
What Is Humanistic Sociology?

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Humanistic sociology is not a difficult idea to define. For the humanistic sociologist, sociology is the study of how to make a better world. The key commitment is that people matter. As economist Kenneth Boulding (1977) noted, “the question for the social sciences is simply: what is better and how do we get there?” This is the conversation of humanistic sociology. It is a conversation about values. As a discipline, we need to be designing and implementing social systems for people rather than plugging people into systems that don’t understand or meet human needs. The question becomes “What tools do we have, what knowledge do we possess, what understandings will ultimately make this world a better place for all people to live in?” Humanistic sociology must be an exploration of effective social arrangements, institutions, and social forms that improve the conditions of living. Sociology is *for* people. We begin with analyzing human needs and then develop a society that meets them. To use Comte’s, Ward’s, Small’s, Lynd’s, Sorokin’s, and Becker’s idea: Sociology is a superordinate science in the service of humanity. To say it is a superordinate science means that it synthesizes the disciplines and then uses that synthesis to forge a shared agreement about how to create a better world. It is this idea that Comte meant to imply when he envisioned sociology as the “Queen of the Social Sciences.”

Ultimately, the quest must be to return mainstream sociology to its roots, which we would claim are humanism. However, many in the 1960s and 1970s felt the need to break away from establishment sociology. Ironically, a year after Al Lee was elected President of the ASA by a write-in vote in 1975, he founded the Association for Humanist Sociology. Rather than just representing another “flavor” of academic sociology, humanism is a different paradigm. Humanistic sociology is about making a better world. What had become mainstream sociology was the tame academic sociology. Humanistic sociology in the 1970s began in the counterculture movement to envision alternative social forms, the reaction against scientific sociology, the sociologies championed by Al Lee and John Glass, and the foundations

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laid by humanistic psychologists including Abraham Maslow and Erich Fromm. Other brands of sociology may contain eventual “change the world” aspirations, but humanistic sociology brings that commitment right through the front door. While many traditional sociologists may confess their values as biases, humanistic sociologists are die hard do-gooders and proud of it.

Humanistic sociology is not only an academic discipline, it is the merging of personal and professional identities. It is a methodology / theoretical perspective that is inter-disciplinary in its delivery. We cannot afford to be only armchair observers. We have a critical stake in the human experiment.

The Two Sociologies

Arguably, the best analysis of sociology ever written is Ernest Becker’s *The Structure of Evil: An Essay on the Unification of the Science of Man*. We think the book should have probably been called “Making the Good,” but that wouldn’t have been seen as academically respectable. It provides a ready summary of the ground on which to trace the history of a humanistic sociology.

In the volume, Becker talks of the two sociologies. One is the superordinate science of humanity which calls us to action and to change the world. It is an ideal science concerned with not just “what is” but what “ought to be.” The postmodernists have re-taught us that any version of “what is” contains its own recommendation of “what ought to be.” August Comte and Lester Ward, in particular, knew this. The second sociology is the narrow academic discipline content to color within the lines and seek only journal articles, research grants, and tenure. The first sociology is the original sociology of Comte, Marx, Ward, and Small, and it is the change the world sociology to which Lynd, Sorokin, and C. Wright Mills invited us to return. Gouldner talked of the two Marxisms and it is the same distinction: one academic, one action oriented.

Armchair theorizing and coffee house speculation over society’s puzzles and predicaments can paralyze us with inaction. A perpetual agenda of more research means action can be delayed forever. Lester Ward understood that piling up more and more facts will never get us to a science of humanity. Implementing a science of humanity is a matter of envisioning an ideal society and integrating the disciplines in the service of humanity. All knowledge is a power strategy. The question is: what kind of world do we want to construct? As Becker understood, sociology is an ideal type science—not in the narrow Weberian sense, but in the bold Comteian and Marxian sense of envisioning a better world. It is a utopian science.

The scientific stance was clearly expressed in Ogburn’s 1929 ASA presidential address: “sociology is not interested in making the world a better place.” This was a far cry from the ambitions of Albion Small when he founded the *American Journal of Sociology*. Albion Small said he launched it:

...to translate sociology into the language of ordinary life, so it will not appear to be merely a classification and explanation of fossil fact...to so far increase our present intelligence about social utilities that there may be much more effective combination for the promotion of the general welfare... to insure the good of man. (*AJS* 1895: 13-14; both quoted in Becker 1968: 73-74)

In 1886, John Eaton said: “Let the warning cry fill the air of scientific associations, from meeting to meeting, that science is our means, not our end...” (quoted in

Becker 1968: 73). This is precisely the idea of Auguste Comte. The early sociologists did not see stacking up more and more knowledge as the sole task of sociology. They did not see it as accumulating data and laws that someone else might eventually apply for fair or foul. Becker uses Franklin H. Giddings as the archetype of the flaw of building sociology into a narrow academic discipline:

It is easy to sum up Giddings's fallacy: ... by lifting an activist humanitarianism to the detached scientific heights of an opportunistic inductivism, we have lifted it right out of the world of contemporary social problems.

The humanistic criticism of social values—radical in intent—bogs down practically into a conservatism of method that is self-defeating.... Sociology would thus be in the business as a disinterested discipline for a long time, and life would go on—and right by it. This is exactly what is happening today—Giddings's own legacy confirms the criticism of his orientation, and the penalty of the loss of an active, superordinate social science. (Becker 1968: 77)

Humanism in Sociology—The Early Sociologists

Humanism in sociology is not new. Sociology has a history of do-gooders. Many early American sociologists were actually also ministers who came to sociology to perfect the art of implementing a Social Gospel. Social amelioration was the goal of most sociologists in the late 1880s.

In our rewriting of history, we often changed who many of the early sociologists were. Emile Durkheim, for example, is cast only as a scientist. Yet this is the same Durkheim who noted that if someone comes up with an individualistic solution to a social problem, you can be sure that it is wrong. This is a social agenda. It is implementing the sociological consciousness as a way of seeing social problems and solving them. Moving past individualistic explanations is as political as anything we will ever do. Comte and Ward in particular were well aware of this.

We have embraced positivism but rewritten what it means. As Becker notes, Comte coined the term “positivism” so he should be allowed to define it:

By his own definition, Positivism meant *the subordination of politics to morals*. Science enters the picture *only to provide the basis for an agreed morality*.

.....Thus, if science is centered on man and subserves him, and if progress is its goal, then, logically, when we find out the social causes of human unhappiness, we will have an automatic directive to an agreed solution. (Becker 1968: 45) (*Italics original*)

However, as sociology moved to become a mere academic discipline, it shunned its roots based on real world problems. By the late 1920s and early 1930s it had gained academic respectability. As mainstream sociology moved away from social betterment towards the academic version, every generation has produced its critics. This loyal opposition has usually represented the voice of humanistic sociology.

Robert Lynd and his wife, Helen, who authored the *Middletown* series, were among the preeminent pioneers of research on social class in America. However, in 1939, as the Germans marched across Europe enslaving all in their path, Lynd began to speak out against a sociology of human behavior isolated in the ivory tower. We were collecting data, but what were we doing with all of those facts? His *Knowledge for What?* proposed grounding sociology in attention to creating a society that meets human needs. The story is told that as he presented his views in

lectures around the country, colleagues sat in the back rows and laughed at him. They saw any effort to involve sociology in real world problems as a do-gooder return to unscientific superstition. They did not want to risk compromising the academic respectability and scientific status sociology had fought so long and hard to achieve.

Over in anthropology, Ruth Benedict was confronting the same dilemma. She talked of her ideas of synergy—the idea of a Good Society—freely in coffee houses and even speeches, but she was reluctant to publish her views because she knew she would be accused of being unscientific. She had worked hard to promote the idea of cultural relativity. She knew she would be misunderstood, yet everything she knew as a trained observer taught her that some social arrangements were factually better when viewed from *any human standpoint*. In some cultures, people flourished. Other cultures were beset with overwhelming social problems. Benedict's concern with cultural relativity is understandable. She had stumbled upon the first concept which emerges when we move past value neutrality and relativity as the supreme goal.

Lynd and Benedict had both excelled in their methods. But when they turned to values and creating the good society, they were in danger of being maligned by their colleagues. Pitirim Sorokin suffered similar treatment. His career towered over half a century and he was the first chair of the Sociology department at Harvard for a tenure lasting more than a decade. Sorokin was critical of the two major trends he observed in modern sociology: towards either minutiae (abstracted empiricism) or pomposity (grand theory). In the 1950s, he would found the "Center for Creative Altruism" at Harvard and write several large volumes on love and good neighbors. These works, of course, have long been forgotten in sociology. If they are remembered, they are treated more as the indulgences of an old man than the culmination of a life of study resulting in a creative, bold direction for sociology.

If we will remember, even August Comte met the same fate. We grudgingly name him the father of the discipline but he has become a shadow figure in the annals of sociology. We have rewritten history and as a result totally misunderstand his entire vision of sociology. For years, teachers of social theory praised Comte's work to build a scientific sociology, but in the next breath discounted his vision of sociology creating a better society. They often blame his "love affair," which is an interesting example of how the spin doctors trivialized things even back then. Actually, she was not some clandestine affair but a woman he loved deeply who died. Through all this, Comte did not drift from his focus—his idea all along was to build a science of society and then implement it to make a better world. Her death simply made him more dedicated to his work and vision. He understood that sociology was in the business of envisioning the good society. As Becker tells the story:

[Comte's] life's work is normally considered to fall into two distinct phases: the first work was a treatise on all sciences, putting forth the striking proposal that sociology followed logically in the history of the development of the sciences. . . . The second work enunciated the 'Religion of Humanity' based on love: in the new community, sociology would subserve the social order and be used to promote social interest instead of the private interest that was rampant. . . .

