

Adam Schaff, *Marxism and the Human Individual*, Introduction by Erich Fromm. N.Y., McGraw-Hill, 1970. 268 pp.

In the early sixties, Jean Paul Sartre offered his existentialist self-annihilation to Marxists, suggesting that his philosophic anthropology be incorporated into their philosophy. By doing so, he hoped to remedy the general anemia of Marxism.¹ Some Marxist philosophers took this as a bad joke. Today, a decade later, we are more than ever before sure that to synthesize the Marxist philosophic system with existentialist philosophizing is a hopeless effort. It is hopeless, even though we realize that both Marx's and Kierkegaard's early reaction against Hegel was existentialistic and particularistic. But the general character of their criticism was different as was the subsequent development of both their philosophic attitudes. No matter how impossible and odd Sartre's proposition, contained in his *Critique de la Raison dialectique* (strangely enough, not yet translated as a whole into English), might have seemed in 1961 to the defenders of the Stalinist conception of Marxist philosophy and other philosophers, a rather strange and paradoxical thing occurred: its influence began to be felt in connection with the development of ideological processes in socialist countries, effected primarily by the anti-Stalinist reaction after 1956, i.e., by Khrushchev's revelations at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Schaff's book is an attempt to examine the long neglected problem of the human individual in Marxist philosophy. This problem had been practically eliminated in the dogmatic Stalinist version of Marxist philosophy. Schaff re-examines Marx's concept of the individual and his product, alienation and dealienation, the relationship of individual and history, freedom, the possibility of a Marxist humanism and finally the role of the individual under Communism. His book belongs to a number of other works dealing with the possibility of humanizing Marxism.²

Schaff's 're-examination and rehabilitation' of Marx is centered around the 'humanistic' content of Marxist philosophy. It presents Marx as a student of the individual and a champion of man's happiness. Schaff examines primarily Marx's early works: *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, *The German Ideology* and *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*. He uses Georg Lukács' *History and Class Consciousness* as one of his important secondary sources.

Schaff refuses all conceptions that divide Marx's work into a young and a mature period, and insists on the inseparable unity of his thought. Marx is examined as having started from a philosophic anthropology, i.e., the problem of the human individual and his relations with nature and society. He called his conception of humanism 'realistic', but Schaff suggests it be called a 'militant humanism', examining all the problems from the point of view of a philosophic anthropology. The problems of man are central: alienation and its elimination, its basis in the private ownership of the means of production, the alienation of the process of labor, self-alienation, private property as the basis of exploitation of man by man, the class division of society and its resultant institutions, especially the state. All these problems had been developed in relationship to the theory of happiness directed toward the liberation of man.

Until 1956, the only interpretation of Marxist philosophy in socialist countries was the Stalinist conception. It did not contain any consistent theory of man, even though it presupposed that man is, theoretically and practically, entirely subjected to the System, with the Personality at the top of the social hierarchy. Philosophic anthropology was rejected with any examination held to be unnecessary and harmful, since – as it was argued – all major questions of man as a social being with his class status had been dealt with by Marx and solved once and for all.

Today, we can hear from the leading Polish Marxist philosopher that 'it is only on the basis of Marxism that the philosophy of man can be cultivated'.³ Schaff admits that the philosophy of man was not part of the Stalinist conception, but today philosophic anthropology 'has acquired a practical meaning'. In the works of at least some Marxists it has acquired an important position, fundamentally linked with the entire Marxist world view.

The Stalinists did not know some of Marx's early writings. They were under lock and key as '*libri prohibiti*' in the libraries and nobody – not even Party ideologues – had access to them. Marx's early works were labelled as 'errors'. At that time Marx was not yet a Marxist but a radical democrat and these writings were treated as products of an erroneous youth and of immaturity.

The turn toward Marx's early writings in recent Marxist philosophy had been caused by the ideological development in the socialist countries, but the interests of Western Marxologists and the discussions among

Kovaly, P., 1973: Resumée on A. Schaff: *Marxism and the Human Individual*, In: *Studies in Soviet Thought*, Dordrecht (Schweiz) Vol. 13 (No. 1-2, 1973), pp. 112-128.

existentialists shortly after World War II probably exerted a certain influence and speeded up this process.

