



A UTOPIAN VISION OF THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL

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Reflexive Statement

My interests run the gamut in sociology from Marxian world systems analysis to laboratory social psychology. Currently, I am most involved in criminology and statistics. The Frankfurt School affords relaxation when numbers become too mind-boggling. Their approach provides a perspective on current societal phenomena that is lacking in much of American sociology. I want to apologize for the use of "man" and "his" when referring to humanity, and do so only because the authors I discuss use these terms; trying to eliminate sexist terminology would have greatly reduced this paper's readability. I would like to thank John Drysdale of Concordia University in Montreal for first introducing me to the Frankfurt School. I would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers from Humanity and Society for suggestions that have led to a much improved paper.

Introduction and Overview

The utopian vision of the Frankfurt School of critical sociology is usually in the background of their writings. Four books are examined in the light of their expression of a utopian vision. Fromm discusses the utopian society at length, but gives no direction for praxis. Marcuse leaves the reader wishing for a clearer expression of the social mechanisms for achieving utopia. Horkheimer and Adorno use a style of writing that has its visions of utopia only in its allusions.

The expression of the Frankfurt School's utopian vision, especially that of Horkheimer and Adorno, is compared with the vision of Aeschylus in The Oresteia. Aeschylus used the central artistic medium of his society to achieve a successful and convincing expression of social transformation. In contrast, Horkheimer and Adorno used the only medium possible--the printed word--and used it well, but sacrificed the possibility of a mass audience in the process.

The Frankfurt School of critical sociology is well known for its critique of society, but behind the negativity, one can usually perceive thoughts about what should replace the current social fabric. As Marcuse says in Soviet Marxism, "Critical analysis has the task of keeping [historical] alternatives in mind, no matter how utopian they may appear in the status quo" (1961:xvi).



This quest for utopia, the transformed society, freedom, reason, or eros is seldom in the foreground. However, in every longer work, there is some image, some allusion, that makes reference to what should be or what might yet be.

While members of the Frankfurt School were in exile during the 1930's to early 1950's, their writings on the transformed society were always abstract with regard to what form the good society would take. Abstraction was required because no institution already existed which could be directly transformed into the good society.

But effectively demonstrating societal transformation to a large audience is not always an impossible task. In the Greek polis at the time of the playwright Aeschylus, the medium existed for a successful popular statement in the yearly competition of tragedies. Institutions existed, as well, for Aeschylus to use as symbols for the transformation which had taken place in society. Because of the reaction of the people to tragedy as an art form, Aeschylus was able to communicate his vision. Institutions and an appropriate art form were two advantages that Aeschylus had over the Frankfurt School in communicating a vision to an entire society.

One can summarize the Frankfurt School's main utopian concern as the need for a reconciliation between man and nature so as to place them into some kind of dialectical relation.¹ According to the School, technical man has subsumed nature under him for his own purpose. Today man is solely concerned with mastery over things, over nature, over other men. Man questions means, not ends, with a technical reason devoid of value orientation. Other people and nature are looked upon solely as objects for the acting subject, science. The relationship between the acting subject and the receiving object is one-way.

According to the Frankfurt School, it is necessary to change this conception of man's relationship with other men and with nature. The individual must become an acting subject rather than an object of science. One must begin by questioning goals and values. Man's relationship to moving, acting things must change so that he interacts with nature in a dialectical manner, taking into account nature's needs as well as his own. Men must interact with other men as subject/object with subject/object, recognizing that each takes on both in his turn. Man must be able to express his full potential in a reintegration of man with man and with nature. But this does not mean that subject and object merge completely; that would take away the freedom of the individual to act and would lead to a totalitarian society.

Each writer in the Frankfurt School stressed different aspects of the above summary in his utopian outlook. Three examples of their work from the period of their exile in the United States will show these differences: Erich



Fromm's (1941) *Escape from Freedom*, Herbert Marcuse's (1941) *Reason and Revolution*, and Max Horkheimer and Theodore W. Adorno's (1972/1944) *Dialectic of Enlightenment* will be examined:

The period of exile alone was chosen because it would seem to be a good time in which to view a group's utopian visions. Prior to being forced out of Germany by Hitler's rise, the School was enmeshed in all the intellectual controversies of the time. Their writing was rooted in that specific, and their aim was to critique and improve their society. With exile, one would expect a loosening of the ties to their German society, and an increase in their more global concerns. Thus, it seems best to look for their vision of utopia when they were in exile.

