

of the universe, but in the sense that man is the center of his world. In fact, Fromm (1967) believes there is nothing transcending man:

. . . his value judgments, like all other judgments and even perceptions, are rooted in peculiarities of his existence and are meaningful only with reference to it; man, indeed, is the "measure of all things." The humanistic position is that there is nothing higher and nothing more dignified than human existence [p. 23].

Subjectivistic vs. Objectivistic Ethics

The underlying principle in Fromm's ethics was that man, and man alone, could decide what was good or bad for him. The criticism to which such a proposition must be subjected is whether man has the capacity to arrive at normative principles which have objective validity.

Fromm (1967) faces the question squarely:

. . . Must we then give up objectivity if we choose humanism? Or is it possible to establish norms of conduct and value judgments which are objectively postulated by man himself and not by an authority transcending him [p. 25].

In order to understand Fromm's answer, it is necessary to note that he holds "objectively valid" and "absolute" not to be the same (Fromm, 1967). A proposition or hypothesis which has objective validity is at the same time "relative." It is, Fromm (1967) states, "'relative' in the sense of having been established on limited evidence and being subject to future refinements if facts or procedures warrant it [p. 26]." Thus, the concept of the absolute is



necessary only in a theological context and "has as little meaning in ethics as in scientific thinking in general [p. 26]."

The observation is important. Russell (1962) views the matter very much the same:

. . . The data of science are individual percepts, and these are far more subjective than common sense supposes; nevertheless, upon this basis the imposing edifice of impersonal science has been built up [p. 20].

The matter is urgent. Scientific truths are the product of opinions, beliefs, and hypotheses. Science has no absolutes, no dogmas; it is tentative. It is tentative, because at root it is subjective. Rogers (1961) observes that:

. . . In regard to the findings of science, the subjective foundation is well shown in the fact that at times the scientist may refuse to accept his own finding In the last analysis he may place more trust in his total organismic reactions than in the methods of science [p. 210].

This personal aspect has been all but lost to the scientist and to common sense. Certainly in order to avoid self-deception, a trained observer will use the methods of science. However, Rogers (1961) does not make science an impersonal thing:

. . . but simply, a person living subjectively another phase of himself The subjective experience of choice . . . is also primary in the use of scientific method by a person [p. 223].

One further point should be cited in this connection. Rogers (1969) quotes Polanyi to the effect that it seems



almost heretical even to question the premises and conclusions of science:

. . . In the days when an idea could be silenced by showing that it was contrary to religion, theology was the greatest single source of fallacies. Today, when any human thought can be discredited by branding it as unscientific, the power previously exercised by theology has passed over to science; hence science has become in its turn the greatest single source of error [p. 274].

Even if this point is agreed upon, the main objection to the possibility of objectively valid statements in ethics remains. The problem is the distinction which must be maintained between facts and values. It would appear true enough that values, emotions, and feelings are bases upon which ethics rest. Russell (1962) states:

Ethics differ from science in the fact that its fundamental data are feeling and emotions, not precepts. This is to be understood strictly; that is to say, the data is the feeling and emotions themselves, not the fact that we have them. The fact is scientific like any other, and we are aware of it by perception in the usual way. But an ethical judgment does not state fact; it states, though often in a disguised form, some hope or fear, some desire or aversion, some love or hate [p. 19].

However, what is a fact? Just how objective are facts? Is there a clear and distinct line of demarcation between an objective fact and a subjective experience? The matter is far from clear. Not to like oysters is no great shame. It is a matter of personal choice. Such an arbitrary preference ordinarily provokes little or no comment. But not all issues are of such insignificant consequences. The systematic liquidation of seven million Jews is anything but arbitrary. People will die in defense of personal liberty. Whatever the argument advanced that the two cases are the

same, there remains a profound difference, no matter how difficult it is to point out. While not decisive, Russell (1962) feels this alone "should make people reluctant to accept at all readily the view that all ethical judgments are wholly subjective [p. 20]."

Fromm (1967, p. 26) also maintains that valid propositions can be made concerning value statements; Kant's contention to the contrary notwithstanding. His argument revolves around the nature of art. No matter the art, medicine, or engineering, its success depends on both theoretical and practical knowledge. Thus, the theoretical knowledge aims to discover general principles about the way the world operates. This information is applied (applied sciences) to effect some practical and perhaps immediate end in line with the theoretical propositions. In fact, according to Fromm (1967), the applied knowledge concerns itself "primarily with practical norms according to which things ought to be done--where 'ought' is determined by scientific knowledge of facts and principles [p. 26]." The "ought" is usually radically tied to success. To achieve an end, for example constructing a bridge, there may be many ways to obtain acceptable results, but the objectively valid norms are by no means arbitrary. To violate norms is to run the risk of poor results or even failure.

Not only must art include a body of theoretical knowledge from which a body of practical norms are deduced and skillfully applied, but as Fromm (1967, p. 27) contends,

such activity rests on the premise that the end of art is desirable.

This is obvious in the practice of medicine. The healing art rests on the premise that it is worthwhile to control and cure disease. When the medical practitioner is confronted with an illness, for example, cancer or heart disease, he has available certain norms, the violation of which would be extremely risky. The risk is extreme because of the objective nature of the practical norms of medicine.

Living, like medicine, is an art, according to Fromm (1967):

But not only medicine, engineering, and painting are arts; living is an art--in fact, the most important and at the same time the most difficult and complex art to specialized performance, but the performance of living, the process of developing into that which one is potentially. In the art of living, man is both the artist and the object of his art; he is the sculptor and the marble; the physician and the patient [p. 27].

To follow the same line of argumentation, the art of living has both theoretical and practical knowledge. The theoretical or pure knowledge is derived from or concerns the nature of man. It is from this body of knowledge that practical norms are to be drawn. Those practical norms are called ethics.

