

resurrection) but simply that no one living has ever experienced death (unless reincarnation be conceded). As the parent and the aged will verify, often we must undergo an experience ourselves before we can identify with it. Perhaps, then, artists' preoccupation with death (if indeed it exists) simply reflects their special abilities to imagine the extraordinary. Which renders that preoccupation a mere by-product rather than cause of their abilities.

In addition, both Becker and Camus maintain that facing death as an immediate possibility should drive us to accomplish more, to live fully. Such empirical evidence as we have seems decidedly mixed. On the one hand, the terminally ill do often respond with bursts of activity in hobbies, travel, and the like, to "make up for lost time" and their priorities do frequently change dramatically, e.g., in personal relationships. (I am grateful to Dr. Jerry Devins for supplying this information.) However, Kübler-Ross' classic study of such persons, On Death and Dying,⁴⁷ concluded that they typically pass through five stages: denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and finally acceptance. Perhaps excepting bargaining, these suggest not Camusian intensity but the opposite, especially so the final stage, with its detachment from life's typical activities, its movement toward not more but less living. In like vein, we repeat that those psychologically most segregated from death, the young, are also the most creatively active. It would be helpful to learn, then, whether creative persons who become terminally ill evince bursts of productivity.

In sum, as we have said before, we find it intuitively implausible that the desire to defeat death should serve, unconsciously or otherwise, as a fundamental motive for creativity. Its occasional role we willingly admit; its ubiquity we question. Admittedly, one's intuitions hardly justify rejecting hypotheses, especially in the shadowy realm of human motives and more especially still when these are thought to be unconscious. Nevertheless, when our gut reactions do not indicate face validity, we will not be converted without appreciable evidence. Such evidence is simply not as yet available. Why our introspective doubts? Above all, these explanations seem to us unduly pessimistic. Behaviorists teach that either positive carrots or negative sticks can motivate. Why must creativity necessarily seek to avoid something discomfiting, be it sex, death, or overly large feet? Why could we not retreat into imaginative fantasy, not to suppress reality's unpleasantness but to obtain the pleasures therein? A recent film about Molière⁴⁸ captures this point. We see him fascinated from childhood by ritual, by human pretense, and by dissemblance, so that eventually he rejected more practical pursuits to pursue and express their hypnotic magnetism.

Erich Fromm

Placing Fromm among humanists may raise some eyebrows. He is, after all, by his own admission⁴⁹ ensconced firmly in Freud's tradition, outdoing many fellow neo-Freudians in ratifying the party line, e.g., in interpreting symbols⁵⁰ and in rescuing the founder's major discoveries from revisionist tinkering. As well, Fromm has explicitly forsworn the existentialist label, since he cannot agree that we possess complete freedom or lack universal values. Actually, his other preeminent forefather, besides Freud, is Karl Marx. Symptomatically, he has labeled his framework for developing Freud as dialectic humanism, no less, and he has stressed personality's social, political, and cultural as well as psychological antecedents. Therefore, as a trip to one's library will verify, Fromm's output relates to sociology, political science, history, and even medicine. As a result, it is scattered throughout the cataloguer's firmament; tracking it down provides excellent exercise for would-be marathoners. Nevertheless, Fromm does accept the main planks of humanism's platform, and his thoughts on creativity clearly march in step with May's, so his concurrent treatment is vindicated.

However, Fromm's ruminations are intimately entwined with other speculations. At base, he distinguishes between creativity as a product and as an attitude towards living.⁵¹ The second is necessary for the first to result, but can also exist on its own. This creative attitude requires, among other things, a readiness to be puzzled (cf. Getzels et al.'s problem finding⁵²), to accept and even seek out conflict and stress, and above all to break out of self boundaries and feel united with the external (cf. May's encounter). Now because this creative attitude surfaces repeatedly throughout Fromm's writing we shall, in the interests of brevity, discuss relevant topics and raise creativity's specter within these contexts rather than separately.

