

Human action is usually based on motivation of some kind. This claim applies to all human action, but what we are here interested in makes us disregard actions in a pathological state (in the broad sense of the word) of the agent. We accordingly disregard not only actions undertaken by people who are ill in the strict sense of the term (e.g. those suffering from mental illness) but also by those whose consciousness has been disturbed by the abuse of alcohol or drugs, by those in a hypnotic state, etc.

Motivation may, of course, vary in character and may be marked by a varying share of the underlying cognitive factor (the truth value of which does not interest us here) and the emotional factor, which usually co-occur in the structure of such motivation. Such structures are very intricate because they are based on one's consciously or unconsciously adopted system of values and the resulting system of norms of behavior, the latter covering obligations and prohibitions of societally accepted human behavior. We can disregard here all these details and subtleties (which are interesting from the point of view of the theory of action) and confine ourselves to the general statement that the motivation of human actions, even if it takes on the form of a deliberate and consciously made decision, is conditioned by a number of cognitive and emotional factors. The acting individual usually does not realize all those factors, ranging from the system of values internalized by him to societally transmitted mental schemata and stereotypes, which affect his emotional prejudices, phobias, and predilections. The less a given individual realizes them and the more they admit rationalizations and are disguised as elements with an objective cognitive value, the stronger their impact upon that individual. That is exactly the source of the pragmatic function of stereotypes and their particular strength in that respect.

A stereotype is a specific cognitive structure, but just because of that specificity, which consists *inter alia* in its combining the cognitive and the emotional factor, it is also a specific pragmatic structure, i.e. the element that underlies human action and hence is covered by the theory of human action. The same can be worded thus: stereotypes have their cognitive, emotional,

0165-2516/84/0045-0089 \$2.00  
© Mouton Publishers, Amsterdam

*Int'l. J. Soc. Lang.* 45 (1984), pp. 89-100



and pragmatic aspects. But we are concerned here not with such or other formulation, but with stating the fact that stereotypes have a certain function in human action, which fact sheds additional light on the problem of their origin. There is a mutual connection between the societal function of stereotypes and their origin: their societal function affects their origin, but conversely their societal origin determines their function in social actions of human beings. The analysis to be offered below will begin with the problem of the function of stereotypes, that function being given priority in the mutual connections mentioned above.

It is common knowledge that stereotypes are transmitted to the individual by society, primarily through the influence of the family and the nearest milieu in one's childhood, and later by the school, schoolmates, workmates, etc. The special significance of that influence in one's early childhood consists in the fact that it is parallel to the development of the faculty of speech in the child. Together with speech the child assimilates the societally transmitted set of concepts and the related set of emotional responses which have the nature of stereotypes. It must be emphasized in this connection that in the consciousness of the young individual whose mentality is being shaped these stereotypes merge with the said concepts into an indivisible whole, which enormously strengthens the working of the stereotypes by blurring their true nature. This fact determines the formative influence of stereotypes upon man's social character.

We use the formulation *social character* in the sense given to it by Erich Fromm,<sup>1</sup> even though that idea is also to be found in other authors under other labels. In my opinion that idea has been given its most mature form by Erich Fromm, who interprets man's social character as the totality of those attitudes which have been societally transmitted to him and which quasi-automatically control his responses to external stimuli. The idea is based on the following reasoning. The mechanism which controls animal responses to external stimuli in a way which makes it possible for animals to survive in their struggle for existence is that of instincts. At the level of the development of the genus *Homo sapiens* the role of the instincts is weakened and even totally vanishes in certain spheres of human life to give place to actions based on appropriate decisions. This carries the danger of annihilation because situations which human beings have to face do not allow enough time for long reflections and require quick responses. The mechanism which replaces the vanishing instinctive responses is that of quasi-instinctive responses, but ones dictated not by the genetic code but the superimposed culture code.<sup>2</sup> The attitudes based on that mechanism, including the readiness to act, make it possible for human beings to respond without reflection, and hence to act quasi-instinctively. Such quasi-instinctive responses are more flexible than the purely instinctive ones, since they have a margin of variability adjusted to a

given situation. That set of attitudes with their characteristic features combines to form the social character of man.

