

# Town Meeting



BULLETIN OF AMERICA'S TOWN MEETING OF THE AIR

BROADCAST BY STATIONS OF THE BLUE NETWORK  
MAY 27, 1943



## Will Russia's Abolition of the Comintern Help Win the Peace?

### Speakers

**MAX LERNER**

Assistant to the Publisher  
and Editorial Writer for *PM*

**LOUIS FISCHER**

Author, Lecturer, and  
Foreign Correspondent

### Interrogators

**JAMES G. McDONALD**

Blue Network Commentator

**HENRY J. TAYLOR**

Author of *Men in Motion*

### COMING

June 3, 1943

## Can Private Industry Provide Jobs for Our Fighting Men?

William Denton

Robert Guinther

Norman Thomas

Emil Mazey

June 10, 1943

## Should We Make Peace With Italy Now?

PREVIEW IN THIS ISSUE

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BULLETIN OF AMERICA'S TOWN MEETING OF THE AIR  
GEORGE V. DENNY, JR., MODERATOR



MAY 27, 1943

VOL. 9, No. 4

## Will Russia's Abolition of the Comintern Help Win the Peace?

### Moderator Denny:

Good evening, neighbors. This is your moderator, George Denny, welcoming you to Town Hall in New York City for the 258th program of America's Town Meeting of the Air and the third in our series on postwar problems. Because of the sudden illness of Congressman Gore, who was to have participated in the program originally scheduled this evening, "Should the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act Be Renewed in Its Present Form?", this program will be replaced by another postwar problem of immediate interest, which the crier has just announced, "Will Russia's Abolition of the Comintern Help Win the Peace?" May I say in passing that both Mr. Crowther and Senator Taft were ready to go on with the program, and we regret that we were not able to proceed with it!

However, this is another timely topic. Four days before the arrival of Joseph E. Davies, President Roosevelt's special envoy to Premier Joseph Stalin, the executive committee of the Third Interna-

tional proposed its own dissolution. This announcement was of intense interest to every government in the world and had the explosive reverberations of a four-ton block buster. Tonight we consider the effect of this startling announcement upon our own United States of America.

We're agreed that this action will help win the war, but will it help win the peace? And this is a postwar problem. Max Lerner, assistant to the publisher and editorial writer for the newspaper *PM*, now on leave of absence from Williams College, says that it will. Louis Fischer, well-known author and foreign correspondent, disputes his statement. Supporting Mr. Lerner will be James G. McDonald, Blue Network commentator and former chairman of the board of the Foreign Policy Association; while Mr. Fischer will be backed up by Henry J. Taylor, also a Blue Network commentator and author of the recently published and widely acclaimed book *Men in Motion*.

Mr. Lerner, will you and Mr.

Fischer step up here a minute and let's see where you stand on this? What, in a sentence or two, Max, do you think the abolition of the Comintern will do to help win the peace?

**Mr. Lerner:** George, I think it will help win the peace. That doesn't mean that I think it alone will win the peace for us. I think it will be only one of many factors, and I think that everything will depend upon what we do, but this ought to help considerably.

**Moderator Denny:** Mr. Fischer, just to ad-lib a little bit more, what do you think about it?

**Mr. Fischer:** I think it's the symptom of a development inside Russia which will prevent the kind of curative peace we all want.

#### **Moderator Denny:**

Thank you. Max, it's time for you to make your speech. At this time I present Mr. Max Lerner of the magazine *PM*. (*Applause.*)

#### **Mr. Lerner:**

Let me make it clear at the very outset that I do not regard the dissolution of the Comintern as an act of softness on the part of the Russian leaders. It is not something they have done with a star-gazing idealism. I don't for a moment think they are giving away something for nothing. Politics is the grammar of power as well as of welfare. It is still being played as a game of power in which the players hold their cards close to their chests, but within which what the people of the world want and aspire to and dream of marks the limit within which the game is carried on.

People ask, "Are Stalin and the

other Russian leaders really genuine about dissolving the Comintern?" I think they are. Obviously I can't say it with any hundred per cent certainty. I have no pipe line to Moscow that would enable me to know with any certainty, but we can form a good picture from the logic of the situation, and here is the picture I see:

First, Stalin needs a second front in Europe and he needs it now. He needs it so badly that he is willing to pay a price for it.

Second, the Russians need more lease-lend arms and they need food badly, as their representatives at the Hot Springs food conference have stated in a strongly worded statement.

Third, the Russians want Hitler and Hitlerism destroyed. Otherwise they cannot be safe. This means that they must help strengthen the resistance to Hitlerism on the part of all the subject peoples of Europe. Stalin knows that the biggest single obstacle toward complete unity and complete will in this resistance has been the fear of the Comintern. Mr. Fischer says that the Comintern died long ago. I say this because I have been reading Mr. Fischer's writings and have been deeply influenced by them actually. That may be, but the people all over the world haven't believed it. Perhaps that is because they weren't invited to the funeral of the Comintern until now.

Well, you may say, "So Stalin means what he says now, but how about the future? Will he continue to mean it after the war? What will make his promise stick then?" My answer is that there will be material things that the Russians will want

in the postwar world and for which they will be willing to pay.

First, they will want their prewar frontiers recognized.

Second, they would probably like us to keep our hands out of the internal affairs of the postwar eastern countries in Europe. They stand to gain from the carrying through of the agrarian revolutions in those countries, and they would rather we wouldn't interfere in them. And they would like the states on their frontier and the states between them and Germany to be, shall we say, symbolically Benes states rather than Sikorski states.

Third, and most important, the Russians want help in reconstructing Russia after the war. They will have suffered the deep scars of war, not only in millions of lives lost, but also in crops and machinery destroyed and the good earth ravaged. They will need help to get back on their feet, for a long time. In return for this, the Russians have already been fighting a magnificent war and will continue to do so. Now they are abandoning the Comintern. They still have a strong card to play in the use of their air bases for attack on Japan. They will, I am certain, take their place in whatever postwar United Nations organization we are able to create, and they will play their part in it with sincerity as they played their part with sincerity in the League of Nations.