Fromm's desire to establish an objectively valid norm for ethics is built on the "drive to live" which is seen as inherent to man's nature. However, the drive, according to Fromm (1967), while it does include the obligation or "ought" to fulfill one's potential, it "does not imply an

abstract drive for perfection as a particular gift with which man is endowed [p. 220]." Thus, Fromm (1967) states: "it follows . . . from the principle that the power to act creates a need to use this power and that failure to use it results in dysfunction and unhappiness [pp. 220-221]."

The point is vital. Fundamental to Fromm's analysis of ethics is the dynamic concept of what it means "to be alive." For Fromm (1967), the first duty of an organism is to unfold its potential:

. . . Existence and the unfolding of the specific powers of an organism are one and the same. All organisms have an inherent tendency to actualize their specific potentialities. The aim of man's life, therefore, is to be understood as the unfolding of his powers according to the laws of his nature [p. 29].

Since to live means the realization of one's potential, it follows that whatever aids that realization is good, and whatever cripples it is evil. The crux of the discussion is Fromm's attempt to incorporate "living well" with the "drive to live." He feels this amalgamation is rooted in man's existence. It doesn't have to be, it "ought" to be. Without it, man ceases to exist as man, in the psychological sense.

Fromm's Categorical Imperative: Live for Living

In opposition to Fromm's (1967) formulation that ethics are fundamentally an artistic endeavor in which man is both the artist and the object of his art, Schaar (1964) contends such an attitude assumes that the canons of the



discipline, of aesthetics, can be applied to another discipline, ethics:

. . . The greatest, the freest, the most creative men live in obedience to some unfulfilled, perhaps only vaguely understood, purpose. A life without some purpose larger than its own cultivation is a life without direction and meaning . . . To make "live for living" the categorical imperative is to counsel man to emptiness [pp. 110-111].

The chief canon of aesthetical criticism is that there is no such thing as a good work of art; the chief canon of moral criticism is that there is such a thing as the good life. To Schaar (1964):

. . . This means that aesthetic criticism must start from the premise that the only question which may legitimately be asked of a work of art is, did the artist succeed in doing what he set out to do? . . . The question of whether the end chosen is a good or a bad one is beyond the province of aesthetics [p. 112].

There can be little doubt that Schaar has hit upon a real weakness in Fromm's ethical system. It appears that Fromm is indeed mixing two separate and distinct disciplines: ethics and aesthetics, for they are, for the scholar, different subjects, each with its own rules of criticism. Weber (1969) makes the same distinction:

. . . The latter [aesthetics] has as its sole object the judgment of appreciation so far as it applies to the distinction between the beautiful and the ugly; or in other words, the artist, and the work are of interest to it only to the extent that they appreciate or are appreciated. In this sense aesthetics is a "normative science," as are ethics or logic, which relate respectively to judgments of the good and the true [pp. 47-48].

This appears to be a fundamental error. In fact, it is an error of such proportions that the possibility that Fromm does not understand the implications of his position

can hardly be maintained. Schaar (1964, p. 113) accuses Fromm of exactly this, but fails to offer any concrete information to support his contention.

When an international authority, who writes with the depth and consistency of Fromm, makes apparently contradictory statements, realistically, there can be but one answer: he is not making himself understood. Fromm's productive man, as noted earlier, is a model of human nature to be realized in the future. The full meaning of such a man appears to be outside the traditional scientific categories. The perennial problem of such categories is the inability to make a clear distinction between reality in mente from reality in re. What Fromm (1970) is trying to do is to protect his developing understanding of man against the all too rigid, too confining logic of Western thought:

. . . They [most people] assume . . . that the rules which determine proper thinking, are natural and universal ones; that what is illogical in one cultural system is illogical in any other, because it conflicts with "natural" logic [p. 101].

However, such is not the case. Fromm (1970) indicates as much by making reference to Aristotelian and paradoxical logic:

. . . Aristotelian logic is based on the law of identity which states that A is A, the law of contradiction (A is not non-A), and the law of the excluded middle (A cannot be A and non-A, neither A nor non-A). Aristotle stated it: "It is impossible for the same time to belong and not to belong to the same thing and in the same respect . . . This, then, is the most certain of all principles."

In opposition to Aristotelian logic is what one might call paradoxical logic, which assumes that A and



non-A do not exclude each other as predicates of X. Paradoxical logic was predominant in Chinese and Indian thinking, in Heraclitus' philosophy, and then again under the name of dialectics in the thought of Hegel and Marx. The general principle of paradoxical logic has been clearly described in general terms by Lao-tse: "Words that are strictly true seem to be paradoxical." And by Chuang-tzu: "That which is one is one. That which is not-one, is also one [pp. 101-102]."

Logical or not in the Western sense, Fromm realizes that in the truth of the matter, "live for living" demands that forces or dimensions of both normative sciences, ethics, and aesthetics converge to come to grips with the reality of the situation. While this is seemingly disadvantageous to the hard and fast distinctions produced by various disciplines of thought, it is clear that the disciplines themselves demand such re-conceptualization to remain viable. Indeed, Dewart (1966) finds a distinction between conceptualization and human experience itself:

. . . Empirically verifiable distinction between human experience and human conceptualization, that is, a distinction between the immediate reality of our "mental" life insofar as it is individually and personally our own, and the reality of our "mental" life insofar as it is represented and communicable (whether to ourselves or to others) in and through concepts [p. 101].