The conception of alienation was unknown to the Stalinist view. Without deeper knowledge, Stalinist Marxists used to argue that it was Karl Marx who analyzed the alienation of man in capitalist societies and solved it by pointing out that in socialism the alienation of man would disappear, because the private ownership of the means of production will be abolished and – as Marx had already shown – it is the basis of all alienation of man. Hence, there is no alienation in socialist society, because the private ownership of the means of production does not exist any more. Thus there is no need even to talk about alienation; it is the worry and trouble of the ideologists of capitalism, where alienation is the major social and theoretical problem. It is under capitalism that man is totally oppressed by greedy exploitation; in socialist society he is free, since he has accomplished the socialist revolution – therefore the problem of alienation does not have to be resolved in philosophy. Karl Marx and the socialist revolution have solved it once and for all.

Schaff examines the problem of alienation both under capitalism and in socialism in its economic and historical forms. He treats it as the major problem of an individual and doubts that the abolition of the private ownership of the means of production will automatically put an end to every kind of alienation. It exists in socialism. And it will persist not only as a relic of the past but as organically linked with socialist conditions. The idea that alienation will automatically disappear with the abolition of the private ownership of the means of production had been an erroneous idea of Marx in his young days, Schaff says. Alienation – in its economic and historical forms that are the only concern of recent Marxist inquiries – will exist not only in socialist society, but it will survive also in Communist society.

What is the outcome of Schaff's examination of the alienation of man?

Alienation and its threat 'should be seen clearly and resisted consciously'.⁴ Conscious efforts should be made to combat it. The major task is to provide the necessary conditions for the conscious fight against it. Schaff does not take into his account the alienation of man as a structural phenomenon; he does not yet use the 'existentialist project'; but the general outcome of his inquiries and his recommendations is not far from the position of some existentialist thinkers who recommended that man should

courageously face alienation, even though he is never able to overcome it.

In the Stalinist version of philosophy, the subject-object relationship has not been dealt with as a philosophic problem. Object is simply taken as different from subject; it is independent of subject; it stands face to face with subject; it is treated in opposition to subject. The relationship of mind and matter is considered to be the fundamental question of philosophy. According to how philosophers solve the relation of mind and matter, they are either idealists or materialists. Idealists defend the primacy of Spirit or mind, materialists the primacy of matter. The schema of the conflict between materialism and idealism is applied to the entire history of philosophy, and in this form it is considered satisfactory.

The separation of subject and object also forms the basis of the epistemological theory of reflection. Since object is primary and individual cognition secondary, our consciousness is a reflection of reality. As Lenin already pointed out in his *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, our thinking is a reflection or copy of an objective world that is independent of our minds and cognition. During the Stalinist era, Marxist philosophers offered a very convenient formula: 'The process of cognition is objective, but includes subjective elements.' Schaff calls it a cliché and inadequate; it is his contention that it allows various interpretations. Finally, he rejects the oversimplified interpretation of the theory of reflection.

The Leninist and Stalinist conception of reflection represents a mechanistic explanation of cognition and – if we use Popper's terminology – it belongs to 'passivist' theories of knowledge.⁵ Schaff tries to overcome the mechanistic concept of reflection as too passive an account of the role of subject in the process of cognition. But he only points out that the subject is more active in cognition than the theory of reflection allows and does not examine thoroughly what this activity consists of. Although his conception is far from being an activist explanation of our cognition and does not examine human projects, transcendence, intentionality, etc. – all that contemporary existentialist philosophy and phenomenology have contributed to the elucidation of the cognitive process – he nevertheless moves toward the acknowledgement of a greater activity on the part of the subject in cognition. He makes attempts to overcome the separation of subject and object; but they do not seem to advance much beyond a Cartesian dichotomy.

