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THE TEACHING OF VALUES

From Ethical Idealism To Social Psychology

Adler, Dewey, Sullivan, Fromm

By

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter One – Introduction

Preliminary remarks	3
Centrality of the teaching of values	3
Shift from the Rational to the Empirical	4
Relevance of the shift for the teaching of values	7

Chapter Two – Felix Adler

Biographical	11
Adler's critique of Kant	15
Adler's moral philosophy	17
a.) Development of his imperative	17
b.) Worth and its attribution	20
c.) Self-realization	21
Adler as a moral educator	22
a.) The question of moral instruction	22
b.) The aim of the ethics teacher	24
c.) The content of ethics courses	26
d.) Freedom	28
e.) Summary	30

Chapter Three – John Dewey

Dewey's moral philosophy	35
a.) Interaction of individual and environment	36
b.) Morality and intelligence	39
c.) Values and the science-guided life	40
d.) The status of principles	43
e.) The source of the Right	46
The centrality of process – genetic method	48
Dewey as a moral educator	50

Chapter Four – Harry Stack Sullivan

Biographical	59
Representative conceptions of Sullivan	60
a.) Some philosophical considerations	60
Empiricism and faith	60
"Epistemology"	63

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b.) Psychiatry, social psychology, and ethics	66
Psychiatry and social psychology	66
Psychiatry and ethics	68
c.) The Self-system	69
Formation	69
Appraisals as moral judgments	71
d.) Self-esteem	73
The significance of insight	73
Mutuality and moral principles	76
Educational implications	78
 Chapter Five – Erich Fromm	
Biographical	85
Representative conceptions of Fromm	85
a.) Some historical considerations	85
b.) The Nonproductive Orientations	90
c.) The Productive Orientation	93
Reason	94
Love	95
The Ethicized Personality and the Productively Oriented Person	97
a.) The Rational ideal and the maturity concept	97
b.) Rational worth and empirical esteem	99
Educational implications	100
a.) Education versus manipulation	100
b.) Faith and science in education	103
c.) Character models	105
 Chapter Six – Conclusion	
Does social psychology replace moral philosophy?	112
How may social psychology help to revise moral principles?	115
Is there a moral ideal for educators to follow?	118
a.) Awareness	118
b.) Dignity	119
c.) Responsibility	120
 Bibliography	 123
 Index	 126

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction



CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Preliminary remarks

This work is largely the product of reflection upon nineteenth and twentieth century philosophical, psychiatric, and educational writings. The selection of the four central figures is at least in some sense arbitrary, since they may be regarded as representative of differing outlooks and orientations. Of particular interest to the author has been the impact, both real and potential, of modern contributions in the fields of psychiatry and social psychology, here represented by Harry Stack Sullivan and Erich Fromm, whose views are considered to be of major importance to the enterprise of teaching values.

The inclusion of contributors such as Felix Adler and John Dewey in a work bearing the title "The Teaching of Values" should need no justification, especially when it is seen that both were moral philosophers with a strong practical interest in education which extended to primary and secondary school work. While the justification for including the psychiatrist Harry Stack Sullivan and the psychoanalyst Erich Fromm will, it is hoped, emerge in the chapters bearing their names, it should be said at the outset that they are important to this study chiefly as they subject the social self to an empirical scrutiny such as receives far less emphasis in the works of Adler and Dewey. It follows that the conceptions of Sullivan and Fromm clarify much to be found in the works of Adler and Dewey. From the standpoint of the value dimension of education, the thinking of psychoanalytically-oriented contributors has and may still further be utilized to revise or modify existing procedures.

Centrality of the teaching of values

Crucial to education is education in values, which enables man to discover ways of developing awareness, dignity, responsibility and a capacity for reason and for love in times when the values he has inherited may no longer be appropriate to the world he inhabits. The fact that we are witnessing today a period of dramatic social change does not need to be elaborated. The

above-cited five aspects of life are basic to the moral life under any definition of morality, and they must be given due emphasis by educators. Unless man discovers ways of developing awareness, dignity, responsibility and a capacity for reason and for love, he will be unable to engage in the process of reckoning with the common moral heritage, which is to say nothing of the need to transform what has been given. The line of thought developed in the chapters which follow demonstrates these qualities as aspects of morality.

The teaching of values has centrality both in theory and in practice. As is to be seen in the case of Felix Adler, the particular view of man and his world held by the moral philosopher has specific recommendations for the practice of teaching values in formal schooling. The major variance in outlook to be taken up in this work is between that view of man which asserts the necessity of his apprehending a fixed rational principle or ideal (Adler) and that view of man which implies that his effort to apprehend such an ideal will fail as there is no fixed, absolute principle or ideal (Dewey). The latter view, perforce, leads in the direction of a "situational" ethics. The consequences of these two views for education are immediate. Some of their practical implications are to be traced in this work.

Shift from the Rational to the Empirical

The following chapters trace a shift or sweep in thinking from the rational outlook of moral philosophers, as illustrated by the thought of Immanuel Kant and Felix Adler, to the empirical outlook of contributors such as Harry Stack Sullivan and Erich Fromm.

The Rational and the Empirical are useful concepts which help to set a framework. Both may be given differing interpretations, for which reason it will be well to consider at the outset the way in which they are to be employed in connection with moral knowledge.

"The Rational" has traditionally had at least two different connotations. In one context, rationalism has been identified with that movement which attempted to substitute human reason for ecclesiastical doctrines in an effort to construct a human cosmology. In this sense, rationalism may be defined as "free thought". In another context, rationalism has been identified with a reliance upon pure reason, with deductive processes, with that mode of inference which depends upon propositions independent of experience. It is rationalism in this latter sense which most closely represents the concept to be discussed in connection with moral knowledge.

Although "the Empirical" is less subject to differing interpretations, it is well to note that empirical knowledge is that which is obtained by direct recourse to sense-data. Empirical constructions, such as the laws and principles of natural science, are developed inductively from bodies of sense-data, remaining valid until such time as they no longer explain what they purport to explain. The Rational and the Empirical are useful in describing broad tendencies of thought. In practice, however, they are often combined, as in the case of a principle of natural science arrived at partly through guesses, hunches, intuitions, or mathematical constructs; and partly through experimental evidence used as a basis for induction. The Rational and the Empirical are useful concepts to distinguish modes of thought, but in actual circumstances rely upon one another. Thus a principle developed apart from experience seeks verification in its practical consequences; and thus a pattern of phenomena pertaining to one set of sense-data seeks explanation with a principle capable of covering other sets of sense-data with a unifying result.

The path to be traced between the Rational and the Empirical with reference to the teaching of values (as well as the sub-title of this work) is suggested by the phrase "From Ethical Idealism to Social Psychology", a chapter-title in Morton G. White's *The Origin of Dewey's Instrumentalism*.¹ The philosophy of ethical idealism, as exemplified in the ethical thought of Immanuel Kant, asserts that moral insights cannot have their source in empirical knowledge:²

. . . all moral conceptions have their seat and origin completely *a priori* in the reason . . . they cannot be obtained by abstraction from any empirical, and therefore merely contingent knowledge . . . it is just this purity of their origin that makes them worthy to serve as our supreme practical principle . . . just in proportion as we add anything empirical, we detract from their genuine influence, and from the absolute value of actions . . . it is not only of the greatest necessity, in a purely speculative point of view, but is also of the greatest practical importance, to derive these notions and laws from pure reason, to present them pure and unmixed. . . .

Kant, whose moral philosophy made a lasting impression on Felix Adler, made a sharp distinction between morality, a purely rational part of ethics; and practical anthropology, a purely empirical part. His theory of ethics began with the following question:³

Whether it is not of the utmost necessity to construct a pure moral philosophy, perfectly cleared of everything which is only empirical, and which belongs to anthropology.

As is to be seen, ethical idealism has remained influential into the twentieth century. Where it appears, there is the general position taken that the world of facts and the world of values are separate, and that the source of moral judgments cannot be discovered in the world of facts. The factual *is* and the judgmental *ought* are held apart.

With the development of the empirical sciences in the twentieth century, however, a new literature has appeared which draws upon empirical research in the biological and social sciences and makes certain claims concerning value. The type of claims advanced is exemplified by the anthropologist M. F. Ashley Montagu, who ventures beyond the descriptive efforts characteristic of his discipline and proceeds to engage in constructing a moral anthropology. The crucial point for ethics made by moral anthropology is in essential disagreement with ethical idealism, namely, that moral judgments may be rooted in experienced facts. Montagu holds that the fundamental human values are a function of the human organism's biological needs. As such, they are accessible to empirical investigation:⁴

The basic needs are not logical inferences but factual phenomena; they ought to survive if the organism is to survive or develop, and that oughtness is as much a fact and lies as much in the world of *is* as do the basic needs themselves. "Ought" is in this sense merely a way of denoting a necessary response—which, again, falls within the world of *is*.

The consequences of these contrasting approaches to values for ethics as for the teaching of values are of high significance. In what follows, the essential rationalism of Felix Adler's position provides a certain background to the position of John Dewey, who is considered here chiefly as a moral philosopher who opposes the identification of morals with matters independent of concrete actualities. Moving from Dewey to Harry Stack Sullivan, a strong bio-cultural tie may be observed. In the case of Sullivan, who is not, technically, a moral philosopher, but whose contributions as an empirical investigator have direct moral implications, the conceptions to be discussed are intended to provide a further understanding of the close connection between moral development and human interaction. Regarding Fromm, who treats the moral situation of contemporary man as though it were in large part determined by developments in preceding centuries, empirical studies of human character types offer additional insight into the nature of the moral orientation. It is the contention of the author that the positions of these four theorists represent a shifting outlook, the implications of this shift being

of high import to the teaching of values. Moving from Adler through Dewey to Sullivan and Fromm, one discovers a shift from an emphasis on duty, to an emphasis on intelligence, to one on love. While the key to morality tends to be described in terms of duty by Adler, love is the key element for Sullivan and Fromm. We are likewise to discover a change from the desire to create a science of ethics (Adler) to the desire to create an ethical science (Fromm).

