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5106-A

PHILOSOPHY

endurance (as being over time) are not problematic (as they were in modes I or II respectively) "participating" may be integrating more than one participant; not in conflict of absolutes but in sharing, reflecting of worlds. Time-horizon becomes multi-linear in the multiplicity of interrelated vantage points; enduring structures are in time; and relationship is being with, letting be.

Microfilm \$3.00; Xerography \$7.40. 160 pages.

INCORRIGIBILITY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE

(Order No. 68-8187)

Stanley Jack Odell, Ph.D.
University of Illinois, 1967

To begin with I argue that certain important philosophers, viz., Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume all held some version of the following view regarding our knowledge of the external world which I have cast in the form of an argument.

P₁ No belief whether it be a factual belief or a belief regarding principle can be accepted as knowledge or used to justify another belief unless it is certain or indubitable.

P₂ Beliefs about the external world do not meet the requirement set down in P₁.

P₃ Analytic beliefs do meet the requirement set down in P₁.

P₄ At least some beliefs regarding appearances or sense-data, i.e., beliefs regarding one's own personal experiences do meet the requirement set down in P₁.

P₅ If P₂ is true then beliefs of kind referred to in P₂ must be inferred from or based upon other kinds of belief.

P₆ Beliefs of kind P₂ cannot be solely founded upon kind P₃, otherwise they would themselves be analytic, but they are not. They are contingent.

P₇ The only kind of beliefs in addition to the kind referred to in P₃ which are certain are the kind referred to in P₄.

C If we are to have knowledge of the external world, i.e., if we are to justify beliefs of kind P₂ we must at some point resort to beliefs of kind P₄, i.e., beliefs about appearances or sense-data.

I also argue that certain influential twentieth century philosophers, viz., Russell, Lewis, Carnap, and Ayer have also held, and in the case of Russell and Lewis continued to hold, versions of this view.

While I consider all the premises in some detail, particularly the twentieth century versions, what interests me most and what I examine in greatest detail are the grounds which these philosophers have provided in favor of the premises P₁, P₂, and P₄. As I see it these are the crucial premises in the argument in favor of C. Put differently, what I investigate in greatest detail is the view that there is an epistemological distinction to be made between beliefs and/or statements about one's own present experiences and beliefs and/or statements about physical objects. e.g., tables, chairs, etc. The epistemological distinction in question is that beliefs and/or statements about one's own present experiences are incorrigible, i.e., can be directly known to be true, whereas beliefs about physical object cannot. It is the view that while one can never be mistaken as regards his own present experiences, it is always possible that he is as regards physical object.

I also set out in detail the kind of contemporary criticism exemplified by Moore, Malcolm, Austin, and Quinton, which attempts to show either that P₂ is false (Moore and Malcolm) or that both P₂ and P₄ are false (Austin and Quinton), in short the kind of criticism which is aimed at the epistemological distinction in question.

I attempt to evaluate both the grounds which have been offered in favor of the distinction in question and the contemporary criticism of these grounds. I then attempt to provide grounds in favor of a version of the distinction in question which are consistent with and thus immune from the contemporary kind of criticism. In conclusion I attempt to restate premises P₁ through P₇, and the conclusion C to make them exempt from the kind of criticism under consideration and thus salvage a version of this view of our knowledge of the external world.

Microfilm \$3.00; Xerography \$9.70. 214 pages.

GOD: MYTH, SYMBOL, AND REALITY: A STUDY OF JUNG'S PSYCHOLOGY.

(Order No. 68-6166)

Stanley Riukas, Ph.D.
New York University, 1967

Please see abstract on Page No. 4925-A.

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THE CATEGORY OF "ALIENATION."

(Order No. 68-8959)

Richard Lawrence Schacht, Ph.D.
Princeton University, 1967

Few terms are more in vogue at the present time than "alienation." This suggests the desirability of an analysis of the use of the term by those writers under whose influence it has acquired such popularity. It is only through such an analysis that one can hope to come to understand "what alienation is"; for it is under the influence of these writers that the term has come to be associated with particular phenomena. I carry out such an analysis, and evaluate the fruitfulness of using the term as these writers do.

The traditional standard uses of the term constitute one part of the background against which the special uses of the term by Hegel, Marx and various recent writers should be viewed. In my first chapter, therefore, I examine the traditional standard uses of "alienation" in English and "Entfremdung" in German.

It is in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit that the term first assumes a position of special importance. His discussion can best be understood, however, in the light of certain pre-Hegelian developments and of Hegel's earlier writings. These are the subjects of my second chapter.

In my discussion of "alienation" in the Phenomenology, in the following chapter, I contend that Hegel uses the term in two basically different senses. In one it has roughly the force of "separation," while in the other it has the force of "surrender." I discuss the nature and interrelation of the separations (from the social, cultural and political "substance," and from man's essential nature) and surrender (of "particularity") with which Hegel is concerned.

Marx's conceptions of the "alienation" of labor and the product and of man's "self-alienation" are examined and evaluated in my fourth chapter. I suggest that Marx fails to distinguish Hegel's two senses of the term, and uses it in a sense which combines elements of both. I also observe that he manifests something of the current tendency to use it overly freely.

Erich Fromm has helped make "alienation" a household word. I analyze his use of the term in my fifth chapter, distinguishing the various different circumstances under which he

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employs it. I argue that he uses it so freely and loosely that he deprives it of all specific conceptual content and utility.

In my sixth chapter I consider the uses of the term in recent sociological literature, which are quite different from Fromm's. Sociologists use the term primarily in connection with separation from various aspects of society; but there are many such aspects. The term therefore has many different employments, which I attempt to distinguish.