The Stalinist conception of society begins with the characterization of

the economic basis and ideological superstructure, with philosophy determined by the economic basis. The relationship between the economic basis and philosophic thought is direct and immediate. Stalinist methodology of the history of philosophy installs a 'jumper' between economic development and philosophic ideas. According to it, all philosophic ideas arise from a particular social order or social-economic formation. Every philosopher is labelled according to the social order he lived in and the particular class to which he belonged. During the last two decades, the history of philosophy in the U.S.S.R. and European socialist countries has been under the influence of Ždanov's dogmatic and reductionist directives, expressed in 1947. The method has its important implications. It has been used to justify the leading role of the Communist Party in all spheres of human life, including philosophy. No philosophic idea can escape its economic basis. The center of the Communist Party manipulates and governs the development of philosophy by means of directives. There is no autonomy of philosophy.

Schaff re-examines the 'jumper' between economics and philosophy, doubts their direct relationship, and concludes that economic developments do not directly and immediately affect philosophic ideas. There exists a relative autonomy of the development of philosophy and at the same time a subtle affiliation of ideas within the framework of this autonomy.

Both the conception of the relative autonomy and the affiliation of philosophic ideas have been of major importance in recent ideological processes in socialist countries. Methodologically, they enable philosophers and social scientists to escape partly – to different degrees in different socialist countries – the rigid Stalinist division (stemming from Marx and Engels) of philosophy into idealism and materialism, bourgeois (or imperialistic) and socialist philosophy as well as bourgeois (or imperialistic) and socialist science. Another implication this relative autonomy has had is a partial escape from the iron rule of the leading role of the Communist Party governing all human life, including philosophy. Using the idea of the relative autonomy of philosophy, a man-oriented Marxist philosopher can argue that philosophic ideas have always developed in wide discussions, that the Communist Party cannot reign over all philosophy and should make room for the open and free exchange of philosophic ideas, rich discussions as well as the possibility of making mistakes without threats of immediate reprisal.

The Stalinist version does not know of such problems as: the meaning of human life, the value of human life, death, love, suffering, guilt and other dimensions of human existence or the conception of socialist humanism: it does not investigate human good and happiness. All these questions are considered unnecessary: they do not belong to the philosophic system. Instead, it defines philosophy as dealing with the general laws of nature, society and human thinking.

Schaff inquires into these problems. He asks, for instance, whether Marxist philosophy can answer the question of the meaning of human life. And his answer is negative. One cannot prejudge the individual answer. One cannot make a choice for any individual man. Nobody can make a decision about the individual meaning of human life for an individual man, except the individual man himself. In general, Schaff offers a view that is not too far away from the position of some existentialist philosophers on the problem of the meaning of the human life.

Stalinist philosophy did not create any theory of man. But it required a certain type of man – man as a mechanical sum-total of his social functions. He is a functional, organizational, bureaucratized and bureaucratic, institutional man, a man of apparatuses, of the System; simply a mechanized particle of the mechanized social organization. Man qua man, individual as individual, has never been a part of the subject-matter of the Stalinist version of Marxist philosophy.

Schaff examines the individual as individual. He inquires into Marx's polemics against Hegel's abstract notion of man. Against it, Marx stresses the concrete, particular man. Thus, in philosophic anthropology it is not an abstract man, but a living, particular, individual man that is the point of departure.

For Schaff, the individual is always the totality of social relations; man is an 'ensemble of social relations', entirely created by social conditions. He is nothing more than the function of social relations and conditions, a concrete product of society. This means that social relations in class society are class relations, with every individual conditioned by his class status. Schaff's views exhibit a definite tendency toward a universalistic solution of the relation between society and the individual.

The characterization of man as a totality of social relations forms the foundation of socialist humanism. Socialist humanism is a part of Marxist philosophy and it not only contains an obligation to believe in certain



(socialist) ideals, it also means waging a struggle to make these ideals become reality.

Schaff criticizes the anti-Communist 'negative' utopias in Zamiatin's novel *We*, Huxley's *Brave New World* and Orwell's *1984*. It is especially the first and third which – he says – falsely interpret the meaning and the fusion of the individual with society. To interpret the relationship of the individual and society correctly one should accept Marxist philosophy as a philosophic worldview since it elaborates questions and answers on major philosophic problems and is offered as a whole to man as an object of belief, with socialist humanism as an indispensable part of it. Schaff says:

In the name of these ideals the adherent of socialist humanism is prepared to make the greatest sacrifices – and so he can himself call for sacrifice and demand it from others.⁶

Schaff in effect constructs a socialist humanism as a set of universalistic ideals and asks man to identify himself with them in both his existence and thinking. And not only that, but man is asked 'in the name of these ideals' to offer everything. It is the acceptance of socialist humanism that gives him the right to ask sacrifices of others.