This brings us to the even broader question of Russian nationalism and internationalism. Many people stress now the new nationalism in the Soviet Union. I should be less than candid if I said that I wholly disagreed with this view. It contains a real kernel of truth. But since

when do Americans object to the emergence of nationalism as a force in any country? We are deeply nationalists, too. Yet, I think that even Mr. Fischer would not say that we offer no prospects for international coöperation. I happen to believe that just as there is a barbarous and provincial nationalism that moves toward the fascist outlook, there is also possible a healthy and humanistic nationalism which by no means contradicts international action. I think the best forces in American life have this combination today, and I am thinking of the movements represented by Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Wallace, Mr. Willkie, and I think the Russians have it or are getting it.

To understand this, we must understand that the Russians have been moving away, and what they've been moving away from is not international coöperation but international revolution. That is what the Comintern stood for—international revolution—and the very fact that Stalin stood for socialism in one country meant that he never made the Comintern the keystone of his foreign policy.

But here we must be careful. That doesn't mean that Stalin never used the Comintern. There are several phases of the Comintern that must be distinguished from each other—four different phases. First, it was originally an instrument of world revolution. In that sense it died long ago. Second, there was a pretense once that it might act as an independent autonomous organization, free of Russian domination. In that sense also it died long ago; perhaps it never came to life. Third, as an instrument of Soviet foreign pol-

icy both on the Continent and in America, it lingered on at least until the present war. It was a way by which the Soviet Government could use the propaganda value and the political strength of the Communist parties to insure its own safety and its own position in the world. In that sense its life has now been terminated. Fourth, from the very beginning, it was a force splitting the unity of progressive and labor movements, of liberal thought and action and passion right down the middle. In that sense it is now formally dead, and I hope and trust it will prove dead for good.

And with these obstacles removed, these obstacles toward an international understanding between Russia and the United Nations, a real internationalism is now for the first time possible.

Whether we shall actually have a strong postwar United Nations, I don't know, but I do say this: If such a structure does emerge, its life and its future and its chances of survival will be immeasurably aided by the expression of Russia's intention not to use Communist parties as instruments of its foreign policy. Russia may, of course, slip back after the war into an attitude of suspicion and fear of our intentions. We may slip back into an attitude of fear and hatred of Russia. Like America, Russia has isolationist impulses as well as internationalist impulses. Which set of impulses will be followed by both nations depends very largely on what the other nation does. The Russians have given us their gesture in the dissolution of the Comintern. We must now do our share.

There is one other conviction of

mine, and that is that, unlike America, Russia has solved its internal economic problems. It will not need war of any kind to achieve an economy of full employment. It wants and needs peace in order to repair its ravaged energies. It wants and needs peace in order to develop further its aim of socialism in one country. It follows that Russia will be seeking a peaceful world to live in as it sought a peaceful world to live in during the years when Litvinov vainly knocked on the doors of every nation, with collective security. It will seek a peaceful world to live in unless it once more feels, as it did in 1939, that the other nations don't want peace, but war.

The Russians are looking far ahead into the future. They have already signed a twenty-year non-aggression pact in alliance with Britain. I'm certain they would like to sign one with the United States, not out of sentiment, but out of a hardheaded way of insuring a peaceful development for the world. Just as I expect that we shall have a healthier international movement because of this, so also we now have a chance for a healthier nationalism.

The Comintern had, as I said, split the progressive and labor forces in each country. Now that obstacle is removed. We can once more work for a healthy, national, and united progressivism with some chances of success. That is the kind of future that is possible. I say "possible" because whether it materializes depends on the Russians and on us—on all of us.

There is room and to spare within our world for the kind of social system that Russia is, the kind of system that Britain is, the kind of sys-



tem that America is, the kind of system that China is. There is room and to spare within each nation for the clash of ideas between a healthy conservatism and a unified progressivism. The future lies in our hands. (Applause.)

### Moderator Denny:

Thank you, Max Lerner. Someone asked us, when we made the rather sudden plans for this program a couple of days ago, why we discussed the question, "Would Russia's abolition of the Comintern promote—help us win the peace? Why not help us win the war?" We reply that we asked this question this way because last time we won a war and lost a peace. In reality, if we could make the American people understand that we don't truly win a war unless we also win the peace, it wouldn't be necessary to make this distinction. But we're trying to explore this question honestly, and there's no inference on our part whatever that this abolition of the Comintern will not help us win the peace. We are presenting both sides of this question as we always do, and I see a man in motion back there now who wrote the book *Men in Motion*, Mr. Henry J. Taylor, who wants to begin his heckling of Mr. Lerner at this time. Mr. Taylor. (Applause.)

Mr. Taylor: Ladies and gentlemen, I've had no thought of heckling Mr. Lerner. As a matter of fact, as a friend of Russia, I've been fascinated by what he said. I do take exception to several points. In the first place, this discussion starts on the basis that there is an exchange going on. I'd like to ask Mr. Lerner: Do you mean that Stalin and ourselves

are bargaining about whether we will open a second front? Our Government's position has always been that we would open a second front as soon as militarily possible. And there's never been any implication that I know of that Stalin had to do this or that this was related.

Mr. Lerner: The word "bargaining," Mr. Taylor, is a curious word. If you were to say, "Are there international conversations going on between the American and the Russian leaders, as they have been going on between the American and British leaders?" I would say, "Undoubtedly." After all, Mr. Churchill didn't come here for nothing. Mr. Eden didn't come here for nothing. Are they bargaining with each other? I don't know. Are they exchanging ideas? Yes. Have our leaders decided to open a second front? Yes. Are the Russians certain that they will? I don't know. But I wouldn't blame the Russians for wanting to make assurance doubly sure. (Applause.)

Mr. Taylor: I think that's a cynical approach toward the Russians' attitude. The Russians seem to me to be very more forthright than that. We've told them we'll open a second front as soon as we can. We haven't made any—put any strings on that, requiring them to take this step. And we will open a second front.

Mr. Lerner: It's not I that am cynical, Mr. Taylor. It's events that create cynicism in the minds of many statesmen. If you remember at the time that Mr. Willkie was in Moscow Mr. Stalin made toasts which indicated that he had very considerable doubt as to whether we really intended to open a second front and open it soon enough. You

remember that he must have communicated those doubts sufficiently to Mr. Willkie so that Mr. Willkie was convinced and made that famous statement of his about "prodding the generals."

This isn't a question of cynicism on my part. It's a question of a world in which, as I said, there is such a thing as power, in which statesmen do operate by the grammar of power. And I think that the same thing applies to Russia as applies to America and to Britain.