It is obvious, although not everything has been clarified so far, that stereotypes play a not-insignificant role in shaping the social character of human beings. As has been said, stereotypes are not identical with attitudes, but they play an important role in the structure of the latter as the basis of convictions that is a prerequisite of readiness to act. The relative rigidity and invariability of stereotypes, and hence in a sense their *a priori* nature, as it were pre-destinate them to play the role of the basis of convictions of man's social character, the basis which has both quasi-cognitive and emotional properties. Man's social character is to guarantee that his responses would be possibly automatic, relatively stable, and independent of experience, and yet somehow adjusted to reality. Stereotypes meet those requirements perfectly well as they enable one to act quasi-instinctively but in a way which is variable under certain conditions and within certain limits, without which social actions would also be in danger. The mechanisms and forms of that combination of automatism and flexibility require further investigation, above all in the sphere of social psychology.

One of the open issues is also that of the connection, within that mechanism, between the stereotypes and the system of values on which the corresponding evaluations and norms are based. On the one hand, a given system of values underlies both readiness to act, which is the essence of man's social character, and the convictions which condition that readiness and which are provided by societally transmitted stereotypes. On the other, however, the process of formation of a social system of values (one of the most intricate and least known social processes) requires a share of convictions whose nature is that of stereotypes. Does it mean interaction? But what, then, are the dominant factors of that interaction? The issue, as has been said, is an open one and requires further research. The problem of stereotypes is still too new to allow ready answers to all the questions it raises.

As has been mentioned earlier, the origin of stereotypes is socially conditioned, but at the same time stereotypes perform, on the feedback basis, the social function of shaping and modifying that conditioning, being thus an important element of social integration, motivation of social actions, structure of ideologies, forms of political activities and political propaganda, prejudices, social character of human beings, etc. They thus have an important function in the sphere of social actions, a function which is usually overlooked in analysis, which must be ascribed to the working of the cognitive dissonance: researchers overlook that function principally because they *do not want* to notice it. It is true that demonstrating the working of that function of stereotypes in the attitudes of one's adversary is a sharp tool of criticism, but such criticism may turn against the user of that tool because no one is immune

against the impact of stereotypes. But a certain role in the fact that the function of stereotypes is often overlooked is also certainly due to a relative recency of the theory of stereotypes. Let us, therefore, review – be it even quite cursorily – the various forms of the function of stereotypes in social life.

First of all, we must pay attention to the socially integrating function of stereotypes. The division into 'our people' and 'aliens', which goes back to prehistoric times, is based on the cohesion of the group of 'our people'. That cohesion in turn is ensured by a given society primarily as a result of the internalizing by its members of the norms of conduct binding in that society and of the underlying system of values.

Such a division may be – and in certain conditions is – based on religion. 'Our people' are, according to circumstances, Christians, Muslims, Jews, etc., and those who do not profess a given faith are 'aliens'. Language can also function as the discriminating factor. Those who do not speak 'our' language are 'aliens' because in a sense they are mute (the Polish word *Niemcy* used to denote Germans is etymologically derived from *niemy* 'mute'). But such and similar criteria are usually too broad since they cover various communities which are internally no less differentiated in other respects than they are from those who differ from them in the light of that primary criterion (religion, language, etc.).

When narrower boundaries are to be drawn a number of additional criteria must be taken into consideration. Some of them are mentioned with pride, for instance the mother country, others are discreetly passed over in silence or even repressed in the psychoanalytic sense of the term. This applies for instance to the use of such formulations as 'our people', 'our folk', etc., to denote those who are fond of strong drinks, which plays an important role in the case of certain communities and is incorporated by the social character of such groups. It is at this point that stereotypes begin to function: being marked by a mixture of cognitive and emotional elements, lack of precision, and a specific mechanism of psychological influence, they are extremely suitable to attain the social goal assigned to them.