As the logician would say, this is a complex question; it does not admit to an unqualified answer. When Fromm counsels "live for living," he does not counsel moral emptiness or anarchy. He is bringing together various cultural forms which more or less adequately correspond to reality. Dewart (1966) notes that:

. . . Concepts are the cultural form of human experience. A cultural form is not imposed upon pre-existing human experience. Human experience as such

requires conceptualization and, therefore, a conceptual form It follows from this [all human behavior] is linguistic, that concepts and conceptual systems (languages, cultural forms) are translatable, but not equivalent [p. 101].

Fromm's productive man par excellence is the artist, but knowledge or insight into the artist is difficult indeed. It is not enough to say that the artist is a creator and his creation stems from both the external world and from the secret depth of his own being. Even his creative liberties, seemingly bounded only by the limits or laws of his own creation, offer only the vaguest conception which is in no way validated.

Weber (1969), in his book The Psychology of Art, offers Victor Basch's description of the artist and the origin of his inner life:

. . . . First of all, the artist is a rare phenomenon and, up to a certain point, a monster

Moreover, even if it is easy for us, as contemplators, to reproduce within ourselves an aesthetic sensation or feeling, and to analyze it by introspection It is extremely uncomfortable for us to penetrate into the soul of the artist, into the source, profound and mysterious to himself, from which springs the creative instinct

The artist, whoever he may be, has begun by being a contemplator and an artistic appreciator The most uncultivated artist, the most primitive --even he has begun by looking around him, by enjoying the spectacle of himself, of a tree, of a woman Later, he tries to bring this vision and emotion back to life for himself and for others Thus, before creation, he has contemplated and enjoyed [p. 55].

While the source of artistic impulse is mysterious and profound, Basch suggests that it begins on the level of contemplation or artistic appreciation.

Weber, however, feels that Basch's position and arguments are without doubt vulnerable to criticism. To substantiate his contention, Weber (1969) quotes Emile Souriau, who is replying directly to Basch himself:

For our own part we believe that artists know things. We believe that their attitude before the forms in the world is not one of enjoyment, but, on the contrary, one of avid and active scrutiny in order to know them. We would go further in saying that this attitude, not of enjoyment, but of study in the presence of forms, is precisely what distinguishes the artist from other men who possess only aesthetic sensitivity [p. 56].

However, the point at hand is whether the aesthetical and ethical impulses both originate from the same source. Schaar (1964, p. 112) feels the decisive factor is the totally subjective nature of aesthetics. However, Weber (1969) finds that aesthetics not only have structure, but even impersonal dimensions:

What I wish to say is quite different. It seems to me that aesthetic feeling, in its multifarious modalities and values, imperfectly and unconsciously imitates the atmosphere and the seductions of the affective recollections of childhood, whether superficial or profound, individual or generic. This imitation seems to me, moreover, to be one of the fundamental laws of consciousness and of the destiny of man. We shall use the term "theme" to refer to the past reality, generally unconscious, that we attempt, unknown to ourselves, to approximate by imitating it. And we shall say that every unconscious imitation of a theme--it may be analogous or symbolic, the difference being merely one of degree--modulates or orchestrates it--it being understood by "modulation" or "orchestration" just this unconscious and analogous (or symbolic) imitation of the theme.

I believe that there exist personal themes--that is, those proper to a particular childhood, a specified artist, a given destiny--as well as impersonal themes--that is, those characterizing the universality or generality of childhood and destinies. I believe it is important to display clearly these two realities that

underlie all consciousness, all aesthetic feeling, all aesthetic creation [p. 84].

Conclusions in these matters are all but impossible. However, the investigation at least bears out that Fromm's "art of living" has some foundation in the structural reality of the human psyche. Although the reality to which Fromm's ethics points does not wholly correspond with any discipline which has been listed in an attempt to define it, in some sense it coincides in part with each. The ethical impulse, stemming from the natural need to unfold one's potential, partakes of the irrational and creative dimensions of aesthetics and the hard driving impulse toward honesty and authenticity which conventional morality so poorly attempts to codify. Thus, living, in this sense, is indeed an art.

The heart of ethics is neither purely subjective nor purely objective; it is neither purely art nor purely science. Ethics is the impulse; always frustrated to some extent, to be oneself. Even the question, "How ought I to live?" is too narrow. Real ethics substitutes the question, "Who am I?" Such a question comprises the ongoing search for the truth--a cosmic truth which transcends both personal and historical epochs. The searcher is both a metaphysician and a poet. The major reason that ethics have fallen on hard times is that the poet has been banished. Fischer admits that ethics have a metaphysical nature; however, he greatly qualifies his understanding of metaphysics. His

observation seems to capture what this investigation has uncovered about Fromm's understanding of ethics. Fischer (1971) concludes that:

Admittedly, such questions point to metaphysics as the basis of ethics. Metaphysics itself is not, however, to be regarded, as it is so often, as a branch of science knowing ultimate truths, but as transcendental poetry groping for ultimate values. The ethical life is an expression of a metaphysical commitment, not something deducible from metaphysical premises.

Thus, at the limit and in the ideal case, ethical man is the expression of his transcendental poetry, of his metaphysical and philosophical creativity. The two of them, ethical man and metaphysician, are one, even where neither the ethics nor the metaphysics is made explicit. The ethical attitude is one of dedication to cosmic truth, goodness, and beauty; however, the infinite cosmos cannot be captured in an ethical formula [p. 270].

Conscience

What Fromm (1966b) means by conscience is what the great philosophical and religious traditions meant by the term:

. . . In this tradition, ethics refers to a particular orientation which is rooted in man and which, therefore, is not valid in reference to this or that Conscience is the organ of this ethical attitude; if we speak of ethics in the sense of the great philosophical and religious tradition of the East and West, then ethics is not a code; it is a matter of conscience [pp. 175-176].