Relevance of the shift for the teaching of values

The concluding sections of the following chapters deal with some of the practical educational implications of the theories discussed. The relevance of the total shift encompassed by this work should, however, be considered at the outset.

The greater emphasis on love and the lesser emphasis on duty have wide ramifications for education on all levels, although the special importance of love in the early years of life focuses our attention upon the nursery and primary grades. An implication of the shift particularly to be noted is that moral beings will tend to develop when duties are undertaken within a context of love rather than when love is encouraged as a function of duty.

A further important implication, stemming within the limitations of this work from the contributions of Sullivan and Fromm, concerns the relationship of psychoanalytic insights and psychotherapeutic methods to values and value-teaching. (A section on Sullivan is devoted to the interrelationships between psychiatry, social psychology, and ethics.) Since the time when Adler developed his moral philosophy and set forth his recommendations for the content of special courses in moral instruction, there has accumulated a considerable amount of information concerning the dynamics of human behavior. It can be inferred that standards of mental health may be and are now more carefully drawn than they were in the last decades of the nineteenth century. For this reason, it may further be inferred that moral development presupposes a state of mental health. For Sullivan and Fromm, morality tends to be identified with mental health. The benefits to be derived from special courses in ethics or moral instruction will be minimal where it is clear that a child is in special need of psychotherapy.

Standards of mental health are, for Fromm, closely linked with his concept of "normative humanism", to be discussed anon. Insofar as much ethical instruction, in Adler's view, occurs in the form of story telling, Fromm's ideal type of the "productively oriented" or the "normatively human" person, based on his own examination of a variety of personality types, suggests a certain

criterion for evaluating the characters in stories, with a resulting process of selecting, discarding, and revising. Since many stories are actually myths, a similar evaluation may be undertaken which can utilize hitherto unavailable techniques in order to explore hidden meanings. Finally, Fromm's concept of the normatively human being has implications for the personality structure of teachers, who, in order to achieve some success with values, must be capable of "care, respect, responsibility, and knowledge".

This work does not attempt to develop a syllabus for the teaching of values in light of newer perspectives. Instead, many of the implications of these perspectives are traced in terms of broad though practical suggestions, and, finally, considerations are posed from the combined views of the contributors from which, in turn, emerge certain basic questions.

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CHAPTER TWO

Felix Adler

"The ethical aim is the development of personality. Personality is to be distinguished from individuality. The individual, insofar as ethicized, is a personality. Empirical man, with his defects and his qualities, is an individual—one of a kind. Empirical man, insofar as he is transformed in subjection to the rational ideal, is a personality".

(From a paper submitted to the Second International Moral Education Congress, The Hague, 1912.)





CHAPTER FIVE

Erich Fromm

Biographical*

Erich Fromm was born in 1900 in Frankfurt, Germany. He studied sociology and psychology at the universities of Heidelberg, Frankfurt, and Munich, receiving the Doctorate from Heidelberg in 1922. He received training in psychoanalysis first in Munich and later at the Psychoanalytic Institute in Berlin. Since 1925, he has devoted his time partly to work as a consultant psychologist, and partly to theoretical work, especially in the field of the application of psychoanalytic theory to problems of culture and society.

He has published many works on various psychological subjects in German, and has taught at the Psychoanalytic Institute in Frankfurt and at the Institute for Social Research at the University of Frankfurt.

Fromm visited North America for the first time in 1933, when he lectured at the Chicago Psychoanalytic Institute. He settled permanently in the United States in 1934. He is a fellow of the Washington School of Psychiatry, and a member of the International Psychoanalytic Society. He has lectured, among other institutions, at Columbia University, Bennington College, and the New School for Social Research.

Representative conceptions of Fromm

a.) Some historical considerations

Although a psychoanalyst, Erich Fromm may with at least as much justification as in the case of Sullivan be regarded as a social psychologist. His writings embrace several disciplines, including psychoanalysis, psychology, philosophy, history, political science, economics, and religion. With a basically psychological orientation, he extends his inquiry to these disciplines for a more

*For this information, the author wishes to thank Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., New York.

comprehensive portrayal of the contemporary human situation. He has a special concern with problems of morality.

Utilizing the genetic method already discussed in connection with Dewey, Fromm portrays contemporary man largely as a product of historical circumstances. Although viewing man in dynamic interaction with society as do Dewey and Sullivan, and although insisting that the individual may have an impact on the social order, Fromm traces the development of contemporary character in such a way as to illustrate how past events have had a determining effect on the contemporary human situation, framing the possibilities as well as the limitations with which man must reckon in his search for the good life. In contrast to Sullivan, Fromm is deeply concerned to trace the path between psychology and ethics; he utilizes traditional philosophical language in this quest. What may therefore be implicit in Sullivan's conceptions is made explicit in those of Fromm, for whom psychic health and moral stature are inseparably linked. It should also be noted that while Sullivan's rather technical contributions have a relatively limited audience, Fromm has reached a far wider audience.

Fromm's portrayal of contemporary man's character is rendered by means of *ideal types*, which were used some fifty years earlier by the German sociologist Max Weber. These types represent *orientations*, which reflects a fundamental stress on situation. Before considering Fromm's characterology, it will be useful to describe briefly the way in which contemporary man's character emerges from the historical background, which, though described briefly in *Man For Himself*, is given fuller treatment in the earlier *Escape From Freedom*.¹ Here again we see the use of the genetic method, not as it applies to the individual, but as it applies to the social order emerging historically.

According to Fromm's analysis, the Middle Ages were characterized both by a lack of personal freedom and by a sense of security. Though man in the Middle Ages had a fixed and undisputed place in the social order, having most of his decisions made for him, he was in a state of bondage, as yet unaware of himself and of others as individuals.

With the Renaissance, according to Fromm, profound changes occurred for man and society. With the growth of a new middle class, there developed an individualistic type of person. The growth of individualism meant at once a new freedom and a loss of the former security. With the breakdown of the old feudal society, man discovered himself and others as individuals. Although there was now more freedom, there was also more aloneness. Along with the new-found feeling of strength, often based

upon wealth, there developed a new anxiety. Thus man began to gain an awareness of himself, seeing himself for the first time in centuries as a being apart from other beings.

In his freedom from the bondage of ties political, economic, and religious, in his new-found ability to see himself as a separate being, man so lost his former moorings that he was prone to accept the appeal of new ideologies, new explanations of life, new religious doctrines. Among these were Lutheranism and Calvinism, which Fromm subjects to a psychological analysis, stating at the same time that the psychological analysis of a doctrine can never completely determine its validity.

In undertaking his analysis of Lutheranism and Calvinism Fromm asserts that the personal characteristics of Luther and Calvin were largely shared by their followers. Just as these leaders were, in their new-found freedom from the Church, beset by anxiety and doubts, so were the lower and middle class people to whom their religious doctrines appealed. Thus the new religious ideas of the Reformation were, according to Fromm, accepted mainly because they helped people to cope with life, aiding them to give expression to both their deep insecurities and resentments as well as to their hunger for security.

While Protestantism has often been seen as the religion which gave man individuality by granting him the authority in religious matters formerly vested in the Church, there were certain other aspects of early Protestantism which Fromm describes in some detail. First, human nature was seen as something preponderantly evil, salvation depending upon a faith grounded in self-humiliation rather than in good works. Second, there was an ambivalence with respect to authority, whereby the newly freed or rebelling shunned one authority but sought another in the form of an overly severe conscience. Third, those who believed they had attained the state of salvation tended to deprecate those who seemed not to have achieved such a state. Fourth, human powerlessness in contrast to divine might was given fundamental emphasis.

Thrown upon the resources of his own potentialities, Reformation man, according to Fromm, was unable to realize this potential, shunning the anxiety-wrought possibility of personal autonomy and taking refuge in the rigidities of new religious faiths. Reformation man's approach to freedom was blocked by his own unmediated guilt, by his low self-esteem, by his severe conscience, and by his psychic need to have a large area of his life's activities regulated by some power beyond him. Reformation man was not ready for true freedom, something yet within his reach.



Although Reformation man had gained what was essentially a subjective dependence, a movement in the direction of freedom attended the new stress being placed upon economic individualism. But apart from this factor, which genuinely contributed toward individuality, insecure individuals were able to derive a sense of importance in the religious realm from their personal encounters with the divine, and in the economic realm from the material fruits of successful competition, from the possession of property, and from the prestige which ensued.

Starting at the time of the Reformation, there began the slow development from what Fromm calls "freedom from" to "freedom to". The former is a negative conception. As will readily be seen in the foregoing paragraphs, it is the state of being liberated from those economic, political, or religious bonds which have served the dual function of yielding security and minimizing the attainment of individuality. After an interim stage of insecurity, anxiety and loneliness, there may ensue the latter state, in which genuine personal security, strength, and dignity are achieved. In the centuries after the Reformation, at different times and in different countries, the evolution of "freedom from to freedom to" proceeded at varying paces from stage to stage. There are instances of an uncertain attitude toward freedom and bondage in the works of philosophers, and Fromm points to Kant as having exhibited such an attitude:³

In spite of the fact that Kant shows a greater respect for the integrity of the individual than did Calvin or Luther, he denies the individual's right to rebel even under the most tyrannical government; the rebel must be punished with no less than death if he threatens the sovereign. Kant emphasizes the native propensity for evil in the nature of man, for the suppression of which the moral law, the categorical imperative, is essential lest man should become a beast and human society end in wild anarchy.

