantness or unpleasantness will depend on the type of experience that is appraised. Thus we can distinguish sense-bound pleasure, the pleasure of motion or of mental activity, the feeling of physical well-being, and emotional pleasure" (74-75).

"We must attend to the aspect of the object that affects us before we can report a feeling of pleasantness or unpleasantness. Without special attention, we deal with the whole object. We treat it as something to eat or throw away, to investigate or disregard, without focusing on any one aspect. Hence it has generally been found that a special attitude ~~xxx~~ to the object is necessary before a person will report pleasantness or unpleasantness. In Beebe-Center's words, the person must assume ~~x~~ 'a specific evaluative disposition.' We would say that he must let one particular aspect affect him and report on it. Attention does not arouse feelings; it merely allows us to become aware of them. Without attention, the feelings aroused by one particular quality of the object are so faint that they are swallowed up in our pre-occupation with the object and its effect on us" (76).

Feeling and emotion: "Linguistic usage seems to hint at a progression from pleasantness to pleasure, from unpleasantness to pain. Older writers have usually used the extremes of feeling, pleasure and pain, while psychologists have usually restricted their discussions to the terms pleasantness and unpleasantness, the more moderate feeling states induced in their experiments. Occasionally it has been held that the distinction between feelings and emotions is merely a difference in intensity; yet the extremes of feeling, pleasure and pain, are as intense as any of the experiences of intense emotion, for instance, intense fear or anger, joy or love. No matter how intense, pleasure and pain are not usually considered emotions. Both feeling and emotion are based upon an intuitive estimate that something is 'good or bad for me.' But emotion is aroused by an object or a situation as a whole, rather than by a specific aspect of it; and in emotions, this object is appraised as good for a specific action, as good to eat or drink or embrace. In contrast, pleasantness of every degree up to the most intense pleasure is aroused usually by a particular aspect of the object and sensed via one sense modality, though eventually the motor system is affected also. The same is true for unpleasantness and pain. The greatest intensity of feeling, pleasure and pain, is a reaction to somesthetic sensations. Sexual pleasure, for instance, is first the pleasure of touch, next the pleasure of muscular contraction, and finally that of muscular relaxation. All of these pleasures have a specific quality. Pain also is a reaction to somesthetic stimulation: to touch, pressure, heat, cold, or muscular spasm....Both pain and pleasure do not lead to specific actions, as do emotions, but bring about general effects on the motor system. Pleasure results in relaxation, pain in muscular tension and movements of avoidance. Degrees of pleasantness and unpleasantness are reactions to various sensations and activities, including emotions. If a man is afraid of snakes or of losing



his job, that fear will affect him adversely; he will estimate it as unpleasant. As long as the danger remains, his fear will remain and so will his feeling of unpleasantness. But the fear never merges into unpleasantness. Since feelings depend on the same sense judgments as do emotions; they should be mediated by the same central structures. At the same time, emotions ~~x~~ also include a tendency to specific action and thus would seem to require an additional circuit.... There are few experimental findings that demonstrate the difference between the two affective states, mainly because feeling and emotion have usually been taken as different either in complexity or intensity. Few psychologists have designed experiments that would demonstrate a qualitative difference. Gemelli (1949), who proposed a similar distinction, is an exception. He describes 'objective feelings' which are reactions to sensations, for instance, feelings of hunger, thirst, well-being, discomfort, anguish, lightness, strength, and others. Emotions, which he calls 'subjective feelings,' are produced when a person 'considers a situation or an object or a person in relation to himself.' (Footnote: An equally good case can be made for calling feelings 'subjective' and emotions 'objective': Feelings are reactions to a subjective experience, while emotions are reactions to objects or situations. Gemelli apparently considers that feelings are in a sense impersonal, the reaction to sensations which the person undergoes; hence he calls them 'objective.' Since the terms 'subjective' and 'objective' can be understood in such an ambiguous way, we refrain from using them to distinguish feelings and emotions.).... These reports exemplify Gemelli's contention that there is first an 'objective feeling' which is then followed by a 'subjective feeling,' the emotion proper. Now it is true that there is always a reaction to the sensory aspect of a situation. But as soon as the person identifies it as coming from some object or being connected with some situation, he focuses on object or situation and feels himself repelled by it or drawn to it; and the feeling is lost in the emotion.... Gemelli postulates ~~many~~ other feelings ~~besides~~ besides pleasantness and unpleasantness, such as feelings of hunger, anguish, lightness, and strength. For him hunger and thirst are reactions ~~at~~ to organic sensations, and hence 'objective' feelings. We shall see later... that hunger includes both organic sensations and an impulse to eat. Sensation of lightness or strength can be felt as pleasant or unpleasant; but apart from such feelings, they are surely integrated organic sensations.... Feelings of anguish should perhaps be counted among 'subjective feelings' or emotions proper, according to Gemelli's own definition, for they are all-pervasive and involve the person in his relation to a total situation. Well-being and discomfort seem to be what we have called 'general feelings' of pleasantness and unpleasantness. Hence it seems that pleasantness and unpleasantness are the only dimensions of feeling that stand up to analysis" (80-82).