1. Existential needs. Recalling Maslow's hierarchy, Fromm's The Sane Society⁵³ posits some uniquely human motives that do not reflect physiological tension but are nevertheless influential. We can choose either to meet them and grow, or to suppress them and regress to animal status. The first such need is for identity. Separation from the mother causes individuation and a search for a sense of ego, or "I." Secondly, we need a frame of orientation and devotion. Having both reason and imagination, we try continually to understand our situation's every aspect, and lacking explanations, we will devise our own, however inappropriate. Both these motives, obviously, are conducive to creativity, but others seem even more so. That same reason and imagination makes us dissatisfied playing the passive animal to whom things happen. We desire transcendence beyond this bestial status, and creating - whether through love, art,



religion or manufacturing - can provide such outlets are available (perhaps because of stifling environments) we will become destructive, because both love and hate, both creation and destruction, answer this same need. Which course we choose is fundamental. Thus, Fromm, like May, recognizes a diabolic as well as sublime side to our nature:

It would be difficult indeed for anyone who has had a long clinical experience as a psychoanalyst to belittle the destructive forces within man.⁵⁴

Indeed, anyone familiar with history would face the same difficulty!

The last, but for us certainly not least, need is for relatedness. Fromm planted the seeds for these thoughts earlier in Man for Himself,⁵⁵ but brought them to blossom in The Art of Loving,⁵⁶ so we follow him there. Isolation induces anxiety, so we seek unification with others. This quest, both neverending and resolute, keeps the human race, and its various subunits such as clans and families, together. It has impelled such varying activities as animal worship, human sacrifice, military conquest, artistic creation, and the love of God. But these are band-aids. Only complete physical and psychological fusion with another person in the act called love is entirely satisfactory.

What is this thing called "love?" First, it is giving not only sex's physical donations but our most precious qualities, like joy, humor, and sadness. Therefore, love is not simply a warmth in heart or stomach that "just happens" and is caught, like measles. It is an act. It demands knowledge, persistence, and practice, making it an art. And these strictures apply to both participants, so love must be reciprocated, these gifts received in equal measure from the other. If we are not loved persons, Sartrean beloveds as well as lovers, then our love is unfulfilled. Secondly, genuine love treats the partner, not as an object for selfish exploitation, but with care (an active concern for his or her life and growth, epitomized by a mother's love for her child). With responsibility (a voluntary agreement to satisfy the other's various needs). With respect (cherishing the other for what he or she is instead of for our selfish preferences--which prevents possessive domination). And with knowledge (trying to understand the other, not superficially but to his or her very essence--which prevents blind, romantic idealization). Lastly, genuine love is paradoxical. Fromm repeatedly stresses our various polar opposites, notably life/death and masculine/feminine. Similarly, love unites individuals completely, yet each retains personal integrity (otherwise, that competing need for identity could be

threatened). A twosome in love can perhaps live as cheaply as one, and may even become one. Yet they remain two. In W. S. Gilbert's immortal words, "a most ingenious paradox."


Let us pause to compare other views of love with these. They immediately recall May, although Fromm emphasizes separateness as well as encounter. Sartre is clearly rebuffed. Fromm admits that perversions such as sadism and masochism do occur, but sees these sybiotic unions as not prototypic but deviant because each partner seeks total unity with the other. Whereas genuine love's egalitarian partnership preserves personal integrity. Each member is both lover and beloved. As well, Fromm carefully separates himself from Freud. Love is not simply a physical, even chemical matter of sex, to be satisfied by orgasm; it requires both physical and psychological union between the polar opposites of male and female. In Biblical legend, Eden's twain, first one, became separate. Ever since, we have striven to again Fly United.

But what of creativity? For Fromm, like May, it seeks to satisfy relatedness, but it seems to him an unsatisfactory solution. Admittedly, creators do unite themselves with their materials and so with the external. Also, they plan, produce, and witness their results, in contrast to menial mass production that isolates producer from product. (By deploring industrialization's alienation of workers from means of production, Fromm shows his Marxist lineage.) Still, such unions are only transitory and, more important, are not interpersonal; creators relate to things, not to people.