Admirers of Comte based their admiration on the first work, and considered that the second work was done in the grip of dementia or senility. Often, they explicitly indict Comte's love affair with Clotilde de Vaux. We shall return to the reasoned and necessary unity of Comte's system; suffice it to say for now that, contrary to the opinion of many superficial commentators, Comte was well aware of what he was doing—the two 'phases' of his work were an integrated whole. The first period was a systematization that he undertook on a positivistic, scientific basis to avoid the charges of mysticism which he knew might be

leveled against his guiding ideas. The second period was a frank predication of his life work on feeling, love, and morality, which he felt were the basis for his whole position. (Becker: 1968, 43-44)

Lester Ward also understood this. So did Albion Small, who was chair of the first sociology department in the country at the University of Chicago. The early sociologists envisioned an applied academy that would improve people's lives.

Today, in our sociological theory classes, we have claimed George Herbert Mead as a sociologist but we don't include other Chicago School members, such as Mead's colleague in philosophy, John Dewey, or his partner in social action, Jane Addams. Furthermore, we have only allowed Mead into the club because we have sanitized Mead. When we think of Mead, we think of an armchair theorist. We don't think of the person who led Women's Rights marches in Chicago or was an active participant in Hull House. But even if we only read Mead's social theories, we don't understand them unless we recognize that they are bent on social action for social betterment. In Mead's theory, we are part of the same overall drama and entwined in each other's fate. He felt that development of a "Generalized Other" would lead to a sane society based on empathy and love. He saw the sociological consciousness as intimately tied to social action, which is similar to the theme of the interrelation between individual troubles and social problems that had been Comte's original concern.

John Dewey, who offered an outright pragmatism that in some ways is similar to the real Mead, was too obviously action oriented for later scientific scholars to claim him as a sociologist. And of course, Jane Addams herself was kicked out of the field, so to speak. She was relegated to a "women's role" of social helper and a discipline called Social Work created to keep her type away from the rational, masculine science of "real" sociology. Sociology was being defined as a narrow academic discipline. However, Dewey and Addams wouldn't have seen it this way. Neither would George Herbert Mead or W. I. Thomas who were their colleagues at Hull House and the University of Chicago. Even Ernest Burgess, who had a role in the academic / scientific legitimization of sociology, also clearly was concerned with social action and social betterment. He was not only an admirer of Jane Addams but led the city's social action committee on homelessness. All this should say that humanistic sociology has a rich and ongoing tradition in sociology. It would be right at home in the Chicago school of sociology.

Humanistic Psychology

Erich Fromm and Abraham Maslow were founding voices of humanistic psychology. Prior to them, psychology had focused only upon individuals with problems rather than the healthy personality. The only people who showed up in therapists' offices and got studied were sick people. Thus, the literature of the field abounded with stories about the abnormal and seldom gave a second glance at those who were not experiencing severe problems in everyday life. Indeed, Freud had hypothesized a healthy personality but it was a negative definition—someone who had made it through the oral, anal, and oedipal phases stages without getting stuck. Fromm would say that medical students spend more time studying cadavers than living, healthy human beings and noted psychological knowledge also focused only on sickness rather than mental health.

Maslow would talk about self-actualization. Carl Rogers would talk about "self-realization." Fromm called the same thing the unfolding of human power, produc-

tivity, or aliveness. In fact, Nietzsche is sometimes referred to as the Father of Humanistic Psychology because of his focus on what he called the actualizing tendency. The “be all that you can be” slogan that the Army ripped off in their ad promotions actually does a nice job of summarizing the viewpoint of humanistic psychology. Victor Frankel’s *Will to Meaning* and Fromm in *Man For Himself* emphasized that making sense of existence is paramount to human beings.

Freud in *Civilization and Its Discontents* had seen an inevitable opposition between the individual and society. Humanistic psychology saw something different. Psychology began to realize that the social context in which interaction takes place matters. For instance, Karen Horney wrote *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time* in which she contended that society itself had become sick. Erich Fromm in *The Sane Society* took a similar approach.

Traditionalists would talk about creating people for society. Humanists, on the other hand, would focus on creating society for people, arguing that social arrangements and social institutions should function for the human. In the 1950s, psychology departments taught courses on the “Psychology of Adjustment.” By the early 1970s, these courses had become the “Healthy Personality.” This is an important distinction. In 1958, publishers insisted on entitling Sidney Jourard’s book on the healthy personality *Personal Adjustment: An Approach Through The Study Of Healthy Personality*. By 1974, he was finally allowed to title what amounted to a revised third edition *Healthy Personality: An Approach from the Viewpoint of Humanistic Psychology*.

Jourard has particular insights for overcoming alienation in bureaucracies and humanizing organizations. His work on *The Transparent Self* and self-disclosure is the perfect antidote to the role player who has lost his or her soul to the game. To create humanistic organizations, we must behave as full people rather than surrender identities merely to a cultural or organizational role. Jourard says that the lack of dialogue is the crisis of our time. We need to develop role distance and begin to wear our roles lightly. To worship cultural myths is idolatry. It also means that we sacrifice our authentic self to the role we think we are supposed to play.

Humanistic psychology had the need for a companion humanistic sociology that could focus on the conditions of life enhancement. Under some conditions people flourish, while under others, although the spirit is willing, people atrophy. A humanistic sociology would ask questions such as: “What type of environment produces psychologically healthy, happy people? What types of social resources are helpful to people in their struggles and make it more likely they will thrive?” Sociology today still focuses upon social problems rather than the healthy society or social solutions. Concluding his book *Building Community: Social Science in Action*, Phillip Nyden of Loyola University’s community research notes that while every sociology department has courses in Social Problems, none have courses on Social Solutions. There is a twin frontier on the human potential. It is self and it is community. We must concur with Immanuel Kant who envisioned the ideal as “maximum individuality within maximum community.”

The Beginnings of a Formal Humanistic Sociology

To the layperson, the term humanistic sociology would seem redundant. It would seem obvious that sociology is concerned with the person and human needs. But

sociology drifted from its original intent and purpose and it became necessary to specify a specially *humanistic* sociology.

C. Wright Mills certainly sought to define a discipline quite different from the confines of scientific sociology. He saw an engaged discipline confronting the powers that be to provide space for the human. Joseph Scimecca (1995) saw the origins of humanist sociology in Mills's conceptions which emphasized human power and confronting the power elite that limits freedom and meaning. Scimecca also firmly credits Ernest Becker's emphasis on self-esteem as an important building block for a humanist sociology.

Historically, humanistic sociology originates in the reaction and critique against a value-free scientific sociology, and in the counterculture movement to create alternative social forms. A few sociologists have spoken formally of the possibility of a humanistic sociology that would depart from existing theoretical approaches. In *Humanistic Society*, John Glass and John Staude (1972) compiled the theoretical ground which might provide the starting point for a humanistic sociology. John Glass would go on to found the Clinical Sociology Association which later became the Sociological Practice Association. Alfred McClung Lee (1973) in *Toward Humanist Sociology* argued that the best sociology has always been humanistic and that the paradigm included the works of classic scholars: Charles H. Cooley, W. I. Thomas, Sorokin, and Mills.

Lee (1973: 180-201) suggests sociologists can perform an important service to humanity by breaking down the traditional barriers that have plagued effective action by academicians to make a better world.

The excuse for the existence of sociologists is not simply the maintenance of academic employment and research funding. The chief excuse is the answering of the question, "Sociology for whom?" in this manner: Sociology for the service of humanity. This answer refers to the need to develop knowledge and direct service to all classes of people as citizens, as consumers, and as neighbors. This means knowledge of social behavior that can and will be communicated by its developers through all appropriate media to those who can best use it. It includes studies of ways in which people can protect themselves from undesirable manipulation by those in positions of power, of how to achieve more livable homes and communities, of constructive alternatives to family, civil, and international violence, and of much more. (1978: 36)

As long as one deals with theories and governmentally-funded studies, one does not have to risk soiling personal clothing. Sociologists might go about inventing or changing the real world through personal involvement. For example, Lee championed the idea of using a variety of public outlets, including writings, lecturing, and media presentations for sociologists to get the message across. Lee viewed the individual as the element through which society is changed and envisioned (Lee 1978: 28-53). Sociology thus needs to debunk myths and change people's minds:

In serving humanity, sociologists act principally as critics, demystifiers, reporters, and clarifiers. They review critically the folk wisdom and other theories by which people try to live. In doing so, they strip away some of the outworn clutter of fictions about life and living that make the human lot even more difficult than it might be. Then they try to report more accurate information about the changing social scene and with it to help clarify ways of understanding human relations and of coping with personal and social problems. (1986: 36)

Several decades ago, C. P. Snow warned that we were becoming two cultures, one scientific and one humanistic. The scientific approach treats people as objects or means, while the humanistic approach values people as ends in themselves. Our means and ends must correlate. Science would simply tack values on at the end of what otherwise was a scientific process. Humanism would begin with values and human purposes. Scientific knowledge views the human as separate and just an object for study. Humanism sees the human as intimately entwined in the whole process of consciousness and knowing.

The move to science has been a curious adventure. Science was not seen as a human act but was simply viewed as a neutral, objective process. We pretend that the scientific act of looking isn't a part of human behavior: the world just *appears* before our lenses. Please note the shift: we refuse to pay any attention to our act of viewing (what is going on "In Here") and pretend we are just objectively seeing the "Out There." As we move from physical science to social science, we then turn our objective scientific lenses back upon ourselves to view human behavior. You can't refuse to acknowledge that science is a human act and then utilize our constructed mechanical science to understand the human. We can't decide to view the "Out There" by denying the "In Here" and then turn around and use such a method to view the "In Here." It doesn't make any sense. But that is what a human science that uses only the scientific method does. Followers utilize a method that denies the existence of human consciousness and then use it to view human consciousness. Psychologist Carl Jung, in the early 1900s, would claim that the central problem of the age was to recover the intuitive, feminine, right brain aspects of self and culture. He felt that if science were to continue to advance without such synthesis, it would leave behind the human.