"Our explanation of feeling seems to stand up to examination when confronted with experimental evidence.... it also fits into a wider scheme in which feeling and emotion are affective responses to the environment, based upon the intuitive appraisal that something is good or bad for us. The only difference is that feeling is based upon the immediate, intuitive estimate of a particular aspect of an object or situation, while emotion is based on the immediate, intuitive estimate of the object as it affects us and demands a particular action" (88).

Phenomenological analysis of emotion

"...the causal relation between perceived object, emotional experience, and bodily upset has been a problem to theorists throughout the ages. From the time when psychology became a science, three main solutions have been advocated: (1) that perception arouses emotion and emotions then causes bodily changes; (2) that perception induces bodily changes that are felt as emotion; (3) that perception arouses both emotion and bodily changes. There have been many psychologists who have seen the problem involved in the causal relations of these three factors, but none of them has solved it adequately or consistently.... The only approach that promises a solution of the problem of how perception arouses ~~emotion~~ emotion is a careful phenomenological analysis of the whole sequence from perception to emotion and action. Sartre attempted such an analysis, but his fascination with the way in which emotion

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emotion changes the world, seemingly for all time to come, sent him into bypaths where we cannot follow him. His antithesis of emotion and action makes of emotion a magical wand that transforms reality into a fantasy world where action is suspended altogether. We hope to examine emotion as a human experience and trace the link that connects emotion with action" (169-170).

"In emotion, as in perception, there is not only someone who experiences but also someone or something that occasions the experience. We are afraid of something, we rejoice over something, we love someone, we are angry at something or someone. Emotion seems to have an object just as sense perception does. To say that emotion may be vague and objectless, as in neurotic anxiety or in depression, is to confuse the issue. These are departures from normal functioning. Normal emotion carries with it the reference to an object or situation that is known in some way" (170).

"The object or situation may be actually present, as in the reunion of lovers after long absence. It may be in the past, as a remembered injury done to a friend. It may be the anticipation of some future event, as an impending automobile collision. Emotion may even be aroused by something merely imagined, as the possible loss of a job, or winning the Grand Prize in the Irish Sweep. To have an emotion, it is necessary to perceive or know the object in some way, though it is not necessary to know it accurately or correctly. In fact, we may ascribe to what we love or fear qualities that exist only in our imagination. We may love or fear something for reasons that have nothing to do with its physical nature or with the way it affects our sense organs. ~~XXI~~ What arouses our emotion need not be a single concrete thing or person. It can be a group of people...or a complex situation" (171).

"How, then, can emotion be distinguished from sense perception? Both perception and emotion have an object; but in emotion the object is known in a particular way. To perceive or apprehend something means that I know what it is like as a thing, apart from any effect on me. To like ~~or~~ dislike it means that I know it not only objectively, as it is apart from me, but also that I estimate its relation to me, that I appraise it as desirable or undesirable, valuable or harmful for me, so that I am drawn toward it or repelled by it. To arouse an emotion, the object must be appraised as affecting me in some way, affecting me personally as an individual with my particular experience and my particular aims" (171).

"Since emotion has an objective, something to be gained or avoided that is appraised as good or harmful, desirable or undesirable, the question arises whether this appraisal itself could be the emotion. If I love somebody, does loving consist merely in estimating him to be good for me? Surely not, for it is possible to form an estimate that is entirely unemotional. Often enough, we do realize that a given person would make a good friend, husband, or wife, that a given association would be both desirable and profitable--yet we feel no attraction and make no move toward closer friendship. Emotion seems to include not only the appraisal of how this thing or person will affect me but also a definite pull toward or away from it. In fact, does not the emotional quale consist precisely in that unreasoning involuntary attraction or repulsion? If I merely know things or persons as they are apart from me, there is no emotion. If I know them and judge them theoretically and abstractly to be good for me, there may still be no emotion. But if I think something is good for me ~~and I feel myself drawn toward it, sometimes even against my better judgment, then my experience is, properly speaking, nonrational; it is other than just cold reason; it is an addition to knowledge; it is emotional.~~ here and now, and feel myself drawn toward it, sometimes even against my better judgment, then my experience is, properly speaking, nonrational; it is other than just cold reason; it is an addition to knowledge; it is emotional." (172).