An individual internalizes the socially accepted system of values, manners, and norms of behavior and/or conduct binding in a given society primarily in the period of his early childhood. Of course, that process of social education takes place during his whole lifetime; he is influenced by his milieu, stimulated by his group and personal interests, etc., but it is obvious that he is most flexible in that respect in his childhood. The child assimilates the spiritual heritage of his society by learning its language, without being able to sort out what in that heritage is objectively cognitive and what is subjectively emotional. The child's brain is still developing during that period and together with speech it fixes the corresponding emotional responses. Finally, the child

is naturally an uncritical receiver of ideas, and this is why human personality, which has the social character of man as its integral and very important element, can be treated as a product of society in its autogenesis or phylogenesis.

In one's mature age one can learn a foreign language, but there is always a remainder which marks the difference between the acquired knowledge of a foreign language, even if that knowledge is formally perfect, and the knowledge of one's native language acquired in one's early childhood. It is often said, and not without reason, that the alien character of (foreign) language is betrayed by its excessive correctness. But while a person can learn a foreign language in his mature age, he cannot at that age acquire the social character of an alien group and cannot truly internalize a socially alien system of values, manners, and norms of behavior and/or conduct. One can, of course, assimilate them intellectually and try, sometimes quite successfully, to apply them in one's life, but the difference will usually be quite visible. A neophyte usually shocks others by his excessive religious fervor; a person who has acquired a perfect knowledge of a foreign language in his mature age betrays himself by excessive correctness in his speech; he who has – usually deliberately and for utilitarian purposes – assimilated the social character, norms of behavior and conduct, and manners of another social group, and is a neophyte in that respect, not only irritates others by his exaggeration but is simply ridiculous. Those things cannot be *learned*, primarily because a neophyte lacks an essential element, namely stereotypes, which are acquired societally by a genuine participation in the life of a given society, especially in one's childhood. Stereotypes are hard to discard, but in no case can they be learned. One can, of course, pretend better or worse to be someone else, on the principle of acting, which is often observed in everyday life, but brilliant actors are rare, even on the stage. And if they even happen in real life they are mere actors, and not the persons whose parts they perform.

In the literature of the subject, that socially integrating role of stereotypes has often been emphasized.<sup>3</sup> It is a quasi-religious function, a function of the cohesive factor of a given group, which is realized spontaneously in the process of the child's learning his native language, and later consolidated by the usually conscious (though sometimes unconscious) desire to become integrated with one's society or some social group. Empirical studies concerned with the content of such concepts as 'mother country' and 'patriotism', and *a fortiori* research into the foundations of chauvinism, would reveal stereotypes (together with related phobias, complexes, etc.) which underlie such concepts and attitudes. The study of stereotypes and the analysis of their cognitive, and especially emotional, aspects is dangerous to many seemingly noble and proud clichés. This is why defensive mechanisms are set in motion to prevent such researches; such mechanisms work as psychological smoke-

screens which conceal unpleasant realities. This applies in the first place to the mechanism of cognitive dissonance. While it serves to protect stereotypes against inquisitive and trouble-making analyses, stereotypes in turn play an immense role in making that mechanism effective. The problem was pointed out by Emory S. Bogardus in his paper cited above.