With the scientific consciousness, the world itself had changed. Not only did we think and deal with the world in scientific terms, but the world was deemed identical with these scientific terms. The earth became a *thing*. It is this "I"-*"It"* brand of knowledge that has such grave consequences. The metaphors of nature were replaced with mechanical, scientific ones. The world was tamed, it was explainable, and carved into this image. This is reification in its purest sense: We created an idea of the world and then shaped the world to this artificial image. A walk in the woods no longer meant what it once had: children marched out from the classroom not to smell a flower but to count its petals; the trees became timber for harvest; the rocks became mineral resources; and the forest and the land changed. It was logged and paved with roads. Cities with factories were erected on the most scenic spots. The world was made manageable and fitted to the scientific vision. As one sociologist commented on the Army Corp of Engineers, their vision must be "if it moves, pave it."

When science turned its view to a social science and a psychological science, it continued to territorialize the unknown. As Freud proclaimed: "Where Id was, let Ego be." The problem is that as more and more of the human became rationalized in our theories and institutionalized in scientific bureaucratic organizations, there became less and less room for the movement of the human. As science territorialized more of the world with its left brain techniques, the human was left to retreat into smaller and smaller realms. As Jung knew so well, a complete scientific "suc-

cess” would mean the elimination of the human. Rationality and left brain technologies would stamp out right brain feelings and values. *The crucial humanistic conversation is to find ways of thinking and ways of managing that allow room for the human spirit.*

Science has minimized or trivialized all that does not fit its worldview. Anything that resembles magic or mystery has long ago been chased from the world and relegated inside the psyche: feelings got stuffed inside, magic became mere mood, visions became projection. Awe and wonder were but fleeting emotions of the untrained. Religion became a soothing opiate and love was deemed an expedient by-product. God was relegated to a far corner in the universe and it made no difference whether we used the word “God” or “Nature” in our theories. Even the human heart became only a “black hole” in an otherwise scientific reality.

The early scientists sought to stamp out the irrational. Everything that did not fit the scientific reality was swept from easy view: feelings, intuitions, love. Francis Bacon, who was also Grand Inquisitor of England during the witch hunts, claimed Knowledge should be tamed into Power. He modeled science after a witch hunt, actually suggesting Nature should be stretched on the rack and tortured until she revealed her secrets (Merchant 1980). Obviously, the feminine was not placed in high regard.

Having tamed the wilderness, paved the landscape, and harnessed natural resources, science then looked for new worlds to conquer. As science turned its gaze to human behavior, human beings were soon left alienated from the world.

Science sought a “knowledge” of nature separate from the human “observer.” It achieved such a vision and legislated such a world. Humans were left as passive consumers; creatures caught in the maze of a mechanical universe. The self-fulfilling prophecy of science had been realized at a terrible cost. This separation of the human from nature was worse than even the earlier mind-body split.

The world had changed and we did not feel at home in it. Our way of viewing each other became colored by the scientific lens, which depends upon doubt, testing, and making things prove themselves. We might wonder if there are not some realities which depend upon our willing suspension of disbelief. A value-free science is incapable of providing us with a world containing meaning. It is no wonder humans were left alienated from the world and from life itself—we were cast as strangers to the whole process. Science has constructed a world separate from human values and purposes. With such an objectivity, the human element could only appear as an anomaly: a “freak” exception in an otherwise scientific process. Lacking any “real world” canopy which would cover the human, we were soon alienated from the world, each other, and ourselves. Humanistic sociology would return the human to center stage.

Determinism—The Soul of Science

In *Radical Man* (1970), Charles Hampden Turner says that the toolbox we have borrowed from science posits a Conservative vision of humanity. The dream of science is to render everything explainable: to eliminate and explain all variation. It is a dream of complete control. Science seeks to make everything predictable—to make us “safe” from the human. It gives credibility to and values the static, the fixed, the predictable. At its core, it aims to eliminate the human from the process.

Ultimately, its goal would change the nature of what we call “human.” Dennis Wrong argued our idea of the oversocialized person who is totally predictable is not the vision of a free society, nor is it good social science.

It is small wonder that the romantic poets sprang to life at the very time science was beginning its heyday. They originated in direct reaction against science. Intuitively, they saw something in science that was taking humanism out of humanity. To a person, the romantic poets wailed against science: Mary Shelley would write the novel *Frankenstein* about the abuses of a science in which curiosity had lost its soul, while William Blake went so far as to claim that science was the Anti-Christ.

What would cause them to invoke such an extreme characterization? The romantic poets saw science as torturing the awe, mystery, and wonder out of life. Science was rendering the world dead—or at least under control—in order to do its analytical dissection. With the scientific world view, all was to be explainable. Mystery would vanish. Nature was tamed. Power was harnessed. However, despite the practicality of technological inventions, something got lost. As the poet Wordsworth said,

Sweet is the lore that Nature brings;
Our meddling instinct
Mis-shapes the beauteous forms of things
we murder to dissect

Fromm maintained there are two ways of knowing. One path is the autopsy table of science:

In children we often see this path to knowledge quite overtly. The child takes something apart, breaks it up in order to know it, or it takes an animal apart; cruelly tears off the wings of a butterfly in order to know it, to force its secret. The cruelty itself is motivated by something deeper: the wish to know the secret of things and of life.... The other path to knowing ‘the secret is love.’ (Fromm, 1956: 25)

Maslow, in *The Psychology of Science*, says Martin Buber’s “I”-“Thou” represents a humanistic way of knowing rather than typical objective science. The other way of knowledge, “I”-“It,” turns everything into an object for manipulation: rocks, trees, and, ultimately, people.

Objectivity would have us pretend that humans are not doing the observing, thus avoiding problems of human consciousness. It demands an alienation between the “In-Here” and the “Out-There”: between the human and the object of study.

Theodore Roszak, in *Makings of a Counterculture: Technological Society and Its Youthful Opposition* (1969), wrote,

... whatever its epistemological status ... objectivity as a state of being fills the very air we breathe in a scientific culture ... the mentality of the ideal scientist becomes the very soul of the society (Roszak 1969: 216).

Objective consciousness is alienated life promoted to its most honorific status as scientific method. Under its auspices, we subordinate nature to our command only by estranging ourselves from more and more of what we experience ... (Roszak 1969: 232).

...when we challenge the finality of objective consciousness as basis for culture, what is at issue is the size of man’s life. We must insist that a culture which negates or subordinates or degrades visionary experience commits the sin of diminishing our existence. Which is precisely what happens when we insist that reality is limited to what objective consciousness can turn into the stuff of science ... (Roszak 1969: 234).

Maslow says that awe and wonder were actually originally the crucial part of the scientific experience. However, our rational pretense meant the submission of awe and wonder, of imagination and reverence for life to a secondary status. Mystery has disappeared. Roszak continues:

One cliched argument suggests that the work of the scientist begins with the poet's sense of wonder (a dubious hypothesis at best) but then goes beyond it armed with spectroscope and light meter. The argument misses the key point: the poet's experience is defined precisely by the fact that the poet does not go beyond it Or are we to believe it was by failure of intelligence that Wordsworth never graduated into the status of weatherman? (Roszak 1969: 253)

Humanism in many ways is a reverse image of the scientific model. Love is not objective and detached, it is involved and concerned. Rather than doubt and testing, it speaks of truths that only reveal themselves with trust and commitment. Instead of prediction, manipulation, and control, humanism respects the person. Humanistic power is about influence, creating resources, and empowering people. Rather than being value-free, humanism is a commitment to human welfare and social betterment.

Buber offers us the way out of our dilemma. He speaks of a twin process of consciousness: (1) the setting at distance which is necessary for perception, and (2) the reuniting of the separated. This is similar to Paul Tillich's work in *Love, Power, and Justice*, as well as the philosophy of Erich Fromm in *The Art of Loving* and his other works. As long as the twofold process occurs, we are in touch with our humanity. However, when the setting at a distance is reified as an ideal objectivity, then we have solidly separated ourselves from each other and turned the other into a permanent "It" or object. So much of this also is akin to George Herbert Mead's conception of the "I" and the "me" as an ongoing process.

As Maslow notes, we must take advantage of both ways of knowing if our knowledge is to be complete. This doesn't mean we do traditional science and then do humanism in our off-duty hours. It means we need to reconceptualize science and formulate a humanistic science that embraces both ways of knowing.

Once we enthrone objectivity, we have separated ourselves from each other. Once we institutionalize ourselves too tightly into the role player ("the me"), we lose the transparency of an authentic self and the fluidity of movement back and forth between the "I" and the "me."

Ironically, while the actual physical sciences moved to a paradigm of relativity following Einstein and Heisenberg, sociology embraced old-line deterministic science. Ideas such as cause and effect, explaining away all variation, and prediction and control dominate modern social science. Modern physics may have developed theories which look more like an old episode of "Star Trek" where each system defines its own time and space, but sociological science is still back with a Newtonian paradigm.

Einstein's favorite philosopher, Emile Meyerson, characterized August Comte as that "inspired madman." His vision of a science where politics was subjugated to morals was truly inspired. Science would provide the basis for agreement on the conditions under which human beings flourish. However, Meyerson argued a predictive science that seeks total control and total explanation is ultimately absurd. It would seek to reduce everything to identity: this variable is really explainable by this, and that is explainable by that, etc. Science, according to Meyerson, is really

slow motion common sense and thinking will not free us from the responsibility of having to decide and implement values.

A post-Newtonian social science could certainly be conceived where each set of value decisions define their own universe and consequences. We see this as precisely what pragmatism sought to do. It is also the hope of a mature postmodern science. However, we do not yet see this conception of science emerging as a major sociological alternative. A humanistic science to which Maslow aspired is very different from the deterministic mode in which modern social science has cast its lot.

Changing the scientific roadmap is critical. It is our way of organizing our thoughts and it is also our way of organizing people in organizations. If humanism is to survive, we must reorganize both our thinking and our organizations to make room for the human.

Counterculture Movement

Science replaced the sacred foundation of culture based on myth, magic, and mystery with a secular foundation emphasizing history, technology, and reason.

The transformation is blunt and bold: one Reality Principle knocking its predecessor for a loop... the great reversal has been the total *secularization* of culture in mind and deed—certainly the most potent, daring, and original project of modern times, as well as the most distinctive historical contribution of Western society. (Roszak 1975: 159-160) [Italics original]

There has been no appreciation by advocates of science for the fact that by such a process something crucial is lost: the humanistic ethos! We treat love and the magical only as anomalies—exceptions in an otherwise scientific world view. The magical becomes mere mood or feeling. Love finds no room in the halls of scientific bureaucracy.