The productive man's guide to full awareness is his conscience. More than anything else, it is his conscience. However, conscience has as many vices as it has virtues. History records men dying for principles of truth, justice, and love, as well as the crimes of the Inquisition and of Nazi Germany. The primary motivation and apology for all



parties involved was that they acted according to their consciences. What is conscience? How can it report such conflicting and contradictory results? Fromm distinguishes between authoritarian and humanistic conscience in line with his distinction of authoritarian and humanistic ethics. In the following discussion the same distinction will be utilized.

The Authoritarian Conscience

Fromm (1967) makes clear the nature of the authoritarian conscience:

. . . The authoritarian conscience is the voice of an internalized external authority, the parents, the state, or whoever the authorities in the culture happen to be . . . The authoritarian conscience is what Freud has described as the Super-Ego [pp. 148-149].

Freud's understanding of the super-ego is without doubt what Fromm understands as the authoritarian conscience. Moreover, for Fromm (1969, p. 45), its induction into the developing psyche is much the same process as that described by Freud for the super-ego. In addition, Fromm believes that the victims are caught by the culturally induced authoritarian conscience while they are still too young to resist. The most damning feature of such a conscience, Fromm (1967, p. 149) states, is that its prescriptions are not determined by one's own value judgments. Rather, its commands are imposed in the interest of the ruling authority, and its strength is rooted in the emotions of fear and admiration on the part of the subject. Fromm's (1967) statement is explicit:

. . . Good conscience is consciousness of pleasing the (external and internalized) authority; guilty conscience is the consciousness of displeasing it [p. 150].

Moreover, the authoritarian conscience is a hard master. It rules by fear of punishment and hope of reward.

The good (authoritarian) conscience, according to Fromm (1967), permits man to identify with the authority: "For it implies approval by, and greater closeness to, the authority [p. 150]." Fromm (1967) notes that the guilty (authoritarian) conscience works in reverse: "Approval and closeness" are replaced by "fear and insecurity [p. 150]." There is not only fear of punishment, but much worse, the terror of being deserted by the authority.

The content of the good and guilty authoritarian conscience flows in part from the very nature of the incompetent authority on which it is founded. As discussed earlier, what is commanded by the authority can be good or bad, relevant or irrelevant. Thus, according to Fromm (1967), "disobedience becomes the 'cardinal sin'; and obedience, the cardinal virtue [p. 152]." There must also be maintained the same fundamental inequality between leader and follower, no matter whether the authority reached his station by fraud, magic, fate, fear, or power.

The authoritarian conscience has as its first obligation the willful submission to the authority. Fromm (1967) indicates that this results in several prohibitions, chief among them:

. . . Is the tabu against feeling to be, or even able to become like the authority, for that would contradict the latter's unqualified superiority and uniqueness [p. 154].

However, there is a paradox in all this. The authoritarian guilty conscience results from listening more to oneself than to the authority. Fromm (1967) concludes that it comes from a feeling of "strength, independence, productiveness and pride [p. 154]," while the good authoritarian conscience springs from listening more to others than to oneself, and results in "feelings of obedience, dependence, powerlessness, and sinfulness [p. 154]." Fromm (1967) reasons that:

. . . The paradoxical result is that the authoritarian guilty conscience becomes the basis for a "good" conscience, while the good conscience, if one should have it, ought to create a feeling of guilt [p. 154].

The Humanistic Conscience

Fromm believes that the authoritarian conscience is but one form of conscience, and perhaps only a preliminary stage toward the development of a humanistic conscience.

Fromm (1967) states:

. . . Humanistic conscience is not the internalized voice of authority whom we are eager to please or afraid of displeasing; it is our own voice, present in every human being and independent of external sanction and reward [p. 107].

This definition is well in line with the rest of his analysis. Fromm's (1969, p. 46) authoritarian conscience was alienating, idolatrous, taking man away from his true self.

While Fromm's (1967) humanistic conscience is:

. . . The voice of our true selves which summons us back to ourselves; to live productively, to develop fully and harmoniously--that is, to become what we potentially are. It is the guardian of our integrity If love can be defined as the affirmation of the potentialities and the care for, and the respect of, the uniqueness of the loved person, humanistic conscience can be justly called the voice of our loving care for ourselves [p. 163].

Moreover, ideally, Fromm's (1967) humanistic conscience "is the reaction of our total personality to its proper functioning or dysfunctioning [p. 162]." It represents the real self; "it contains also the essence of our moral experience in life [p. 163]."

Fromm assumes, an assumption borne out in his clinical practice and daily living, that most men never develop a humanistic conscience. In trying to line up the reason for this condition, Fromm (1967) replies that "its voice is so feeble as not to be heard or acted upon [p. 164]." This is derived from the very nature of the conscience itself. Paradoxically, the more man needs the real voice of conscience, the more faint, almost nonexistent, it becomes. Again, Fromm (1967, p. 164) believes most people are afraid to listen to themselves; afraid to remain passive and wait. Listening to oneself requires a subtle ear. Moreover, Fromm (1967, pp. 165-167) maintains that one must be prepared to hear things which generate anxiety and guilt--things about dying and death; about lost opportunities for growth and development.

Ethics are a matter of unparalleled concern. Without ethics man has no sense of well being or meaning in the

world. A great deal of what Fromm designates as the ethical impulse is contained in man's honest search for meaning. It is a continuing search for order and relatedness of man to his world. Without meaning, the world holds no significance; with it, it affords options of goals, directions, and purposes--a personal orientation.

The productive orientation permits man to invest himself, creating and strengthening his valuing capacity. For Fromm, it is not that there is so little to value, but that modern man lacks the capacity to recognize and commit himself to those things which look to his health and development. Psychology would do well to return to this tradition. Its major emphasis is man, his well being and creative development. For in Fromm's view, the division of ethics, philosophy, religion, and psychology has produced near chaos in the field of psychotherapy today.