The major problem here is not only with the universalistic solution of the relation of society to the individual, but also with the general character of socialist humanism, which does not have any criteria for its practical application. We could ask a number of questions that are vital and to which Schaff does not offer any answers. For instance: How is it possible that a man by accepting a certain ideal becomes a judge of others? Who gives to a man who accepts the ideal the power to decide about the sacrifices of others? Do men who accepted the ideal of socialist humanism form an 'élite' entitled to decide, for example, life and death for the others? Are they the 'only just' in this world?

Schaff contends that people should be educated and prepared for the acceptance of socialist humanism. The goal of socialist education is not the destruction of individual identity and interests, but the development of a social attitude which will overcome narrow egoism. Such education seeks "the eradication from the minds of men of the effects of the market economy in a class society, and in particular of the results of capitalist market economy".⁷

Schaff does not suggest any criteria; specifically he does not mention

who is supposed to decide how the 'eradication' will proceed and what the 'narrow' egoism is. Setting aside my personal dislike for words like 'eradication', let me point out that the methods of eradication change, that they are different, some of them very unpleasant, and the 'narrow' egoism has been explained during the decades of socialist development in very different, even contradictory ways.⁸

The Stalinist conception of freedom, originated by Marx and developed by Engels, is directly related to the foundations of historical materialism that is defined as the application of dialectical materialism to society. In the Stalinist view, both nature and society develop according to objective and necessary laws. If people do not know them, they cannot act according to them and hence they are not free. But if we know the objective laws of nature and society, we shall act according to their recognized necessity and only then will we be free.

Social laws are founded upon economic laws; they are necessary and operate everywhere. If we know the laws of the capitalist society – for instance, that it develops on the basis of the conflict between the productive forces and relations of production – we can act accordingly, acknowledge the law and help to resolve the conflict by joining the major force fighting for progress – the Communist Party. By doing so, we recognize the laws and therefore we are free.

The conception of freedom is not fatalistic, since it takes into its account man's activity; but it is external, general and vague as well as reductionistic. Its major weakness, probably, is that it does not say who is supposed to determine the laws. Also, it presupposes the absolute truth of Marx's discovery of social laws. But social development has shown that many of Marx's investigations appeared inadequate for changing modern society. The practice of Stalinism and neo-Stalinism shows that social laws are discovered and established by the leadership of Communist Parties. They decide what the law is. Yesterday, the intensification of the class struggle had been determined as a social law. Many people, apparently, did not 'recognize' its necessity.

The conception of freedom as recognized necessity has always functioned as an ideological apology for all actions of Communist Parties in power, since they decide what is the 'necessity' today and what it will be tomorrow. Experience further teaches that the necessity of yesterday, today and tomorrow might be three entirely different things. The concep-



tion of freedom as recognized necessity allows subjectivism and voluntarism both in theory and practice.

Schaff accepts it. He does not inquire into its general character, nor see its vagueness and lack of criteria. But since he is examining the individual, he does see it as a personal problem.

If I say with Spinoza and the dialectical materialists – as I personally would certainly do – that freedom is a recognized necessity, I am only indicating the problem of the social conditioning of human actions; despite appearances, I have said nothing about the possibility or impossibility of the individual being able to choose between a number of alternatives.⁹

This is a considerable modification of the Stalinist explanation, since it introduces the concept of individual choice. It stands against the determination of all choices by the Organ (State or Party) that turns man into a totally manipulated, alienated object, because choices are made for him. Schaff's views leave some room for an individual choice by man himself.