Theodore Roszak (1969) originally coined the term “counterculture” in a book entitled *The Making of a Counterculture: Technological Society and Its Youthful Opposition*. Roszak saw rational science as an inadequate basis for culture. Youthful alienation was a natural byproduct of a technological culture with little room for the human. The counterculture itself set about attempting to create new social forms and social institutions that would overcome alienation. People were called to function as an artist inventing their own lives and society.

Not only did the counterculture involve sociological ideas, but it involved many people who were sociologists. Indeed, students then came to sociology to change the world. We must not forget that the campus student protests of the 1960s and early 1970s were a movement largely brought about and “sponsored” by sociology. It was sociology teachers who were talking about the Vietnam War and the need to restructure society and to rethink our values. Fully fifty percent of Berkeley campus demonstrators were sociology majors (Lipset and Wolin 1965). This was a fact not lost on the Nixon administration which then worked to cut funding to sociology departments.

When former Columbia student activist James Kunen, who wrote *The Strawberry Statement*, was asked what happened to the counterculture movement, he said, “They stole our symbols.” The Madison Avenue capitalistic machine could mass market blue jeans, peace signs, and protest music as well as anything else. Get yourself a t-shirt and be a hippie too. When everybody’s a hippie, nobody’s a

hippie. It didn't matter to the corporate establishment what decal you put on your t-shirt or what message was in the lyrics of the music, as long as you bought it with good, hard cash. Capitalism is amazingly flexible. As media visionary Marshall McLuhan warned us: "The medium is the message." The content is almost irrelevant. The counterculture became a fad and went the way of all fads: it passed out of fashion.

When Roszak (1979, 1980) was asked what became of the counterculture movement, he claimed it won. It became enfranchised in a historically new normative ethic of personhood. Self-fulfillment became a right. We had always talked about the pursuit of happiness, but prior generations embraced the cultural values of "self-denial" and "self-sacrifice." The counterculture made self-exploration a legitimate rhetoric of motive.

In this case, Roszak was both right and wrong. The counterculture was routinized into American society by emphasizing the psychological and neglecting the sociological. The psychological focus on personal fulfillment became a part of the American cultural mythos, but the movement to create new alternative social forms and social institutions was rejected and ultimately negated. By institutionalizing only the psychological aspects, the routinized counterculture led to abuses of self-indulgence and the overconcern with self. The insight of personal power that you create your own reality became a mandate rather than a doorway. Ironically, it actually became part of the conservative backlash which then and today focuses on the myth of individualism and individual responsibility and denies the plight of the other. The only difference between the alienation that characterizes youth yesterday and the alienation today is that once we actually thought we'd change things. However, without an effective social canopy which empowers youth in a meaningful drama, we are left growing up as absurd as ever. We must realize that it is not just the individual creating their own reality, but that we do it within the context of available social resources. The sociological understanding is not that just "I" create reality but that "we" create reality together.

The other good answer to the question of "what became of the counterculture?" is that it became the Women's Movement. Bill always thought that the counterculture died one night on the late-night "Tonight Show with Johnny Carson." Students for Non-Violence Coalition Committee Co-Chair Stokely Carmichael, who coined the term "Black Power," was asked: "What positions are available to women in the movement?" Carmichael, who is normally a very intellectual, persuasive, urbane gentleman, said, "The only position for women is prone." It was an obscene and sexist joke, but the audience at the time laughed.

Women had marched on Selma. They had been killed at Kent State. They had sat down on buses. They had worked with their brothers throughout the movement. But despite this movement to human freedom, women were clearly regarded as second-class citizens. What happened to the counterculture? We always thought women went right on changing, although men were only willing to go so far. Shere Hite talks about this in *Women and Love: A Cultural Revolution in Progress*. A cultural revolution is when we change the story—women were changing and men soon sat the revolution out. They did not bargain for it changing their power relationships with women.

It is also no coincidence that the women's movement occurred historically at the same time that the self/personal psychology movement evolved—the two are actu-

ally part of the same movement. Women had always been taught to sacrifice self for others. Self love was a new virtue. "I am a person. I am also important." As Gloria Steinem indicated in *Revolution from Within: The Politics of Self Esteem*, the women's movement redefined love and self.

Unfortunately, the larger capitalistic culture was right on guard to try and ensure that changes would only affect individuals rather than transform all social institutions. We have divided the world into masculine and feminine qualities and systematically devalued the feminine. Traditionally, the masculine has been rational, thinking, and scientific, while the feminine has been caring, feeling, and humanistic. We need to revise both our ways of organizing information (our theories) and our ways of organizing people (our organizations and ways of governing). The scientific compromise with humanistic values has always been quite simple: leave humanism at home, confined to a day of rest, and allow rational science to determine how we shape the world. It is the old dialectic of the mind-body split, think-feeling, and masculine-feminine. It is also the dichotomy of what we have traditionally felt belongs at work and what belongs at home. We left love and humanistic values out of the practical marketplace and political conversations. We have made the "real world" in the left-brain, masculine, rational, scientific image. Feminism ultimately means not just female bodies in the work place, but restructuring the way we do business and government alike.

When women enter the system as it stands, those who succeed will do so by adapting to it—by being competitive, by submerging their interpersonal, humanistic and supportive qualities.... Is achievement of *his* lifestyle to be the goal of this great social revolution of human liberation? ... Freed from sexist values, we, as a society, could conceivably strive under the leadership of women to alter the priorities and styles of our institutions in order to foster the psychological development of each individual, the relationships of people with other people, and the relationship of people with their institutions. What we must accomplish is the reverse of the direction in which we are sliding. The worthwhile and extraordinary revolution would be one in which the objectives and styles historically associated with *women* become those of society and are associated with *people*. (Bardwick 1979: 174)

We need a new synthesis between the masculine and the feminine. We have discarded and devalued the feminine. It is only natural that we must now celebrate and revalue the feminine which has been lost. Having divided the world into two categories, masculine and feminine, we must reintegrate them in a new synthesis which preserves the best of both. This means a new marriage between thinking and feeling; between rational science and values.

Humanism would set about remaking the world so we cared about self and about each other. The counterculture originally spawned such a vision. The larger culture routinized it and we detoured.

Perhaps sociology should be an art instead of a science. Robert Nesbit held that sociology is an art, but he didn't really mean it. His classic article "Sociology as Art" is really about the role of the intuitive in hypothesis formularization. Otherwise, he is clinging to a scientific process.

The counterculture offered a preview of the directions sociology might take. It seems to have pinpointed the questions for a humanistic sociology as art: How do we create social forms which empower people? How do we create society for people instead of people for society? *Our social constructions should function for the human—not mold the human to some other purpose*. This is the meaning of humanism in sociology. Sociology must be an art creating new social forms. Human-

istic sociology seeks to overcome alienation and establish social institutions where the human spirit and wonder can flourish. It also strives to confront the forces of de-humanization and depersonalization which would enslave us.

Humanistic Epistemology

Martin Buber contrasts between “I”-“Thou” relationships and “I”-“It” relationships. An “I”-“Thou” relationship realizes that the other person has a full humanity just like yourself. Humanists are not willing to just turn others into objects. We cannot settle for theories that reduce people to less than what they are. As humanists, we can settle for nothing less than full humanity.

We must respect the humanity of the other person. They are also a “thou,” just like us. They are also struggling with the predicaments of life. Mark Carey (2001), the director of probation in Minnesota, says he wants a sense of humility in probation officers: a feeling that there but for fortune go I.

Lovers must also respect the humanity in the other person. If I just force a lover, then it is not love—it is closer to rape or prostitution. Parents have a similar dilemma because they want their child to be free and to have their own identity, but they also want the child to do what they want. If a child always does what their parents want, then freedom is only hypothetical and is untested.

For the humanist, our means must reflect our ends. Our means cannot violate our image of the human. As humanists, we must respect our subjects. As humanistic sociologists, we must opt for social forms that empower humanity rather than techniques for some to manipulate and control others.

If we study the forest, the redwood trees, and wildlife, do we not have some sensitivity and caring that what we are studying should survive? Humanists begin with a commitment to humanity. We cannot opt for a science which diminishes or reduces our humanity.

It may sound strange, but perhaps we must discuss the theology of our brand of sociology. Theologians would claim that a loving God allows free will and therefore does not control the outcome. A loving God values the human. A loving social science must do the same. A humanistic social science cannot opt for prediction and control that destroys free will and the human.

Humanistic sociology departs from the narrow scientific epistemology which seeks prediction and control. In *The Psychology of Science*, Maslow writes:

The ultimate goals of knowledge about persons are different from the goals of knowledge about things and animals....If humanistic science may be said to have any goals beyond sheer fascination with the human mystery and enjoyment of it, these would be to release the person from external controls and to make him *less* predictable to the observer (to make him freer, more creative, more inner-determined) even though perhaps more predictable to himself. (Maslow 1966: 40) (Italics original)

Indeterminacy

If we allow people freedom, who knows what will happen? We can't control the outcome. As Ernest Becker (1968: 364) notes, “opting for man as an end, ...means introducing indeterminacy into the world. One must have a firm faith in man, in his potential for increasingly ethical action.” Humanism refuses to conceive of human

beings as smaller role-like versions ripe for manipulation. However, if we are to empower people, we must ultimately trust the person. If people are ends and not merely means, then we have no absolute power over them. We cannot control the outcome. At its very core, humanism introduces indeterminacy into the equation.

Humanistic power provides a very different road than the scientific power of force, control, and determinism. We value the person rather than treating people as objects for manipulation. The research on children who beat the odds and rise out of at-risk environments shows they tend to have mothers who believed there was something special in the child. Rather than just mold to a purpose, they listened to the child.

