



ingly vague. This much he does specify about them: they include a wide range of statements going from sense reports to mathematical propositions; there are some such statements in science and ethics; epistemology furnishes part of the fund in the form of normative principles of coherence and action; there is some sort of conformity with experience. Such terminal sentences are not held absolutely, but at least for the present they are regarded as stable.

There are two unsatisfactory features in this solution. First, White leaves unexplored the reference of terminal sentences to experience, and hence leaves obscure the original basis for giving selective belief to precisely these sentences. This omission is due to his eagerness to avoid reinstating a mathematical empyrean. He is willing to call the terminal sentences *a priori*, simply because of the performatory act in which we resolve to give them stable acceptance. This meaning for the *a priori* is a loose, poetic way of noting that some statements are expected to weather many a crisis. In the second place, White makes philosophical reunion contingent upon our giving up the search after real existents and attributes, and concentrating upon the procedures of linguistic activity. This is an extreme reaction to the objectifying tendencies of Frege and Russell. If the root-phenomenon of linguistic analysis is the firm belief expressed in the terminal sentence, then even the linguistic approach invites one to give up the exclusive universalism of speech-acts. It asks us also to attend to the significance of what White himself calls the factual considerations and conformity to experience, but approached without the objectifying bias of the earlier Russell.

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***The Sane Society.* By Erich Fromm. New York: Rinehart and Company, 1955. Pp. xiii + 363, with index. \$5.00.**

To review a book of this scope is difficult. One must read the book to appreciate it fully. We can, however, discuss some salient points. This review is divided into: (1) the argument of the book; and (2) a critique.

Accepting the evolution of the person from animal life, Fromm distinguishes the first man from his ancestors by his capacity for thought, imagination, and self-awareness. Feeling uprooted because he

"first emerged from the animal world as a freak of nature" (p. 353 and p. 23 ff.), man attempted to re-identify himself with the world by worshipping animals. About 4000 years ago, he made himself relatively free, using reason and conscience as guides to make a human home to replace his lost home in mother nature. To accomplish this, the great religious teachers before Christ set as goals of human life the unity of man, reason, love and justice. This tradition was continued by Christ and subsequently by Mohammed.

Counting as worthless the achievements of the Middle Ages, ignoring them, man, in the sixteenth century A. D., discovered nature and the individual, and the natural sciences began. The Middle Ages had collapsed, and with it the theology that had unified men. Science now became the unifying principle.

Although man freed himself from clerical and secular authority, he is afraid of his freedom, and, consequently, cannot be fully himself, that is, fully productive. Today, man does not search for God, but seeks to dominate nature to increase his material comfort. Production and consumption themselves become ends instead of means to a full human life. A man experiences himself as a commodity to be sold on the labor market to be able to consume more and more. This equates his value as a person and his ability to sell his labor. Happiness is the consumption of better and newer commodities. Thus, he is back where primitive man was—worshipping the product of his own hands. Science now ceases to be a unifying principle because man has lost reason, love, and the ability for decision. Individual initiative has been killed by the "bureaucratization" and "managerialization" of capitalism which tends to manipulate men not as human but as abstract quantities (pp. 110-120). This intensifies man's alienation and creates "socially patterned defects" which are an attempt to compensate for any neuroses which can break out in such a basically insane situation.

The problem today is further heightened by the conflict between Western capitalism which clothes itself in the ideas of liberty, reason and individualism, and Eastern socialism with its ideas of solidarity and equality. The West has possibilities for greater human freedom, while the East is bogged down in Soviet totalitarianism which makes a man an efficient automaton.

But Capitalism and authoritarian Communism have many similarities: "Both systems are based on industrialization, their goal is ever-increasing economic efficiency and wealth. They are societies run by a



managerial class, and by professional politicians. They both are thoroughly materialistic in their outlook, regardless of Christian ideology in the West and secular messianism in the East. They organize man in a centralized system, in large factories, political mass parties. Everybody is a cog in the machine, and has to function smoothly. In the West, this is achieved by a method of psychological conditioning, mass suggestion, monetary rewards. In the East by all this, plus the use of terror. It is to be assumed that the more the Soviet system develops economically, the less severely will it have to exploit the majority of the population, hence the more can terror be replaced by methods of psychological manipulation. The West develops rapidly in the direction of Huxley's *Brave New World*, the East is today Orwell's '1984.' But both systems tend to converge" (pp. 358-359).

What does this situation promise for the future? The first alternative is atomic war, which would bring about either the destruction of industrial civilization with a consequent return to agrarian civilization, or, world domination by one victor through a centralized state based on force. The second is to avert war, and then the only other road open to man is for both Capitalism and Communism to continue automatization and alienation under the domination of a managerial class, a situation in which intelligence increases while reason, wisdom and love deteriorate. Such a situation is fertile ground for a general schizoid self-alienated insanity.

What is the solution?

Abolish war, completely disarm; provide a relative and equitable sharing of wealth and income so that the "experience of life" may not be different between various social classes. This entails property ownership changes to create a "community of work." To accomplish this, there must be a new division of economic resources, international economic cooperation and planning, retention of the industrial method coupled with the co-management of all workers. In politics, forms of world government must be tried, and both work and state decentralized, allowing only such minimum centralization as industry requires; town meetings and small "face to face" discussion and voting groups should be set up. In the cultural sphere, work and education should be combined for the young; universal adult education should be initiated; and a new system of popular art and secular ritual for all should be created; lastly, all social institutions and planning must serve to make man more productive in a truly human manner. These changes must

be brought about simultaneously in all spheres. They will make man fully awake to human living and help him face the contradictions of his existence in a human way. In short: "Man today is confronted with the most fundamental choice; not that between Capitalism or Communism, but that between *robotism* (of both the capitalist and communist variety), or Humanistic Communitarian Socialism" (p. 363).