### **Moderator Denny:**

Thank you very much. You've had a taste of what's going to happen in the discussion period. Let's hear now from Mr. Louis Fischer. Mr. Fischer. (*Applause.*)

### **Mr. Fischer:**

Joseph Stalin is the calculating businessman in politics. He has dissolved the Comintern because he gains much by it and loses nothing.

It is difficult to understand the general rejoicing over the Comintern's suicide. Just as Stalin dissolved the Comintern, he could have dissolved the Communist parties of all countries. He did not do that. Those parties remain to carry on exactly as before.

When the news came of the Comintern's death, Earl Browder, the American Communist leader, stated that it did not concern him because his party has not belonged to the Comintern since 1940. But in 1940 his party was anti-war, calling it an imperialist war, and interfered with America's preparedness program. When Russia was invaded in 1941, however, Browder's party became prowar.

Browder took his party line from Moscow although his party no longer belonged to the Comintern. Nothing known to us at this moment would indicate that the Communist parties will not go on taking their cue from Moscow even though they no longer belong to the Comintern.

Stalin has only torn up a label. He loses nothing. He must be laughing at us for being so naive as to celebrate the death of a name.

Even if Stalin's action were real, there would be no cause for capitalist jubilation. For under Stalin's instructions, the Communist parties of England, the United States, and so forth have been as well behaved as any capitalist could hope. They have supported the war, opposed strikes, and in England they have voted with the Tories to defeat Laborites like Tom Wintringham and Jennie Lee for Parliament.

If the ties between Moscow and the world so-called Communist parties were actually severed, those parties might become Communist again, and that would be a discomfort to the capitalists.

The Comintern, founded by Lenin in 1919, has been a dismal failure. Moscow knows this. The Comintern has held only one convention in the last fifteen years. Stalin might have "liquidated" it years ago along with many other things—and persons. He might have liquidated it when he signed the Nazi-Soviet pact in August, 1939. Instead, he used it to hamper the conduct of the war in France, England, and America. Since then Stalin has kept the Comintern in a half-dead state for its nuisance value—just in case somebody would turn up who wanted to pay for this near-corpse. Finally,



the United Nations turned up. They were ready to pay for it in the form of much good will. So Stalin threw the Comintern to them, and, as the editorials and radio comments of the last few days indicate, we have gobbled it up.

It has been suggested that this is Stalin's gesture to show that he is ready to cooperate with us. Yes, he is ready to cooperate with us to the extent of unloading the ships that bring him lend-lease material. (*Applause and cries of No.*) If Stalin's cooperation goes any further, I have yet to hear of it. Thanks to the toughness of Admiral Standley, our Ambassador in Moscow, the Soviet press admitted that we were helping Russia. That was probably our greatest victory of cooperation.

Now, why did Stalin make this so-called gesture at the present time?

It seems that a very powerful Nazi offensive impends in Russia. Stalin naturally desires to face this attack with as much strength as possible and, I hope, to convert it into a Soviet counteroffensive. Stalin needs maximum help from abroad. The Russians have asked us for more food. Russia also needs more munitions. It is the policy of the British and American governments to give Russia all possible aid. That is the only sensible policy, for the Red army has killed, wounded, and captured millions of German soldiers who otherwise would be fighting us. But Stalin also knows that there can be many a slip between official decisions and actual deliveries in Soviet harbors. Much depends on the friendly attitude of general staffs, manufacturers, and official bureaus. Stalin's

suicide order to the Comintern is a bid for that friendly attitude.

Moreover, Stalin has territorial ambitions. The sooner he can get us to commit ourselves to Russia's annexation of certain foreign provinces the happier Stalin will feel, for he does not know how the coming Nazi offensive will affect his stocks abroad. Eastern Poland in the hand is better than birds at the peace conference, he thinks. Stalin hopes that the Comintern's death will make us more receptive to his territorial claims.

The Comintern could not have been liquidated, however, before many things had happened inside Russia. The Comintern has always been a symbol to the Soviet public and to some foreign workingmen of an ultimate international socialist goal. But beginning 1935 and since then in mounting crescendo, Russia has been turned by Stalin away from Soviet internationalism toward Russian nationalism. The Czarist past of Russia, which all good Soviet citizens hated as something their revolution has undertaken to destroy, has been resurrected. Ivan the Terrible has become Ivan the Fourth. Peter the Great, cruel serf driver, is a Soviet hero. The Stalin regime has tried to teach the country Russian nationalism.

Next, Stalin began to foster Slavism much as the Czars did. Moscow wished to restore the Czar's empire. Hence, Soviet aggression against Poland, the Baltic States, Finland, and Rumania in 1939 and 1940. Under Lenin, no such tendencies existed. They were considered anti-Bolshevik and reactionary.

I deeply believe that this new

policy in Moscow bodes ill for our postwar settlement. The Comintern has been regarded in certain circles as a menace. It never was. Communists were a nuisance. But they were never a danger to the stability of capitalism or of any capitalist government. In fact, by antagonizing the large moderate labor groups of many nations, the Communists probably served as an influence against revolution.

But Russian nationalism could easily become a menace to the peace. The end of the Comintern is a sign that Russian nationalism has reached an unprecedented peak. In such circumstances, Russia may wish to be one of a concert of two or more great powers who will dominate a prostrate Europe. There are straws in the wind.

No word in favor of collective security has come out of Moscow for months. Maxim Litvinov has been silenced by his masters. Russia has given no indication that it is thinking of the peace in terms of international organization, or of the Four Freedoms, or of the ideas which Wallace and Wendell Willkie advocate. Instead, the Soviets have claimed foreign territory. What protection will Russia find in the next war from an additional hundred miles of territory when airplanes will fly a hundred miles in ten or fifteen minutes? Territorial appetites, narrow nationalism, and power politics are stupid in the Air Age.

We must make it clear to *all* the United Nations that the only kind of peace we are interested in is the peace that removes the causes of war. Nationalistic map carving is the road to a third world war.

America, which has so much wealth, power, and idealism, should persuade our Russian and British friends to march hand in hand with us to a curative, progressive, international peace. (*Applause.*)

#### **Moderator Denny:**

Thank you, Louis Fischer. I forgot to announce that Mr. Fischer was a correspondent in Russia and lived there for fourteen years and his book about Russia is his autobiography—*Men and Politics*.