Maslow's critique of science was at least as important as his idea of self-actualization. Sociology must examine its moral epistemology. A sociology where knowledge is based on being able to predict and control people is morally suspect. Value-neutral techniques which can then be used for fair or foul will not suffice. Whom do we serve? This is the dilemma that Alvin Gouldner warned about in *The Coming Crisis in Western Sociology*. It is also the warning of Alfred McClung Lee's *Sociology for Whom?* As Becker questions, do we want a sociology that masters the art of enslaving? If we build a deterministic science that allows prediction and control, it will be used.

Humanistic Power

Carl Rogers (1977) said he had always thought of power as power over things or the ability to force one's will on another. When someone said his psychology was about power, it took him a long time to understand that they were right. He was talking about personal power.

The humanistic power is not force and compulsion. It is the power of actualized being. Nietzsche spoke of it as "the will to power." This is why Nietzsche is sometimes referred to as the "Father of Humanistic Psychology." He gave us a different ontology of power—the humanistic power. Power in this sense is the will to life.

... basically the will to power in Nietzsche is ... a designation of the dynamic self-affirmation of life. It is, like all concepts describing ultimate reality, both literal and metaphorical. The same is true of the meaning of power in the concept the 'will to power.' It is not the sociological function of power which is meant ... enforcing one's will against social resistance, is not the content of the will to power. The latter is the drive of everything living to realize itself with increasing intensity and extensity. The will to power is not the will of men to attain power over men, but it is the self-affirmation of life in its self-transcending dynamics, overcoming internal and external resistance. This interpretation of Nietzsche's 'will to power' easily leads to a systematic ontology of power. (Tillich 1954: 36)

Humanistic conceptions of power differ radically from the scientific power of cause and effect. We cannot successfully treat the human with the same mechanical tools we have used in the physical sciences:

That which is forced must preserve its identity. Otherwise, it is not forced but destroyed One cannot transform a living being into a complete mechanism, without removing its centre and this means without destroying it as a living unity. (Tillich 1954: 46)

Nietzsche spoke of freedom *for* things as opposed to freedom *from* things. He noted that when most people use the word freedom, they are speaking as if they

meant *freedom from*, but what they really desire is *freedom for*: the ability or the opportunity to accomplish some purpose. Power can also be conceived of in this way. Power *for* is the humanistic power and relates to actualization. Power *from* or power *over* is the scientific power which needs control and domination. Fromm (1947) used this same distinction to develop his conceptions. He termed them power *of* and power *over*:

Power of = capacity, and power over = domination. This contradiction, however is of a particular kind. Power = domination results from a paralysis of power = capacity. 'Power over' is the perversion of 'power to.' . . . Domination is coupled with death, potency with life. (p. 94)

Fromm (1947: 98) noted that this conception was also not foreign to the thinking of Spinoza (Ethics IV, Def. 8) who wrote that "by virtue and power, I understand the same thing." *The humanistic power is the power of actualized being.* Charisma is the personal power. *It is an attraction to realized living.* We are attracted towards the humanistic power. We do not need to be forced, but willingly join the dance.

In the discussion of the ontology of power, we are going to have to include theologian Paul Tillich. He and Fromm clearly read and were influenced by each other. It is sometimes hard to distinguish who came up with which idea. Tillich also was firmly in personal dialogue with Maslow. Tillich expands these same concepts in *Love, Power, and Justice*. For Tillich, like Fromm, love means overcoming separateness: two people becoming one. Fromm would call it "fusion under conditions of integrity." Power is the actualizing power, the life force, realized being. This is the same as Maslow's, Fromm's, and Nietzsche's understanding. Justice is being just to oneself. It is recognizing the other person. It is what Fromm would call "respect," which from the original Latin means "to look at," to see someone—not as who you want them to be—but who they really are. It is perhaps the grain of truth in the scientific idea of objectivity. It is the commitment to be honest, not to falsify. Respect allows someone to be who they are.

Love is overcoming separateness: two people becoming one. Justice or respect is two people being two—each having their own identities. As Martin Buber said, these two twin processes are inseparable. We must have one to have the other. It is setting at a distance and then overcoming the separateness.

Tillich (1954) proceeded to argue that conceiving of love as overcoming separateness implied that co-dependent relationships which dilute individuals into partial persons cannot, by definition, be love:

Love is the drive for reunion of the separated. It presupposes that there is something to be reunited, something relatively independent that stands upon itself. Sometimes the love of complete self-surrender has been praised and called the fulfillment of love. But the question is: What kind of self-surrender is it and what is it that it surrenders? If a self whose power of being is weakened or vanishing surrenders, his surrender is worth nothing. . . . The surrender of such an emaciated self is not genuine love because it extinguishes and does not unite what is estranged. The love of this kind is the desire to annihilate one's responsible and creative self for the sake of the participation in another self which by the assumed act of love is made responsible for himself and oneself. The chaotic self-surrender does not give justice to one's own power of being and to accept the claim for justice which is implied in this power. Without this justice there is no reunitive love, because there is nothing to unite. (Tillich 1954: 68-69) [Italics original]

Buber's "I"-*"Thou"* offers a different paradigm to science. It provides a framework where overcoming separateness and love can take place. As long as the world and others are frozen as objects, such a reunion cannot be achieved.

“Setting at a distance” is essential: for thought, for movement, for perception, and for speaking. In order to see and frame in language, we must distance—abstract. This is the nature of thought. And yet our abstractions from whole—from process—must not be such that they are reified and become treated as the thing-in-itself. “Setting at a distance” must not be allowed to cement into objects; our framework of thought must not estrange Self from Other. It is essential that we frame our conceptions in a way that we can overcome the separateness which is implicit in our distancing and thus preserve a dialog. (Buber 1957: 105)

Love is infinitely social. It is between an I and a Thou and requires respect for the identity of each. It requires the uniting across the distance, a social relationship, and a way of organizing self with room for actualization. How do we create social arrangements with room for the hand of life to move?

If we are going to talk about humanistic sociology, then we have to talk about love. It is the core value in a humanistic conception. Love invites. We cannot force love. We cannot move past a person’s defenses into love unless the person allows us. The other person must be willing to entertain love. Abraham Maslow’s (1962) discussion of growth shows this aspect of the humanistic power quite clearly:

Defensiveness can be as wise as daring; it depends on the particular person, his particular status and the particular situation in which he has to choose. The choice of safety is wise when it avoids pain that may be more than the person can bear at the moment. If we wish to help him grow, then all we can do is help if he asks for help out of suffering, or else simultaneously allow him to feel safe and beckon him onward to try the new experience like the mother whose arms invite the baby to try to walk. We can’t force him to grow, we can only coax him to, make it possible for him, in the trust that simply experiencing the new experience will make him prefer it; no one can prefer it for him. If it is to become part of him, he must like it. If he doesn’t, we must gracefully concede that it is not for him at this moment. (p. 54)

This reminds one of the battered woman trying to get out of her circumstances. We must continually offer an outstretched hand. We must be there for her when she is willing to take the chance. But we must also realize that the most dangerous time is when she is trying to leave—more women are killed then than any other time. We must continue to offer help and never give up. Most women do leave such situations eventually (DeKeseredy and Schwartz 1996); however, the average woman tries to leave unsuccessfully seven or eight times before she finally is successful. We must be there for her when she is ready to take that step. This may not be the time, but we must not give up. We can’t force her. We have asked her to make a new life and that is hard. We must provide resources and alternatives. We must invite her, but it is her decision and we must respect that.

The humanist can only set the stage, invent resources, and extend an invitation. The scientific power will seek to force an outcome at any cost with no regard for the pollution created by such coercion. However, if the humanist tries to take the Other by force, the very essence of the humanistic vision is lost. The secrets we wished to unfold remain unfulfilled. If we must force love, then it is not love. If we must trick or swindle or in other ways try to coerce love to render its fruits, then we will never be quite satisfied with their sweetness. Sidney Jourard expresses it nicely:

I love her. What does this mean? . . . As she discloses her being to me or before my gaze, my existence is enriched. I am more alive. I experience myself in dimensions that she evokes, such that life is more meaningful and livable. My beloved is a mystery that I want to make transparent. But the paradox is that I cannot make my beloved do anything. I can only invite and earn the disclosure that makes her transparent. I want to know my beloved. But for me to know, she must show. And for her to show her mysteries to me, she must be assured I will respect them, take delight in them. (Jourard 1971: 52)

Perhaps it is because we have conceived of love as a gift and thus outside of our control that we find it so valuable. Love that can be bought or forced is only a pretense. Real love is similar to a free gift. Those seeking scientific and technological ways of controlling and predicting love will never be satisfied with their results, for it will slip through their grasp. Love is not a force that we can chain to our intentions. We must all remember that at times there has been nothing that we could do to “win” a love. And at other times, we have been loved far beyond anything we could have ever predicted.

Humanistic Social Control

The conservatives want to put the Hobbesian values of obedience into place claiming we need society to protect us from each other. Rousseau, on the other hand, postulated that people were born good and corrupted by society. His solution was that we must then remake society—both its social forms and its social institutions.

We must look at styles of social control. Sullivan, Tifft, and Sullivan (1997) present “discipline as enthusiasm” as an alternative to discipline by obedience. This strange-sounding phrase means that people who are self-actualized, enthused (literally, “filled with the spirit”), and have a greater purpose are trustworthy. Discipline takes care of itself. Hal Pepinsky would claim that more safety can be had with empathy and dialogue than by obedience and forced conformity. In *The Geometry of Democracy and Violence*, he says democracy is responsive to the needs of others. When we communicate in dialogue, our perceptions and agendas shift as we take each other into account. He argues that refusing to take the other person into account is the fundamental essence of violence.

Pepinsky and Quinney (1991) presented the idea of peacemaking criminology. Rather than wage a war on crime with more punishments, peacemaking criminology maintains that to end crime we must heal broken lives. The writer Dostoyevsky wrote, “You can judge the degree of civilization of a society by visiting its prisons.”

Peacemaking is more than avoiding war. Conflict resolution has taught us we need to pay attention to human needs (Burton 1990), without which societies manifest all kinds of social problems. To create a peaceful society we need to create social arrangements where people flourish.