While Hegel shares this dual emphasis on autonomy and subordination, which may be characteristic of the eighteenth century, nineteenth century thinkers such as Nietzsche stress autonomy to the exclusion of subordination, maintaining that personal growth and happiness must not be impaired by other considerations. Fromm sees the latter half of the nineteenth century as the period during which the movement toward human autonomy reached its peak. But not long after the beginning of the twentieth century, with the advent of monopolistic capitalism, freedom declined and aloneness and powerlessness again increased. Like man of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, twentieth century man, virtually freed of all traditional bonds, yet

feels threatened, is insecure and anxious. Capitalism, in its effects on man, has therefore played a dual rôle. In its earlier stages it was supportive to personal growth and initiative; in its later, monopolistic phase, it has been restrictive and manipulative.

It is at this point in Fromm's historical interpretations that the works of other contemporary students of man and society may function to support his thesis. C. Wright Mills, for example, renders a portrayal of contemporary middle class working man in his *White Collar*³ which serves to document further the situation as described by Fromm in *Escape From Freedom* and *The Sane Society*. David Reisman's idealized character types in *The Lonely Crowd*,⁴ including the *tradition*, *inner*, and *other-directed* types, are rooted in historical circumstances and generally support Fromm's conception of the evolution of "freedom from" to "freedom to".

Twentieth century man is portrayed by Fromm as he emerges from the background of centuries, and in his relationship to several phases of his life, including the economic, the political, and the religious.

In the economic sphere, where the laws of the market prevail and competition and manipulation predominate, market values have come to permeate man, extending to his personal or social relations. Thus people tend to become regarded as objects, as though saleable commodities; furthermore, with the growth of larger and larger enterprises, everyday relationships tend to become more impersonal and abstract. With a developing specialization in labor, the employee finds it increasingly difficult to see where his particular work relates to a meaningful whole. In these circumstances, Fromm holds that it is difficult for man to retain a sense of dignity and importance.

In the political sphere, it is Fromm's thesis that parallel developments have tended to produce like results. Where formerly the citizen participated in public situations involving a reasonably limited number of people, and voted on familiar issues for familiar candidates, he is today confronted with a bewildering variety of issues and candidates whom he has little personal opportunity to evaluate. Furthermore, policy decisions with far-reaching consequences are often made by small groups of key public officials without the assent or even the knowledge of the individual citizen. While it may be assumed that this sometimes occurs because urgent situations cannot await a general plebiscite, it may also occur because of a growing gap between representatives and the represented. Augmenting the loss of the sense of dignity and importance resulting from these circumstances, modern propaganda techniques, manipulative devices often derived from the



findings of the social and psychological sciences, may give the citizen a spurious sense of importance during political campaigns, but may further obscure the real issues at hand.

The religious phase of twentieth century man's life, especially in the last few decades, has often been influenced by the market values so characteristic of the economic phase. Thus, as has often been noted, attempts are made to "sell" religion as though it were a commodity. The findings of the social and psychological sciences have also been utilized to further the effectiveness of religious institutions in their work. The various religious traditions are represented with varying degrees of beneficence to man in the twentieth century. In their most beneficial form, they encourage the development of "freedom", being unwilling to indulge man's frequent desire to lose his identity in the conforming group. Considering that for so many people religion and morality are inseparable, religion is of unique importance in the furthering of creative human relationships, and will assist or hinder according to the particular form it takes. In general, however, Fromm believes that man is still projecting his own powers to the concepts and objects which he proceeds to worship and to which he submits.

In summary, Fromm's portrayal of contemporary man is set against a background of significant developments in the preceding centuries. Having won his freedom from bonds which afforded security but which prevented the development of individuality, man has yet been largely unable to profit from this by developing his inner resources, his freedom to be himself. Instead, he has vacillated between attempts to realize his capacities and his frequent desire, born of anxiety, aloneness, and feelings of powerlessness, to deny his uniqueness, worth, and dignity by losing himself in a conformity to rigid social patterns. This situation is currently revealed in various phases of man's life, particularly in the economic, the political, and the religious.

b.) The Nonproductive Orientations

Having outlined the various historical factors which form a background necessary to an understanding of the contemporary human situation, Fromm proceeds to inquire into the various orientations or modes of relatedness exhibited by contemporary man. These, as demonstrated in behavior, are indicative of *character*, which is for Fromm "the (relatively permanent) form in which human energy is canalized in the process of assimilation and socialization".⁵ Character, for Fromm, is not something simply to be analyzed and described, and his treatment of it is more

than simply descriptive, containing also a prescriptive element. Far from presenting a dispassionate critical analysis of various character types, Fromm evaluates the various orientations and proceeds to advance his own recommendations. In so doing, he engages in a distinctive type of moral discourse. Here to be noted, with reference to Dewey's analysis of character and conduct, is that Fromm's character types are relatively free or unfree to exemplify moral conduct according to their particular character (e.g., productive or non-productive). For Fromm, conduct is an exemplification of character. Like Dewey, Fromm would disagree with the Kantian separation of motive and consequence, conduct and character.

Moral prescriptions, often rooted in various religious traditions, have taken the form of principles, rules, or commandments. Whether as written or spoken expressions, much of their compelling force is attributable to their close connection with these religions, and to the emotional commitments of religious communicants. Their force, in view of their linkage with religious traditions, is also to be explained by their capacity to arouse anxiety. In large part, their effectiveness is to be explained by a common human tendency to avoid anxiety, which attends the threat of punishment or isolation. As principles, rules, or commandments, they have been conveyed directly and unconditionally. The Decalogue and the Golden Rule are good examples.

Fromm's character types, as idealized portrayals or portraits of differing orientations, are capable of being translated into principles, rules or commandments. Thus the description of a given type might be translated into a series of prescriptions urging that behavior be in keeping with this type of character. Fromm, however, does not attempt to accomplish such a translation. Instead, he achieves something of a prescriptive force by giving his various orientations positive or negative evaluations. While the positive orientation is the *productive*, the various negative orientations are the *non-productive*. To be noted is that the non-productive orientations are essentially immoral. By contrast, the productive orientation is essentially moral. For Fromm, productive behavior is ethical behavior. Moreover, there are for Fromm certain laws which govern man's mental and emotional functioning, only partially discovered, but justifying a position which he advances, namely, *normative humanism*. This position assumes that "there are right and wrong, satisfactory and unsatisfactory solutions to the problem of human existence".⁶

Before giving a brief summary of Fromm's non-productive orientations, it will be useful to refer again to Sullivan's discussion of the self-system and self-esteem. Granted an adequate self-

system, self-derogation and the derogation of others is lacking. With an inadequate and derogatory self-system, however, the groundwork is laid for what Sullivan termed the "power-drive", a movement on the part of the individual, based on feelings of personal powerlessness, to control or dominate others. This state, as described by Sullivan, may in a general sense be described as non-productive. Fromm, however, renders certain elaborations, differentiating four nonproductive orientations which are briefly described as follows:

The *receptive* orientation describes those whose mode of relatedness to the world is such that they look beyond themselves for their sources of sustenance. This particular form of powerlessness is characterized by dependency, sensitivity to rebuff, helplessness, and inactivity.

The *exploitative* orientation describes those who, looking beyond themselves for their sources of sustenance, must wrest from others what is needed rather than depending upon sheer kindness or generosity. Although such people are often capable of creative originality, they derive more pleasure from what they can take from others and then call their own. (This represents a form of powerlessness which incorporates the essential features of Sullivan's "power-drive".)

The *hoarding* orientation describes those who, rather than merely seeking to receive or exploit what is not theirs, desire to possess as much as possible and to give as little as possible. They are entrenched within a wall of their own making, and their mode of relatedness is such that if they cannot possess objects or other people they remain remote. This again represents a form of powerlessness, since those with this mode of relatedness subjectively experience power in terms of that which is exterior to themselves.

The *marketing* orientation, already implied in Fromm's description of the contemporary economic sphere of life, is peculiar to this era, occurring when individuals come to regard themselves and others as commodities. It is a well-known principle of salesmanship that salesmen, in order to sell their products, must first sell themselves. The influence of the laws of the market in the present era is such that individuals may come to see their worth as a function of supply and demand, their goal being to become saleable. The successful person thus considers himself worthy, and the unsuccessful person considers himself worthless. The criterion of success is, of course, the possession of material goods. The marketing orientation implies impersonality, superficiality, and the negation of individuality. The peculiar powerlessness of this orientation resides in that the individuals so oriented are

alienated from their own genuine identity, forced as they are to play a rôle in which they must behave as they believe others wish them to behave.

As already noted, powerlessness pervades each of these non-productive orientations. Human power, according to Fromm, is to be equated with human potentiality, human *capacity*. Paradoxically, however, power has another common meaning, *domination*, which is perhaps the very antithesis of capacity. Fromm relates these two meanings as follows:⁷

Power = domination results from the paralysis of power = capacity. 'Power over' is the perversion of 'power to'. The ability of man to make productive use of his powers is his potency, the inability is his impotence.