Numerous daily experiences and statistics prove that twentieth century man is self-alienated. Dr. Fromm is correct in stressing an understanding of man's nature as a starting point for any solution. He says that the problem cannot be coped with from one point of view alone, and yet he maintains only one throughout the book: humanistic psychoanalysis with a Marxist twist. The "psychoanalysis" is excellent; the "humanistic" ephemeral; the "Marxist" suspect.

There are some theses that are debatable. For example: who has proven that man first emerged from the animal kingdom as a *freak* of nature? This is an important premise of Dr. Fromm's reasoning. Is it true that nature and the individual were not discovered until the sixteenth century? Would it not be more accurate to say that in the sixteenth century man began to deify the individual? Is man afraid of his freedom today, or is it not rather that man has lost sight of the ultimate goal of his freedom? Is it true that production and consumption are no longer means to a full human life, but ends in themselves; that a man today views himself as a commodity on the labor market? Certainly, in this country—and the book is aimed at this country—"a man today" is noted for his sense of individuality and his superiority to the labor market; if he does not like his job, he will change jobs; as a union member, he casts his vote, and he can rise to leadership. He is anything but a commodity in his own eyes; and the employer does not dare risk treating him like a commodity.

Whence Dr. Fromm's dark view of things? Throughout the book he gradually builds a case in favor of a total change of our civilization over to a humanitarian communitarian socialism; hence he focuses only on those points which will paint a picture that demands such a change. This biases the whole work, distorting some of his genuine insights into the necessity for adult education, small discussion groups, social justice, real charity, and his discovery of socially patterned defects.

One could take issue with the contention that capitalism, as we have it, kills initiative; on the contrary, we may be confronted with too much of it.



"Property ownership changes" suggested by Dr. Fromm has about it the ring of a denial of the right to private property inherent in the individual. How can there be international economic planning? Who is to do it? As always, who would consistently abide by it? There is no mention of the use of sanctions, so necessary for law whether on the domestic or international levels. This seems to indicate a lack of recognition of the significance of free will and the true nature of man. In general, his view of the economic phase of civilization seems limited and one-sided. For example: there is no mention of the contribution of labor unions to the individual and to society as a whole; nor of the great social encyclicals. In a book of this type, one cannot ignore such important items without distortion of the truth.

The recommendation of a secular ritual seems a return to the last days of the Roman Empire; it calls to mind a society much like that described in Robert Hugh Benson's novel, *The Lord of the World*. It is aimed directly at true religion—one of Dr. Fromm's pet peeves.

In conclusion, there are two general observations to be made. This book is a sincere effort to help man and is written in popular style; but this does not grant license to pass off as facts what are not proven so, to give only one side of the picture. Scholarship must still manifest itself in a popular work through a clear-cut distinction between truth, probability and mere personal opinion.

Looking at things from a socialist's point of view, Dr. Fromm's summary of the choices open to man in the future is quite logical. His conclusions, however, go astray because he has no metaphysical understanding of man's nature. Coming right to the point: the problem is not so much man, as it is man's creation, namely, socialist ideology and outlook.

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***The Philosophy of Man.* By Henri Renard, S. J. Revised and enlarged by Martin O. Vaske, S. J. Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1956. Pp. xiv + 313, with index. \$3.00.**

Father Martin Vaske's recent revision and enlargement of Father Henri Renard's *The Philosophy of Man* has succeeded in making a respectable textbook in the philosophy of man an even better pedagogical

instrument. Father Vaske's purpose in revising *The Philosophy of Man* for its fourth printing has been to clarify and enlarge the original edition by the addition of expanded explanations when needed, the assignment of abstruse points to footnotes, and the additions of summaries at the end of each chapter. By and large this purpose has been successfully achieved, and the result is a textbook in Thomist philosophy of man, rather admirably suited for the ordinary undergraduate course in philosophical psychology.

The work of revision has been relatively drastic, clearly involving careful and thoughtful re-evaluation of the entire earlier edition. The first chapter, on life, has been completely rewritten. A general treatment of the immanent operations of man has been added to the second chapter, on the unity of man, and this chapter has itself been thoroughly overhauled. The seventh chapter of the original edition, on the appetites, has been expanded into three chapters, respectively on the sense appetites, the will, and habits. In addition, there has been at least minor revision, chiefly in mode of expression, in each of the other sections of the original work. Finally, there is the addition of a brief summary at the end of each chapter.

The revised edition includes nine chapters. Each chapter, with the exception of a brief chapter on knowledge in general, is divided into questions and articles. In all, there are sixty-six articles, each concerning itself with some significant problem in Thomist psychology. A final epilogue, on the last end of man, completes the exposition. To this is added an adequate index of important terms and names.

Father Vaske has been wise to follow the lead of Father Renard, limiting himself entirely to St. Thomas' philosophical consideration of man. In choosing not to include even related materials from the experimental area, he has succeeded in presenting a textbook which does not suffer from the "cluttered-up" effect evidenced in several current textbooks in philosophical psychology which have attempted, sometimes with questionable profit, to incorporate the new with the "old." The fact of the matter is that St. Thomas' philosophy of man is neither old in the sense of outdated, nor deficient by itself in the analysis of man proper to philosophy. Furthermore, there is little enough time in one semester simply to probe into the riches of St. Thomas' thought on man without attempting as well to comprehend the implications of more recent experimental findings. Some will undoubtedly criticize the book on this score, but, though admittedly there are persuasive arguments