Yet elsewhere⁵⁷ Fromm portrays one species of creativity more positively. Denial or incomplete satisfaction of those unique human needs invites psychosis or neurosis, respectively, so

Mental health is characterized by the ability to love and to create, by the emergence from incestuous ties to clan and soil, by a sense of identity based on one's experience of self as the subject and agent of one's powers, by the grasp of reality inside and outside of ourselves, that is, by the development of objectivity and reason.⁵⁸

Something called collective art, "(a responding) to the world with our senses in a meaningful, skilled, productive, active, shared way"⁵⁹ best achieves these various goals. Examples are such group artistic activities as communal singing and dancing. Now that these activities might satisfy needs for transcendence and relatedness is obvious. But how could they do likewise for



orientation? Fromm answers that we need to understand, not only logically via philosophy, theology and science, but also sensually and intuitively through art and ritual, which therefore resemble one another. Not, perhaps in superficial form but certainly in the needs they satisfy.

Such collective pursuits, therefore, become not mere leisure-filling frills, of less import than making money or waging war. They are absolutely basic for secure lives devoid of anxiety. Any purportedly "sane society" provides for them--in fact, singing and dancing, in Fromm's opinion, rival scholarly literacy in importance and deserve at least the emphasis sports and games currently receive.* Unfortunately, he asserts, both production and consumption of art is nowadays a largely individual endeavor. Only woefully pale imitations like fraternities and spectator sports fill the communal void:

There is no active productive participation, no common unifying experience, no meaningful acting out of significant answers to life...What help is it to have almost no illiteracy, and the most widespread higher education which has existed at any time--if we have no collective expression of our total personalities, no common art and ritual? Undoubtedly a relatively primitive village in which there is still real feasts, common artistic shared expression and no literacy at all--is more advanced culturally and more healthy mentally than our educated, newspaper⁶⁰ reading, radio-listening culture.

2. Character orientation. Another Frommian description arises from his discussions of ethics and values, most fully realized in Man for Himself.⁶¹ The essential argument recalls Maslow, so we merely repeat its gist. Ethical questions must not be avoided while discussing personality and culture; we should ask both what humans do and what they ought to do. Prevailing

*This may be laudable in theory. But will such bastions of combative higher education as Alabama or Nebraska sacrifice their famous football teams so students can gambol gleefully on the green in, say, Morris dancing? Let us not hold our collective breaths for Howard Cosell to bring us The Wide World of Collective Art, this week spotlighting Sing-Along Madrigals, with Michael Jackson countertenoring the Fa-la-las.

belief to the contrary, it is possible to determine universal values if we discover our healthy, natural best interests. However, Fromm's pessimistic streak (courtesy of Freud) leads him to deny, unlike the humanists, our inherent goodness. Rather, we possess potentials for good and evil in equal measure.⁶² Various factors, e.g., environmental, can sway us toward one or the other, but we can also choose whether to give our lives meaning and develop our potential. Yet to take control of our existence implies both freedom and responsibility, attributes that many find threatening. To avoid them, they will resort either to authoritarianism (domination of or submission to others), conformity (immersion in a larger group), or destructiveness (aggression and violence).

Fromm's basic character orientations represent different solutions to these problems. Each displays a distinctive, reliable style of responding to and relationship with the surrounding culture and so lends consistency to personality. At base we can choose (cf. Maslow again) between nonproductive orientations, which are neurotic and even evil (leading to depersonalization, apathy, personal dissatisfaction, and occasionally violence) and the productive orientation--self actualized, fully mature, integrated, and (in some sense at least) creative.