Our next speaker, who is to heckle Mr. Fischer—I hope he'll heckle him—has also visited Russia many times and is a distinguished Blue Network commentator and former chairman of the Foreign Policy Association, James G. McDonald. Mr. McDonald. (*Applause.*)

**Mr. McDonald:** I've no intention of making a speech. I merely want to ask Mr. Fischer a question or so.

But first I'd like to say that my friend, Louis Fischer, has just delivered, to my mind, an unrealistic and a thinly veiled Trotskyite attack on our colleague, Mr. Stalin. (*Applause and cries of No.*) And I should like to know why Mr. Fischer has chosen at this juncture to follow what in essence is the Trotskyite line.

**Mr. Fischer:** You know, Mr. McDonald, I'm surprised that you should say that. That's a "smear" word. And you shouldn't use such words. I am not a Trotskyist. I was never a Trotskyist. I always differed with Trotsky. My ideas are my own, and there's no sense in attaching labels to them. I am a careful, cautious, objective observer, and these are the things which I think. (*Applause.*)

**Mr. McDonald:** Then I should like

Use This

k Mr. Fischer how he knows so isely, as he has told us, what in thinks and what Stalin ins. Does he have what Mr. Lersaid he didn't have, a private ination line to the Kremlin? (applause.)

**Mr. Fischer:** You will have noticed at I, as is my habit, talked about the past and the present, and very little about the future, because I don't know what the future will bring. I talked about Russian nationalism as I have seen it emerge, beginning 1935. I have seen it grow; I have seen it convert itself into aggression, into the beginnings of Soviet imperialism; and I know from history that such tendencies are a danger to the peace. Those are the causes of past wars. Since I am a student of history, I am entitled to say that the same tendencies which produced wars in the past are likely to produce them in the future. (Applause.)

**Moderator Denny:** Now, don't be too polite here, Max, if you want to fire a question at Mr. Fischer. Mr. Lerner.

**Mr. Lerner:** I am not sure that I want to fire a question. I should also like to make a comment. The question of whether it is polite or impolite I can only leave to you. I was a little disturbed by several sentences in Mr. Fischer's talk, one particularly. As I remember it, the sentence that "Stalin coöperates with us only to the extent of unloading our lease-lend supplies"—I don't think that's a very helpful sentence, Mr. Fischer. I don't even think it is a very true sentence. I would say that you and I, ladies and gentlemen, right here in this audience and also all over the country,

wouldn't be listening to this program tonight if it weren't for what Stalin and the Russians have been doing in this war. (Applause.)

I want to add that America and American democracy escaped their doom by a perilously narrow margin. We escaped our doom by two threads. One, what the British did after Dunkirk. Two, what the Russians did in those fateful days of June, 1941, and ever since. And may I add particularly—and here perhaps I am not so polite—I think it comes with particularly bad grace from a man who, and I say this with all respect for his analysis, had been telling us before the war that Russia was rotten to the core, that it couldn't possibly resist an invasion, that the Russians didn't have machine tools which would be able really to stand up under an invasion, that the Russians were tied to Hitler because of their weakness; and I say that, in the light of the record that the Russians have made since then, Mr. Fischer ought to say something different about them. (Applause.)

**Moderator Denny:** Mr. Fischer, you have two points to answer.

**Mr. Fischer:** I didn't know that these discussions become discussions not of the subject matter but of the persons participating. (Cries of *No and applause.*) Now, if you want to be personal, and since I have been brought into the picture, I will answer.

I think the first judgment is whether a thing is true, and I think what I said is true. The second consideration is whether what we say here for public education is helpful. I think it is helpful to tell the truth. One of the reasons why we are fight-

ing this war is to preserve the right to criticize. In a dictatorship one doesn't criticize, or rather one doesn't criticize twice.

I am entitled to criticize my own government. That does not make me anti-American. It means that I want the war prosecuted better. I am also entitled to criticize the actions of our Allies. I criticize the British, I criticize the Russians, because I am afraid that although we are winning the war we may, because of certain of our policies and the policies of our friends, lose the peace and that will mean that we will have lost the war after winning it. That's what worries me and that's why I am worried about Russian policy.

Incidentally, I did not say that Russia was weak. I said when Russia was tied to Hitler's apron strings that she was tied to Hitler's apron strings, and I condemned it; and I think many people condemned it, and probably many of you condemned it, and I think it brought disaster on Russia and on us. I believe that I am entitled to say what I think at the moment, depending on what Russia's policy is. (*Applause.*)

**Mr. Lerner:** Let us go on with the factual question. Mr. Fischer says that Russia does not cooperate with us. I wonder whether he could tell us in what respects he would like to have Russian cooperation, a cooperation, which on specific points, he has not extended to us. Concretely, what could Russia do; not what could the Russian leaders say—not words—but what could Russia do now that it is not doing in the way of cooperation?

**Moderator Denny:** Mr. Fischer, I

want you to answer that, but as soon as that has been answered, let's get back to our main subject, "Will Russia's abolition of the Comintern help win the peace?" (*Laughter.*)

**Mr. Fischer:** Well, Max Lerner, my good old friend, being a very skillful debater, turns the point around. I said that Russia was cooperating to the extent of unloading the ships which brought them lend-lease material, and that I had not heard of any other forms of cooperation. Now, that being my statement, it would be natural for him to jump up and say, "But Russia's doing this, and Russia's doing this, and look at all the forms of cooperation." He doesn't do that because he doesn't know them, and so he asks me what they could do.

I'll tell you one of the things they could do. They could, for instance, allow our military observers to go to the front. (*Applause.*) They could, for instance, allow us to study certain German weapons which they have captured. All nations do that. There is an exchange of captured war material so that we can benefit. Of course, fortunately, now in North Africa we got a lot of German and Italian material. But before then there was a dearth of that kind of material, German material, in the United States. There was also a dearth of knowledge on the part of our military men of how the Russians were fighting and how the Germans were fighting—their tactics, their strategy—but the Russians never let us get very near the road. A certain British general, General Mason MacFarlane, was allowed to go down the main highway to Smolensk several miles and not to get off the road, and they haven't

treated American military observers any differently. (*Applause.*)

**Moderator Denny:** How long will it take you to answer that question?

**Mr. Lerner:** Just a little bit.

**Moderator Denny:** Just half a minute.

**Mr. Lerner:** My dear friend, Louis Fischer— (*laughter*) being an even more skillful debater than I am, tries to shift the burden of the proof. When a man makes a statement, I think he has the obligation to prove it rather than wanting his opponent to prove the opposite. I would, however, like to take that. What are the Russians doing in the way of cooperating? They are killing more Germans than anyone else has been killing during this war. (*Applause.*) I think that's cooperation on a pretty good plane. Now, may I add this about giving us military information? If I were an

American general, I would wish to have the Russians give us military information. But if I were a Russian general, I would understand why I do not give the Americans this information, and may I tell you why. Just before we entered this war, one of the secret plans of the War Department leaked out and was published in one of our great national newspapers. The Russians know this as well as anyone else does. They still don't trust our capacity to keep this kind of information. (*Applause and cries of No.*)

**Mr. Fischer:** Max, does that mean that the Russians will give us military information only if we have a dictatorial censorship of the press?