In the tradition of humanistic ethics, Fromm centralizes the rôle of human potential and productiveness. An internal potential and a capacity for productiveness is thus posited. The nature of this potential and the productiveness which is its concrete manifestation will next be considered.

c.) The Productive Orientation

Fromm's interest in the ethical implications of the various modes of human relatedness is made quite explicitly in his writings. While Freud, he states, offered a fine description of the neurotic character, no real effort was made to trace the relationship between the healthy personality and the good life. Fromm, however, wishes to traverse the gap between psychoanalytic and ethical investigation:⁸

In discussing the *productive character* I venture beyond critical analysis and inquire into the nature of the fully developed character that is the aim of human development and simultaneously the ideal of humanistic ethics.

Humanistic ethics has its ideal of the fully developed character. The work of psychoanalytic investigators provides certain empirical data yielding information concerning what constitutes this ideal. Undoubtedly, no one person can exemplify such an ideal. Indeed, it would be a grave contradiction if a stated ideal could be represented as something actual. Nevertheless, careful and comprehensive observations of human performances, uncharacteristic of former eras, may eventuate in a competent portrait of the good life. This portrait is composed of inferences drawn from observations, though it is naturally conditioned by



the acquired values of the investigators, who may themselves strive for universally valid and authentic values.

What is the productive orientation? It is identical with the ideal of the good life and the good society as depicted in the tradition of humanistic ethics, and as illustrated by such thinkers as Aristotle and Spinoza. In Fromm's writings, the ideal type capable of living the good life receives elaboration of a kind made possible through Fromm's own investigations of a variety of character types, each demonstrating a different mode of relatedness. The productive character, in the most general sense, is capable of realizing its potentialities. Instead of conceiving the world productively, he conceives it generatively, using his capacities for thinking and feeling to recreate imaginatively his perceived world. Further, the productive character is capable of *reason* and *love*. Both of these powers are subject to common misinterpretation. As basic ingredients of the productive character, both will now be separately considered.

Reason

Reason, a faculty peculiar to man, is, according to Fromm, both a curse and a blessing. Because man is a rational animal, possessing reason together with self-awareness and imagination, he is at once part of his natural setting and alienated from it. Unlike other animals, he is also capable of visualizing his own death. In the case of man, the harmony characteristic of animal existence is broken.

With a tendency to become alienated because he possesses reason, self-awareness and imagination, man is nevertheless capable of developing his own frame of orientation, his own understanding of the world. In the task of developing such a frame of orientation, his chief guide is reason. The need for a satisfying explanation of the world has been met in many ways, some frames of orientation being more reasonable than others. Where man's explanations of his world have been most highly developed through the use of reason, man has approached most closely to the truth. Reason, a uniquely human faculty, aids man to grasp his world in depth by means of thought.

Fromm distinguishes between reason and intelligence. While intelligence, a tool, aids in the attainment of practical goals which are taken for granted and which may not be rational, reason reaches to the heart of objects and processes, seeking to know, to grasp things whether practical or impractical. While intelligence is normally manipulative, being used as a means to some end, reason is often its own end, acting as a guide to the actualization of man's potentialities and the good life.

Reason and character are closely linked. While nonproductive characters may exercise intelligence to a high degree, their ability to utilize reason will be impaired. Productive characters, by contrast, while capable of intelligent manipulation, will in addition be in a position to trust reason as a guide to the good life, to make use of their powers, to make value judgments, to distinguish between good and evil. The life of reason and the ethical life are therefore closely connected. To be noted here is that Fromm gives far more emphasis to reason than does Dewey, the latter criticizing those who uphold reason as a pure faculty.

Love

The connection between reason and love is traced by Fromm in the following passage:⁹

love and through reason. His power of reason enables him to penetrate through the surface and to grasp the essence of his object by Man comprehends the world, mentally and emotionally, through getting into active relation with it. His power of love enables him to break through the wall which separates him from another person and to comprehend him. Although love and reason are only two different forms of comprehending the world and although neither is possible without the other, they are expressions of different powers, that of emotion and that of thinking, and hence must be discussed separately.

Love, then, is for Fromm that emotional form of comprehension which enables man to overcome his separateness. There is another mode of relatedness, however, which may pass for genuine love. This is symbiotic union, which involves two persons in a nonproductive existence characterized by dominance and submission, control and dependence.

Genuine or mature love, by contrast, is "union under the condition of preserving one's integrity, one's individuality".¹⁰ It is exemplified in various types of relationships, including those which exist between parents and children, between brothers, between neighbors, and between erotic partners. It is also exemplified in love of self and in love of God. Since love is for Fromm so pervasive a form of comprehension embracing so wide a range of relationships, the nature of each of these relationships will be briefly described:

Love between parents and children is unique in that children are loved, especially by the mother, for what they are, and *because* they are. While the love of the mother is unconditional, the father's love is conditioned by expectations of certain types of conduct. Brotherly and neighborly love, by contrast, extend

to all people, including the helpless and the insecure, and constitute a relationship of equality. Erotic love is distinguished by its exclusiveness; although sexual desire alone may masquerade as erotic love, it will not be genuine unless there is also an element of brotherly love. Self-love, the very opposite of selfishness, is fundamental, since one who does not love himself in the sense that he affirms his own existence cannot find in others objects of love. Love of God is centered about the characteristically matriarchal and patriarchal concepts of God, which express themselves in different proportions in various religions.

Productive love, finally, is characterized by certain constituent elements, namely, *care, respect, responsibility, and knowledge*. Without care and responsibility, love is reduced to a mere desire for law, order, and unmerciful justice; Fromm cites the biblical character Jonah¹¹ as one who does not love insofar as he does not care for or feel responsibility for the lives of his brothers. Without respect and knowledge, love is reduced to domination and possessiveness. Respect is an awareness of a person's individuality, and such awareness depends on knowledge. Likewise do care and responsibility depend upon knowledge of the uniqueness and individuality of the loved person.

Given that love in its several forms will have the effect of unifying what has been separated, productive living is such that love together with reason may be enhanced, in Fromm's view, by *faith*, a character trait. The world, grasped by reason through thought and by love through the emotions, contains so many confusions and uncertainties that an attitude of faith is also essential to the state of productiveness. The word "faith", as often employed, is synonymous with religious belief, but may also be used to describe a firm or confident attitude in face of those confusions and uncertainties with which man is confronted. The difference in the degree of certainty required for productive living accounts in large measure for the difference between irrational and rational faith, the latter being grounded in reason. While irrational faith is rooted in great doubt and a resulting compulsive need for absolute certainty, rational faith is the product of life experiences, expressing itself in the ability to regard at least some aspects of life as reliable and enduring. Rational faith may contribute to the productive mode of relatedness without the necessity of fixed, changeless, and eternal objects of faith. (It is well to note that Dewey's *The Quest For Certainty* and *A Common Faith* contain a viewpoint with regard to faith which is allied to that of Fromm.)

The triumph of reason over irrational religious beliefs in preceding centuries is, according to Fromm, responsible for a most

unfortunate contemporary cleavage between faith and reason, whereby the scientific attitude breeds skepticism towards not only religious irrationalities but also towards the positive forces in man which may be realized in terms of human productiveness. The conflict between reason and faith, between science and theology, is certainly manifested in the various educational systems of the world. This conflict, for Fromm, is not incapable of being resolved, and some of its implications for education will be discussed in the final section of this chapter.

The Ethicized Personality and the Productively Oriented Person

a.) The Rational ideal and the maturity concept

The Kantian position, as already outlined in this essay, held that the source of moral goodness was to be found in the apprehension of the moral law, and not in the sense-data of the phenomenal world. Adler, although rejecting the categorical imperative, agreed with Kant in that people were to be treated as ends in themselves, advancing the concept of the rational ideal to which empirical man subordinated himself in his development from individual to ethicized personality. The concept of an ethicized personality is central to Adler's thought, and may be fruitfully compared with Fromm's concept of the productively oriented person as already described in this chapter. Such a comparison is appropriate because just as the ethicized personality is for Adler the ideal goal for man, so the productively oriented person is for Fromm both the ideal type exemplifying moral stature and the ideal goal of human development.

The chief point of contact between conduct issuing from allegiance to a rational ideal and conduct exemplifying the productive mode of relatedness lies in the assumption, common to both, that people are to be treated as ends in themselves and never merely as means to some end. In this respect, a line may be traced from Kant to Fromm. The difference to be noted is not to be found in the ends of moral behavior, which may remain the same, but in the reasons why such behavior occurs. On the one hand, empirical man is transformed in subjection to the rational ideal to become an ethicized personality, hence treating people as ends in themselves. On the other hand, empirical man labors for the productive orientation, and similarly treats people as ends in themselves. In the former case the chief motive is duty; in the latter, it is love and reason as enhanced by the attitude of rational faith. Notwithstanding this difference, there is a certain kin-



ship between Kant's rational ideal and the rational faith of Fromm.

The motive of duty is, of course, common to both Kant and Adler. Fromm, who upholds the primacy of self-love, points to Kant as one who denied the ethical necessity of self-love in his preoccupation with the adequacy of duty:¹²

Kant differentiates egotism, self-love, *philautia*—a benevolence for oneself—and arrogance, the pleasure in oneself. But even 'rational self-love' must be restricted by ethical principles, the pleasure in oneself must be battered down, and the individual must come to feel humiliated in comparing himself with the sanctity of moral laws. The individual should find supreme happiness in the fulfillment of his duty . . .

In substituting love for duty, Fromm is maintaining that the type of behavior stemming from one's obligation to moral laws may also occur as a response to oneself and others as objects of love. Fromm's position is here supported by Sullivan, who, in describing the various developmental stages leading to "the fully human estate", refers to "the quiet miracle of pre-adolescence" as the stage in life when others begin to become as important to one as oneself. In these circumstances, people will, in the normal course of events, be treated as ends in themselves.