For the same reason, the limits of this analysis extend only to the end of the 1940's, with the return of the School to Frankfurt. Once again, their presence in the land of their birth would likely lead them to address more practical problems, such as how to rebuild their society.

The three examples of their work examined are chosen because they seem to represent a continuum of expression of utopian views from most to least explicit. All the authors discussed have been influential, showing that each had struck a resonance in a part of society.

The findings regarding utopian visions in the three books examined do not imply either that later members of the School, such as Habermas, would agree with them, or that these same writers continued to voice the same views. In fact, Fromm and Marcuse seem to have qualitatively changed their ideas on utopia as they became integrated into their land of former exile. This argues strongly for ending the analysis at the time when a return to Germany became possible.

Fromm (1941) was the most verbal of the Frankfurt School about man's potentialities. He soon left the group because the others disagreed about how man's potentialities should be expressed in their work, and to what extent these potentialities can be realized within the bourgeois society.²

Marcuse's *Reason and Revolution* (1941) discusses some of the features of the utopian society, but at an extremely abstract level. Marcuse, in general, remained close to the Frankfurt School after its return to Germany, although he stayed in America. In his later works he became more concrete than the other members about his utopian visions. Fromm and Marcuse's vision was not compelling because of its abstraction, and, therefore, it was not effective as a telos toward which to strive.



In Horkheimer and Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment (1972/1944) the concerns of the Frankfurt School come out most clearly. Since Horkheimer was its head, we would expect to find in his writings the clearest expression of the School's point of view. Horkheimer and Adorno were concerned, on the surface, with a critique of the society. The utopian vision is only visible in allusions. Their message is more effective than that of Fromm or Marcuse because of their refusal to state a utopian vision in a straight-forward rational manner. However, precisely because of the complex style, Horkheimer and Adorno inevitably can reach only a small audience.

In Erich Fromm's Escape from Freedom (1941) the utopian element comes out most specifically in "Freedom and Democracy: Part 2: Freedom and Spontaneity." In these 20 pages Fromm tries to explain how man can be free:

We believe that there is a positive answer. . . . This freedom man can attain by the realization of his self, by being himself. . . . [It] is accomplished not only by an act of thinking but also by the realization of man's total personality, by the active expression of his emotional and intellectual potentialities. . . . Positive freedom consists in the spontaneous activity of the total, integrated personality (1941:283-4).

Note first the abstraction. Words like "realization of the self," "man's total personality," "emotional and intellectual potentialities," and "total, integrated personality." These are words which are subject to many possible interpretations. Fromm seems to assume here that all his readers agree on values.

The key to the above quote for Fromm is "spontaneous activity." First he defines "spontaneous": it is the "quality of creative activity . . . the acceptance of the total personality and the elimination of the split between 'reason' and 'nature'" (285). His examples of spontaneity are artists, some philosophers and scientists, and small children. Fromm emphasizes individual action: "For the self is as strong as it is active" (288). The acting self, acting spontaneously, is the apex of human freedom.

The political implications are not treated extensively. Earlier in the book the distinction is made between freedom from external controls, which is a necessary prerequisite for man's freedom to "realize his self fully and uncompromisingly" (296). This freedom to "has never yet been realized in the history of mankind" (296).

Fromm suggests that political centralization is the answer to attaining this freedom (298-300). Centralization must go along with "the active control



and co-operation of each individual" (301), which requires decentralization. "To solve this problem of combining centralization with decentralization is one of the main tasks of society" (301). He then spends two pages saying that this is not an insurmountable problem, but he gives no suggestions on how to solve it.

An important self-contradiction, a keynote for the entire utopian vision, is the problem of reason and nature. On page 285 Fromm mentions the need for the elimination of the split between "reason" and "nature," and on page 299 he states that "society must master the social problem as rationally as it has mastered nature" (italics added). This is confusing because at the abstract level on which Fromm discourses we cannot tell if reason and society's rationality can be equated. If they can, his prescription for the better society implies a mastering of the social problem which would be as destructive as the conquest of nature in Western society has become.

At the end of his projection Fromm leaves the reader hanging, wondering how to get to "freedom to." The reader might agree that it is a desirable goal for man to express himself in spontaneous activity, to create his full individuality in active participation in the determination of his own life and that of society. But the proposal of centralization/decentralization in an economy, planned by everyone for everyone, with no one having power without responsibility, is confusing. How can these words be translated into concrete images? Not even how do we get there, but how would we recognize it if we did get there?