Leon Festinger in his theory of cognitive dissonance<sup>4</sup> formulated an idea of great importance for the comprehension of social life, an idea which still – and probably not by coincidence – is passed over in silence in relevant analyses. I mean the experimentally verified fact that in conflict situations, if the opinions and attitudes (in the sense of readiness to act) of a human being concerning certain issues, primarily social ones, are at variance with the realities of life and if neither those realities can be brought into agreement with the said opinions nor those opinions modified without ruining the ideology of their carrier, then a psychological defensive mechanism is put in operation to make one's mind immune against inconvenient information. This leads to paradoxical situations, which, however, do occur often in practice, in which certain knowledge that has apparently been assimilated intellectually is emotionally blocked and practically erased from one's consciousness because it is inconvenient. Such situations are in a sense schizophrenic because a given person at the same time knows something and does not know it, which, while it must appear strange, often does occur in practice. This in turn breeds specific forms of dogmatism and the phenomenon of 'closed mind', deaf to all arguments, as described by Milton Rokeach.<sup>5</sup>

All this forms a most suitable substratum for the formation and preservation of stereotypes understood in the sense explained above. But at the same time stereotypes are an excellent instrument for performing various operations conducive to cognitive dissonance and maintaining 'closed minds'. This is so because the human mind must have recourse to something when it shuns embarrassing information about the hard realities of life. In such cases there can hardly be anything more convenient than the defensive attitude based on quasi *a priori* knowledge, fairly invariant and independent of interfering experience, knowledge provided by stereotypes.

Such precisely is the the defensive function of stereotypes, which in a sense is a prolongation of their *integrative* function mentioned previously. The singling out of these two functions is in a sense an abstract procedure because they are in fact very closely intertwined, but it is made here to bring out the two different aspects of the functioning of stereotypes, which makes it possible better to grasp their role in ideologies and politics.

An ideology, in one of the meanings of that word, is the sum of opinions and related attitudes which, being based on a given system of values, outline the optimal structure of society and indicate the paths leading to the attainment of such a social structure. In this sense an ideology is *always* an expres-

sion of definite class interests and the resulting struggle for the implementation of the tasks defined by those interests. Hence *any* ideology inevitably leads to a struggle for positive goals (in the sense of the attainment of certain ideals) but also to a struggle for negative goals (in the sense of opposing rival ideals and preventing their implementation).

*Any* ideology has, and must have, its offensive and its defensive aspect. This is why *any* ideology must include an element of faith, be it religious in character if it appeals primarily to human emotions and extraempirical inspiration, be it scientific in character if it appeals primarily to arguments and motivations resulting from experience supported by the rigor of scientific methods. But even in the latter case, if bonds are to develop among representatives of a definite opinion, which fact enables effective action intended to attain given social goals, the emotional factor cannot be missing. Hence resistance which has the nature of cognitive dissonance comes into play if acceptance of the arguments advanced by the adversaries could weaken one's ideological stand. This provides a base for dogmatism in the sense of 'closed mind', and then, even contrary to the principles of the doctrine held by a given group, bonds of a quasi-religious nature (in Durkheim's sense) develop among the members of the groups although these continue to believe that they are radically 'scientifically minded'. This has occurred many a time and continues to occur today, not only in the case of religious and conservative ideologies but also in the case of revolutionary ideologies, including those which are theoretically based on Marxism. As examples we can mention the various dogmatic Marxist groups in Western Europe. The same phenomenon was observable on a large scale in the classical communist movement some 50 or 40 years ago, but it does occur today too, either in entire political parties or in so-called orthodox (i.e. dogmatically conservative) groups within the various parties. We have then to do with typically schizophrenic symptoms, when cognitive dissonance, working very powerfully, makes some people at the same time know something and ignore it.

Elements of irrationalism and emotional voluntarism are in varying proportions inherent in every ideology because without such bonds among their followers ideologies would be ineffective in their operation. It is exactly at this point that we have to do with bonds between an ideology and certain stereotypes. The working is bidirectional: thinking in terms of stereotypes reinforces the defensive function of ideologies, and thinking in terms of an ideology is conducive to the emergence and consolidation of stereotypes in thinking. This is so because nothing else makes one's mind more immune against arguments of an alien ideology than does thinking in terms of stereotypes. Stereotypes are so much independent of empirical data and so stable that one's mind becomes closed to the arguments advanced by the opponents and one's ideology easily carries the day. On the other hand, any ideology



strengthens one's tendency to think in terms of stereotypes by setting the mechanism of cognitive dissonance in motion. If we consider those mutual bonds between ideologies and stereotypes we realize immediately that stereotypes are indispensable instruments in political conflicts. Their political function is their next important characteristic.