"The appraisal that arouses an emotion is not abstract; it is not the result of reflection. It is immediate and indeliberate. If we see somebody stab at our eye with his finger, we avoid the threat instantly, even though we may know that he does not intend to hurt or even to touch us. Before we can make such an instant response, we must have estimated somehow that the stabbing finger could hurt. Since the movement is immediate, unwitting, or even contrary to our better knowledge, this appraisal

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of possible harm must be similarly immediate. Animals and very young children seem to be able to judge things that are harmful and things that are good to have, for they avoid the one and approach the other. They may have to learn, of course, that some judgments are mistaken. Small children or kittens may well reach for a candle flame the first time they see it and will be burned. Once burned, they avoid it....There must be a psychological capacity of appraising how a given thing will affect us, whether it will hurt or please us, before we can want to approach or avoid it. To call upon mere 'learning,' 'past experience,' or the 'conditioned reflex' for an explanation is futile. Without such appraisal learning would be impossible and past experience useless" (172-173).

There is a significant difference "between sense judgment and reflective judgment. When the elephant tests the ground with his foot, he makes a sense judgment. When the physicist tests a hypothesis by an experiment, he makes intellectual judgments. What we call appraisal or estimate is close to such a sense judgment. In emotional experience such appraisal is always direct, immediate; it is a sense judgment and includes a reflective judgment only as a secondary evaluation....Such sense judgments are direct, immediate, nonreflective, nonintellectual, automatic, 'instinctive,' 'intuitive.' The terms 'instinctive' and 'intuitive', whenever they were used to describe such sense judgments, had the meaning of direct, immediate, nonreflective, as, for instance, in the phrases: 'he shrank back instinctively,' or 'he knew intuitively that he had met a friend.' This usage is still common in literature but has been banished from psychological writings because of the mistaken conviction that 'instinctive' must mean a mechanical behavior pattern and 'intuitive' must have the character of a hunch. In the context of this book, the term 'intuitive appraisal' will mean the direct, immediate, sense judgment of weal or woe" (175).

"In the human adult and the older child, the estimate of weal or woe is both intuitive and reflective. But the intuitive judgment is immediate; the reflective judgment follows. This is shown by the fact that the intuitive appraisal is often supplemented or corrected by later reflection. When this happens, the emotion changes with the new intuitive estimate which follows the corrective judgment" (175). The author, of course, is referring here to emotion, but the relation to what Festinger's ideas on the reduction of cognitive dissonance once a decision has been made is an interesting one. The author here states that emotion is first of all an immediate "intuitive appraisal" kind of response, but that emotion can change with later reflection, what she terms "reflective judgment." The reflective judgment would seem to be based more upon intellectual processes, upon past learning, and the like...and it is exactly in this regard that the idea of cognitive dissonance comes into play. Just off the top of my head right here, Erich, it seems to me that the concept of immediate intuitive appraisal as one aspect of emotion relates to some of your ideas as to what a "real feeling" is all about (although the author has discussed the difference between what she considers a feeling and an emotion... ..but this is besides the point right here), and the aspect of reflective judgment which then changes the emotion experienced would relate to your ideas as to when a feeling is not a true feeling, but rather a "thought feeling"---and, of course, once you talk about thought in regard to a feeling, all your ideas about the "social filter" and "categories of thought" have a bearing on this topic. (Festinger's ideas about cognitive dissonance have a place in ~~your~~ your concepts of social filter and thought schemas.)