The confusion generated by the abstraction leaves the reader frustrated. Guidance is needed. Perhaps Fromm was clear about what he had in mind for a utopian society, and approximately how our society could be transformed, but he was unable to communicate his ideals sufficiently well through his writing to point the way to praxis.

Herbert Marcuse in Reason and Revolution (1941) has the utopian element far in the background. The book is concerned mainly with a discussion of ideas, and few visions of a better society are held out to the reader. But throughout there are clues to what Marcuse would like to see in a transformed society. The good society would have to embody the two concepts of freedom and reason.

Reason presupposes freedom, the power to act in accordance with knowledge of the truth, the power to shape reality in line with its potentialities. . . . Freedom, in turn, presupposes reason, for it is comprehending knowledge, alone, that enables the subject to gain and to wield this power (1941:9).



This is Marcuse's statement of Hegel's concepts and, as it later becomes apparent, is the feeling of Marcuse himself.

In his later discussion of Marx, Marcuse writes of the positive transformation of capitalist society into socialism: "The transition from capitalism's inevitable death to socialism is necessary, but only in the sense that the full development of the individual is necessary" (317). And finally, close to the end of the book, Marcuse reiterates the relationship between reason and freedom, in the middle of a discussion on National Socialism: "Reason implies the unity of all men as rational beings. When reason finally fulfills itself in freedom, the freedom is the possession of all men and the inevitable right of every individual" (417).

It would seem that Marcuse's predominant ideas on the desirable future society are quite similar to those of Fromm in Escape from Freedom, though Marcuse is far less explicit. The reader of Escape from Freedom was left hanging at the end, wishing for praxis. Not so in Reason and Revolution. The book is concerned with ideas not actions. It was not an important aim of the book to point the way to the future society, but rather to win acceptance for a form of social theorizing then lacking in America. It is a type of theorizing based on Hegel, who, Marcuse emphasized, had nothing to do with the rise of Nazism; and based on a reading of Marx that placed important emphasis on his pre-1848 writings. The book opposes the ideas of various thinkers to each other but leads to no expectations for practice. In fact Marcuse states, "theory will preserve the truth even if revolutionary practice deviates from its proper path" (322). So, while much of the book is a discussion of abstract ideas, the reader is not as frustrated by the lack of praxis. The abstractness of the book is in fact necessary because ideas themselves are abstract.

In the Dialectic of Enlightenment Horkheimer and Adorno (1972/1944) do not specifically mention a future society. They hold out no promises for the future--only by allusion is there anything that resembles a utopia, and to find these allusions the reader is forced to dig, to think, and in a sense, to create the book in reading it.

The book is a critique of Western civilization since the Renaissance--specifically, how the Enlightenment has been misused by bourgeois capitalism. As if to point out the faults of the main tool of the Enlightenment, the book is not written in a straight-forward manner. The ideas jump from one to another, from allusion to allusion, and the reader, unless he is very careful, gets lost completely in the text. The style is almost like a piece of music. Fredric Jameson (1967:41), in discussing Adorno's writing style, could have been writing of the Dialectic of Enlightenment:



And the resolute abstractness of this style serves as an imperative to the reader to pass beyond the individual concrete phenomena to their meaning. . . . This style . . . seems to reach a kind of knot of ideas, a moment in which everything is unified into a synthesis or vision.

Complex themes are interwoven, disappear, reappear, and are understood, if at all, in an intuitive way.

The book has as one of its themes a discussion of individuality. In the two excurses the critique seems to be one of individuality run rampant, a kind of individual hubris. Odysseus is the lone individual against the world, the prototype bourgeois individual. De Sade is the individual powerholder freed from tutelage.

Following this is a critique of conformity, the loss of individuality. The dangers of conformity are presented clearly in the essays on mass media and anti-semitism. This might lead to an expectation for an answer to the question of what kind of individuality is good. Indeed, the entire book poses the question: what kind of individual praxis is worth having? The conclusion to the book is in "The Genesis of Stupidity" in the last "Notes and Drafts." It is tentative, but it is the only place where the authors say directly to the thinking individual, "You ought." It is, however, in keeping with the rest of the book, in parable form:

The true symbol of intelligence is the snail's horn with which it feels. . . . Only tentatively does it re-emerge to assert its independence. . . .

The higher animals have earned their greater freedom; their mere presence proves that once feelers groped out in new directions and were not then withdrawn. . . .