Research on the language of politics is still to be done. What is the role played by stereotypes in that language? The growing literature concerned with political science and in particular with the language of politics<sup>6</sup> handles in principle only surface phenomena in that field and is oriented rather toward speculative theoretical reflections than toward empirical studies.<sup>7</sup> What should be done is to study empirically the language of political propaganda of great contemporary political movements in search of the function of stereotypes in that language. An unimaginable wealth of data in that respect can be found in the writings of Nazi leaders, of whom Hitler wrote even in *Mein Kampf* a theoretical chapter on the working of the language of political propaganda. It is a cynical chapter, but it strikes one with its author's penetrating psychological knowledge of the methods and effects of mass propaganda using chauvinist and racist stereotypes (of course, Hitler did not call stereotypes by their name, but referred to them in a very clear manner). At the other end of the political scale we find the wealth of data in the propaganda materials of the communist movement, ranging from the writings of political leaders to political pamphlets abounding in stereotypes from the sphere of class struggle, images of class enemies, etc. Very much content is also to be found in national stereotypes, especially when we have to do with historically conditioned feelings of hostility.

Empirical studies, in the form of both an analysis of the sources of the language of politics and responses of the various populations to stimuli in the form of stereotypes current in a given milieu, would certainly contribute many new elements to our knowledge of the subject, but the essentials of the problem can be presented clearly on the basis of a theoretical reflection on the essence and the pragmatic goals of politics. If by politics we mean human activity intended appropriately to shape social life primarily by influencing the functioning of the State, then it is understandable that politics implies struggle for such influence and that in a given society there are various political conceptions which reflect the various interests and aspirations of classes, groups, and strata. On the surface such a struggle takes on the form of a conflict between individuals or political parties that struggle for power (parliament seats, jobs in public administration, the right to form the cabinet, etc.). But at a deeper level — and that is the most important thing — the struggle is for the victory of definite conceptions and ideas because it is they only which, by providing political motivations of human options, are decisive for the political victory of this or that trend. Self-evidently, it is not a struggle in the

sphere of 'pure' ideas because interfering practical considerations can always verify or falsify certain ideas, but those ideas nevertheless play an important role which in certain situations becomes decisive. This occurs especially when their advocates have succeeded in making them immune against rational arguments and possible falsification by expanding a psychological apparatus that favors irrational beliefs and opinions. It is at this neuralgic point that stereotypes start working.

A politician (whether an individual or a political party) who does not understand that is doomed to defeat if his adversary succeeds in assimilating that truth whether he does that deliberately or spontaneously. When one engages in a political struggle, then, in order to convince the masses about the correctness of one's ideas, one must, first, make people believe that one defends a just cause in whose victory they are interested, and second, guarantee for oneself stability of that favorable attitude, which means immunizing those people against the impact of an alien ideology. In order to achieve that and extend one's political influence over the masses, and not merely over the elitist circles of professionals and intellectuals, one has to find one's way not only to human minds but to human hearts as well and to control human emotions; the road to popular convictions often leads through popular emotions. From the intellectual point of view it is not a model procedure, but it is the most effective one if we approach politics from the pragmatic point of view. What can be achieved in this way was shown by Fascism, in particular by Nazism, when chauvinism and racialism were being manipulated cleverly in an atmosphere of a general frustration of the masses. What can be lost, when one does not comprehend those things, was shown by the communist movement, which failed to win over the masses in pre-Nazi Germany. To use a specifically technical terminology, the point is to handle stereotypes cleverly, namely to formulate (or construct) them, to transfer them to the masses by propaganda means, and then to exploit them, by creating among the followers bonds of a peculiar kind, as it were religious in nature, and by closing thereby their minds to the arguments of the opponents. All this is neither elegant nor attractive, but one has to realize all that in order at least to be able skillfully to use preventive and counteractive measures in one's counter-propaganda. In any case, propaganda and counter-propaganda acquire in such situations characteristics of deliberate actions involving scientific reflection on the issue. This is also one of the elements of the implementation of the requirement that politics should be based on scientific foundations and in that sense made scientific.