**Moderator Denny:** Just a minute. I'm sorry but we've got to pause at this moment for station identification. Remember Pittsburgh! (*Pause.*)

# QUESTIONS, PLEASE!

*Moderator Denny:* We're continuing America's Town Meeting of the Air from Town Hall in New York City, where Mr. Louis Fischer and Mr. Max Lerner are locking horns on the question, "Will Russia's Abolition of the Comintern Help Win the Peace?" At least that's the subject.

Before I let them go on with this, I want to remind you that there are four more programs to come in this postwar series. Town Meeting does not go off the air for the summer. We continue on a coast-to-coast tour which starts next week in Akron, Ohio. We go on to Des Moines, Iowa; Kansas City; Salt Lake City; Portland, Oregon; Palo Alto; Santa Barbara; Los Angeles; and other points between there and here.

And now let's see who's this on my shoulder. Mr. James G. McDonald has a comment to make on the observations of Mr. Lerner and Mr. Fischer.

*Mr. McDonald:* I'd like to ask a question which I hope will bring us back to the subject. It's addressed to Mr. Fischer. How can you, Louis Fischer, seriously argue that the ending of the Comintern is a sign of the development within Russia of chauvinistic tendencies dangerous to peace? Now, can you really argue like that?

*Mr. Fischer:* I can seriously argue that way because I have closely observed those tendencies grow up in Russia. Beginning in 1935, Stalin looked around and, I believe, saw how Hitler was getting so much more out of his nation by whipping up nationalistic sentiment.

In any case, whatever the motive, the fact is that the Russian press suddenly started talking about Russian nationalism, not Soviet nationalism—Russian nationalism—and Ivan the Terrible became a hero, and Peter the Great became a hero. Now those who know Russia—some of you have lived in Russia, some of you were born in Russia—you know how the Russians who were liberal, who were radical, who were laborite abhorred, hated those figures. They were the oppressors of Russia. They were the Czarists of Russia. Suddenly those people became Soviet heroes. More and more.

I read the Soviet press today. I see what the Russians are saying. They are talking Russian nationalism. They are not talking internationalism. They want territory. They have demanded territory. That is why I can seriously talk about the emergence of Russian nationalism. I can talk about it because I can prove that it is there. It is there in facts. It is there in the statements of Soviet statesmen. It is there in the Soviet press. That's why I talk about it. (*Applause.*)

*Mr. Denny:* All right, Mr. Lerner.

*Mr. Lerner:* I don't understand the intensity with which Louis Fischer approaches this question of Russian nationalism.

*Mr. Denny:* Maybe he's just an intense person. (*Laughter.*)

*Mr. Lerner:* Well, it's partly that. But I think it proceeds from something else, Mr. Denny, and I hate to get at anyone's motivations. I think it proceeds from the fact that Mr. Fischer is deeply disillusioned



about the Soviet Union. He is disillusioned about the Soviet Union largely because he, like others, had expected them to be a nation carrying out revolutionary internationalism, and they have been moving away from revolutionary internationalism. If you start with an illusion, you will get disillusioned. (*Applause.*)

Now, I think we can recognize, as I said in my opening remarks, that the Soviets have been moving away from revolutionary internationalism. Of course, they have. I think, on the whole, that has been healthy, healthy for the labor movements of the world, healthy for the relations between the United Nations. If the Russians today really were revolutionary internationalists, Mr. Fischer could then stand up and say, "Russia will not allow us to win the peace because they are revolutionary internationalists, because they will interfere with our internal affairs."

All right, then what do the Russians do? Many have been saying this about the Russians. So the Russians say, "All right, we abandon our revolutionary internationalism." Does this satisfy Mr. Fischer and others? No! Now he turns around and he says, "You are too nationalistic. You believe in Peter the Great," and so on.

Well, we believe in George Washington. We believe in Thomas Jefferson. We believe in Abraham Lincoln. That is nationalism. It is nationalism. We, too, get up in Congress and ask about English air bases. We, too, get up and ask about air routes in the future. We don't need territory. We have reached our natural frontiers, but we still

are thinking in nationalistic terms. Does that mean that Mr. Fischer thinks that America is the biggest nut that will have to be cracked in the postwar world—because we are thinking about nationalism, too? Let us understand that there must be a healthy mixture of both nationalism and internationalism, and the Russians have it. (*Applause.*)

*Mr. Denny:* This is awfully good, but make it short, please. We've got about fifty people up there who want to ask questions.

*Mr. Fischer:* An American official who just came from Moscow and from a visit of several months to Russia—he had once lived in Russia for years—said to me in Washington last week, "To the youth of Russia today, Kutuzov, the general who defeated Napoleon, is more real than Lenin." Now to me, that is a serious criticism, and I know it is right—that is a serious criticism of recent developments in Russia; and I wonder whether Max Lerner in his heart of hearts isn't sorry that Eisenstein, the great Soviet movie producer who did "Potemkin," who made a picture called "October" about the revolution of 1917, whether Max Lerner isn't sorry that that Eisenstein is today doing a glorifying picture, movie picture, of Ivan the Terrible, who is now Ivan the Fourth?

*Mr. Denny:* Yes or no, Max? Come on.

*Mr. Lerner:* Now come on, I'm not on trial for my life. (*Laughter.*)

*Mr. Denny:* But I want to get the questions—

*Mr. Lerner:* Yes, Louis wants to know if I'm sorry about this. Well, I'll tell him after I've seen the picture. If it's a good picture, I won't be

## THE SPEAKERS' COLUMN

**LOUIS FISCHER**—Mr. Fischer, author, lecturer, and foreign correspondent, after his graduation from the Philadelphia School of Pedagogy, was a teacher in the Philadelphia public schools. His career as a foreign correspondent began in 1921 when he was a contributor to the *New York Evening Post* from Berlin. Since his first trip to Russia in 1922, he has specialized in the study of the Soviet Republic and of European politics. Since 1936, he has traveled and studied extensively in Spain. Mr. Fischer is the author of *The Soviets in World Affairs* (two vols.), *Why Recognize Russia?*, *Machines and Men in Russia*, *Soviet Journey*, *The War in Spain*, and *Men and Politics*, an *Autobiography*.