The last chapter, Chapter 5, proposes to investigate the role or function of ethics in psychotherapy. It was the intention of this study to underscore the emptiness and triviality to which psychotherapy can be wedded in the absence of concern and awareness of man's basic ethical attitude.

Moreover, the study provides, in the light of the foregoing evaluations, a frame of reference with which to compare and contrast man's own position in this matter with that of Fromm's.



Chapter 5

The Role of Ethics in Psychotherapy

This study falls into three large divisions. The first division probed the nature of man and the human condition. The second attempted to account for man's lack of success and happiness in life itself. Central to Fromm's teaching is the conviction that man's mechanized and alienated society is unconsciously committed to the systematic and ruthless destruction of man's deepest needs and noblest aspirations. The third division is Fromm's proposed cure, involving his analysis of ethics and the role of ethics in psychotherapy.

Man, in spite of his intelligence and imagination, and for all his ethical pretensions, seems unable to maintain even that level of happiness which was accorded him in the beginning of the human race. More embarrassing still is the fact that man's primates, for example the chimpanzee, his closest neighbor, seems to satisfy his appetites for food, sex, and aggression far more successfully than man. It can hardly be posited that modern man, who lives under every conceivable threat--accident, economic ruin, sickness, emotional strain, nuclear war, death, etc.--is as happy in his world as the chimp is in his. Even man's ability to



provide for the future and offset pending disaster does not seem to lighten man's burden significantly. He is safer at times, but just as unhappy. Man's intelligence and imagination have altered his physical world without substantially bettering it. The return to raw nature, as indicated in Chapter 1, is impossible, and the technological paradise has not produced the fruits to make man happy. Far from securing man's happiness, the scientific community has sought its own power. Science has the knowledge to continue its dazzling array of progress without the wisdom to know how to arrange man's true priorities. All this points to the fact that ethics are a more basic consideration than science. Scientific discoveries, however valuable, concern themselves with objects, not persons. The inability to establish clearly the significance of ethics has brought mankind to the brink of disaster. Understandably enough, the social sciences are the first to raise the question to crisis proportions. As will be pointed out, the psychological community is now in the process of choosing between persons and objects, between the technical ability to manipulate behavior and the in-depth search to maximize the personal, the unique, and the subjective. Fromm's mood is that the outcome of this struggle may well spell triumph or disaster for mankind.

The study's intent is to derive implications for therapists and counselors from Fromm's view of man's ethical responsibility. Naturally enough, the critical reader may

find applications which are outside the scope of the study. Nevertheless, in the interest of brevity, the following areas will be included for summary discussion: Neurosis as an Ethical Failure, The Dangers of Adjustment Psychology, and Cure of Soul.

Neurosis as an Ethical Failure

Ethics would seem a great distance removed from the permissive atmosphere of a psychotherapeutic session usually associated with psychiatry, psychology, or counseling today. In fact, entire schools have made their non-judgmental character the hallmark of their orientation and emphasis. The counselor is to maintain, as nearly as possible, a strictly neutral position. Nevertheless, it is the contention of this study that ethics touch the very heart of the therapeutic effort. In effect, there is no real cure unless the client commits or reorientates himself to an ethical position which favors growth over decay, progress over regression, and life over death. The more fully such an orientation is realized, the more fully a person can be said to be "cured." In other words, man's cure is dependent upon, according to Fromm (1967), the wise and judicious use of his basic drive toward human and humane behavior:

My experience as a practicing psychoanalyst has confirmed my conviction that problems of ethics cannot be omitted from the study of personality, either theoretically or therapeutically. The value judgments we make determine our actions, and upon their validity rests our mental health and happiness. To consider evaluation only as so many rationalizations of



unconscious, irrational desires--although they can be that too--narrows down and distorts our picture of the total personality. Neurosis itself is, in the last analysis, a symptom of moral failure (although "adjustment" is by no means a symptom of moral achievement) [p. v].

If Fromm's contention is correct, the treatment of neurosis is not, in the last analysis, a technical problem but a moral one. Years of clinical experience have taught Fromm that the chief cause of neurosis is conflicts of conscience; that is, difficult moral questions which require resolution, even if the client is unaware of their presence. This places the therapist in a difficult position. On the one hand, he is faced with the uniqueness of the client's personality. The infinite diversity of personalities is in itself a fundamental characteristic of human existence, according to Fromm (1967, p. 58). His distinctiveness is basic to what it means to be a person. It is a world so singular that assumptions and conjectures serve little or no real purpose. On the other hand, as Fromm's treatment of ethics indicates, there are no intellectual short cuts or collective recipes which can answer the problems basic to a person's life. What a particular code deems right or wrong never seems to answer adequately what is right or wrong for the individual client.

Fromm's analysis makes ethics a matter of unparalleled concern for the therapist. Neurosis is rooted in the violation of the ethical impulse. As was seen, Fromm greatly simplifies ethics by concluding that there is only



one universal moral impulse. This impulse arises out of the unique need on the part of the client to be himself. Its expression is not stifled by demands placed on it by man's basic needs which he has in common with all mankind. To the contrary, these core needs, as the study has shown, look to the unfolding of man's unique potential, if they are given their proper priority. Thus, the ethical impulse seeks to develop and unfold one's powers, to exercise one's unique capacity toward creativity and individual definition. Fromm (1966b) states that "there is only universal humanistic ethics applied to specific human situations [p. 176]."