We have so far singled out four pragmatic functions of stereotypes: socially integrative, defensive, ideology-making, and political. They are mutually interconnected, but retain their distinctive features. The *screening off of social facts* is that common denominator to which these functions can be brought.



A discussion of that problem will conclude our reflections on the pragmatic function of stereotypes.

The problem reduces to the following question: are motivations of human actions, especially those in the sphere of social policy, always rational? By 'rational' we mean here such motivations which result from reflection that takes the sequence of causes and effects in the striving for a given goal into account, with the proviso that facts are established on an empirical basis. By 'irrational' we mean motivations which are due to emotional factors, do not take the logical sequences of causes and effects in the striving for a given goal into account, and draw the knowledge of facts not from experience but from extra-empirical sources, which may be even totally at variance with empirical data. Such sources include religious faith and mystic revelation, and also the dogmatism of the 'closed mind' of 'true believers' of all kinds, deaf and blind to facts and enclosed in their imaginary ideological world by the defensive mechanism of cognitive dissonance.

It suffices to reflect for a moment to realize that – contrary to the prevailing mythologization of those problems – motivations of human actions, especially in the case of mass movements which have social goals in view, are not only not always rational, but often irrational, be it alone in the sense that they originate from a specific mixture of rational and irrational elements. This is clearly proved not only by crowd psychology, but also by observation of deliberately aroused and then controlled mass movements, especially political in character. We thus mean not only manifestations of mass hysteria based on irrational motivations originating from religious beliefs, decomposition of society in periods of natural disasters with the resulting psychosis of fear, such as the mass hysteria in the period of witch hunts, the psychosis of the children's crusade, the ruthless breaking of moral principles during the plagues, Muslim religious fanaticism in present-day Iran, etc. We mean also mass movements, clearly amoral in character, deliberately and often cynically aroused, incited, and controlled, such as Hitler's national socialism, based on a chauvinist and racist ideology. Unfortunately, such phenomena are observable even in those mass movements which have originated from rational scientific thinking: I mean here contemporary ultra-leftist movements, which sometimes refer to Marxism, and even the classical communist movement with its enclaves of sectarianism and dogmatism and, even worse, of chauvinism and racialism, which just mock the formally accepted ideology by introducing irrationalism into the motivational basis in the functioning of those movements. We thus have to do with a widely spread phenomenon, which is also dangerous in view of its connections with social actions.

Out of the examples mentioned above we concentrate on those which are not religious in character (because then the situation is clear) but aspire to the status of political movements, guided in principle by rational thinking and

programs based on scientific foundations. What in their case is the cause of deviations and adoption of irrational motivations? What mechanism is at work there and what are its cognitive and psychological instruments?

In analyzing this problem we can be helped by an analogy to the problem of what is objective and what is subjective in cognition. People think, especially when they aspire to scientific thinking, that their cognition is purely objective, and they are ready not only to reject but to anathematize outright subjectivism in cognition. Yet a more penetrating analysis of the problem shows that, when the nature of man's cognitive apparatus, and in particular the social conditioning of the process of cognition, is taken into account, all cognition is both objective and subjective and that progress toward eliminating the subjective factor can be made only if we realize the actual state of things.