Thus, freedom of an individual is a matter of choice between alternatives – especially important in conflict situations – where it cannot be said what man will do. One can only say: 'You must decide for yourself.' And Schaff comments: 'As far as this goes, the existentialists are right.'¹⁰ But he immediately criticizes the existentialists for their subjectivism and voluntarism. I shall leave the criticism aside, since it is my contention that it hardly can be discussed in the general terms used by Schaff. Every existentialist offers different views and the criticism – to be considered valid – should specifically examine the major representative conceptions.

In an interesting way Schaff speaks about the limitations and censorship of artistic and creative freedom under socialism. He asks for more freedom. He is critical of excessive interference into any creative process. And he considers it a big step forward – from the Stalinist censorship and manipulation of culture – if the politicians would observe the minimal principle: interfere no more than strictly necessary. The principle can play an important and positive role against the severe limitations of cultural freedom in the Stalinist and neo-Stalinist society. But the principle is too general and vague. It looks more like a wish which the politicians might accept – if they choose to do so. And what is, after all, 'strictly necessary' and 'no more' in a scientific, philosophic analysis and political practice, we might ask? Despite its vagueness, we are grateful to Schaff for defending more freedom, since this is what it's all about.

Errors committed in the Stalinist period could be reduced to the doctrine of the sharpening of the class struggle under socialism and to the idea that the class enemy must be stamped by terror.¹¹

One of the major sore points of the past two decades of political and ideological development in the socialist countries has been the relationship of all people to the theory and practice of Stalinist era. Many Marxists in socialist countries are very well aware that the criticism of the 'cult of personality' at the 20th Congress of the CP of the Soviet Union delivered by Khrushchev, was a superficial explanation of all that was happening in the Soviet Union during Stalinist times. It was, naturally, a positive phenomenon that the 'cult of personality' was criticized, since the worst excesses of Stalinism had been to a certain extent removed. But a deeper philosophic, historical, sociological and scientific analysis was never offered.

Precisely because a thorough analysis of the methods and system of the 'cult of personality' was not made, something very fundamental was not removed. What was not abolished is the possibility of a renewal of the system and methods of the 'personality cult'. Thus contemporary neo-Stalinists always have the possibility of returning to Stalinist methods should they feel the necessity to do so. We can expect them to avoid the use of extreme methods of repression, if they do not feel threatened; on the other hand, we know very well that they will not hesitate to use them if they think circumstances warrant it.

Schaff knows that the analysis of the system of repression called the 'personality cult' has never been made. At the same time he realizes that the 'cult of personality' does not concern only the major excesses introduced by one personality – Stalin – but that it developed into the entire social and political system of repression of people in the USSR and in other socialist countries. What is more, the system stayed practically untouched by the critique of the 'personality cult'.

During the past two decades the above-mentioned problem underlay all major social and political processes in the socialist countries. This will be the case as long as the philosophic and sociological analysis of the 'personality cult' and of the current neo-Stalinist system is not made, as long as the system of repression is not submitted to a penetrating criticism. Such a critical analysis would have to deal with the 'personality cult' as a social phenomenon; it would have to criticize the system of terror, repression

and abolition of human rights, including their roots; and it should make theoretical conclusions that would become common practice. The conclusions could become a modern Bill of Human Rights for socialist countries, since the rights of man have suffered most.

In this respect Schaff's book is rather disappointing. He gives only vague advice:

These are questions that should be taken up in a searching analysis we are still awaiting of the so called 'cult of personality', which has its roots in social phenomena and not in the personal character of an 'individual'. Suffice it to say that many of the undesirable elements of the educative model of socialist man can be traced to the Stalinist period and its distortions. Without a penetrating inquiry of the social roots and causes, it is impossible to understand these phenomena and so effectively to counter and overcome them.¹²

Precisely because Schaff is aware of the significance of the problem, we are the more disappointed by the general character of his recommendation as well as by the fact that he contributes little to the explanation of what he himself considers of utmost importance for the conception of an individual in contemporary Marxist philosophy and socialist society.

At the beginning of his book, Schaff mentions that the primary concern and the starting point of Marx's philosophy was human happiness. How does he inquire into the happiness of man?