Let us dally briefly over the four nonproductive types. The receptive and exploitive both believe that all things worthwhile exist external to themselves. However, the first named assumes an inability to control their attainment, so he receives them passively; in love, therefore, he prefers dependency and masochism. In contrast, the exploitive, assuming that he must use force and cunning to get what he wants, grabs and steals; his love is sadistic, aimed at targets currently attached to others. The hoarding orientation, a suspicious wolverine, distrusts the outside world. Since he values only things under his lock and key, he saves compulsively. He usually surrounds himself with a protective emotional wall, but once bitten by love he becomes extraordinarily possessive. The marketing orientation, a relative newcomer, arose with capitalism. He evaluates everything by its dollar value, including other people and their accomplishments. Since he views even himself as a mere commodity, his self esteem is minimal.

Turning to the productive orientation, we need note, since it closely resembles Maslow's self actualization, only a few distinctive highlights. Again, a desire to realize the potential within oneself defines it, but Fromm frequently⁶³ corrects a possible misinterpretation. Unlike, say, Rand he does not advocate selfishness over altruism or personal licentiousness over social responsibility, but distinguishes forcefully between



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selfishness and self-love. Only the latter accompanies the true productive personality. Selfish persons cannot love others. Only taking gives them pleasure, so the worth of another depends on usefulness. Those who would truly love must first love themselves, since they must love all mankind. Therefore healthy living requires not selfishness but self-interest, whose meaning, Fromm feels, has become severely compromised. It is actually the first named's antonym rather than synonym:

The failure of modern culture lies not in its principle of individualism, of self-interest, but in the deterioration of the meaning of self-interest; not in the fact that people are too much concerned with their self-interest, but that they are not concerned enough with the interest of the real self; not in the fact that they are too selfish, but that they do not love themselves.⁶⁴

Thus for Fromm - as for Maslow, Rand, and indeed old Polonius - seeking one's own interests, striving to preserve one's being, is virtuous; not to do so is neurotic, even criminal. But Fromm rejects the romantic ideal of loving only one person at others' expense. Such narrow infatuation is mere symbiotic attachment, not love. It follows, strangely, that selfish persons have less in common with the self interested than with the neurotically unselfish, those who care excessively and live only for others. They too are unproductive, incapable of genuine love.

The productive orientation also displays, simultaneously, two distinct relations to the outside world; the lack of either begets sickness. The reproductive relation perceives and evaluates that world as it is (thus preventing deluded fantasy), while the generative relation conceives new possibilities to improve that world (to enhance spontaneity and imagination, and to preclude excessive preoccupation with realistic detail). The productive orientation also features a distinctive cognition. We become involved with and concerned about our objects of thought, rather than indifferent to them, thus blurring our separation from them. Still, we will retain enough objectivity that we can respect them for their genuine, unique qualities.


As Maslow too proclaims, such a person's tangible "creativity" may be moot. On the one hand, it seems to Fromm eminently natural for us to transform available materials with our imaginations, so works of art may well result--in fact the real artist provides the productive orientation's definitive representative. Yet living is also an art, its products being

nothing less than actualized human beings. Some creators are woefully unproductive in this sense, while the healthy often produce nothing concrete. In the last analysis, the person's attitudes, not output, identify productivity--"we are concerned with man's character, not his success"⁶⁵--and this creativity everyone (except the mental or emotional cripple) can achieve. Still, even those who succeed will occasionally display various nonproductive symptoms, for these simply exaggerate universal tendencies. After all, survival demands periodic receptivity, exploitation, and so on. But the productive hold these tendencies firmly in moderation, not excess.

But what determines one's dominant orientation? The Heart of Man speculates. Three tendencies, love of death, narcissism (excessive self-love) and symbiotic-incestuous fixation (immature, selfish relations with others) lead to destruction and evil rather than actualization. Only the first merits discussion here. Certain necrophilous persons, fascinated by death, worship force, power, and everything mechanical and nonliving. They wish to change even people into things, "the organic into the inorganic."⁶⁶ They fear life's messy, disordered uncertainty, its lack of control; the past, which is immutable, they prefer to the future, which is unknown. Supposedly the necrophiliac's morbid attitudes influence even his appearance. Central-casting's Ebenezer Scrooge, he is cold, his skin looks dead, and "often he has an expression on his face as though he were smelling a bad odor."⁶⁷ His counterpole, the biophilous orientation, however, prefers life to death, construction to destruction, novelty over certainty, and love over power. It follows that "the pure necrophiliac is insane; the true biophiliac is saintly."⁶⁸ Now biophilia, unsurprisingly, is invariably present in productive persons, so the choice of life over death seems the fundamental one for inducing health.