The infant is, of course, not capable of assuming the productive mode of relatedness. The relationship between parents and their infants is characterized by what might be called a one-way flow of love, whereby infants receive love but are able to do no more than delight in receiving it. According to Fromm, the child, until adolescence, is loved but does not love. Narcissism and egocentricity are obstacles to be hurdled on the road to development:¹³

Eventually the child, who may now be an adolescent, has overcome his egocentricity; the other person is not any more primarily a means to the satisfaction of his own needs. The needs of the other person are as important as his own—in fact, they have become more important.

Conduct issuing from allegiance to a rational ideal and conduct exemplifying the productive mode of relatedness may, on comparison, be found essentially similar. What remains is to attempt an explication of the rational ideal in terms of the productive orientation. A clue to the experience of apprehending the rational ideal is to be found in Adler's writings in a passage already quoted in this work:¹⁴

Moral experience . . . may be described as a series of subjections to imperious impulses which urge our finite natures toward infinite issues; a sense of propulsions which we can resist but may not discuss; a sense of power greater than ourselves, with which, nevertheless, in essence we are one . . .

Where, in the productive orientation, is a similar experience of "subjections to imperious impulses" to be located? How is this experience, which Adler considers distinctively moral, to be explained in terms of the productive orientation? A pertinent account of developmental phenomena leading to the state of productiveness is to be found in the following passage in Fromm's writings:¹⁵

Eventually, the mature person has come to the point where he is his own mother and his own father. He has, as it were, a motherly and fatherly conscience . . . The mature person has become free from the outside mother and father figures, and has built them up inside.

Authority which becomes internalized as conscience will vary in its severity according to the severity of the parents. According to Fromm, the paternal conscience is more likely to be severe than the maternal. It may be concluded that the productive orientation offers an explanation of the rational ideal on empirical grounds. According to this explanation, the rational ideal is a function of the internalized fatherly conscience. The ethicized personality may therefore be described in terms of mature empirical man, who, we may infer from Fromm's concepts, may strive to achieve a satisfactory balance between the paternal and the maternal conscience. It should be added that the more compelling the impulse to which the ethicized personality is subjected, the more dominant is the fatherly conscience.

b.) Rational worth and empirical esteem

A comparison of conduct issuing from allegiance to a moral law or a rational ideal with conduct appropriate to the productive mode of relatedness reveals that in both instances people are treated as ends in themselves and never merely as means to some end. On the one hand, it is a prescribed duty; on the other hand, it is the natural outcome of negotiating the various developmental stages to maturity. The philosophical term used to describe the value which attaches to those treated as ends in themselves is *worth*. The psychological term used to describe the natural feeling which obtains between the productively oriented



is *esteem*. While worth may be furthered in the attributor in the very process of attribution, esteem, rooted in love, cannot be described apart from self-esteem, since self-love or self-esteem is the basis upon which others may be loved or esteemed.

The chief difference between rationalistic worth and empirical esteem is as follows: while worth cannot be established as an empirical fact, esteem is so established. The languages of philosophy and psychology each utilize a term to describe the same aspect of life, each from a different standpoint. While worth is independent of sensory evidence, esteem is phenomenal, observable, even susceptible to measurement. Here, rational and empirical modes of thought as related to the moral life converge.

Educational implications

As in the case of Sullivan, Fromm is not an educator in the formal sense, having little to say directly concerning the activities of the school. Unlike Adler and Dewey, Fromm is not concerned with the problem of curriculum, with the way in which the value dimension of life is to be represented and transmitted in the process of schooling. His contribution to an understanding of these matters is broadly foundational; his studies of character, based upon a scrutiny of various human personality types, present a vantage-point from which several issues tangent to the topic of moral education may be discussed. From the representative conceptions already outlined in this chapter, one broad issue will be elaborated, namely, education versus manipulation. Also to be discussed, and more directly related to specific curriculum studies, is faith and science in education. The effect of teachers and their materials of instruction upon children is the subject of the final section on character models.

a.) Education versus manipulation

The rôle of duty and love in establishing relationships between persons as ends in themselves has already been noted in connection with the ethicized personality and the productively oriented person. Ends-means relations, as applied to the educational process, may also serve to clarify an essential difference between education and manipulation. While education may be described as a process in which educators treat those being educated as ends in themselves and never merely as means to some end, manipulation, as the active process of manipulating, is characterized by relationships in which those manipulated are treated as means to some end. While manipulation in its activities assumes

that individuals do not have goals of their own which are to be respected, education acts to assist in the realization of individual goals. Fromm's distinction between reason and intelligence, already noted, may here be applied. While education is essentially characterized by reason as supported by intelligence, manipulation is characterized by intelligence alone. The contrast between educative and manipulative activities is described by Fromm in the following passage:¹⁶

Education is identical with helping the child realize his potentialities. The opposite of education is manipulation, which is based on the absence of faith in the growth of potentialities and on the conviction that a child will be right only if the adults put into him what is desirable and cut off what seems undesirable.

Manipulation, as antithetical to education, will therefore deny the realization of potentialities and obscure the capability of the individual to determine what is right. In this respect, while education is a moral activity, manipulation is immoral, a-moral or moral, depending upon the degree to which children are seen as separate human beings and as having goals of their own. It should be added that some degree of manipulation is necessary in relations between parents or teachers and children.

There is the assumption that each person possesses as something inherent unique capabilities or potentialities for *becoming* which are not to be sacrificed for other interests. Ultimately, the life of the individual must take precedence over ends, capable of being introjected, which are not of his own design, for which reason people are to be treated as ends in themselves. If, in the course of his life, man begins to treat others as ends in themselves, it may be concluded that his education has succeeded in its most important function. In Fromm's view, the original assumption giving precedence to the life of the individual is capable of being verified, since potentialities and capabilities are observable, developing in certain given situations with the productive orientation.

Education and manipulation have here been presented as antithetical processes, and the distinction made between them may serve a useful conceptual purpose. In practice, however, education and manipulation are not always readily distinguished. During the course of his intentional guidance, the child must to greater or lesser degree have decisions made for him, must be satisfied with an explanation of the world and his relationship to it, and must be introduced to the necessity of performing actions which would at least superficially seem to place the inte-



rests of others above his own. Such, for example, is constituted by the need for respecting and assisting one's elders, and by service programs in schools.

Furthermore, in making decisions, in satisfying with explanations, and in introducing initially distasteful responsibilities, the personal values of educators are most influential. In the last analysis, although education is open-ended, it unavoidably contains manipulative elements; moreover, programs of manipulation contain genuinely educational experiences. Regardless, however, of the difficulties encountered in the attempt to isolate the purely educational from the purely manipulative, there are procedures which may facilitate the growth of potentialities and reduce manipulation to the minimum prescribed by necessity. In being satisfied with explanations, children may be left with a sense of the variety of puzzling phenomena, of the many wonders worthy of their curiosity but incapable of a fixed, final, and absolute formulation. In having decisions made for them, children may be allowed to grasp the achievement represented by those other decisions which they yet do make. In being introduced to new activities, initially distasteful, perhaps anxiety-provoking, but eventually necessary, children may be demonstrated the value of such activities as means to some goal they prize. Self-discovery rather than conformity will have centrality in all instances of genuinely educational experience.

It must be acknowledged that such procedures reflect a particular view of human nature, since alternate views could be advanced which proclaim the need for conformity and which de-emphasize self-discovery. Man, according to this view, especially as advanced by Fromm, is originally neither good nor evil, but capable of realizing moral powers through the offices of education rather than propaganda. Further, man is characterized, in Fromm's view, by certain universal, objectively ascertainable needs not necessarily identical to those needs, subjectively experienced, which may be pathological. Thus it is that Fromm formulates the concept of *normative humanism*, referred to earlier in this chapter. The productively oriented person, described in his earlier writings, is the ideal type of the normatively human being. As elaborated in *The Sane Society*, it is Fromm's contention that this view of man, unlike all others, may be verified by a science of man. The position of normative humanism is further discussed in the last section of the final chapter.

Assuming the existence of universal, objectively ascertainable criteria for the good life, the fundamental task of education is to implement the fulfillment of those needs which they encompass. Assuming the existence of laws of human nature, programs of

education and manipulation may be distinguished from one another according to the degree to which these laws are observed.

b.) Faith and science in education

In the discussion concerning Dewey's approach to values and science which occurs earlier in this essay, it is pointed out that for Dewey, there was no necessary discontinuity or conflict in virtue of the intelligence factor common to both. The moral life and procedures of experimental science are, in this view, therefore compatible.

Fromm's position with regard to values and science is substantially the same as Dewey's, and his discussion of the relationship of science and values supplements the earlier treatment of this theme in Dewey's *A Common Faith*.¹⁷ As already noted, Fromm sees the unfortunate contemporary cleavage between science and faith as having its roots in historical circumstances, in the tradition of rebellion against the church, a tradition which advanced the scientific attitude. Entrenched and influential, the forces of reason, enemies of the irrational, were therefore also skeptical. Today, skepticism, far from being opposed only to religious doctrines, conveys an attitude of uncertainty, of nihilism in the fact of the possibilities of man, breeding doubt and confusion. It may therefore be said that the young are too often confronted with the necessity of choosing between a skepticism which denies life and a faith which denies reason and science. Too often, the student may be swayed in his attitudes by irrational religiosity or by the dry and skeptical though rational materialism. Teachers of both types of attitudes are to be found who are interested principally in advancing their particular position.