It is likewise in the case of irrational elements of rational motivations of human actions. Their sources vary from case to case but they are always linked to the emotional aspect of human life: from individual psychology including the issue of subconsciousness (complexes of various kinds, individual traumas with related phobias, etc.) to social psychology, and in particular such manifestations of the latter as prejudices (racial, national, religious, etc.) and thinking in terms of stereotypes.

I have mentioned separately prejudices and stereotypes since I share Allport's opinion that the two are interconnected but nevertheless different phenomena.<sup>8</sup> Stereotypes are always present in the structure of prejudices, but they are not always negative in character and hence not always result in prejudices. But it would be difficult to overestimate the role of stereotypes in motivations of human actions: the less people realize that stereotypes exist and affect human actions, the greater the role of such stereotypes. People say, for instance, 'love of one's country', 'patriotism', 'the eternal enemy of our nation', 'class enemies', 'the highest values of our sacred cause', etc.; but they not only use such formulations, but – much more important still – they act accordingly. In the belief that their cause is just, they are ready to sacrifice their lives, destroy and kill their enemies. What underlies the motivations of such actions? There is no doubt that each of these formulations refers to important and fully rational concepts, but at the same time there is also no doubt each of them refers to stereotypes with all the negative properties of the latter: beliefs based on emotions, often at variance with the real state of things, or at least distorting such states of things, unchanging and inflexible as a result of their origin, and at the same time having a powerful impact on human mentality owing to their emotional charge. They are a terrible weapon in the hand of a politician who is an advocate of an evil cause. Much harm has been done by arousing the fanaticism of the mob and often making it commit crimes. That has been and still is easy because every such formulation includes

both objective cognitive elements and emotional elements which are consciously or unconsciously subjective in character, and because such a formulation is a name of both a concept and a stereotype which merge into a single whole, intertwine and permeate one another so that it is difficult to draw a demarcation line between the two. And this is why a stereotype can thrive parasitically on a concept and disguise itself as one. That is the danger, but that is also the key to overcoming that danger on a societal scale.

*European Coordination Centre for Research  
and Documentation in Social Sciences*

### Notes

1. Cf. E. Fromm (1975): *Charakter und Aggression, Wissenschaft und Weltbild* 1, 9-31; E. Fromm and M. Maccoby (1976): *Social Character in a Mexican Village*, New Jersey.
2. Cf. F. Jacob (1970): *La logique du vivant*, Paris.
3. See for instance E. S. Bogardus (1950): Stereotypes versus sociotypes, *Sociology and Social Research* 34, 286-291; S. I. Hayakawa (1950): Recognizing stereotypes as substitutes for thought, *ETC. A Review of General Semantics* 3.
4. Cf. L. Festinger (1957): *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*, Stanford.
5. Cf. M. Rokeach (1960): *The Open and Closed Mind*, New York.
6. For instance, G. Klaus (1977): *Die Sprache der Politik*, Berlin; W. Dieckmann (1975): *Sprache in der Politik*, Heidelberg; H. D. Laswell (1957): Language of Politics, in *Language*, R. N. Anshen (ed.), New York; F. C. Irion (1950): *Public Opinion and Propaganda*, New York.
7. Some timid attempts have been made in that respect. See in this connection H. D. Zimmermann (1969): *Die Politische Rede. Der Sprachgebrauch Bonner Politiker*, Stuttgart; D. Faulstich and G. Kuhn (1974): *Die Sprache des Arbeiters im Klassenkampf*, Berlin (DDR); L. Löwenthal and N. Guterman (1970): *Prophets of Deceit*. Palo Alto; Stemberger, Storz, and Süskind (1968): *Aus dem Wörterbuch der Unmenschen*, Hamburg; H. D. Zimmermann (1972): Der Allgemeine Barzel. Zum politischen Sprachgebrauch, in *Sprache und Gesellschaft*, A. Rücktüsche (ed.), München.
8. Cf. G. W. Allport (1958): *The Nature of Prejudice*, New York.