The therapist might feel that such a sweeping generalization, even if correct, is hardly advantageous. Indeed, the client's complaint, arising as it does out of his refusal on some level to define himself as a person, seems the condition of every human being. In part, the objection is true. However, Fromm (1967, p. 222) realizes that the lack of integration and productiveness do not always lead to neurosis. If such were the case, the vast majority of people would be neurotic. With his characteristic logic, Fromm (1967, pp. 222-224) makes a distinction between neurosis and a defect. A defect is the result of an individual not having achieved maturity, spontaneity, and freedom, etc., provided it is assumed that freedom and spontaneity are objective goals to be attained by every human being. However, Fromm (1967) indicates that "if such a goal is not attained by the majority of members of any



given society, we deal with the phenomenon of socially patterned defect [p. 223]."

The "socially patterned defect" keeps the individual from becoming aware of his own loss. Since the defect is shared generally, he feels nothing is wrong. What he loses, in the genuine experience of self, is made up by the security which is gained by the feeling of fitting in.

What are the specific conditions which make for a neurotic outcome? It would seem that the matter is highly personal. Why one child in a family of four succumbs to a neurosis has been the subject of years of study and speculation. Fromm (1967) circumvents the problem by citing character as the key to ethical crisis in psychotherapy:

. . . Difference in character constitutes the real problem of ethics; they are expressive of the degree to which an individual has succeeded in the art of living [p. 59].

It is character that makes judgment possible. Without each person possessing that semi-permanent group of qualities called character, there would be no basis for judgment. The will is an expression of a person's character. Contrary to popular belief, Fromm (1967, pp. 232-235) feels that the capacity to do right or wrong is rooted in the absence of empirical prediction, not in an abstract power or faculty which scholastics called free will. When the blend of constructive and destructive impulses are so balanced as to defy prediction, a person is said to be free:



Freedom, in this case, is seen by Fromm as the inability to determine which impulses, constructive or destructive, are stronger.

It comes as no surprise that Fromm's philosophical discussion of freedom, as Chapter 2 indicated, is not entirely satisfying. Nevertheless, he has presented an analysis which throws a great deal of light on the question. The present status, it would appear, is that man is by far too complex a phenomenon to be understood simply under categories of free will or determinism. Fromm's synthesis, merging both sides of the controversy, free will and determinism, places the problem on solid psychological grounds. Fromm's (1967) statement not only clarifies his position, but protects him against accusations of fatalism:

Man, while like all other creatures subject to forces which determine him, is the only creature endowed with reason, the only being who is capable of understanding the very forces which he is subjected to and who by understanding can take an active part in his own fate. . . . Man is the only creature endowed with conscience. His conscience . . . permits him to know what he ought to do in order to become himself, it helps him to remain aware of the aims of life and the norms necessary for the attainment of these aims [p. 234].

The proposition that neurosis is at root a moral problem works contrary to the view of modern psychological science which assumes man to be unfree. Nevertheless, in this analysis, the basis of cure, in the real sense of the term, is found in the experience of responsible choice. This is one of the most profound aspects of psychotherapy, and can be cited as one of the elements which most solidly

underlines real personality change. Real change cannot get under way unless the client, no matter how tentatively, chooses to cooperate more fully with his biophilic tendencies. Only then can he increase his realm of freedom and respond more completely to his need to be more fully alive.

The Dangers of Adjustment Psychology

Therapy, according to Webster's Dictionary (1961), means "to care for" or "to be at the service of [p. 881]" someone. Hence, the task of psychotherapy is to care for the psyche, that is, the spirit or soul of man. The therapist can in this sense be said to engage in a servant's role. He humbly cares for the human and humane spirit of his client, or more clearly, he looks to the healing or integration of the whole man.

However, there are different forms of psychotherapy which differ not only in their general objectives, but in the techniques utilized to achieve those objectives. The major division is between action and insight therapies. Action therapy, according to Goldenson (1970), was derived from Behaviorism and can be "viewed as a culmination of the movement toward objective psychology and a revolt against functionalism and introspectionism [p. 149]." In this tradition, the physical, materialistic, and the mechanistic were deemed scientific, while anything classified as mental was labelled unscientific. Action therapy is heavily indebted to Pavlov, Thorndike, et al., and limits its

investigation and treatment to the objective, specific, observable phenomena. Since this therapy is based on a learning theory, it presumes that problems or symptoms presented by the client are rooted in learning, and their resolution is achieved by applying basic learning techniques. Goldenson (1970) indicates that the sole concern is the elimination of symptoms through the modification of faulty learning patterns:

There is no attempt to probe the unconscious, evoke insight, or produce any basic change in the patient's personality. The only object is to revise current behavior patterns and alleviate symptoms [p. 151].

Under insight therapies, the distinction between intrapsychic and phenomenological therapy does not appear particularly germane to a study on ethics. The objectives and techniques of both therapies are in substantial agreement as to the subjective nature of the undertaking and its desired ethical outcome. Nevertheless, to offset confusion, the difference in orientation and emphasis will be briefly stated. Millon (1967) indicates that:

The emphasis given to early childhood experience by intrapsychic theorists represents their contention that disorders of adulthood are a direct product of the continued and insidious operation of past events To the question "What is the basis of adult disorders?" they would answer: the anxieties of childhood and the progressive sequence of defensive maneuvers which were devised to protect against a recurrence of these feelings [p. 139].

Millon (1967) explains the change in focus for the phenomenological therapies:

Phenomenologists stress that the individual reacts to the world only in terms of his unique perception of



it. No matter how transformed or unconsciously distorted this perception may be, it is the person's way of perceiving events which determines his behavior. Concepts and propositions must be formulated, therefore, not in terms of objective realities or unconscious processes, but in accordance with how events actually are consciously perceived by the individual [p. 243].

Fromm (1962) is well within the intrapsychic tradition and has been the chief protagonist within his own school, trying to broaden and loosen its founding doctrines which were so rigidly tied to "the libidinal organization of the individual [p. 14]," which Freud felt to be the basic nature of all reality.