First of all, let us mention that the concept of human happiness has never been the center of Marxist philosophy in its Stalinist version. At most, happiness was seen in the revolutionary struggle for the socialist revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Today, we can see the concept of human happiness investigated in some works by Marxist philosophers. For instance, Ernest Kolman examines it in both socialist theory and practice. For him, the first step in the pursuit of happiness is the creation of conditions such that all people have minimum worries and troubles about food, shelter, clothing, medicare and other external conditions, necessary for their lives. To provide for good material external conditions is the first step toward man's happiness.

The greatest happiness of man will be when he is useful to others and especially when he becomes a self-conscious Communist.

In Kolman's conception, man is supposed to fulfill consciously his social duties and functions and let himself be ruled and governed by the most powerful external force – the Communist Party. Man is asked to see in it his greatest happiness.

Schaff's ideas on human happiness are similar to Kolman's, but there are some differences. The former believes that the supreme goal of human life is the greatest happiness of the masses of people.

According to Schaff, a supporter of socialist humanism believes that personal happiness can be attained only through social happiness. He believes that his goal can only be achieved by a struggle in which he serves the socially determined cause.

In the name of humanity and brotherly love, he proclaims class struggle and, paradoxical as this might seem, it is his love of man that makes him avow hatred of those who oppress man.¹³

The problem with this conception is again its general character and the lack of criteria. According to it, it is quite possible to harm in the 'name of love' anyone, if 'somebody' proclaims that he oppresses man or that he is a class enemy.

The senseless deaths of millions of people should warn us about formulating such ideas – especially without specification and firm criteria. Nevertheless, Schaff considers relentless struggle for the conditions of progress to be necessary presuppositions of human happiness.

What are the possibilities of the achievement of human happiness in the 'new' world? Are there guarantees of happiness in it?

Schaff proceeds rather carefully in his examination of this problem. The final outcome of his inquiry is negative. It is not possible to guarantee the happiness of man in the future society. His skepticism is a new feature that contrasts with the oversimplified and dangerous optimism of the rosy Marxian and Stalinist utopia about a socialist paradise on earth. Thus he turns from asking about human happiness to asking about the conditions of a happy life, i.e., rather than about happiness itself. If the future society eliminates causes of mass unhappiness, possibilities for a happy life will be created.

But the elimination of the social sources of unhappiness that existed in the past does not at all mean that there might not be new causes of an even greater unhappiness in the future society. It is, therefore, impossible to guarantee that the new conditions, although in a certain respect much better than the old ones, will not be worse in other respects.¹⁴

Schaff's skepticism is in order and represents an entirely new tone in recent Marxist philosophy. It is the view of a man who experienced the heights of excited optimism of great hopes for the future society as well as

black, deeply hopeless despair during the Stalinist terror and neo-Stalinist oppression. Of course, we might be justified in asking why then indulge in a struggle of the kind that Schaff asks for, if the result is not only doubtful, but quite certainly, in many respects 'will be worse' than before he started to fight? Why not choose an entirely different direction that would bring results less doubtful than the ones he recommends?

With every major problem that Schaff brings up – for instance, the universalistic solution of the relationship of society and man, socialist humanism, socialist education and re-education of man as an individual, freedom, alienation and de-alienation in socialism and Communism, happiness, etc. – one fundamental question arises: who in society is supposed to set criteria for the determination of the degrees and development of all these theoretical formulas in their practical application?

From our studies and experiences with the functioning of socialist society, we know that it is the principle of the leading role of the Communist Party which penetrates the entire social structure. Theoretically, this principle means that all members of the Communist Party take part in the governing of socialist society and are responsible for it. In practice, however, it means that the apparatus, organs and offices of the Communist Party decide and set criteria for the application and interpretation of theoretical problems. They decide about the relationship between society and man. The Communist Party is supposed to be the cognitive center of society; it leads and governs ideology, science, culture, social, political and economic life with the help of its apparatus. By not analysing this organizational structure, by not specifying the exact criteria that actually operate in socialist society, Schaff sets up general principles that can be interpreted and used differently according to the subjective will of an individual or of one powerful group that rules over the rigidly centralized, hierarchical structure and with it over the entire society, without any checks and balances and without any majority–minority principle. Once a universalistic principle is outlined as the major one, then the criteria of its use and the guarantees against its misuse become of primary importance. Universalistic solutions of social problems are always – in different degrees – rather problematic, but they might become dangerous if they are formulated without clear specifications, exact determinations and firm guarantees against any possible misuse. And, in this respect, Schaff's investigation leaves still much to be desired. As it is now, it leaves us with

the possibility that the principles might be misused if the rulers of a socialist society consider it necessary or useful.