Yet one of the main tasks of education is assisting the young to develop a well integrated view of life, enabling them to grow in a richly varied but harmonious atmosphere of learning. Hence, such competition between science and faith has no place in the educational setting. Were science and faith to be in irremediable discord, it might perhaps be necessary for mankind to suffer the consequences in the educational transmission of such discord. In Fromm's view, however, these aspects of learning are capable not only of existing in harmony, but may actually sustain each other in fruitful interconnectedness. In this view, faith has its scientific dimension just as science has its dimension of faith. Fromm writes:¹⁸

Rational faith . . . is a firm conviction based on productive intellectual and emotional activity.

and:

The history of science is replete with instances of faith in reason and vision of truth . . . At every step from the conception of a rational vision to the formulation of a theory, *faith* is necessary: faith in the vision as a rationally valid aim to pursue, faith in the hypothesis as a likely and plausible proposition, and faith in the final theory, at least until a general consensus about its validity has been reached. This faith is rooted in one's own experience, in the confidence in one's power of thought, observation, and judgment.¹⁹

Given that faith is here grounded in individual experience, then science and faith are capable of mutual enrichment. Faith, for Fromm, is an attitude, a character trait. Science, when humanly embodied, is represented by a scientific attitude, and insofar as one may be deeply committed to such an attitude, there will be evident a scientific character trait.

Specific inferences may be drawn both for curriculum studies and for the teachers of these studies. If the content of science courses extends to include something of the history of science, students will thereby be enabled to discover elements of faith in the ongoing scientific enterprise. If the methods of science are presented not as arid, arbitrary procedures but as hard-won achievements crucial to life's facilitation, their significance will be immediate, touching upon the aspirations and experiences of each student. Likewise, if the "curriculum of faith", as represented by teachers of religion, will acknowledge the contributions of the natural and social sciences, utilizing their findings and methodology to refine, criticise, clarify, and render more intelligible its own position, it will itself become more viable.

Teachers of science and faith, to be truly contributing educators, must be capable of working with a curriculum including such dimensions as have been described. The teacher of science, though demonstrating faith in its approach to the unknown, must yet be humble in the face of vast mysteries still to be explored, being sustained in his partial knowledge by a confidence which cannot be ascribed wholly to his hard-won yet incomplete certainties. The teacher of faith will not fully realize his best purposes unless he respects that body of scientific findings uncontested among scientists, and unless he has confronted whatever discord he has subjectively experienced in his honest encounter with these findings. He should, for example, be capable of resolving the "supernatural" with naturalistic explanations; the young may then feel no necessary irresolution between their curiosity for scientific understanding and religious tradition.

In his *Psychoanalysis and Religion*, Fromm offers the view that

the human reality underlying a variety of religious teachings is essentially the same, insofar as it is determined by a striving for love, truth and justice. He concludes a discussion of religious experience with the following statement:²⁰

If religious teachings contribute to the growth, strength, freedom, and happiness of their believers, we see the fruits of love. If they contribute to the constriction of human potentialities, to unhappiness and lack of productivity, they cannot be born of love, regardless of what the dogma intends to convey.

c.) Character models

In the final section of Chapter II, certain recommendations of Adler concerning the content of ethics courses were outlined. To be recalled is the fact that Adler selected certain story materials as pertinent to the teaching of ethics, the characters of these stories in each case exemplifying positive and negative aspects of human nature. Adler desired to represent moral weakness as well as moral strength. The characters of stories could be utilized to shed some light on the moral ideal, whether as positive or negative illustrations, and those which Adler recommended were chosen on the basis of his own experience and judgment. Such stories therefore had an important didactic function, and could serve as the core material of the ethics course. Whether directly or by implication, the teacher was obviously to indicate, in cases of doubt, which human qualities were worthy of emulation and which were to be avoided.

Fromm's character types, described briefly in this chapter, suggest a certain criterion for evaluating characters in stories. Since story materials constitute such an important part of the curriculum, especially in the earlier years, the possibilities of an objective basis for judging the strengths and weaknesses of characters should be explored. Fromm's orientations, ranging from the non-productive to the productive, and including blends of each type, offer a framework within which a variety of characters may be scrutinized, compared and evaluated. In general, the productive orientation may serve as a positive character model.

In addition to the possibility of applying the norms of the productive orientation to story characters, much may be gained from a consideration of dream and myth materials such as Fromm undertakes in his *The Forgotten Language*. Here he states:²¹

Dreaming is a meaningful and significant expression of any kind of mental activity under the condition of sleep.

One educational implication of Fromm's exploration of dreams may be that the moral educator should also be an interpreter

of dreams, or at least one who urges the young to take responsibility for an earnest attempt to grapple with the meanings of their dreams. Fromm expresses the following opinion:²²

Interpretation of dreams is still considered legitimate only when employed by the psychiatrist in the treatment of neurotic patients. On the contrary, I believe that symbolic language is the one foreign language that each of us must learn. Its understanding brings us in touch with one of the most significant sources of wisdom, that of the myth, and . . . with the deeper layers of our personalities.

Moral irresponsibility might thus be characterized by the attitude that one's dreams are absurd and therefore irrelevant to one's life. Closer to story material than the dream is the myth, also symbolic, of which Fromm states:²³

The myth, like the dream, offers a story occurring in space and time, a story which expresses, in symbolic language, religious and philosophical ideas, experiences of the soul in which the real significance of the myth lies.

Analyses of myths similar to those provided at the close of *The Forgotten Language* might eventuate in a deeper understanding of story material than was available, for example, to Adler when he set forth his recommendations in *The Moral Instruction of Children*. Such analyses might be expected, first, to provide a more appropriate selection of story material; second, the moral educator's own awareness of profound implications would be increased.

Since the character of the teacher is, in the final analysis, of more significance to the enterprise of moral education than any group of myths or stories he may assemble, the standards suggested by the productive orientation may likewise be applied to the character of educators. Just as the productive orientation may serve as a standard for moral strength among story characters, so may it aid to define the essential characteristics of the good teacher.

Dewey, taking the position that moral development occurs within the broad context of life, indicates in *How We Think* the manner in which children learn by imitation:²⁴

Educators (and psychologists) have often assumed that acts that reproduce the behavior of others are acquired merely by imitation. But a child rarely learns by conscious imitation, and to say that his imitation is unconscious is to say that it is not, from his standpoint, imitation at all. The world, the gesture, the act, the occupation of another, falls in line with some *impulse already active* and suggests some satisfactory mode of expression, some end in which it may find fulfillment. Having this end of his own, the child then

notes other persons, as he notes natural events, to get further suggestions as to means of its realization. He selects some of the means he observes, tries them on, finds them successful or unsuccessful, is confirmed or weakened in his belief in their value, and so continues selecting, arranging, adapting, testing, till he can accomplish what he wishes.

In Dewey's view, then, each child has some goal of his own, a product of his own impulses, (for which reason, in light of the discussion at the beginning of this section, children should not be manipulated). This goal is to be achieved in a complex process which includes the noting of other persons, and, it may be inferred, representations of persons in myths and stories.

Life, in all its variety, includes a profusion of character models for the child, extending also to imaginative representations in stories. Since, in accordance with Dewey's statement, the child is engaged in a process of selecting, arranging, adapting, and testing in light of his own goals, it may be inferred that not all available models will be significant from the child's standpoint. In some cases, an available model may have relatively little significance, as when a child working to develop facility with language by means of sharing experiences is confronted with an uncommunicative person. In other cases, an available model may have relatively little significance, as when a child working to develop facility with language by means of sharing experiences is confronted with an uncommunicative person. In other cases, due to special circumstances, a person may have vast significance for a child entirely disproportionate to this person's normal significance, as when a child struggling to mitigate the personal disadvantage sustained from overly demanding or rejecting parents encounters a permissive and accepting person. In all cases, the child will take steps in the direction of the productive orientation by noting persons, by evaluating and selecting in accordance with his own pre-established goals.

The final educational implication to be noted in connection with the productive orientation concerns *awareness*, and must also take into account the manner in which children learn by imitation as described by Dewey. The examples of significant and insignificant learning situations cited in the previous paragraph are characterized by accident; what learning does or does not occur in these examples is determined by random happenings. The teacher, by contrast, offers deliberate guidance; as a productively oriented person, he can maximize his effect on those he influences by growing in an awareness of the very process which Dewey describes. A teacher with such awareness would, for example, be sensitive to the fact that despite his own

capabilities, some children are unlikely to discover from his teaching anything which speaks directly to their own situation. He would likewise be sensitive to situations in which children are learning much from his teaching, and be able to harness the potential in such situations with the best possible results. Having developed a sense of his capacities and limitations to assist each child, he would be in a position to employ his words, gestures and acts with the greatest possible economy. In such a manner, he would be sustained in his efforts by receiving the greatest rewards.

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CHAPTER SIX

Conclusion





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Conclusion

Throughout the course of this work, an attempt has been made to record and interpret certain tendencies in thought concerning the sources of moral insight and the meaning of the good life from the rationalistic outlook of moral philosophers to the empirical outlook of social psychologists. In so doing, it is recognized that newer emphases emerging in the twentieth century may appear to have the effect of unseating the claims of earlier formulations; nonetheless, the effort has been largely to trace a developing sequence of events. The principal objective has been to demonstrate certain practical implications of this development for the teaching of values. Although philosophers may be empirically-minded, and although social psychologists work with rational conceptions, a general shift or sweep has been described from a focus upon the ideal to one upon the actual, from sources of moral insight independent of experience to sources which are sought within concrete social situations.