Fromm's essentialism stands in the way of his complete acceptance of phenomenology. He is naturally impressed and in sympathy with any approach to human beings which places man, his needs and well being, so forcefully in the forefront. In this connection, it must be remembered that Fromm is not purely an essentialist. His paradoxical logic itself is sufficient to dispel that proposition. He stands in the middle between the essentialists and the existentialists, between the philosophies of East and West. Man does not simply and solely define himself. He emerges and becomes by valuing, but not completely. There are laws, truths, and principles to which he must conform, or he will lose in the end. However, the laws and truths are not immutable or absolute. In fact, many norms are even now seeking definition. Thus, man possesses a common core (essential) which, if followed, will permit him to develop (existential) into the unique person his potential comprises.

Before leaving this matter, it should be noted that there is a trend in some quarters to join action and insight therapies. Should these therapists retain their orientation toward measurable, observable behavior while dividing their concern with the interior world of the client, it would appear that their position would be greatly strengthened. Fromm's analysis would support such a trend and would affirm his feeling that the insightful reduction of symptoms is a great advantage.

Fromm is diametrically opposed to both the objectives and the techniques of Behaviorism per se. Instead of seizing on this or that neurotic symptom, he looks to the less conspicuous concerns which have arrested the growth and development of the personality.

There are marked differences in the results of therapies which aim primarily at "social adjustment" as opposed to those which aim at the "cure of soul," in the larger sense of "caring for" noted above. Many therapists, pure behaviorists being the extreme, consciously or unconsciously view social adjustment as the primary criteria of mental health. Their therapies, according to Fromm, aim at returning man to an already alienated society. Thus, they view man, alienated and out of touch with himself, as real man, healthy and happy as can be expected to be in today's world. Fromm (1966b) sees the same trend even in psychiatric circles, and sounds a stern warning:

Our current psychiatric definitions of mental health stress those qualities which are part of the alienated social character of our time: adjustment, cooperativeness, aggression, tolerance, ambition, etc. [p. 187].

Much of the modern psychotherapy, from Fromm's perspective, has itself alienated ideology. The therapists are victims of the diminished concern and care for man's basic need which is so extensive in the larger community. As noted earlier, Fromm's contention is that modern man, as he is found in Western countries and especially the United States, has a marketing orientation. This particular orientation comprises a strong tendency toward conformity. The Marketing man has no real identity. His "self" is hardly more than an echo chamber which collects and magnifies what others are saying about him. He learns about himself as if by rumor. He registers high in social intelligence, but his jovial and smiling face is but a mask for his basic insecurity. He is insecure because success is the sole measure of happiness. However, success rests in the hands of others. In fact, success means the approval of others.

It is important to note that as this new personality orientation began to predominate, a new trend among clients themselves began to manifest itself. The new clients were not sick in the traditional sense. Well fed, housed and sociable, they suffered from none of the more conspicuous neurotic symptoms, for example, hysterical vomiting or obsessional thinking, which was almost exclusively associated with traditional mental illness. They were led into



psychotherapy with vague complaints about suffering from general "difficulties in living." They felt lifeless and bored; but neither family, friends or employer looked on them as sick. With this shift in trend, therapists shifted as well. Fromm (1965b) maintains that "emphasis was more and more shifted away from therapy of neurotic symptoms to therapy of difficulties in living rooted in the neurotic character [p. 67]."

Neurosis is a moral failure. That failure is rooted in the character. From this it follows that not the neurotic symptom but the neurotic character properly ought to be the concern of the therapist. It is not this or that counterproductive action which is worthy of ethical measurement, but the whole series of actions flowing from the nonproductive character. The separation of the neurotic symptom from the larger problem of faulty character development not only destroys the basis of ethical judgment, but works a distinct disservice on the client himself.

In discussing the disservice done to the client, there is no advantage in reducing the consideration to the absurd. Few discerning therapists would relieve an Adolf Hitler or child molester of their disturbing feelings. Their increased anxiety and guilt feeling give indication of the decay orientation exhibited by their behavior. The point in question is made quite adequately by the typical assembly line worker. His complaint, on the surface, is that he has suffered hysterical blindness for the last few



days. The blindness is total and sets in about fifteen minutes before it is time to go home. Medical reports indicate that there is no organic base. His complaining symptom may well be rooted in his inhumane position at work and an intolerable marriage situation. Consciously, he admits only to feelings of lifeless boredom. It can hardly be termed a moral achievement merely to remove the symptom without further insight and affective knowledge into his more general complaint. In point of fact, the neurotic symptom may well be a defense mechanism set in motion to protect the client against unconscious suicidal or homicidal impulses. The premature removal of the symptom may well permit full attention into just how useless and wasted or angry he really feels, and his suicide or a homicide may follow.

Nevertheless, some action therapies propose to do just that. London (1964) reflects:

The scientific pretensions of all systems [of action therapy] are based primarily on the claim of practical consequences, specifically on their potency for symptom reduction. Under the circumstances, the scientific status of action therapies is relatively easy to judge; either they remove symptoms or they do not [p. 117].

It is clear that the whole criterion of merit, within the ranks of action therapies, rests on the premise that what is done be scientifically measurable, as if what is scientifically measurable is any guarantee as to what is in the best interest of the client. Since what is scientific is in no sense absolute and a good deal more personal.

than common sense purports, such therapies can easily be exploited by current ideologies which may or may not be friendly to mankind in general and the client in particular.

The underlying danger is the strict division between psychology, philosophy, and ethics. Without this frame of reference, action therapies are reducible to a greatly exaggerated yet dangerous piece of technology. Yet, London (1964) concludes such is the case:

. . . Though they have none of the Skinnerian's disdain for theory, neither Wolpe nor Stampfle nor any other action therapy theorist would rest the scientific claims very heavily on the intellectual elegance of his theoretical formulations [p. 117].