All these differences between the rigid, dogmatic, Stalinist views and recently developing modifications that we can see in Schaff's work are based on changes in the methodological attitude toward the history of philosophy and contemporary philosophy in general.

The Stalinist conception applied the conflict between idealism and materialism to the entire history of philosophy. According to it, Marxist philosophy is the only scientific philosophy of our times and the only true one. All other philosophic attitudes are unscientific, incorrect and untrue. Marxist philosophy accepts the class principle of partisanship in philosophy and hence it has a negative relation to all non-Marxist philosophies. There is nothing that Marxist philosophy could learn or take over from any kind of non-Marxist philosophy. All of them should be severely criticized and completely rejected. In contemporary times, non-Marxist philosophies have either an openly imperialistic character or they are – in some degree – in the service of the bourgeoisie or imperialism. They are harmful for Marxist philosophy as well as hostile, since they oppose or weaken the fight for socialist revolution, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the construction of socialism.

It was the former ideologist of the French Communist Party, Roger Garaudy¹⁵, who came closest to formulating a methodological principle that modifies the Stalinist one. It can be expressed as follows: The relation between Marxist and non-Marxist philosophy is based upon the theory of class struggle and the age-old conflict between materialism and idealism. But, at odds with the Stalinist methodology, Marxist philosophy should study deeply all types of non-Marxist philosophies. Many major questions in Marxist and non-Marxist philosophies are the same or similar as questions or formulations. Therefore Marxist philosophy should tackle all those questions which it did not deal with in the Stalinist version; it can accept impulses from non-Marxist philosophy. But it always has to examine all non-Marxist views and solutions critically from the class point of view – that of the partisanship of Marxism – and it should offer instead its own Marxist explanation.

We have examined some differences between the Stalinist conception of philosophy and the recent development of Schaff's work. We have seen one form of reaction against the Stalinist views, and the turn to the young Marx

and to the concept of the individual. Even though Schaff modifies a number of questions as compared to the Stalinist version and deviates somewhat from some of Lenin's views, he stays within the tradition of Marx's thought.

But what about Sartre's offer to incorporate his existentialist philosophizing into Marxist philosophy?

Non-Marxist philosophies have been investigating problems of man for a long time and some of them even consider philosophic anthropology to be their major concern. Neo-Thomism, personalism, existentialism and the recent development of phenomenology have – from their respective points of view – considerably contributed to our knowledge of man.

As far as Sartre's suggestion is concerned, the direct acceptance of his existentialism by Marxist philosophy turned out to be an illusion. But existentialist philosophizing is far from being confined only to Sartre's views; it is a very diverse stream of thought, different with almost every existentialist. It has never been a philosophic system with exactly formulated questions and definite, elaborated answers. Actually, one of the major characteristics of existentialism has been the indirect approach, the method of questioning.¹⁶ Existentialist philosophers are quite satisfied with formulating a philosophic problem that inspires the others to think about it and to investigate it.

Today we face a situation where groups of Marxist philosophers gradually turn their attention to major questions of man that have been examined again and again by the existentialists and other philosophers. Hence a question suggests itself: to what extent has the philosophic questioning of existentialist philosophers influenced the recent interests of Marxist philosophers in an circumscribed, indirect and mediated way. The answer might be that the 'petty bourgeois', 'bourgeois', 'imperialistic' and 'reactionary' non-Marxist philosophies have exerted an indirect impact upon Marxist philosophy through their philosophic problems and questioning. Perhaps we can expect a gradual continuation of this development in the future. In addition, considering that many former Marxist philosophers have emancipated themselves from the narrow limits of philosophy – as allowed, manipulated and directed by the Communist Party – by turning their interests toward philosophic anthropology, the question arises whether this is not one of the possible ways of the passage beyond Marxism.