**MAX LERNER**—Mr. Lerner is editorial writer for *PM* and assistant to its publisher. At the present time he is on leave of absence from Williams College, where he is professor of political science. Mr. Lerner was born in Russia and came to the United States when he was five. He holds an A.B. degree from Yale University, an A.M. degree from Washington University, and a Ph.D. degree from Robert Brookings Graduate School of Economics and Government. He has been a member of the faculty of Sarah Lawrence College, Wellesley Summer Institute, and Harvard University, as well as Williams College. He was editor of *The Nation* for two years. He is author of *It Is Later Than You Think*, *Ideas Are Weapons*, and *Ideas for the Ice Age*.

**JAMES G. McDONALD**—Mr. McDonald, commentator for the Blue Network, is former chairman of the board of the Foreign Policy Association (for the study of international relations). He studied at the Harvard Graduate School and received degrees from Indiana University, Tufts College, Hebrew Union College, and Rutgers University. He has been high commissioner for refugees coming from Germany and a member of the editorial staff of the *New York Times*. Mr. McDonald is a member of the National Advisory Council on Radio in Education and of the National Refugee Service, Inc. He is a trustee of Brooklyn Hospital and the Twentieth Century Fund. He is a member of the Board of Education, City of New York.

**HENRY J. TAYLOR**—Mr. Taylor is an author, economist, and business executive. He was graduated from the University of Virginia and is now a member of the board of its alumni association. He has been associated with the pulp and paper industry for many years. He is a member of the advisory board of the Chemical Bank and Trust Co. Mr. Taylor, who has traveled frequently in Europe and South America, has been a close student of European political and economic affairs since 1923. He is a contributor to *Life*, *New York Times Sunday Magazine*, and economic periodicals in the United States, England, and Sweden. He is the author of *It Must Be a Long War*, *Why Hitler's Treadmill Economy Fooled the World*, *Time Runs Out*, and *Men in Motion*.

sorry, no, of course not. (*Laughter.*)

This is really very important. We had our revolution a long time ago. The Russians have had their revolution. After a revolution, a ruling group, a people always becomes more conservative and more nationalistic. We became more conservative and more nationalistic after our American Revolution. The Constitution followed the Declaration of Independence. In fact, many considered it a counterrevolution. The Russians are now consolidating

their revolution and in the process of consolidating it they are getting a new and, I should say, healthy nationalism. Of course, they do everything in excess, and in the process of doing it in excess, they're going to produce movies that Louis Fischer doesn't like. (*Laughter.*)

*Mr. Denny:* Thank you very much. Could we have this question now?

*Lady:* Mr. Lerner. If Stalin was really sincere, why did he not do as Mr. Fischer suggests and dissolve

the Communist party? In other words, is this promise on the up and up or simply "Mission to Moscow" propaganda? (Applause.)

*Mr. Lerner:* Now, the question is—

*Mr. Denny:* They heard it.

*Mr. Lerner:* Well, I think Stalin was sincere and did what could be done in dissolving the Comintern. The question of dissolving Communist parties is up to the individual Communist parties. They will be meeting in various countries and deciding on what they will do. I have a hunch that they will decide not to do anything, but that has nothing to do with Stalin.

*Mr. Denny:* All right, thank you. Next question?

*Lady:* Mr. Fischer. You say that Russia has territorial ambitions. Did you fail to read this morning's news story stating that Russian official newspapers repeated the pledge that the Soviet seeks no territorial gains? Or are you one of those cynics who doubt the word of an ally who, at Munich, proved that her word was a lot better than Great Britain's.

*Mr. Fischer:* No, I'm not a cynic at all and anybody who knows me knows that I'm not, but I know that the Soviet Government has officially claimed eastern Poland, the Baltic States, part of Finland, and part of Rumania. Now speeches don't count, but when the Soviet Government officially asks for territory, then I believe that it is claiming those territories.

*Man:* Question for Mr. Lerner. Won't the Communist parties in the several countries, free of the stigma of international communism, become stronger in those countries

and, therefore, won't international communism be advanced?

*Mr. Denny:* This is the kind of a program you want to read and study and play back. This is a pretty deep question, Mr. Lerner.

*Mr. Lerner:* Yes, that's a deep question. (Laughter.) I think that the radical and progressive forces in each country will become stronger. That's different from saying that the Communist parties will become stronger. For example, I think that in this country, as I said, we have now a chance for a really unified progressive movement on the left, which has been so far deterred by the existence of a Communist party which had international allegiances. I believe that the Communist parties will have to change their leadership in each country and will have to accommodate themselves in the long run to this movement. And I, for one, will be very glad to see the day when we have a genuinely American radical party. (Applause.)

*Mr. Denny:* Thank you.

*Lady:* This question is to Mr. Fischer. Has Stalin the power to dissolve international communism?

*Mr. Denny:* Has Stalin the power to dissolve international communism?

*Mr. Fischer:* He has had the power to dissolve the Comintern, that we know, and from past history we know that the Communist parties of all countries have obeyed Moscow and, if Stalin had wished, he could have given the Communist parties of all countries the order to dissolve themselves and they would have done it.

*Mr. Denny:* I see among our distinguished guests this evening a

distinguished American columnist, Mr. Merryle Stanley Rukeyser. I wonder if he has a comment to make. Mr. Rukeyser.

*Mr. Rukeyser:* Thank you, George Denny. I thought we came here to pay homage to the deceased Comintern, but apparently we came to examine Mr. Fischer and Mr. Max Lerner. (*Laughter.*) Mr. Lerner says that we can take the news at face value; at least he gives us a definite maybe. Mr. Fischer is a little doubtful, but he tells us that the Communist party has been a bulwark against revolution. So we're all a little puzzled. Some wit remarked that the passing of the Comintern really represented waving bull at the red flag. (*Laughter.*) From my point of view, Mr. Denny, as an American, we're very happy to have anyone join us in our main objective of producing dead Nazis, dead Italians, and, if Mr. Lerner will excuse me, dead Japanese. (*Laughter.*) We shouldn't look a gift horse in the mouth at this time. (*Laughter.*) But in passing, we should recall that, as far as the United States is concerned, we had similar assurances of lack of interference in our internal affairs a decade ago when the United States first recognized Soviet Russia, and, as part of the deal, they agreed then to call off their propagandists and their saboteurs.