As regards the conditions that encourage this choice, Fromm admits doubt, but security (due to basic need satisfaction), justice (due to protection from exploitation), and freedom (to become responsible members of society) seem to him likely candidates. Especially, children must experience others who love life ("love of life is just as contagious as love of death"⁶⁹) and who provide warm affection. As well, they must receive

* As Fromm recognizes, he here recapitulates Freud's notion of competing life and death instincts. However, he differs when he sees the former as primary, as more "natural." A death preference resides within us all but dominates only in perverted circumstances.



teaching by example rather than by preaching, so they are free to explore and to wonder without threat. Again Maslow's hierarchy rises to memory. Again "the good" is what healthy, productive persons do, and a moral society is one that facilitates the doing of it.

3. The sex difference. Masculinity/femininity to Fromm seems a particularly important dichotomy.⁷⁰ His most extensive discussion of our need to unify these, while not tackling creativity directly, certainly suggests possibilities. As usual, he straddles several traditions. Like Freud, he attributes sex differences partly to biology, but he assigns the primary role to cultural conditioning and he deplors Freud's equating of differences with deficiencies, which brands one sex (usually the female) as second class. Indeed, the differences between the sexes seem to him insignificant compared to their similarities (since both represent the same species) and to variations within the same sex.

The sexes' variant roles during intercourse suggest to him such differences as there are. To demonstrate potency, the male must achieve erection, but the female need only display willingness. Thus his inadequacies will be more evident. She can pretend but he cannot (his readiness being under involuntary, not voluntary control). Therefore intercourse becomes for the male a test that he may fail. This, his main sexual anxiety, makes him sensitive to ridicule, especially from women. They too experience anxiety in this sphere, but more about their ability to attract males, whom they require for satisfaction.

The male's desire to "prove himself" fuels his persistent need for prestige and recognition. Given his fear of failure, he becomes more competitive, driven to prove his superiority. Moreover, our culture accentuates these tendencies by rewarding them. Therefore,

There is probably no achievement of men, from making love to the most courageous acts in fighting or thinking, which is not colored, to some degree by this typical male vanity.⁷¹

As for the distaff side, Fromm agrees with Freud that women desire possession of the male organ, but not because they feel inadequacy or envy. Rather, they thereby demonstrate their adequacy and also avoid frustration. And, as is usual with Fromm, we can choose to satisfy these various desires either morally or neurotically. From the male's seeking after prestige and his fear of failure comes initiative, activity, and courage, but also vanity and boastfulness. Likewise, women frequently

display reliability, intense love, and patience, but also excessive dependency and passivity.

It seems straightforward to extend these ideas to the sex difference in creativity. Producing admirable products can satisfy those typically masculine needs, self worth and vanity. On the other hand women, perhaps, might prefer to receive, admire, and even buy such products (and audiences do seem weighted, casual observation suggests, toward the distaff side). Also, Fromm at least implies (as do Rank and Horney) that men's inability to bear children might drive them to sire artificial progeny, although their aim, for him, is not to overcome death but to prove themselves capable of this exclusively feminine talent. In contradistinction to Freud, might we call this "uterus envy"?