The pertinence of psychological inquiry to life's value dimension has been illustrated in several ways, among them the following: First, the developmental emphasis in the writings of Sullivan and Fromm parallels the concern with developmental states demonstrated by Adler and Dewey. Process is a central concern in psychological inquiry, giving rise to the employment of the genetic method; while process is central to the moral philosophy of Adler, both process and the genetic method are fundamental to the value theory of Dewey. Second, the nature of freedom, something with which moral philosophers are much preoccupied, receives considerable scrutiny by social psychologists, the latter offering explanations of the genesis and nature of freedom which may assist the moral philosopher in his effort to locate and designate the uses to which freedom may best be put. Third, the self-concepts of social psychologists, in this work particularly Sullivan's concept of the self as seen as "a series of reflected appraisals", is relevant to the concerns of the moral philosopher when appraisals are considered as moral judgments. Worth, a key term in the language of rationalistic philosophy, has its counterpart in the concrete phenomenon of esteem. Fourth, the clinical

scrutiny of various character types, which result in a description of non-productive and productive orientations such as is undertaken by Fromm, may be applied to the assertions of moral philosophers such as Adler with a clarifying effect. Thus Fromm's productively oriented person may be fruitfully compared with Adler's ethicized personality. Fifth, the therapeutic form of psychological inquiry, an interpersonal activity, especially as seen in this work with Sullivan's definition of psychiatry as the "understanding of living to the end that it may be facilitated", bears a resemblance to ethical activity as described by the moral philosopher.

Given the pertinence of psychological contributions, a final series of questions are now to be raised which structure the remaining pages: Do the contributions of the social psychologists tend to undermine the position of moral rationalism by "explaining away" the Ideal, the Ought, and the Right? Does psychological inquiry cause the inquiry of moral philosophers to become outmoded, substituting for it an empirically-validated model for man's normative capacities such as the productive orientation? Alternately, does psychological inquiry simply perform a valid and meritorious function by criticizing the assumptions of philosophers, thus enabling them to designate more accurately their best pursuits? Assuming the need for a revision of moral principles to meet the needs of a turbulent social order in transition, what do the contributions of social psychology imply for such a revision? Do they lead away from or toward the conclusion that there is a moral ideal for educators to follow?

Does social psychology replace moral philosophy?

Social psychology, as an essentially descriptive undertaking, is not concerned with providing norms for human conduct, but rather with providing explanations of the manner in which individuals within groups behave in reaction to one another. When, however, Fromm explores the connection between his special study and problems of moral philosophy, he engages in constructing a moral anthropology which includes much that is original and pertinent to moral philosophy. When Sullivan considers matters of great import to moral philosophy, it is possible to interpret his concepts in the interests of moral philosophy. Confusion may arise when a contributor assumes both rôles. Provided, however, that the new rôle is clarified at the outset, there is no reason why a descriptive scientist should not deal with prescriptive problems.

As a descriptive, scientific activity, social psychology contributes at least two kinds of knowledge to the enterprise of teaching values:

First, it furthers our understanding of why individuals behave as they do in relation to one another, having no necessary prior commitment to specific standards for human conduct. Second, in view of this understanding, it sheds further light on the complex process by which all learning occurs, this process duly encompassing the achievement of awareness, dignity, responsibility, and a capacity for reason and love. While the moral philosopher envisions goals for human conduct which involve, in one or another form, a certain resolve or dedication, the social psychologist is in a position to help clarify the reasons why certain ways of approaching these goals will succeed while others will fail. He may do so on the basis of certain evidence at his disposal concerning the nature of human nature which has escaped the moral philosopher. He may offer a critique of the philosopher's program which it will be well for the latter to consider. Just as the biologist attempts to provide a coherent structure of knowledge with which the social psychologist may harmonize his conceptions, so the latter attempts to provide a coherent structure which the moral philosopher can ignore only at his own risk. Moral philosophers must engage in an attempt to resolve value-conflicts as a venture in harmony with the shared knowledge of the natural and social sciences, for which reason they should be familiar with universes of discourse other than their own. Moral philosophy must create viable new concepts, the test of viability being their capacity to cohere with the common understandings of natural and social scientists. To this end, ideals may be viewed as imaginings, and viewed within a framework of the natural human capacity for imagination.

Assuming the desire and the ability of the moral philosopher to make psychologically valid contributions, there is *no* sense in which the work of the social psychologist can replace the work of the moral philosopher. Sullivan, in exploring the geography of human personality, makes no comment, as a clinician, concerning the norms which human beings ought to recognize and exemplify, although he is obviously predisposed to the state of mental health. Fromm, equally concerned with standards of mental health, does no more (as an empiricist) than classify various modes of human interconnectedness. At the point where Fromm recommends the productive orientation as the ideal type exemplifying the moral life, he ceases to be a social psychologist, becoming the moral anthropologist, perhaps the moral philosopher.

Many forms of psychological investigation, always character-





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ized by the genetic method, have exerted a powerful influence on the work of moral philosophers. Two special instances of the manner in which the genetic method makes inroads upon such philosophy are briefly to be considered here. The first has already been mentioned in this work, namely, Dewey's reductive treatment of the Right. The second, an elaboration of Dewey's approach which has developed in more recent years, is the psychoanalysis of ethical terms.

When Dewey treats the Right reductively, tracing it to the fact of human dissatisfaction with human institutions, it appears difficult to take issue with his position. In attempting to explain away an effect by pointing to its cause, in penetrating beneath its impressive surface features, he wishes to reveal Ethical Idealism as an attitude rooted in a common human frailty. Ethical Idealism, with its transcendent claims, appears vulnerable to this attack.

The other special instance of vulnerability occurs when the genetic method is applied to Idealism's ethical terms, when the language of philosophical Idealism is subjected to psychological analysis. In keeping with more recent thinking among some social scientists and philosophers, ethical terms, incapable of being analyzed logically, surrender to psychoanalysis. This view is presented, for example, by Lewis Feuer, who contends "that the psychoanalysis of ethical terms tends to deprive them of their emotive efficacy as anxiety-inducers".¹ From this standpoint, Feuer makes the following statement:²

The metaphysical ethics of Kant and Hegel is still to be found in academic seminaries, the stodgy survivors of cultural lag. But in a setting of friendliness, individuality, and equality, the anxiety-inducing ethics stands out as rigid, artificial, and cruel.

Key ethical terms of Idealism, such as "ought" and "right", are charged with specific emotive content, being capable of generating anxiety when uttered. (This fact may well be noted in connection with the discussion in Chapter V concerning the Rational Ideal and the paternalistic conscience.)

Summarizing statements made in response to the question "Does social psychology replace moral philosophy?", it may be concluded that although social psychology contributes to knowledge of human behavior, as well as to an understanding of how moral insight is achieved, there is no sense in which the former discipline may replace the latter. (A conclusion to the effect that contemporary social psychologists *are* today's moral philosophers

would not be warranted on the basis of investigations undertaken in this work.) The genetic method, which appears superficially to erode the ramparts of Ethical Idealism, may be said to produce beneficial results, causing idealistic moral philosophers to refine, criticize, and clarify their own assumptions. It should be added, with reference to the genetic approach, that the meritorious activity of explaining ideal norms, standards, or principles by seeking for their cause implies no necessary judgment as to their validity. Where such judgments are offered, one witnesses an example of the genetic fallacy.

How may social psychology help to revise moral principles?

The challenge confronting the value philosopher in theory and the teacher of values in practice is largely one of responding to the necessity of revising moral principles. How, explicitly, may psychological contributions aid in the revision of such principles? In light of previous discussion, three ways are now suggested:

First, psychological data yielding information concerning the nature of human nature and human interaction can provide a critique of existing principles, enabling philosophers and teachers of values to discover whether or not such principles harmonize with the nature of man. Second, psychological data concerning motivation and the learning process, often called "learning theory", can provide a critique of educational programs which are concerned with the teaching of moral principles. Third, as verbal constructions, the key ethical terms of moral principles may be psychoanalyzed, such activity perhaps resulting in an increased understanding of the efficacy of these terms for the specific social structures in which they are to operate. Each of these suggested avenues of approach in the revision of moral principles will now be discussed:

The first critique, which involves an attempt to discover whether any given moral principle harmonizes with the nature of man, is beset by a unique difficulty, namely, that there is no necessary agreement as to the nature of human nature. The very prospect of establishing a science of ethics raises uncertainties. When Fromm, with his empirical attitude, writes that "the real problem is to infer the *core* common to the whole human race from the innumerable manifestations of human nature", he is writing as one who, having declined to acknowledge the finality of the Rational Ideal, is seeking the *ideal* in the *actual*. He is also writing as one who recognizes that this body of data is still being sought, which is evident in the following passage:³



. . . it is true that our knowledge of man is still so incomplete that we cannot give a satisfactory definition of man in a psychological sense. It is the task of the 'science of man' to arrive eventually at a correct description of what deserves to be called human nature.

Notwithstanding the empirical character of this passage, a purely idealistic element enters with "what *deserves* to be called human nature". The "correct description", the completion of which is awaited by Fromm, might become the basis for moral prescriptions, the educational implications being that children would be taught to do and want only that which is consistent with their empirically-comprehended natures. Such laws or principles as might be inferred from the manifestations of human nature could then become an ethical science, and taken by educational planners as basic to educational systems. Indeed, educational applications derived from principles established on the basis of incomplete knowledge might even be made prior to the assembling of complete knowledge concerning man. Fromm, for example, though proposing no specific educational program, acknowledges that his own advocacy of normative humanism is made prior to this assembling of complete knowledge. Although Fromm may be thought to be making a full commitment where there is only a partial basis for such a commitment, the ongoing search, consistent with the scientific spirit, is in itself a meritorious activity. What is controversial is the prospect of practical educational reforms based upon principles derived from incomplete data.