"To know or perceive something and to estimate its effect on us are two distinct processes, and appraisal necessarily presupposes perception. The perception of an object requires the integration of sense impressions even within one sense modality, for we perceive objects, patterns, or shapes, not simply a collection of colors, tones, or touch impressions. It also requires the integration of impressions from various sense modalities, for we know that the sound we hear comes from this bell we can feel as hard and smooth and see as golden and shining. To estimate how it affects us personally (for instance, when someone threatens to toss it to us) seems to require a further step beyond perception which cannot be the function of any one sense modality nor of all of them together. At the same time, as we have

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seen, this appraisal is instant and intuitive; hence it cannot be the result of reflection but must be the work of some integrative sensory function. Following upon perception and completing it, appraisal makes possible an active approach, acceptance or withdrawal, and thus establishes our relationship to the outside world. The process by which isolated sensations are integrated so that we perceive things and people is not open to introspection. We know that such integration must occur in all living beings with sense organs and we assume that it is the result of some integrative nervous function. Only in special cases can a pure sensation be experienced apart from the object and its meaning for us: for instance, people born blind, who regain their vision after an operation, at first see patches of color instead of objects. For anyone who is not blind, sense impressions are immediately and automatically ordered into objects; only when the sensory cortex is destroyed is this integration disturbed. After injury of the visual cortex, for instance, the patient sees colored patches instead of patterns or objects. The process by which we estimate whether a thing is harmful or good for us is similarly direct and intuitive, hidden from inspection. A fear or anger reaction follows so quickly upon a sudden threat that it may be all but impossible to separate perception, appraisal, and emotion. In other cases, there is no perceptible time interval between grasping the meaning of the situation and feeling the emotion, but there may be a perceptible interval between perceiving the situation and realizing its import for us. The fact that perception and appraisal can thus be separated shows that sense perception alone is not sufficient for an emotion" (176-177).

"As soon as we appraise something as worth having in an immediate and intuitive way, we feel an attraction toward it. As soon as we intuitively judge that something is threatening, we feel repelled from it, we feel urged to avoid it. The intuitive appraisal of the situation initiates an action tendency that is felt as emotion, expressed in various bodily changes, and that eventually may lead to overt action. Normally, the sequence perception-appraisal-emotion is so closely knit that our everyday experience is never the strictly objective knowledge of a thing; it is always a knowing-and-liking, or a knowing-and-disliking. There is hardly any object we simply note as such without appraising it" (177).

"In the past, psychologists have analyzed the sequence emotion-expression-action rather than the sequence perception-appraisal-emotion. As a result, it has often been claimed that perception and emotion follow upon each other immediately, that they are always associated and should be considered as one. Every perception, it is said, is accompanied by some feeling tone, hence perceptual and emotional processes cannot be separated. It is quite true that perception and appraisal (and therefore emotion) normally occur together, but there are obviously some instances where emotion is at a minimum, and others where emotion is so intense that it blots out all incidental perceptions. In between there are all shades of intensity, unrelated to the intensity of sensation. Since the two processes, perception and affect, do not vary together, they cannot be identical, though their connection in time is exceedingly close" (178).

"The attraction of repulsion felt in emotion is not a mere psychological state; it is an impulse to action that brings with it a host of physiological changes.... Since different emotions urge us to different actions, and the physiological symptoms are relieved when we give in to this urge, we might expect that the physiological changes, taken by and large, will be as different as are the emotions. We know from personal experience that the physical sensations we feel are different in different emotions.... For each emotion, there is a distinct pattern that remains more or less constant and is recognized as characteristic for that emotion. Whether we are afraid of a bear, a snake, or a thunderstorm, our bodily sensations during these various experiences are very much alike. When we are afraid, we tremble, our heart races, we feel chilly, have clammy hands, and suffer from general malaise, the more pronounced the longer it lasts. When we are bubbling over with joy, we have quite a different bodily experience; and never would we mistake the one for the other. It may be difficult to describe these differences



accurately even to our own satisfaction (let alone to the satisfaction of the psychologists) but subjectively we feel quite sure of it. In any experience of the same emotion, the same pattern is repeated and is more or less widespread and intense, according to the intensity of the emotion. True, two different people may show and experience fear or any other emotion in individually different ways; nevertheless, there will always be a core that is similar from person to person even from man to animal. Unless there were such a core, we would never recognize emotions in another human being, let alone in animals. Since the felt tendency to approach or withdraw comes in full strength as soon as we have appraised the situation, while the physical disturbance takes an appreciable time to reach its peak, the felt emotion cannot be identical with the physical upset. Both may start at the same time; both are the result of appraisal: but the physical disturbance requires the conduction of nerve impulses from brain to periphery while the experience of emotion evidently does not. Lehmann (1914), Newman and associates (1930), and others have found repeatedly that an emotion is reported before any peripheral changes can be felt or observed. ~~Through~~ Secondary appraisal. The physical changes that come with emotion are sensed and appraised in turn. They may be evaluated as having a meaning, indicating some physical condition that affects the person in some way. If a man is afraid without paying attention to his fear (as happened, e.g., time and again to pilots during bombing missions) the physiological effects of fear may be noted with surprise long after the threat is over" (178-180).