4. Commentary. At first blush, Fromm's analyses seem typically humanistic. Creativity is inherent to the human psyche, a life attitude rather than a road to masterpieces. So when it remains dormant, stifling environmental/social factors are invariably to blame and creators are not neurotic but paragons of health. In fact, to Fromm, living itself seems an art form, quite as worthwhile as any other. The superior works of the genre, healthy actualized persons, possess not novelty and value but happiness and joy, indicating that they have satisfied those uniquely human needs. Thus, "happiness is the criterion of excellence in the art of living."⁷²

In the humanistic pantheon, Fromm clearly stands closest to May, and like his compatriot he gives us nothing like a full blown account of creativity. Yet despite this reticence he provides decidedly more stimulating company. He does not pretend to discuss our topic to any depth, so we are less disappointed when he does not do so. In addition, while he too fails to develop some of his ideas, quite bewildering their applications to Part I's data, others, notably those about personality types and human motives, possess obvious fecundity. He too borrows copiously from his predecessors. Yet he usually explains his diversions from, and his additions to, their largesse.

Likewise, the distinction between productive and nonproductive orientations certainly recalls Maslow, so similar commentary is called for, e.g., the ethical system that results is blatantly circular; "the good" is what healthy/productive persons do, and those same good deeds verify their productive status. Furthermore, the various orientations, like all such stereotypes, wildly oversimplify the hilarious heterodoxy of the genuine article and, unlike Jung's, they have not as yet been defined by objective criteria, such as psychometric tests, to insure that they actually differ empirically. Nevertheless, the



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nonproductive types do breathe an air suggest possible answers to some questions, such as the choice of creative field and of preferred style of expression. Perhaps a neo-Frommian in the readership will undertake these embellishments.

Fromm again resembles Maslow, and here even surpasses him, in stressing our essentially paradoxical nature. We contain a plethora of polar opposites, but can resolve them in that greater unity, the integrated personality, to overcome the potential anxiety. He does not pretend to explain how this comes about, but we can now understand, at least descriptively, the paradoxes endemic to the creative personality. This most developed, integrated exemplar of humanity simply dramatizes phenomena latent in us all.

But on further examination, Fromm's humanism seems in some ways atypical, notably when The Art of Loving depicts creativity as a sign of inadequacy, a compensation for an inability to love completely. But this departure does help explain several phenomena. As Frommian lovers must both give and take, so too should creators view their produce as gifts to others, and often they do. As well, love must, for Fromm, be reciprocated to be fulfilled. A rejected lover is a contradiction in terms. But his or her torment will not exceed a creator's whose gift of self to audience and critics is spurned. The streets joining both audience with creator, and lover with beloved, must be two-way; even Sartre, that advocate of struggle in matters of the heart, admitted as much for the first named.

This position also implicates critics. Because their relationship with creators inevitably includes judgments of worth, it smacks of a Sartrian dominance struggle. In Fromm's terms, it becomes an incomplete, neurotic form of love, one-sided and lacking in give and take. True lovers do not evaluate one another! Love may be blind, but the critic's senses must remain alert. Yet that critic wonders. Why do they resent my negative judgments and not accept them in a spirit of constructive camaraderie? I'm only trying to help. In this dreamy naivete, the critic resembles the beloved who, having spurned a would-be lover's advances, avows, "But we can still be friends". No they can't, as spurned lovers and creators will both agree. Critic Stanley Kauffmann recognizes reality:


A work of art of any kind is a tremendous investment of ego, of self, of nakedness (Note: as is a declaration of love). Even if it's the worst play or film ever made, you still exposed yourself in it. If someone tells you you're deformed after

you've exposed yourself, the more truthful he is, the more you hate him... If a man or a woman hates me for negative things I've written about him, I never resent it in the slightest. Why shouldn't he? Why shouldn't she? How could I in reason expect him or her to like me or to say, "Well, that's reasonable."⁷³

However, Fromm renews his humanist membership when he holds that we must choose between productivity and barrenness, between growth and deficiency, health and neurosis. We might now mention Dabrowski's theory of positive disintegration⁷⁴ which sounds a rather different chord. Supposedly, neurosis becomes a necessary, ultimately beneficial stage through which we must pass to reach personal fulfillment, or secondary integration--a sort of Khumbu ice-field barring our challenge to Everest's heights. Conflicts, depressions, and anxieties provide "psychic loosening" that force us to "muster (our) own forces and engage in self-education."⁷⁵ They induce us to escape ordinary mechanical routine, to become more internally oriented, more fully individual, and yet also less self centered and more altruistic. We also will become more creative, both in the humanist's life attitudes and in tangible productivity (which may explain such neuroses as eminent creators have sometimes had).