Maslow explores needs. Oddly enough, one might actually look at Maslow as an extended footnote to B. F. Skinner. Skinner didn’t understand that people should not be a manipulatable variable. He did not understand the difference between rewards and punishments, and also failed to understand the dynamics of what are motivators for human beings.

Negative reinforcement is not just the opposite of positive reinforcement. Rewards and punishments are totally different realms. Love and meaning are rewards. Fear, imprisonment, and physical pain are examples of negative motivators. It doesn’t make sense to understand love as just the opposite of imprisonment, or meaning as the reverse of physical pain. Rewards and punishments are in different theaters, each with their own different dynamics, feelings, and experiences—we are drawn toward rewards and we flee from punishments. There is a difference between pushes and pulls; the forces of attraction and repulsion are not just opposites but are different in kind.

Rewards and punishments are not on a continuum where one can be added or subtracted from the other. Removing a punishment is just not the same as a reward. One may talk about finding food or water when you are starving as a “reward.” However, it is really not a “positive reinforcement” but a matter of removing a deficiency. This is different from true positive reinforcement, such as having a significant other in your life or being part of a meaningful drama.

Maslow (1968) distinguishes between deficiency motivators (d-needs) and being motivators (b-needs). D-needs are the basic survival needs including food, shelter, and safety. We seek to avoid deficiencies because they operate as pushes. The B-needs are pulls and include self-esteem, meaning, and love.

Bill once took a class on “Humanism and Mysticism” with counterculture analyst Theodore Roszak. The enduring text was philosopher Henri Bergson’s *The Two Sources of Religion and Morality*. The two sources referenced in the title are two visions of social control: the first is social obligation (“you must because you must”), and the second is the impetus to love. We are pushed by obligation, but love is an aspiration toward which we are drawn. Bergson writes in every age “exceptional souls have appeared who sensed their kinship with the soul of Everyman” (1935: 95).

“It is these men who draw us toward an ideal society, while we yield to the pressure of the real one” (Bergson 1935: 68). We have followed after them trying to make moral codes and recipes to enable us to repeat the peak experience. It is the perfect example of reification and institutionalization.

When things become institutionalized or reified, does that mean they automatically go wrong? It is a classic problem. We know supposed humanistic sociologists who just assume less structure is better. But that is naïve and non-sociological. We are going to have social constructions. The question is what kind? We have a friend who worries that restorative justice is going to be institutionalized. He wonders how to continue it as an ongoing open dialogue even when it becomes mainstream. How do we create open social institutions with room for the human? This is a crucial question for humanistic sociology.

Humanistic Management, Humanistic Government

How do we manage people’s behavior? How do we govern? When he was first elected to the Iowa legislature several years ago, a friend asked us: “What laws should I make?” We still haven’t gotten back to him. Government is not just about law making. Management is not about making rules. In fact, the new rhetoric in the management literature is about managing the organizational culture.

Leadership is not about manipulating people. It is about creating a vision and a context in which people can flourish. There are two kinds of social organization: social arrangements where we are more ($1 + 1 > 2$) and social arrangements that diminish us ($1 + 1 < 2$). Humanistic sociology aspires to create society where people are more.

B. F. Skinner’s work is an extensive body of research showing conclusively that rewards work better than punishments. For someone who studied rats and believed in determinism, it is a surprising conclusion. We must reflect on the meaning of his haunting line that “love is the use of positive reinforcement.” It is probably right, at least as a theory of management, government, and social control.

Positive reinforcement creates a very different world. If we use negative reinforcement, we focus on punishment and fear. The grain of truth in punishment worth keeping is feedback. Feedback is simply informational—it is just enough to let a person know they are over the line and it won't be tolerated. We must realize what force can do and what it can't do. Force can incapacitate. We must be careful that we do not overload the person so that the volume of punishment is so great that one cannot hear the message in the deafening din. If punishment is our only tool, we may quickly incapacitate people who are already wounded. We must build people up. Some cultures empower, while others produce alienation.

Ironically, humanistic social science probably owes as much to the debate with B. F. Skinner as to anything else. A mechanical metaphor would assume that people are small “widgets”—we pull the lever to make them behave in different ways. A humanistic metaphor would deal with a full human actor who is dancing on the hands of time itself. How would we create social constructions, institutions, social arrangements, social resources, and other social inventions that human actors could bring to their situations? Culture is a series of resources.

The sociological insight isn't that hard to understand:

Human behavior takes place in a context. Culture is a series of resources. The resources one has available influence how one acts. Different environments make some behaviors more likely and some less probable. By seeding resources into the environment, we can influence behavior. (Du Bois and Wright, no date)

If culture influences how we act, then management and government is about setting the stage. What kinds of resources would be helpful to individual actors in their struggles? Humanistic social control is a different theory of management and government than manipulation, force, and rules.

We cannot talk of a humanistic sociology that promotes the good without somehow accounting for evil. We need a theory of alienation. Humanistic sociology needs a Theory Of Evil. Social problems are merely symptoms of larger societal problems. Sociology shows common causes include lack of meaning, lack of empowerment, lack of community, and inability to share power. A formula for overcoming alienation includes empowerment, inventing participatory resources, meaningful roles, and feeling part of a meaningful drama. We must be about creating social resources individual actors can use in their lives. This is the real meaning of the sociological imagination. As a society, we reap what we sow. Under some conditions, people flourish, while under other conditions, although the spirit is willing, people atrophy. What shall we sow?

What kind of framework do we want for organizing society or an organization? A rational roadmap might envision individuals as being ripe for manipulation. A humanistic conception of humankind pictures an organism with grand purpose and full humanity. Bill once taught at a school where they seemed to think that humanism was simply part of the phrase “godless humanism.” He met writer Catherine Roberts on the train to one dissertation committee meeting. Her article “The Three Faces of Humanism” reminds that if some would say people are made in the image of God, then we should respect the sanctity of the human.

Rational planning must make room for the movement of the spirit. We must realize what rules can do and what they can't do. We must understand the difference between the letter of the law and the spirit of the law. Weber did not under-

stand why rationality had been such a mixed blessing in organizations. Rationality does not leave room for the movement of the human.

How do we create government and organizations that respect the human? In 1959, C. Wright Mills wrote in *The Sociological Imagination* that we have learned from the Enlightenment that “increased rationality may not be assumed to make for increased freedom” (1959: 16).

Science, it turns out, is not a technological Second Coming... The increasing rationalization of society, the contradiction between such rationality and reason, the collapse of the assumed coincidence of reason and freedom—these developments lie back of the rise into view of the man who is ‘with’ rationality but without reason, who is increasingly self-rationalized and also increasingly uneasy. It is in terms of this type of man that the contemporary problem of freedom is best stated. . . .

From the individual’s standpoint, much that happens seems the result of manipulation, of management, of blind drift Given these effects of the ascendant rationalization, the individual does the best he can. He gears his aspirations and his work to the situation he is in, and from which he can find no way out. In due course, he does not seek a way out: he adapts. That part of his life which is left over from work, he uses to play, to consume, ‘to have fun.’ . . . Alienated from production, from work, he is also alienated from consumption, from genuine leisure. (Mills 1959: 168)

In our time, what is at issue is the very nature of man, the image we have of his limits and possibilities as man. History is not yet done with its exploration of the limits and meanings of ‘human nature.’ . . . Among contemporary men will there come to prevail, or even to flourish, what may be called The Cheerful Robot? . . . there lies the simple and decisive fact that the alienated man is the antithesis of the Western image of the free man. The society in which this man, this cheerful robot, flourishes is the antithesis of the free society. (p. 171)

It is the story of both science and the accompanying rational bureaucracy. B. F. Skinner in *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* boldly stated that with the move to social science, we have entered the kingdom of decisions previously reserved for the gods. As we debate issues of nuclear power, human cloning, environmental pollution and bioengineering, we make decisions about the world that a century ago would have never been dreamt. The knowledge of sociology tells us that decisions on social policy clearly shape whether people are more likely to be good or evil.

That is what the pragmatists told us a century ago, and this is the conclusion the postmodernists are re-echoing if we take them to their logical conclusion. What kind of world do we want to make? We are in the kingdom of the gods.

Skinner, of course, thought the implications of all this is that we must treat human freedom and dignity as outmoded pre-scientific concepts. Humanists would disagree and suggest instead that we must remodel our conception of science.

The question for social control is always: What kind of person do we want? It is a strange question and we often shy away from the full impact of such awesome responsibility, yet we must make the choice or defer to someone else who will. We must design society and sociology with an eye to *what kind of human beings we want to make*. At a recent conference, Lisa Bjergaard, who is the Eastern Northern Dakota Director of Juvenile Corrections, stated it just that boldly. In the state that has the lowest recidivism in the nation by far, she said they begin by asking what kind of person they want at the end. It is the question for all social designers.

Human Nature As a Self-fulfilling Prophecy

This brings us to the question sociologists and psychologists alike have habitually tried to avoid: What is human nature? It is here that humanists have usually

been undone by the shadow side. The politics of good and evil confront us across human history. However, we cannot avoid the question and must give at least a tentative orientation.

Human nature may not be any more than a matter of potential: not a matter of “being,” but a process that is “becoming.” It is a departure from “what is” to what “might be.” Self is not contained, but has many faces. Human experience may vary, but we see a thread of possibilities from the best to the worse. Indeed, we recognize a familiarity in all experiences, because once we understand the situation, we may see how we might have behaved similarly in the same situation. We can cross and connect with other lives, seeing how we might be living those lives.

The social institutions we create will shape humans to an image. What do we want to make? What kind of human being do we want? What is your image of humanity?

To opt for a theory of human ills is not only to opt for the kind of person one is going to have to pay deference to professionally; it is also to opt potentially for the kind of world one is going to wake up in, the kinds of human beings that one will have to come across on the street. To opt for a particular theory of human ills is very much like falling in love in strictest sense: it is to opt for the presence of a certain kind of being in the world, and hence for a certain kind of world. (Becker 1968: 364) (*Italics original*)

Humanistic sociology strives to bring values right through the “front door” of the discipline and envisions society in such a way as to make a better self-fulfilling prophecy. Human nature does appear to be a self-fulfilling prophecy: some people will be good no matter how they are treated and some people seem to screw up irregardless of what society does, but most of us could go either way. We can design social systems where people are likely to be good. Unfortunately, we typically design social systems where people are more likely to resort to evil.