It is commonly thought that the term plays an important role in recent European--and particularly, "Existentialist"--philosophy. In my seventh chapter I argue that this is not so; and that, when writers such as Heidegger and Sartre do use the term, it is usually in ways which have little to do with more vague notions of "alienation."

In my final chapter I demonstrate that it is virtually impossible to discover anything common to the various different uses of the term. I suggest the desirability of using it only (a) in connection with feelings of "alienness," (b) where a "becoming alien" has occurred, and (c) as a descriptive rather than polemical term. I further suggest, however, that as the term is presently used, it is incapable of performing a useful function in serious discussion.

Microfilm \$5.35; Xerography \$18.90. 418 pages.

THE LOGIC AND METHODOLOGY OF REDUCTION IN THE PHYSICAL AND BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES

(Order No. 68-8618)

Kenneth Francis Schaffner, Ph.D.
Columbia University 1967

An examination is made of the logic and methodology of the reduction of scientific theories. Reduction in this essay is understood as the explanation (and possible replacement) of one scientific theory by another theory, generally originating in a different branch of science.

In the first chapter, the history of reduction is surveyed, and then four current accounts of theory reduction are presented, first informally and then formally: (1) an account of direct theory reduction that is based on the contributions of Nagel, Woodger, and Quine, (2) an indirect reduction paradigm due to Kemeny and Oppenheim, (3) an "isomorphic model" schema traceable to Suppes, and (4) a theory of reduction that is based on the work of Popper, Feyerabend, and Kuhn. A decision is made to test their adequacy by carefully reconstructing three examples of reduction in the natural sciences.

In the second chapter, the explanation of physical optics by Maxwell's electromagnetic theory is considered, axiomatizations of both theories are constructed using a set-theoretical formulation, and a reduction is effected. Difficulties arising from optics' earlier incorporation in elastic solid theories of the aether are cited, and the relation between the elastic solid theory and Maxwell's theory is examined. A study of the relations of optics with electromagnetic theory yields the conclusion that there is a close, but nevertheless imperfect fit between the traditional optics and the newer electromagnetic theory. It is noted that the new theory corrects the older (optics) and that deducibility relations can be established between the reducing theory and the corrected optical theory. The relation of the uncorrected reduced theory to the corrected theory is seen to be one of strong analogy.

Chapter three axiomatizes a portion of the chemical theory of valence, and analyzes its reduction to atomic physics. The homopolar bonding of the hydrogen atom is considered in the light of Heitler and London's quantum mechanical explanation. Some general questions about the reduction of classical theories to quantum mechanics are raised and answers are developed in

the context of this reduction. The question of meaning variance is considered and attempts are made to show that it is a natural consequence of scientific change, and that it is responsible in part for an inexact fit between uncorrected reduced theories, and newer reducing theories.

The fourth chapter is an analysis of the concept of the "gene" that traces its development from Mendel's "factor" to Benzer's "cistron" and its DNA basis. An analysis is made of the Vitalists' and Organismic Biologists' claims and a reduction, unfortunately not complete, is constructed using molecular biology. The conclusion reached is that though there are gaps in our knowledge, and though there are good reasons for stressing the importance of organization and for assuming a hierarchy of control, there is no basis for assertions that "non-physical" or "emergent" forces are present. Some current criticisms of the reduction of biology to physicochemical theories are discussed and refuted. The extent to which biology may be methodologically considered autonomous is indicated.

The final chapter summarizes the conclusions reached in the earlier chapters and proposes a general reduction schema. This schema (1) incorporates "reduction functions" that identify entities or aggregates of entities in the reduced theory with entities (or aggregates) in the reducing theory, (2) introduces rules for connecting predicates of the two theories, and (3) allows for an inexact fit between reduced and reducing theories. The schema is also shown to yield as special cases the four reduction paradigms considered in the first chapter, and is seen to be in close accord with actual scientific practice.

Microfilm \$3.00; Xerography \$10.15. 223 pages.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF CONWY LLOYD MORGAN

(Order No. 68-8619)

Pat S. Schievella, Ph.D.
Columbia University, 1967

The Philosophy of Conwy Lloyd Morgan is a delineation and critical examination of Morgan's philosophy of Emergent Evolution. Chapter one is biographical.

Chapter two presents Morgan's two fundamental acknowledgments: (1) a psycho-physical world and (2) Emergent Evolution as God's "method of creation." Both constitute a monistic but methodologically trichotomized world to which he alludes through his A B C method: A (metaphysical), B (physical), and C (Psychical). Delineated are Morgan's concepts of correlation and relatedness in addition to the concept of determinate, unpredictable levels of emergence, out of which arise, respectively, life, mind, value, and religious attitudes. Fundamental to such emergence is an evolution, defined by Morgan as the "outspringing" of novelty. Basic to that concept, however, is another: the teleological "unfolding" of that which by God's intervention is already "unfolded."

Chapter three deals with the story of life as organic physical systems in relation to external influence. Examined are (a) various kinds of physiological patterns as intervenient events, (b) adventitious influences, (c) the relation of a to b, and (d) the regulative factors of instinct, heredity, and determinate plan. Moreover, since God's Activity alone is the Directive Power underlying these factors, Morgan rejects the theories of "old" mechanism, and such hormic realms of force as vitalism, *élan vital*, animism, etc. Given, also, are Morgan's theories of innate proclivities, conditioned response, and the relation of intelligence, consciousness, and instinct to the emergence of levels of proficient reference and guidance of conduct.

Chapter four concerns itself with the problem of mind. Out of Mind (the psychical attribute of the physical world) mind emerges. The emphasis, however, is placed on emergent levels

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