Stupidity is a scar. . . . Every partial stupidity of a man denotes a spot where the play of stirring muscles was thwarted instead of encouraged. . . . If the child's repeated attempts are balked, or too brutally frustrated, it may turn its attention in a different direction. It is then richer in experience, as the saying goes, but an imperceptible scar, a tiny calloused area of insensitivity, is apt to form at the spot where the urge was stifled. Such scars lead to deformities. . . . Like the species of the animal order, the mental stages within the human species, and the blind spots in the individual, are stages at which hope petered out and whose petrification demonstrates that all things that live are subject to constraint. (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1972:256-8)



Horkheimer and Adorno do not outline any future utopia; they do not try to paint a picture of the future when everything will be as it should. They suggest the way to reach a better future, tentatively, if the reader is willing to see it: we must not be afraid of looking at new things and new ideas, as that is the only way we can continue to evolve. The praxis is tentative, based on proper behavior rather than a telos of a specific post-capitalist society, but it is satisfying because the reader who was really searching would have seen in the allusions the real possibilities for the future. The communication of their visions by allusions is much more compelling than the abstract writing of Fromm or Marcuse. However, the complexity of their style makes it inevitable that they could communicate to only a small group.

The aim of the Frankfurt School was the reconciliation of man and nature in a dialectical relationship, but it is apparent that the School was unable to communicate this need on a mass basis to the society in which they lived. A model of successful communication on this level might prove helpful to understanding the reasons for failure. Aeschylus' The Oresteia (1967) is in many ways the perfect comparison for the Frankfurt School. In it Aeschylus is trying to communicate the need for man to harness nature to build a better society, the need to place the rule of rational law above natural law. The play is a statement of man's learning to use technical rationality for the betterment of society.

The utility of using The Oresteia as a comparison lies in the light it sheds on what is lacking in the Frankfurt School's presentation. The special clarity with which Aeschylus is able to depict a utopian transformation is the deciding reason for my discussing The Oresteia at length. It is all the more interesting that the change depicted by Aeschylus is opposite to the vision of the Frankfurt School. The School stands at the end of the era that began in Aeschylus' time: technical rationality has now become all-pervasive; there is a need to return it to its place as a tool for man rather than being his master. The Oresteia is attempting to communicate ideas that are opposite, but on the same level of abstraction.

The Oresteia is a trilogy that was performed on one day, with breaks between the plays and followed by a satyr play (a kind of comedy). It is of a tradition of lyric tragedy in which dancing, music, choral odes, masks, and actors combined to produce an art form unlike anything that we have today. The plays were either based on myth or on historical occurrences that were (usually) long past. The playwright took the myth, or one of the versions that existed, and either used it as it was, or changed it to suit his purposes. The members of the audience would, of course, be familiar with the story before they arrived at the play, so that any variations the playwright introduced would be noticeable to them.



The Agamemnon, the first play of the trilogy, begins by stating the history of the house of Atreus (Agamemnon's family) and that of the Trojan War. Agamemnon then returns victorious from the war along with his men. Clytemnestra, his wife whom he has not seen for ten years, and who has been living with her lover Aegisthus, welcomes him. Agamemnon goes into the palace and is caught in a net by Clytemnestra and Aegisthus, and is killed. Clytemnestra and Aegisthus then announce that killing is over and that justice is done.

The Libation Bearers follows with Orestes, Agamemnon's son whom Clytemnestra had sent away, returning to Argo to kill Clytemnestra in revenge for the murder of his father. He is doing this on the orders of the god Apollo; Orestes is himself a somewhat reluctant killer. After a prodding from his sister Electra and his friend Pylades, Orestes kills Aegisthus and then Clytemnestra. He declares that killing is over and that justice is done. At the end of the play he must flee because he is being pursued for matricide by the Furies, the old Cthonian gods.

The Eumenides begins with Orestes purified of the matricide by Apollo, but still fleeing from the Furies, who are egged on by Clytemnestra's ghost. Orestes flees to Athens where Athena persuades the Furies that they should allow her to judge the case. Athena declares the problem too great for any single mortal to decide, or even for her alone, and chooses citizens of the polis to judge between Orestes and the Furies. Before the vote of the jury, Athena declares that henceforth the tribunal (the Court of the Aereopogus) will continue to protect the polis. The jury votes with Athena, casting a vote for acquittal. Athena frees Orestes. To placate the Furies Athena offers a privileged place in Athens with the power that no family will prosper without their help. They are then called Eumenides (kindly ones).