*Mr. Denny:* Mr. Lerner says that something you've said needs explaining.

*Mr. Lerner:* Mr. Rukeyser says that we've been talking too much about Fischer and myself, and then he proceeds to make a very cryptic remark about me and the Japanese, and I think—(*laughter*) I think he

really owes me an explanation. I want to see as many dead Japanese as you do, Mr. Rukeyser. (*Applause.*)

*Mr. Rukeyser:* I don't want to get into this scrap between Fischer and Lerner—(*Laughter.*)

*Mr. Lerner:* No, but you've opened up another scrap between us. (*Laughter.*)

*Mr. Rukeyser:* But I would like to clarify my remarks.

*Mr. Denny:* I'm sorry, but we didn't hear you.

*Mr. Rukeyser:* I said I don't want to get into this scrap, but I would like to clarify that remark so that there's no misunderstanding about the position of Mr. Lerner. I think that when Mr. Lerner asked Mr. Fischer what else Soviet Russia could do, beside what it is now doing, that he might have said something about opening up airfields for the United States Army on Russian territory for an air raid on Tokyo. (*Applause.*)

*Mr. Lerner:* I thought that Mr. Rukeyser might have meant that. As a matter of fact, when I asked Mr. Fischer this question, I wondered whether Mr. Fischer would say exactly that. He didn't, and I'm very glad that he had enough good sense not to say that. I think we're agreed on that question.

*Mr. Fischer:* I want to say, although I have to disagree there with my friend, Rukeyser, that, even if we—if say, President Roosevelt could give orders to Stalin, which of course he cannot—but suppose Roosevelt could give orders to Stalin, he would not tell Stalin to divide Russia's forces between fighting Germany and fighting Japan. (*Applause.*) It is in our best

interests and in the interest of victory for all the United Nations that Russia concentrate her strength against Germany. We, of course, hope—there is no sign yet that this will happen—but we, of course, hope that when Germany will have been defeated, we with Britain, and Russia, and China, and all our Allies will proceed vigorously to smash Japan. (Applause.)

*Mr. Lerner:* May I say that Louis Fischer and I are in the blessed state of complete agreement finally. (Laughter.)

*Mr. Denny:* Mr. Taylor. Mr. Henry J. Taylor.

*Mr. Taylor:* Well, I am glad to realize that these two gentlemen I have been listening to are now in agreement, because I happen to think that this last point has been oversimplified. The fact is that the Russians do have a very important army in the eastern section of Russia which is disassociated entirely from its action on the other front. There is great hope and constant effort to get the Russians to give us these bases. I hope they will. I believe that everybody who has been in Europe hopes they will, and believe me, the Chinese hope they will. (Applause.)

*Mr. Denny:* Just when we are getting things simple, we open up another scrap. All right, Mr. Fischer.

*Mr. Fischer:* I want to make a comment on what Max said about

our American nationalism. Of course, we started out being very nationalistic. We are still a nation, but we have accepted certain internationalistic ideas. For instance, we are now in favor of a good-neighbor policy in Latin America and beginning to carry it into reality. Willkie, Wallace, the Four Freedoms are the beginning of a real internationalism on our part; but Russia, started out with internationalism, is giving up the internationalism and is moving toward the kind of narrow nationalism which in the past has contributed toward the making of wars.

*Mr. Denny:* Well, now, that's on the subject all right. The little lady here with a bow hat. Yes?

*Lady:* Mr. Lerner. In view of the fact that Stalin comes out one day for a strong, independent Poland, and the next for Russia's 1939 boundaries, how can you believe that the Russians would actually dissolve the Comintern?

*Mr. Lerner:* Well, I don't see anything incompatible between a statement as to prewar boundaries and a desire to have the Polish government that does exist after the war, a strong and independent and progressive Polish government. Maybe there is something contradictory about it, but I don't see it. I think he is quite genuine about that.

*Mr. Denny:* All right. We have

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a man in uniform who has a question.

*Man:* Mr. Fischer. I would like to know whether you have seen the motion picture, "Mission to Moscow," a very enlightening movie. Have you seen it?

*Mr. Fischer:* I have seen it, yes, and it certainly enlightened me about the intentions of Warner Brothers and the people who wanted to make the picture. (*Laughter.*) That picture is very interesting, but certain parts are complete distortions of history and the truth. (*Cries of No and applause.*)

I would like to say that I welcome the dissolution of the Comintern only because it may open the eyes of certain decent people who will ultimately free themselves from their political and ideological slavery to the Kremlin, where communism and idealism have ceased to exist. Unless Communists realize that Moscow has ceased to be communistic and internationalistic and become nationalistic and expansionist, unless they see all this, their opinions and their acts will continue to be shaped by Moscow even if the central office of the Comintern is closed.

*Mr. Denny:* I am afraid that we are going to have to have a debate on "Mission to Moscow" before very long. At least, I guess a lot of people are going to see it.

*Man:* Mr. Lerner. Do you think that the world in general will believe Stalin, or do you think his promises will have about as much effect as a speech made by Earl Browder at the Union League Club?

*Mr. Denny:* That's a pretty picture—Earl Browder at the Union League Club! (*Laughter.*)

*Mr. Lerner:* Well, if what Mr. Fischer says about the role that the Communist parties have played in the strengthening of capitalism is really true, I imagine that Mr. Browder's speech at the Union League Club would be greeted with a big ovation. (*Laughter.*) Do I believe the people of the world will really believe Stalin? Well, I think a good deal depends on how the Communist parties act in the immediate future. I think a good deal depends on what we, those who believe in democracy in the various countries, say about this. If we really profess our own disbelief, I think it is likely to strengthen the disbelief of a lot of other people and thereby, may I say, it is likely to strengthen the cause of those who want to exploit the fear of communism all over the world.

*Mr. Denny:* Thank you very much, Mr. Lerner. And tonight we haven't solved the problem any more than we solve any of these problems, but we have certainly opened up a lot of subjects for you to discuss.