Fromm (1968), in an incredible article entitled “What It Means to Be Human,” recommends we follow Walt Whitman in saying that “I contain multitudes” and Goethe’s idea that “I can conceive of no act so horrible that I cannot imagine myself to be the author.” Across so many different cultures, the human spirit has taken so many different forms.

Some may remember third grade teacher Jane Elliot’s classroom exercise in which she divided students into brown-eyed and blue-eyed groups to teach about prejudice and discrimination. One of the interesting side effects was that when students were in the superior group, their scores on tests were higher; on the day they were in the inferior group, their scores were lower; and after the exercise everyone’s scores were higher and *remained that way permanently*. As the researchers said, that wasn’t possible but that it appears to be what happened. The lesson is clear: When people are treated as superior, they become superior. And after they learned they could be superior, the lesson stuck. The self-fulfilling prophecy exists in daily life. Perhaps like Garrison Keillor’s mythical land of Lake Wobegone, we need to create a society where everyone is above average.

“Making the Good”

Comte had envisioned sociology as a humanitarian religion. Today, we laugh at his arrogance, but perhaps this candor was his genius. He realized that sociology is clearly in the realm of religion and forging a new shared understanding. There but

for fortune go I. Is that not the sociological understanding? Our lives are entwined. Our personal problems are related to our social problems.

Max Weber maintained sociologists should seek a *verstehen* approach or a subjective understanding. Charles Cooley recommended sympathetic introspection as the method of sociology. "There but for fortune go I" might be an easy translation of what he meant. It is a common ideology that sees how the fates of circumstances influence who we are and our outcomes.

"I"-*"Thou"* is a different paradigm for knowledge than the one to which we are accustomed. Many languages actually take this concept into account and provide different words for "you," some defining the concept of *"Thou,"* offering respect, a closeness, a sense of sharing. English, on the other hand, forces us to use a modifier, another inserted word or phrase, to make this distinction. Our obsession with the individual and individual values has so influenced the language that we use, the way that we think using that language, that we have difficulty in making such a sense of *"Thou"* as a part of our culture.

Comte sought to demonstrate the relationship between private problems and public issues. This is the only reason he felt that we could compel people to act together: a realization of shared fates; an enlightened self-interest. This is the exact same mantle that C. Wright Mills would later take up. Reviewing what we have learned about the nature of the social bond in the first 150 years of social science, Ernest Becker wrote:

It showed exactly what Comte had wanted: the fullest possible correlates of the dependence of personal troubles on social issues.

The problem for all thinkers of the Enlightenment, and especially for Comte, was how to get social interest to predominate over selfish private interest. The new theory of alienation showed ethical action could not be possible where man was not supplied with self critical and socially critical knowledge, and with the possibilities of broad and responsible choices. Recurrent evils like sadism, militant hate, competitive greed, narrow-pride, calculating self-interest that takes a nonchalant view of others' lives...—*all stem from constrictions on behavior and from shallowness of meanings;* and these could be laid in the lap of society...and the kinds of choices and cognition which its institutions encourage and permit. Man could only be ethical if he was strong, and he could only be strong if he was given fullest possible cognition, and responsible control over his own powers. The only possible ethics was one which took man as a center, and which provided him with the conditions that permitted him to try to be moral.

The antidote to evil was not to impose a crushing sense of supernatural sanction, or unthinking obligation or automatic beliefs of any kind—no matter how 'cheerful' they seem. For the first time in history it had become transparently clear that the real antidote to evil in society was to supply the possibility or depth and wholeness or experience...It had never been so well understood that goodness and human nature were potentially synonymous terms; and evil was a complex reflex of the coercion of human powers. (1968: 325-326) (*Italics original*)

If you will note, this is also the exact solution proposed by Dewey. And because of these beliefs he was dedicated to educating people for democracy. If you will understand his Chicago Philosophy department colleague George Herbert Mead's conception of the generalized other and his approach to social problems, you will realize that they are similar.

Postmodernism and Pragmatism

The sociological consciousness was probably understood *better* in the early 1900s than it is understood now. Pragmatism may have formulated it better than any other

set of ideas. Our pretenses to final truths are but a detour. What kind of world would we like to make? How do we get there? And how should we travel?

The outcome of postmodernism should be to examine the consequences of different knowledge strategies. Actually, this brings us back to the pragmatism of John Dewey and the whole conversation that led to the birth of the Chicago School. Pragmatism offers the way to move with and beyond both value relativity and postmodernism: What are the consequences of different knowledge strategies? The postmodernists would tell us that reality is only “make-believe.” So what should we make believe?

We frankly don't understand what is advanced by postmodernism that wasn't solved by pragmatism. There is no truth. So what? There *are* consequences of different knowledge strategies. There is no real reality. So what? There *are* consequences of choosing to define the situation in different ways.

Ernest Becker wrote in his time that we live in a world of an overabundance of truth—too many truths. Perhaps this was just the clutching of a modernist man. But the remedy to his dilemma would have been Omar Khayyan's insight that to “each must come the time to decide between truth and wisdom.” Wisdom would be the right truth at the right time.

In our time, postmodernists conclude properly that there is no truth. That does not mean that there is still not need for wisdom: the right insight at the right time.

The old questions of the ancient philosophers was simply: “should we find the truth or make the good?” It was decided that we should *first* find the truth and *then* we would know how to make the good. Well, sorry, the journey to find the truth didn't work out. That shouldn't be cause for eternal moaning. What it means is that we are back with the question of “how to make the good?”

Charles Lemert (1995) notes in the modernist world, the truth structured differences. Values decide what to rank from best to worst. Classes get ranked in relation to those values. In the postmodernist world, there is no truth, so the ranking is more arbitrary and the power relation more obvious.

At its best, postmodernism is really a “liberation theology” and best understood when conceived of as that. But once you get free, we still have a world to make. What kind of world do we want to create? Fromm suggested clearly there are consequences to depending on how we define the situation. We can create a world where we define human nature as good and people are more likely to act like that. Ruth Benedict said in the synergistic cultures she studied, it wasn't that people never did bad things—it was that the society never gave up on them and figured someday they would come around. And they usually did.

The journey to find the truth has revealed some very interesting things. Despite the fact that what we discovered wasn't what we wanted, whatever we concluded from that journey must be the truth. What has the journey to find the truth revealed? First, that where you choose to focus determines what you see. Second, how you look determines what you see. So we need to decide what we want to create. If it is make believe, what should we make believe?

As important as it is, it is not enough just to deconstruct the world. We also have lives to construct. It is an armchair luxury merely to condemn without beginning the hard work of deciding what to recommend. We have a world to make.

Making the World

We might suggest that “I”-“It” knowledge has become a nuisance and a danger even to the planet. The journey of science with its abstraction of the uninvolved observer separate from the process is an abstraction that we can’t afford. Pressed to its farthest frontier, we have reached the end of its usefulness and it is now a danger. Science not only means the possible pollution and destruction of the environment, it also means the alienation of the human.

Can Science Save Us? So far, science has always pulled us out of the fire. Maybe we would not have had the fire from which we are pulled had we not had science as it exists in modern society. Beginning social scientists believed in the myth of progress. However, we have come to learn that there are limits. We are bounded. The planet itself is encased in an atmosphere. Nuclear and environmental pollution comes back upon us. There are limits beyond which we cannot go. We would like so much to wish away any reality or limits—to pretend that there is no ozone layer that matters.

From the 1950s through the 1980s, we had to learn to live with the threat of nuclear holocaust. The explosion of the entire planet and elimination of most life-forms remains a possibility. There are consequences to what we do. A science of mindless tinkering and endless curiosity eventually bumps up against them. We learn that the pollution of rivers and the very air we breathe cannot go on endlessly without consequences for human life.

Fromm says that a humanistic science is based on “interest” instead of mere “curiosity.” Do we care about humanity? Are we concerned with making people’s lives better? Or are we just meddling?

Food supplies can be contaminated by chemical preservatives and pesticides, thus poisoning us and producing, among other bad things, cancer. To put things in an ecological perspective is a whole new way of thinking. There are consequences to different actions. Species can become extinct. Water supplies can be poisoned.

Science would assume there are no limits—that we can just endlessly tinker. But we have learned that long before we get to the end of the journey, the scientific prodding has its limits. The ancients sought to discover the elementary building blocks of matter. They called them corpses. Today, we call them atoms. But if you will notice, the splitting of the atom not only launched us into a nuclear age, it also shattered a whole way of thinking. If the atom could be split, then there were not irreducible fundamental building blocks of matter. Slowly, it became abundantly clear that we were not *discovering* the truth. We were *shaping the world to an image*.

Pretending to separate the observer from the process was fool’s play. The objective observer does not exist. We are tied to the planet and the process. “I”-“Thou” knowledge must be an essential part of our vision. We need a humanistic science. We must put the human back into the system.

As the deconstruction of science has reminded us, the human has always been there:

We have found that where science has progressed the farthest, the mind has but regained from nature that which the mind has put into nature. We have found a strange footprint on the shores of the unknown. We have devised profound theories, one after another, to account for its origin. At last we have succeeded in reconstructing the creature that made the footprint. And lo! it is our own. (Eddington quoted in Matson 1964: 125)

This time we must put the human back into our science through the front door. Remember Comte's dream: a world in which politics was submitted to morals. Sociology was to gather the knowledge from which to build that consensus. This was Aristotle's dream. When he first conceived of the idea of science, he imagined a science of the polis (the community). Postmodernism would claim no consensus is ever possible. Postmodernism's language keeps it safely academic and obscure. It poses no threat to the established social politics.

We are learning from our social science that there are consequences for disregarding our fellow human beings. Oddly, it is Erich Fromm (1968: 63-64), a psychologist, who has the crucial sociological understanding: *you can treat people almost any way, but you can't do it without consequences*. Children growing up absurd in an alienating environment take guns to school and kill their classmates. Nations that have higher income disparities between the rich and the poor have higher crime rates.