The change from the old order to the new is most clearly demonstrated by the transformation of the Furies into Eumenides. In The Agamemnon the Furies are pictured as automatic retribution:

The gods fail not to mark
those who have killed many.
The black Furies stalking the man
fortunate beyond all right
wrench back again the set of his life
and drop him to darkness. (53--11. 461-6)
Now hear you this, the right behind my sacrament:
By my child's Justice driven to fulfillment, by
her Wrath and Fury, to whom I sacrificed this man. ³ (91--11. 1431-3)



The Furies continue to be characterized in the same way in The Libation Bearers. At the beginning of The Eumenides Pythia, priestess of Apollo, describes them to us before we see them:

they are black and utterly
repulsive, and they snore with breath that drive one back.
From their eyes drips the foul ooze. (149--11. 52-4)

We then see Orestes surrounded by these sleeping monsters. Though he has been purified by Apollo, he must flee them. Clytemnestra's ghost exhorts them to revenge her murder. They whimper, they moan, they howl.

After the Furies arrive in Athens, their transformation occurs gradually. They agree to turn over judgment of the case to Athena because she pays them honor: They tell her "Your father's degree, and yours deserve as much" (163--1. 435). The trial is held, with the Furies arguing that if the crime of matricide is left unpunished, other children will be able to kill their parents without retribution; automatic justice is necessary to prevent this (165-7--11. 490-565). But later, argument gives way to threat. Then in lines 778-92, the threat becomes ritualized: "Gods of the younger generation," and is repeated in lines 808-22. This prepares the way for "That they could treat me so . . . out cast, like dirt . . . have taken my rights away," which is repeated twice (178-80--11. 837-47 and 870-80). Then they are completely transformed. They become interested in the privileges that Athena offers, accept them, and become the Eumenides.

Through the change in the Furies and the change in the way justice is meted out, from automatic blood justice to the court of law in the polis, Aeschylus shows the change from the old order to the new. A central point of the transformation is that it is effected, not by some neutral process, not by fate, but by the actions of the new order itself--the Olympian gods. Apollo, on Zeus' orders, tells Orestes to kill Clytemnestra. The trial takes place before Athena, Zeus' daughter. Athena herself persuades the Furies to accept their new position. Thus the submergence of the old order to the new is carried out by the actions of the new, as man himself shall carry out his domination of nature by his own actions.

The yearly dramatic competition in the Athenian polis was extremely important. Originally, the competition was a religious festival, and still, at the time of Aeschylus, had religious overtones. Kitto (1950:109-10) refers to the central place of religious thought in The Oresteia. The dramatic competition was very popular as well. Kitto (1957:96) states that this dramatic competition was a recreation of choice among the citizens. We could probably say that the polis that would have seen The Oresteia would likely have given



it its full attention and would have taken it very seriously.

Greek tragedy was not merely a theater piece, but a multimedia occurrence. Dance, music, and words all combined to create an emotional and intellectual impact that we can only imagine today. The playwright, who was also director, could transmit his vision in a manner that must have had an intense impact on the audience.

It must be noted that the institutions of the mature polis in which Aeschylus lived were the results of the "historical" actions reported in the plays. Thus his message would have been popular with the people of the polis because he was telling the citizens that their polis was a society already transformed for the better. Since he had in mind an existing institution, the Court of the Aereopogus, for the expression of the new order of rationality, it was easier for him to express his abstract ideas than it was for the Frankfurt School. The critical theorist had instead the task of taking an abstraction and creating some means of expressing it to a society in which it was far from an accomplished fact.

Besides the difficulty that the members of the Frankfurt School had in pointing to an institution of society that symbolized their ideal--man's need to come to a dialectical reconciliation with nature--they faced one further problem that was foreign to Aeschylus. Aeschylus worked in the most central medium for artistic expression in his society. His audience was most of the citizens of the polis, and intellectual content in the tragedies presented was expected. The equivalent institution in American society today, as it was in the 1940's, is sport. Spectator sport, such as the World Series, captures the minds, the total concentration, of most of the American public. A truly mass medium when combined with radio, or today, television, it has one drawback: there is no intellectual content associated with it. Thus what would be the perfect mass institution is lost to a group which wants to transmit meaningful ideas.