Thus, Dabrowski agrees with Fromm (and Maslow) that fully actualized persons resolve seemingly paradoxical needs, but for him they climb a different route towards their lofty state. He also, like Becker and Rank, sees neurotics as climbing higher in some respects than do the "normal". Their greater sensitivity, e.g., to existential anxieties, is precisely the reason for their problems. Therefore to classify them as "mentally ill" may be cavalier; sometimes they occupy a half-way house on the road to creativity. But only sometimes. Dabrowski distinguishes between various levels of disturbance. One type immobilizes the person and prevents growth, e.g., "self centered" depression, due to feelings of personal loss, inferiority, and the like. The second type spurs him to greater heights, e.g., "creative" depression, due to dissatisfaction with oneself. The psychopath, supposedly, has the least growth potential of all. While oftentimes perceptive and intelligent, he or she lacks emotionality or concern for others.

The remainder of this discussion we devote to what is for us Fromm's most intriguing concept, that of collective art. The term obviously has a Jungian aura (ironically, since Fromm seems to have admired Jung neither as theorist nor, we suggest, as man; at one point,⁷⁶ he describes Jung as a textbook example of a necrophilous person.) Closer inspection, however, suggests



mirror imagery. More specifically, Jung's artist, by withdrawing from social intercourse to work alone, thereby expresses the unconscious' collective aspects. Whereas Fromm's artist favors communal activities in order to satisfy personal psychic needs. Actually, Fromm seems more Rankian when he hypothesizes competing drives of individuation and identification (here called identity and relatedness, respectively) and when he deprecates modern art's excessively individualistic streak. But he repudiates such art for psychological, not aesthetic reasons. Unless creators and consumers both partake of art socially, it will not satisfy the needs that it should. As well, for Rank the two opposing needs struggle eternally for dominance; to provide the tension essential to both life and art. But for Fromm, apparently, both can be fully met, and in actualized persons, they are.

Be that as it may, we must take issue with Fromm's assertion that we nowadays lack adequate social interaction. Admittedly, we less frequently practice group art; most of us passively consume rather than actively produce it, and rarely will we see dancers frolicking around maypoles in Times Square or Piccadilly Circus. But do we not satisfy these various needs in other ways, notably by sports, and games which, as Michener's wide-ranging Sports in America persuasively shows, play such an important role in our culture? Nor are we mere tube-bound passivities, slumping corpulently, beered and popcorned, to peer at Hockey Night in Canada or Howard and Dandy Don. Myriads of young and old, rich and poor, male and female sweatily pursue those very Frommian motives on playing fields (at Eton and elsewhere), racquet courts, and jogging trails. Perhaps hockey provides the quintessential example of this dedication. Even Canada's arctic climate provides insufficient ice to meet the demand, so otherwise sane persons, foregoing the arms of nod, can be seen dragging their protesting corpulences to deserted, hypothermic arenas at 2 a.m. merely to play shinny.

Now because sports are inherently competitive, Fromm explicitly rejects them as adequate answers to those cooperative needs. But these rabid pucksters harbor few dreams of NHL. They seek mainly exercise, personal fulfillment, and the communal feeling that arrives both during combat and afterwards, whilst sharing cool bubbles in a steaming dressing room. They compete only with themselves, to maximize their own abilities, a drive they share with teammates and opposition alike.