# TOWN MEETING PREVIEW

## Should We Make Peace With Italy Now?

By CHARLES E. MARTZ, Editor of OUR TIMES

*As far as can be foreseen, this topic will be discussed on America's Town Meeting of the Air, Thursday evening, June 10, 1943, at Des Moines, Iowa. Any change in the program will be due to the exigencies of current events.*

Every bit of evidence emerging from Italy indicates that more than 90 per cent of the Italian people want peace. In fact, they did not want to go into the war in the first place. After years of humiliating defeats and increasing German occupation, the present attitude seems to be that only by losing the war can the Italians survive. To win the war will be to become a minor satellite of the German New Order.

Day by day this desire to get out of the war increases as living conditions become more and more difficult. The Italian must live for a full week on a piece of meat the size of his fist. He finds it almost impossible to secure white spaghetti. Olive oil, the staple of the Italian housewife, is off the market. Since every train that brings coal from Hitler's domain returns laden with fruits and vegetables, even these commodities are more scarce. Italians who succeed in getting to cities in Switzerland are said to eat as if they had not had a square meal in months.

This shortage of food, coupled with long casualty lists, provides part of the picture of the physical and mental state of Italians. A second factor is the changed attitude of the masses toward Mussolini and the leaders of the fascist dictatorship. They no longer receive the spontaneous cheers which once greeted every public appearance.

It is reliably reported that, were it possible, the Italians would be glad to turn out the whole fascist regime.

In painting the picture of the Italy to which we might offer peace, it is important to get some less favorable elements. The most important, probably, is the fact that Italy is at present an occupied country. Even before our invasion of North Africa, it was reported that the Germans had ten divisions in Italy. All the vital nerve centers of Italian life are in German hands.

As soon as it became evident that Italy was about to make a separate peace, the Germans could wreak a murderous vengeance on the peninsula. Charles Lanier, writing in the *Saturday Evening Post*, tells of a German colonel who said, "In twenty-four hours Rome would be dust. Our Stukas would destroy Rome as no city has ever been destroyed before. We'd make those macaronis wish they'd never been born."

*To Whom Would Peace Be Offered?*—We must not obscure our problem by thinking that we can offer peace "to Italy." "Italy" is an abstraction to which you cannot offer peace. You must negotiate with some flesh-and-blood human beings. Thus, the practical aspect of the offer becomes complicated.

It is clear that we cannot deal with Mussolini. United Nations leaders have made it clear that the

Axis leaders must be eliminated before any peace can be considered. And Mussolini is still protected by a picked guard of 800 huskies, and his secret police still have the machine guns to prevent a popular uprising.

Even if Mussolini could be erased from the picture, who would take his place? Our experience in North Africa indicates the difficulty of finding a civil government which is free from the taint of fascism and is still powerful enough to do the job. The current leadership in Italy does not inspire respect. No democratic leadership has any chance of rising until the iron hand of fascism has been lifted.

The only possibility of revolt appears to lie with the army, the only group that has weapons. This possibility seems remote in view of the large number of German divisions that are scattered about the country.

We cannot negotiate with the existing government except on terms of unconditional surrender. There is no other government, at present, with which terms of surrender might be discussed and have practical value.

*The Usefulness of Italy*—From the strategic point of view, there would be some advantage in knocking Italy out as a belligerent. It would not be good strategy to permit the peninsular country to resume its role as a neutral. It would be occupied and used for further operations against the Axis. The cities of northern Italy have been bombed by airplanes flying all the way from England over the Alps. Conversely, control of air bases in Italy would bring our planes within

bombing distance of most of Germany. The attack on Fortress Europe could take on new vigor.

With Italy out of the war, the Mediterranean would become a United Nations lake, with all the transportation advantages that this would bring. The moral effect of the withdrawal of Italy from the war might be great.

*The Other Side of the Case*—The results of peace with Italy, even if it could be brought about, are not all one-sided. It is possible that a belligerent Italy is a decided handicap to German war power. Many divisions of German troops are now tied up in Italy to meet invasion or domestic trouble. Hitler could well use those divisions on a more active front if he dared take them out of Italy.

Then there is the problem of food for the civilian population. The first responsibility of the victorious United Nations would be to provide supplies of food for a people who are now threatened with starvation. From the recent food conference in the United States come demands for more food for the soldiers of heroic Russia and China. Food supplies themselves are not too plentiful, and the demands for shipping to meet our own needs are not yet being met fully. Can we take time out in the midst of the war's crucial campaigns to carry food to a defeated enemy?

If Italy were to give up, soldiers, vitally needed elsewhere, would have to be stationed there, for the domestic situation is none too stable. The Italian leader who could be trusted to carry on is not now in sight. Salvemini has been warning in numerous articles that the

collapse of fascist power might bring Italian violence against the Church officials who have favored Mussolini's regime. In the absence of constitutional measures, Italian communists might seize the opportunity to take over.

With peace in Italy, we should be obligated to begin immediately the process of reconstruction, both political and material, and such an obligation might seriously interfere with our own military plans.

*Before or After Invasion?* — After viewing all the aspects of this picture, should we "make peace with Italy now?" The word "now" indicates a peace offer before we have invaded Italy. It is difficult for arm-chair strategists to evaluate the pros and cons as they apply to advantage in our war against Hitler. Some of the most pressing questions, however, are largely political.

Are we to treat with men who

have been henchmen of Mussolini and who will become turncoats when the fascist regime is doomed? Or, as indicated in a recent trial balloon from Europe, are we to dust off the royal family and bring it forth as the future government of Italy? Competent observers do not give us much hope from that quarter. They picture the king as thoroughly fascist and the crown prince as a most ineffective young man.

Is the question of offering peace to Italy purely academic, in view of the German forces in the peninsula and the improbability that the Nazis would permit any group in Italy to negotiate?

Or is it possible that a mere offer of peace, whether or not anything came of it, would have a good influence in Italy and other regions of Europe and a bad effect upon German morale?

## WHAT TO READ

*In connection with the Town Meeting program of June 10, 1943.*

### Current Articles

"Allies' Next Targets: Europe's Paths of Invasion," *United States News*, May 28, 1943.

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"Crack-Up of Italy?" *United States News*, November 27, 1942.

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Lanius, Charles, "The Italians Want To Quit," *Saturday Evening Post*, January 2, 1943.

Lingelbach, Anna Lane, "The End of

Mussolini's Dream," *Current History*, March, 1943.

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Salvemini, Gaetano, "After Il Duce, What?" *Free World*, June, 1943.

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Sforza, Carlo, "Realities and Illusions About Italy," *Free World*, July, 1942.

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