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NOTES

¹ 'From the day that Marxist thought will have taken on the human dimension (that is, the existentialist project) as the foundation of anthropological knowledge, existentialism will no longer have any reason for being.' (J. P. Sartre, *Search for a Method*, Knopf, New York, 1963, p. 181).

² See Pavel Kovaly, 'Is it possible to Humanize Marxism?', *Studies in Soviet Thought* 11 (1971), 276–293.

³ Adam Schaff, *Marxism and the Human Individual*, p. 255.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 138.

⁵ Karl Popper discerns 'activist' and 'passivist' theories of knowledge. According to 'passivist' or 'receptacle' theories, the subject remains passive and receptive in cognition. In 'activist' theories, knowledge is explained largely as the result of man's active role in cognition. (Karl Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies*, Harper and Row, New York, 1962, vol. 2, p. 213–214.)

⁶ Schaff, *op. cit.*, p. 247.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 202.

⁸ Schaff is fully justified in his criticism of the language used by Stalinists. He stresses that it is not an accident that Stalinism 'clothes its thinking in military language as 'front', 'combat task', etc.' (*Ibid.*, p. 215).

Without any attempt to be malicious, let us look at what kind of language permeates Schaff's book: task, crucial task, victory, militant movement, militant humanism, militancy, struggle, crucial struggle, struggle for, struggle against, struggle as action, campaign, mission, hatred of enemies, battle, battle for, battle against, weapons in struggle, fighting, attack, we must attack, elimination, eradication, liquidation.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 153.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 212.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 208.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 247.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 254.

¹⁵ In 1969, Garaudy was expelled from the CP of France, partially because of his 'revisionistic' views and his strong protests against the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

¹⁶ 'The essence of philosophy is not the possession of truth but the search for truth. Philosophy means to be on the way. Its questions are more essential than its answers, and every answer becomes a new question.' (Karl Jaspers, *Way to Wisdom*, Yale University Press 1967, p. 12).

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JAROSZEWSKI, TADEUSZ M., *Alienacja?* (Alienation), Książka i Wiedza, Warszawa, 1965.

Helmuth Dahm, *Vladimir Solov'ev und Max Scheler. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Phänomenologie im Versuch einer vergleichenden Interpretation*, Anton Pustet, München u. Salzburg, 1971. 468 S.

This book goes far beyond a comparative interpretation of Solov'ev and Scheler and contains much that is of direct and indirect interest to students of Soviet philosophy. Dahm devotes the first six chapters to showing that there are important and striking similarities in their thought, although he rules out the possibility of direct influence as the cause. In the first chapter he shows this for their basic notions of philosophy; in the second for the nature of knowledge; in the third for the relationship between religion and metaphysics; in the fourth for systematic philosophy; in the fifth he discusses the women's question and the idea of God and the question of influence; and in the sixth he gives an overview of the entire argument. Throughout the six chapters he also deals with the historical sources, influences, and evolution of their thought. The structural similarities of their thought and of their common concerns, as systematized and laid out by Dahm, amount to a mutual complementarity. This conclusion is important because Dahm will use it three chapters later as one basis for an interesting prediction about future central trends in Soviet philosophy.

At the beginning of the seventh chapter Dahm introduces a series of themes of direct concern to the Sovietologist. Chapter 7 is a concise, but cogent, survey of the history of Russian philosophy from Solov'ev to Šestov. This establishes a framework in which the first six chapters and the last two are connected and made relevant to one another. Chapter 8 consists of Dahm's translation of four Soviet articles on Solov'ev. His few comments on these articles are in the preceding and following chapters, but they are not as extensive as this reviewer would have liked. Dahm could have given us even more fascinating suggestions by analyzing the shifts from the 1947 article on Solov'ev to the 1961 article. The last chapter of the book is a very detailed, annotated bibliography, discussion, and analysis of Soviet works (both books and articles) on Husserl and Scheler. He complements this discussion by frequent comments on Polish work in the area. Such comments are often helpful suggestions as to what turn Soviet developments will take five to ten years later.

In the final paragraphs of the book, Dahm discusses a conference on