The media that were available to the Frankfurt School in America were limited because the School's vision was subversive to the capitalist society. Such abstract media as serious dance or music were clearly unsuitable, first, because their audience is so limited, and second, because their expression is too abstract. Adorno, who had studied music in his younger days, kept his creativity to the written word after joining the School. The theater and opera are clearly unsuitable because of the small size of their audience and the high cost of performances. Popular music was mindless in America. Most popular songs had words about love, boy or girl friends, all on a very simplified level. Popular music was truly the opium of the young masses. Even the moderate amount of political protest present in popular music after the



mid-1960's was unthinkable in the late 1940's.

Radio and movies would have been the most suitable media to use. In fact, after they returned to Germany, the members of the Frankfurt School did present a series of radio broadcasts on sociology (Frankfurt Institute, 1972). Movies would have been more suitable than radio because vision is added to sound. But radio and film are expensive and are controlled by commercial requirements, government censorship (movies), and government licensing (radio). Television, which became available in 1948, is controlled like radio, except that there are fewer stations, and large monopolistic networks have greater control. Another problem with radio, the cinema, and television is that people who watch or listen to them expect that they are leisure media. Difficult intellectual content would, for most people, either make the program uninteresting, or would pass over their heads without notice.

Only the written word provided an appropriate medium of expression. The Frankfurt School would probably have turned to it in any case because the printed word (at least since the Renaissance) has always been the medium of choice for intellectual theorists. Since the message of the Frankfurt School was subversive to bourgeois society, it could not be expected that a high-volume capitalist press would publish their books. However, unlike the situation in the other media, there are many small publishers in Western society that publish books they feel are of value, even though these books are unlikely to make a large profit. Thus books and journals were the available medium for the School. But the problem with books, unless they are high-volume editions that are heavily advertised, is that they usually have a very small readership. Any writer of "difficult" books would be preaching to the converted in that only people who are already interested in the problem would be likely to read the books. A book that has as its purpose getting people to think in ways not usually taught by the society is likely to have that effect only on people who already believe in it.

The Oresteia succeeded because it used the central art form of its society, an institution well-suited to a combined intellectual and emotional statement of the transformation of society. Aeschylus was able to point to a concrete institution, the Court of the Aereopogus, that was the embodiment of the transformation he was seeking to communicate.

Fromm and Marcuse were not successful in their aim of initiating a transformation in society that even remotely resembled the one they envisioned. Each did later, however, attract a large following. Their books were released in inexpensive, high-volume paperback editions. The society changed a little so as to allow large groups of people to accept certain kinds of critiques of



society. But the basic structure of American society did not transform to one in which an individual has the chance to better express his potentialities, to express freedom, and reason. What Fromm and Marcuse presented was a vision of a utopia that the reader would find quite attractive. But because they both wrote in a straight-forward prose style, there was no depth beyond a first reading, and the abstractness of the society depicted did not lend itself to any kind of praxis.

Unlike Fromm and Marcuse, Horkheimer and Adorno did not aim to transform society in the short term. They also did not treat the printed word in the same way the others did. Their style is very complex and does not invite the same audience as Fromm or Marcuse. The reader must read slowly, must think about the allusions. But he or she can read again and again, always finding a new relationship, a new thread. Their allusions are richer than any straight-forward essay can be. For the person who wishes to delve, there is a world view in the book.

The great success of their book is in the discarding of the rational form. Their critique is of the Enlightenment, and their mode of criticism is that of a different method through the printed word. In a sense the medium is the message in their criticism. The success is the reader's discovery of the praxis that is appropriate to the world view alluded to throughout the book. But unlike Aeschylus, Horkheimer and Adorno did not have existing institutions to symbolize their message, and they could state it effectively only in a form which would be accessible to very few people.

FOOTNOTES

1. This summary has been taken from the various books analyzed below, but is indebted, as well, to Jay (1973), especially Chapter 2. The problem with summarizing the Frankfurt School's utopian concerns is that their emphasis is always on the critique of the current society. Thus summarizing involves some reading between the lines of their critiques.
2. Fromm actually severed his ties with the group in 1939, two years before Escape from Freedom was published (Jay, 1973:93). Most of the analysis in the book is still very close to the Frankfurt School. It is only in the discussion of man's potentialities (the utopian part of the book) that Fromm really breaks with the School. This book is used mainly because the utopian concerns are expressed at great length, and as we see below, are compatible with those expressed in 1941 and later by Marcuse. In his later work, Fromm's ideas became more separated from those of his former colleagues.



3. Line 1433 is more clearly translated by Podlecki (1966:68): "And Ate and Erinys with whom I slew this man." This more clearly shows the active power of the Furies (Erinys) than Lattimore's translation. The Furies would have been a driving force in any such vengeance.

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