Despite the controversy implied in the prospect of basing educational reform on incomplete data, the less complicated activity of criticizing existing moral principles from the standpoint of empirical knowledge of man is warranted. Thus, for example, the Decalogue, the Golden Rule, and the Categorical Imperative may be scrutinized, and thus may the forbidding character of the Ought, of absolutistic ethics, be found unduly severe. On the basis of empirical knowledge of man, the ethical principles of Kant and Hegel will be found defective.

The second critique involves an attempt to provide, with the assistance of learning theory, an evaluation of educational programs concerned with the teaching of moral principles. Such principles may be evaluated from the standpoint of available knowledge concerning the way in which human beings learn; it may be discovered, in this fashion, that while some principles readily take root in conduct, others are unteachable. An evaluation of principles from the standpoint of their capacity to be learned may eventuate in the discarding of some, the conserva-

tion of others, and the revision of some which are conserved. Those to be discarded may be incapable of presentation as an extension of previous knowledge. Kant's abstract categorical imperative would be found defective for this reason. Adler's imperative, which takes into consideration relations between concrete selves, and which may be applied successively to various stages in life, would be an improvement on Kant's, although the problem of what constitutes the "best", already posed in Chapter II, raises certain difficulties, as does the riddle of conjoined ends. The greater value of Adler's formulation is at least in part to be accounted for by the degree to which Adler perceives the dynamic nature of the learning process. Unlike Kant, Adler also centralizes the developmental, emphasizing the unique learning situations of those in different stages of life.

The third critique involves an avenue of approach already suggested, namely, what has been called the "psychoanalysis of ethical terms". Such a procedure assumes significance as a method of revision when moral principles are seen as forms of ethical language. Feuer has stated the following as a general principle:⁴

Corresponding to different social structures with their different personality forms, there will likewise be diverse ethical languages, each with its specific psychoanalytical characterization.

The idea implicit here might well be developed into two views of ethical language: the vertical view, which deals with such language in historical perspective; and the horizontal view, which deals with ethical language as a phenomenon of various existing cultures. Vertically, the venerable "datum" of ethics throughout history would be examined, the key ethical terms of moral principles being scrutinized in the perspective of the cultures in which they arose. Horizontally, the diverse ethical languages of contemporary cultures would also be examined, key ethical terms being found to have a wide variety of meanings. Whether vertically or horizontally, terms such as "good" and "right" would be found to have a range of equivalencies, according to the disposition of a given social structure as liberal or authoritarian, etc. The aim of such investigation, whether vertical or horizontal, would be the progressive adaptation of ethical language to the contemporary human situation. While a positive result of vertical investigation for the values teacher would be a conservation of resources to be found in history, a positive result of horizontal investigation would be a developing awareness of those unifying factors which underlie diverse educational aims.

Is there a moral ideal for educators to follow?

At the outset of this work, five aspects of life were presented as providing a basis for morality. These were awareness, dignity, responsibility, and a capacity for reason and for love. Subsequently, each has been directly or indirectly discussed from diverse points of view. Now follows some elaboration of awareness, dignity, and responsibility in light of the cumulative contributions of Adler, Dewey, Sullivan, and Fromm. (Reason and love have already been singled out for special consideration, particularly in the chapter devoted to Fromm. From the standpoint of ideals for education they may now be combined, achievement being seen in the development of a capacity to balance thought and feeling—the rational and the emotional aspects of the moral life.)

It should be noted that the selection of several aspects presupposes the existence of no one Ideal for the teacher of values to follow. Yet though he may no longer be able to speak intelligibly of the Moral Ideal, *ideals* have in no sense been vanquished. Although the Right may, in accordance with Dewey's position, be a substitute for the inadequacies of existing social institutions, such inadequacies are facts to be confronted;* upon confrontation, they will give rise to a series of rightnesses which challenge the teacher of values. The aspects of life here chosen may each be considered a "rightness". They cannot, of course, be combined to constitute the Right, and it should be added that they do, of course, in no way exhaust the moral, having been selected as representative of the multiple facets of morality.

a.) Awareness

"Awareness" may be taken to be so comprehensive as to provide a definition of morality. Warner Fite, for example, using the term "self-consciousness", has written as follows:⁵

What is it, then, to be moral? As a formal definition I offer the following: *morality is the self-conscious living of life*. Stating this more simply and concretely, I say that to be moral is to know what you are doing . . . to be moral is to be thoughtful; to be conscious; to live one's life, if possible, in the clear consciousness of living . . . the moral life, as I conceive it, is the examined life.

While the central figures in this work have not, as does Fite, so centralized the rôle of awareness, the fact remains that each

*Dewey was himself, for example, an upholder not only of instrumental but also of at least some institutional values.

has given it emphasis. Adler stresses uniqueness, and the unique qualities to be elicited in each person; such elicitation cannot, it is to be inferred, take place unless the elicitor has a prior awareness of these unique qualities. Dewey stresses awareness in urging full consideration of the social consequences of action. Sullivan, for whom the center of awareness is the self-system, is concerned with the task of expanding both. For Fromm, awareness is indispensable to the productive orientation, its function being encompassed with the term "reason", which "penetrates through the surface of things in order to discover their essence, their hidden relationships and deeper meaning . . ."⁶

From this consensus as to the fundamental importance of awareness two important implications may be drawn: First, the teacher of values may be seen as one who urges an examination of the motives as well as the consequences of behavior. Second, he may be seen as having the task of laying open many views of life, alternate approaches to the problems of living, the aim being to develop what is more than tolerance, namely, appreciation. Competing philosophies, educational aims and religious views may be fairly assessed with the purpose of achieving increased awareness. In this fashion, children holding views which they consider to be their own may learn to disagree without becoming disagreeable.

b.) Dignity

"Dignity" is offered as an educational ideal with the realization that certain of its traditional implications, especially stateliness, gravity, and nobility of manner, are somewhat less indicative of moral stature than others, such as worthiness (or "estimableness"), which fare better when subjected to psychological criticism.* If dignity is to be equated with pure reserve, it may be said that a person who attempts to achieve dignity chiefly through reserve may still be morally culpable in comparison to one, who, though relatively unreserved, is sincere in motive and aware of the consequences of his actions. "Dignity" is here offered as an educational ideal with the realization that it implies as much for self-esteem as it does for worth, in which respect true dignity finds its basis in mental health. While Adler would prize dignity as an achievement in connection with an attainment to the Rational Ideal, Sul-

*J. W. von Goethe, for one, has commented tellingly on the question of manners, politeness, and courtesy, holding that "there is no external sign of politeness which would not have a profound and moral reason". See, in this regard, *Elective Affinities* and *Wilhelm Meister*.



livan prizes it, together with self-respect, competence, and freedom, as a characteristic of the "fully human estate".

The achievement of the quality of dignity in the young assumes, on the part of parents and teachers and other adults, an ability to see children in all their uniqueness, and as separate human beings. The importance of dignity both as an educational ideal and as a goal for mental health becomes clearer when it is seen that true dignity presupposes a secure sense of one's own self-hood. As a practical consequence, the teacher of values may not only be a personification of dignity, but may also, through the use of story dramatizations, illustrate instances of dignity in the crucial moments of the lives of such persons, for example, as Moses, Socrates, Jesus, Joan and Arc, and Luther.

c.) Responsibility

"Responsibility" is of key significance as an educational ideal when it is seen that children do not become moral beings until such time as they can make decisions with personal and social consequences. Prior to this time, it may be said that children are neither moral nor immoral. With the advent of freedom to decide and act, the child becomes a moral being, and there arises the necessity of responsibility.

Adler, Dewey, Sullivan and Fromm have, in different ways and for different reasons, urged the attainment of responsibility. It has been variously advocated in terms of duty, awareness of consequences, and competence. The chief transition illustrated in this work with regard to responsibility has been one which moves from an uncompromising duty to imperious impulses, as in the views of Kant and Adler, to a conscientiousness tempered with self-esteem or self-love, as in the views of Sullivan and Fromm.

Seeking among the practical educational consequences to be drawn from the philosophical and psychological contributions here considered, *the primacy of the developmental* is now selected as having the greatest bearing on responsibility. Adler, who sketched in a course of ethical development extending through life, saw that various stages call for particular responsibilities. In this respect, Adler applied the Rational Ideal to his own empirical observations of the young, of those in middle life, and of the old. The value of Sullivan's elaboration of the developmental epochs lies in the opportunity afforded to assess with greater clarity the psychic situation of children at different stages of development. A heightened sensitivity to developmental processes may result in the avoidance of two types of error: the overburdening and the underburdening of children with respon-

sibilities at any given stage. The educational goal becomes a carefully graded series of tasks or responsibilities to suit each level.

* * *

Pending empirically grounded and universally acceptable normative principles for education, the several sources of moral insight will continue to be worthy of man's allegiance. Ideals for education will be manifold, as will be the unending processes by which they are reached. Always, in the life of man, there occurs adversity from which he derives growth, and always is he confronted with the necessity of establishing imagined ends-in-view which function as his ideals. Without complete knowledge of the world, and faced with existential choice—the need to decide and act, he may develop his idea of the whole to which such acts may have reference. Drawing upon the known while facing the unknown in his search for meaning, and privileged to assist in illuminating for others the moral wisdom by which he lives, man may also grow in his appreciation of the plenitude of sources from which moral wisdom can be derived.

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