Ironically, the Christian Right is correct about the separation of church and state. We can't really separate values from social policy. Now, we just need to debate *which* values. The Founding Fathers thought such an objective separation of values and action was possible only because in the background *they believed in science*. They thought science could be used to shape a shared understanding to make the world.

Sociologists and other social scientists know some lessons. As Becker iterated, we can actually sketch some conclusions. Human beings need love and human contact. Without it, infants die, or at the very least do not grow and thrive. The human organism needs meaning. People need to feel empowered. If we do not create societies that address human needs, we create alienation.

Humanistic sociology is really an ongoing merging of religious and philosophical insights. All religions have a value similar to the golden rule. Perhaps this is why Auguste Comte had originally conceived of sociology as a humanitarian religion. It was to be a shared understanding of our commitment to each other.

We must move beyond behaviorism and deterministic science. Carl Jung noted that "the mind lives by aims as well as causes" (Matson 1964: 208). This is reminiscent of the early sociologists' quest to find the elementary social forces. If you will recall, the elementary social forces are human purposes. In the late 1800s, sociologists were trying to agree on a complete definitive list of human needs. When they couldn't get a list that looked like a periodic atomic table of the elements, they abandoned the conversation. We do not need to agree on the exact naming and delineation of human needs. We have always been struck by the fact that all lists of basic human needs look very similar. The precise naming or categories differs from theorist to theorist. Who cares what we call them? Your list may not look like ours, but all categorization schemes really sketch much of the same territory. We don't need an exact atomic chart of needs, as the early sociologists supposed. We don't need such analytical dissection. It is enough to acknowledge that human needs are critical. Social systems must address them.

Values—Which Values?

If humanistic sociology is to make values matter in designing the world, we must ask: Which values? The sociologist should not strive to be without values. Cultural relativity means taking your values off long enough to see. It does not mean to be without values. Objectivity means putting things in perspective. It re-

ally means honesty—not to falsify things. The core element of objectivity is “respect.” Respect, according to Erich Fromm, is from the original root meaning “to look at.” We certainly need to be streetwise in our knowledge and non-naive in our humanism. We must bring our values to work. Humanism is not a hobby we do after work: making a better world must be the real work of sociology.

Relativism is grounded if we can obtain one referent. That reference point is human welfare. What is good for the person? Once we ground humanistic science in that understanding, everything changes. This is not a new idea. This was Comte’s notion, as well as Ward’s, Small’s, Lynd’s, Fromm’s, Maslow’s, and Becker’s. *Humanistic sociology embraces the value that we must relate everything to what is good for people.* This is what has been meant from the beginning as the idea of a humanistic sociology.

As Becker noted (1971: 152): “. . . the brilliant work of Erich Fromm is the best synthesis . . . to emerge in our epoch, and it is this we shall have to build.” It is still true today. In *Man for Himself*, Fromm proposed the very same standard Robert Lynd had recommended thirty years earlier: we can overcome the relativism of science if we agree upon one value—the promotion of human welfare.

Humanistic ethics... is formally based on the principle that only man himself can determine the criteria for virtue... ‘good’ is what is good for man and ‘evil’ is what is detrimental to man: the sole criterion of ethical value being man’s welfare. (Fromm 1947: 22)

Fromm (1968: 96) suggested we obtain a humanistic “science” if we begin with the value “that it is desirable that a living system should grow and produce the maximum of virtue and intrinsic harmony” (1947: 163).

Ernest Becker (1968: 327-346) said when it first occurred to him that self-esteem is the value for synthesizing the social sciences, he thought it must be too simple. But that is precisely what it is. *Self-esteem—a subjective feeling of well-being—should be the referent value for a science of humanity. Social institutions should answer human needs.*

We would also recommend Ruth Benedict’s concept of synergy. Ironically, a young, new Ph.D. by the name of Abraham Maslow went to work for her shortly after graduation. He was so fascinated by the energy of her personality that he made a career out of identifying and studying people he felt were models of a healthy personality. Ruth Benedict was in fact Maslow’s first model of the self-actualized person. She herself was interested in the interrelationship between personality and culture, and imagined an ideal society based on synergy. In *The Farthest Reaches of Human Nature*, he began to explore Benedict’s idea of a synergistic culture that promoted the conditions for a better life. Synergy thus got smuggled into psychology through the back door as it were and sociology has still not gotten around to exploring the implications of Benedict’s argument. The self-actualization of a humanistic psychology is incomplete without a companion sociology that focuses upon synergy (Du Bois 2001).

In actuality, Benedict had discovered the first synthesis that emerges once we leave behind a value-free science and move firmly into the direction of an integrated science in the service of human needs. As Bill argued in his dissertation on humanistic sociology, Ruth Benedict solved two philosophical problems which had been outstanding for more than 2,000 years. Synergy provides an operational definition of “the Good” and also an operational definition of “Love.”

Synergy is a win-win arrangement between the individual good and the communal good, the person and the organization, and between individuals. Anything less is impractical. Losers always create unwanted negative consequences. Alienation does not work.

From all comparative material the conclusion that emerges is that societies where non-aggression is conspicuous have social orders in which the individual by the same act and at the same time serves his own advantage and that of the group. The problem is one of social engineering and depends upon how large the areas of mutual advantage are in any society. Non-aggression occurs not because people are unselfish and pursue social obligations above personal desire, but when social arrangements makes these two identical. (Maslow 1971: 40)

It is a matter of social invention as Benedict (1970: 55) notes, “the fundamental condition of peace is federation for mutual advantage.” To create a successful society, we must create a win-win situation for everyone and every entity involved.

Where do values fit in sociology? The central question is whether values belong as the mainstream focus for the work of sociologists or whether they should be after-work avocations and hobbies. As *American Sociologist* editor Larry Nichols pointed out, Ogburn, who sought scientific respectability for sociology and was so critical of an ameliorative social science, consulted with the federal government on issues of social planning in the 1930s. Talcott Parsons, who often became the straw man for C. Wright Mills’ writings, “wrote against fascism, resisted McCarthyism, and wrote about the reform of education in the U.S.” Sociologists have always cared about social problems. Indeed that is why we have all entered the field. The question is one of methods. Where do values fit?

Although William Foote Whyte is not normally claimed as a humanistic sociologist—a recent Sociological Practice Association annual meeting in honor of him was appropriately entitled “Using Sociology for Good.” Whyte’s idea of action research is appropriate for humanistic sociology. Effort is brought to bear upon an organization or problem in an attempt to change it and make it better.

Comte envisioned a society where we could better live the dream. Truly credible scholarship keeps the human possibility alive and furthers its direction. We also must take sociology into the world and change it. To record “what is” is not enough. We must report that “what is” suggests alternatives and possibilities that could be followed. We must invent new social resources and alternatives. Sociology is precisely in the business of re-visioning society. If society is theater, then how do we stage the dream? It is an old quest. Starry-eyed youths enter the field eager for the romance of changing the world. As we grow to maturity, we put aside the grandeur and begin the day-to-day task of living. But some of the old dream never quite goes away. As people retire, we find them once again challenging youth with the same old hope. We cannot hold out the promise of sociology just at the beginning and the end of careers. The real mid-life crisis that nags us in our sleep and comes bursting through as we turn back to the world from peak experience is: how do we return the old question to the mainstream of the field? What does it mean to be a humanist and what are the implications for sociology? How do we build upon meaning, values, and the quest for a better world and make it the work of sociology?

Conclusion

We need some referent if we are to escape from relativism. What should be our evaluative standard? Humanism simply means people have human needs and social systems should address them. It also embraces incorporating the sphere of values that Jean Kilbourne (1979) would suggest we have labeled feminine and neglected. Love and concern for human welfare would be first. It is about social amelioration.

We would recommend two evaluative standards: (1) Human Needs: Humanistic sociology begins with the proposition that social systems should meet human needs. Maslow and humanistic psychology laid the foundation for a humanistic social science by exploring basic human needs. The whole conversation of humanistic sociology is about how. We need to empower and invent resources. (2) Synergy: The second evaluative criteria for social inventions should be synergy. We should fashion win-win arrangements between individuals, between the organization and the person, and between the communal good and the individual good.

Humanistic sociology begins with the critique of value-free science and embraces the counterculture's effort to create alternative social forms. Science is not going to discover a truth that will tell us how to live. We must choose our values. Following Nietzsche's "Will to Power," humanistic psychology recognized that all knowledge claims are about shaping humanity in an image. Human nature is a self-fulfilling prophecy. We need a society that offers meaningful roles and the depth of experience. A humanistic society creates a context in which people flourish.

Humanistic sociology begins with a recognition of our common humanity. It values "I" - "Thou" knowledge rather than an "I" - "It" knowledge that treats people and the environment only as objects for manipulation. Humanistic social control emphasizes rewards and positive motivators rather than the authoritarian social control of obedience. A humanistic sociology respects the human. If we value the human, we must allow people free will, which means indeterminacy enters the picture. A deterministic science ultimately means elimination of the human. A humanistic sociology realizes that "there but for fortune go I." It makes social institutions with that in mind.

Humanistic sociology must be forever breaking the mold. It must be breaking out of the institutionalized "me," to use Mead's terms, and returning to the dialogue and open creativity of the "I." Humanism must strive to create social forms and social institutions which bring more of the human spirit into play. This creation must also be true for our professional organizations.

Alfred McClung Lee founded the Society for the Study of Social Problems (SSSP). When it became too large and institutionalized, he went on to found the Association for Humanist Sociology (AHS). The Clinical Sociology Association (now Sociological Practice Association—SPA) and the Society for Applied Sociology (SAS) were also founded as efforts to return sociology to the vision of early sociologists, in which sociology was about making the good.

We have no idea whether any of these organizations will be vital forces for social change in the future or just survive as esoteric clubs for academicians. What we do know is at its core, sociology, the larger discipline, must return to its roots and re-embrace the vision that gave it life. Sociology must once again become the study of how to make a better world.

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