Definition of emotion: "We have seen that emotion is an experience in which the person appraises the object as affecting himself. Such an appraisal of the object results in a felt attraction or aversion, and eventually (if no other motive interferes) in approach or avoidance. Perception is completed by an ~~intuitive~~ intuitive appraisal that arouses emotion. Hence the sequence perception-appraisal-emotion comes before the sequence emotion-expression-action, which so far has been emphasized almost exclusively in psychological theory. It is the sequence perception-appraisal-emotion that alone will explain the conditions necessary for arousing emotion. Since the emotion is experienced as an action tendency, it must excite brain circuits that give rise to emotion/expression and action....These expressive patterns then allow us to recognize emotions in others, both in men and animals. In human beings, bodily changes may be appraised in turn when they are felt, particularly when the connection of appraisal with emotion and autonomic changes has escaped attention because the person was otherwise occupied. Summing up our discussion, we can now define emotion as the felt tendency toward anything intuitively appraised as good (beneficial), or away from anything intuitively appraised as bad (harmful). This attraction or aversion is accompanied by a pattern of physiological changes organized toward approach or withdrawal. The patterns differ for different emotions." (181).

Therapeutic development of emotion

At the conclusion of this volume (Vol. 1), there are two chapters, one on 'Basic Emotions' and the other on 'Basic Emotions in Psychological Theory.' I think the material in both of these chapters will be of interest to you. If I were to do a thorough job on these two chapters (and on the last chapter in Vol. 2 on 'Some Positive Human Emotions'), I would wind up excerpting nearly everything in those sections. Instead, I am xeroxing these chapters in their entirety and attaching them.

Vol. 2. Neurological and Physiological Aspects

This volume is concerned primarily with the physiological and neurological evidence that the author presents to substantiate her theory of emotion as she outlined it in Volume 1...which I have presented in the preceding pages here. Although what she does give here is interesting, I do not see it as having direct bearing on your interests in these volumes. Therefore, I am excerpting only very little from this volume. I am, however, attaching a copy of her concluding chapter (in its entirety) on 'Some Positive Human Emotions.'

In her review of the neurological and physiological data, the author concludes that "...different emotions produce different physiological changes. Anger and



rage are accompanied by massive motor innervation and the secretion of noradrenaline, and eventually lead to muscular incoordination. Love and affection have mild cholinergic effects that lead to a sense of well-being and heightened efficiency. Fear, on the other hand, excites adrenergic pathways. If it is mild and the threat can be avoided, the harmful effects of temporary sympathetic excitation are negligible. But if fear is pronounced or chronic, the intense sympathetic excitation may seriously impede normal physiological functioning. Emotions related to fear will have similar effects. Sadness, sorrow, and depression show a heightened level of sympathetic activity without the usual parasympathetic reaction. (Funkenstein.) As a result, the action circuit and perhaps even the estimative system seem to be severely inhibited, which accounts for the indifference and 'retardation' so characteristic of such states. Impatience and irritability, on the other hand, seem to be the result of increased excitability of the estimative system, which can be brought about by a number of factors, among which the habit of reacting impulsively, without deliberation, surely plays a role." (265).

"Whatever the emotion, once it is ended, the organismic balance will be restored, though not completely. We have seen that every appraisal brings with it an expectation that the object of our emotion will remain constant in its effect upon us. Every new appraisal of a similar situation builds upon earlier expectations, eventually creating an enduring emotional attitude. Though the physiological changes may not be large on each occasion, they will have a cumulative effect if the emotion occurs repeatedly, for the disposition to such changes seems to be preserved and registered as autonomic motor engrams in the prefrontal association areas. When an emotion recurs persistently, the emotional attitude that develops from it will eventually stand out among others and will dominate the person's outlook as well as influence his bodily functioning" (266).

"The most obvious example of such cumulative changes in bodily functioning is the habit of muscular tension and posture as it develops in different individuals. A small child is extraordinarily relaxed, almost as much as a kitten.... But the human adult is far from having the flexibility and relaxed grace of a full-grown cat. There are far-reaching individual differences in the degree of muscular tension. The anxiety neurotic is almost rigid, particularly when he attempts to relax.... Such habits of tension and posture are the result of attitudes an individual develops toward things and people around him, of his habitual readiness for particular actions" (266).... "With repetition, the physiological effects of his habitual emotion have become cumulative, and gradually they leave their mark on face, posture, and movements" (267).