Having raised this point, we may as well exorcise some demons. We certainly agree that creative work can provide one path to psychological Nirvana. But when Fromm dismisses, as do too many of the scholarly inclined, athletics as somewhat base or supercilious, as less uplifting than, say, madrigal singing, we jib. Actually, sports at their best become art forms second to

none. Witness. Hockey (for us, the jock art supreme): Team Canada vs. the Soviet Union (September 1972), Montreal Canadiens vs. Red Army (New Year's Eve, 1975), or U.S.A. vs. Soviet Union (Lake Placid Olympics, 1980), or Team Canada vs. the Soviet Union (September 1984). Baseball: Boston Red Sox vs. Cincinnati Reds (World Series, 1975). Soccer: France vs West Germany (World Cup, 1982), or England vs. West Germany (World Cup, 1966). Golf: Watson vs. Nicklaus (final round, British Open, 1977). Tennis: Borg vs. McEnroe vs. the officials at Wimbledon--the list is endless. In fact even football, usually an unrivalled soporific, occasionally approaches these aesthetic heights. Competitions these were, but to us, and probably to the participants, there were no losers. Do the trumpets defeat the flutes in Beethoven's Ninth merely because they play louder? Does not each contribute, in its own way, to the peerless Gestalt that emerges?

Similarly, as Michener has also observed, great athletes blur the distinction between physical and aesthetic activity, and thus resemble dancers. Bobby Orr, Sandy Koufax, Billie Jean King, Pelé, Lynn Swann, Nadia Comeneci, Julius Erving, et al. tread the exalted turf of Baryshnikov, Graham, Fonteyn, and Astaire. Without question, great athletes and great artists both, even in memory, take our breath away and bring tears to our eyes at the sheer colossal beauty of their endeavors. They restore our faith in our species' sublime possibilities.

* Former Montreal Canadiens goalie Ken Dryden, in his wonderful book, The Game⁸ points out that great athletes, to achieve their potential, need great opponents. Thus Ali should be grateful to Frazier for bringing out his best and helping realize that greater unity, which is the unforgettable event. The Boston Bruins, Dryden reports, served a comparable role for Les Canadiens.

Chapter 16



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
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
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
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To my father and in memory of my mother

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
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
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Humankind has come a long way. At one time we existed in a largely hostile environment, which we neither understood, modified nor enriched to any marked degree. Balanced precariously in trees or huddled in caves, with survival our main concern, we languished at the mercy of seemingly whimsical, uncontrollable disasters.

Things have changed. We now understand many striking phenomena of our experience; the idiosyncrasies of heavenly bodies, climatic changes, and occasionally the behavior of our fellow creatures. We have sent our representatives to the moon and to the depths of the seas. More to the point, we have brought them safely back. We have learned much about how life begins and also how it ends. We have immeasurably increased our ability to avert disease, starvation, and natural cataclysm; for example, we have eliminated the once-dreaded scourge of smallpox. Of almost equal comfort, we can often predict and explain even those disasters that we cannot yet control.

The fruits of artistic genius, such as Shakespeare's plays, Beethoven's symphonies, Jane Austen's novels, and even Andy Warhol's Campbell's Soup cans entertain, stimulate, and enrich us. Thanks to our ubiquitous technology, our modern environment, with its fluorescent lamps, stereo components, reclining rockers, flush toilets, and electric toothbrushes, is almost entirely artificial rather than natural, peopled with products of our own devising.

Nevertheless, our ingenuity has been a decidedly mixed blessing, since it has also bestowed such less desirable progeny as nuclear weapons, as well as such minor irritations as junk foods and those penultimate inventions of the devil, transistor radios. Still, we seem to have made what resembles progress. Our lives seem richer, more satisfying, and certainly longer and safer than those of our distant predecessors.

It is our propensity for creative activity that has led to all these developments. Why are we driven to produce things that previously did not exist? What are creative people like? What is the creative process like? Such fascinating questions have often been asked, and some valuable answers have been provided, with which readers might wish to become familiar. Unfortunately, such interested persons face a formidable task. Apart from some brief summaries,^{1,2} the various theoretical contributions are scattered throughout the literatures of philosophy, psychology, sociology, aesthetics, art criticism, and the history and philosophy of science. Several books of readings do provide excerpts from important sources^{3,4,5} but these share some appreciable inadequacies. An author's actual