It would appear from this that action therapy is a good deal more dangerous when it succeeds than when it fails. It is true enough that "cure" is a vague concept, just as insecurity and lifeless boredom are value complaints. Nevertheless, the removal of a symptom, in and of itself, can in no real sense be said to cure the client. It is at best a provisional solution which never produces the kind of ethical attitude which marks the turning point in a person's life. If psychotherapy is worthy of its name, the client must be "cared for," that is, his interests--far reaching and ill-defined--must be the object of concern and investigation on the part of the therapist. For Fromm, the object of such concern is the character which, as will soon be indicated, is the basis of ethical judgment.

Cure of Soul

The heading "Cure of Soul" comprises the full weight and depth of what Fromm means by psychotherapy. As noted earlier, therapy connotes the larger and more profound context of caring. It is in this context that the therapist himself must bear heavy ethical responsibility. Living is an art. Those whose function it is to aid and intensify the search for life should themselves be skilled artisans. The therapeutic process has its own norms and principles which, if violated, frustrate or destroy progress. However, the objective norms by which the therapist operates must themselves be the subject of continual investigation and refinement.

Ethics, then, come in on the side of the therapist. He must make a moral judgment as to the degree and intensity of the client's constructive and destructive impulses. Logic demands that the nature of such an ethical judgment be discussed.

First, the client's uniquely personal choice for or against life is not made the object of ethical inquiry. To seek to place praise or blame in this incredibly private area is outside the therapist's competence. It is well known that many client's decay orientations are the product of environmental forces which, for all practical purposes, no individual could have escaped. Thus, their course could be said to have been set for them. Certainly the

experienced therapist many times feels that had he been subject to the same pressures, he would have collapsed long before the client. Thus, the question as to whether the client could have acted differently is not made a part of the therapist's ethical judgment.

Second, exactly what is the therapist judging? What is there to judge if not the client's personal moral choice to live or die? The answer is that instead of trying to judge whether and to what extent the client could have acted differently, the therapist weighs and evaluates the end product, that is, the client's present condition. But even here, the judgment is greatly qualified. Fromm (1967) contends that the therapist does not "have the function of a 'judge' referring to the activity of absolving and condemning [p. 236]." As is obvious, such a judgment would arise out of an authoritarian frame of reference. It is an appeal to a power which transcends man himself. Instead, Fromm (1967) uses judgment as a second sense which "means to exercise the mental function of assertion and prediction [p. 236]." This is a moral judgment. The assertion states the present strength or weakness of growth oriented impulses. Prediction provides a judgment about future behavior. Compassion and caring cannot be genuine if it distorts the client's present course and lessens or nullifies his chances to be more fully alive. Hence, the therapist's evaluation must not only be made correctly, but he must tenaciously

hold on to it. Failure to do so is to reduce therapy to mere sentimentality.


It is necessary to note that Fromm (1967, p. 237) finds the judgment of character essentially no different from understanding and judging any human performance. Anything from a portrait to a suit of clothes can be made the object of judgment. The judgment is based on the norms and principles of painting or sewing. Even should a master tailor or artist choose to help the novice and demonstrate great compassion for the limitations which forced the individual to produce such an inferior product, the judgment as to the quality of the work remains in force. The same is to be said for the therapist. The object of the art of living is the unfolding and development of the individual's potential. No matter how tragic the client's history, the moral judgment is made. The fact that the therapist elects to aid and understand the client does not change his judgment.

The therapeutic relationship itself falls well within Fromm's meaning of ethics. As just indicated, judgment, in the sense of authority transcending the client, is to be scrupulously avoided. The therapist establishes judgment of competence, nothing else. Fromm's works seldom deal directly with therapy. However, two points should be drawn from his writings.

First, it is clear from the study that Fromm would view a person coming to therapy not as a "client" in the

Rogerian sense, but as a "patient" who comes to an expert for help. The therapist and client are not peers in an existential encounter, but more like a teacher and student relationship. Fromm uses this model not only to give weight to his own expertise, but to signify the distance between them as well. The therapist is a model, an individual more successful in the art of living. The distance is neither defensively maintained nor even desired. It is simply an acknowledged fact which is never made the object of ethical inquiry. This therapeutic model can be contrasted with the relationship between the slave owner and the slave. As noted earlier, this relationship is built both on maintenance and increase of distance, and the frustration of the slave's desire for independence. Fromm's goals for psychotherapy are just the opposite. His aim is to reduce the distance and increase independence as rapidly as possible.

Whatever the contribution of the skilled therapist, he cannot be said, in any real sense, to heal the client. This observation touches the heart of the study and the therapeutic effort as well. The client, by his ethical decision to choose life, "heals" himself. There is no substitute for this basic commitment on the part of the client. Neurosis, like no other phenomenon, demonstrates both the client's desire and failure to be productive. Neurosis is the conflict between man's desire to live and those forces mobilized to block that development. Fromm (1967) concludes the study by pointing out that his therapeutic experience



cannot help but impress the therapist with strength of non-productive forces, but on the other hand:

. . . he cannot fail to be impressed by the fact that most of his patients would long since have given up the fight were they not impelled by an impulse to achieve psychic health and happiness The problem of psychic health and neurosis is inseparably linked up with that of ethics [p. 225].



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ERICH FROMM: A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Erich Fromm was born on March 23, 1900, in Frankfurt, Germany. An only child of an orthodox Jewish middle class family, he was greatly influenced by the writings of the Old Testament, especially the writings of the prophets. In reading Fromm's works, it is easy to sense the heavy influence of the prophetic writings on his thought. A prophet was the conscience of the people; he was to awaken and warn the community when they were unfaithful to their higher and nobler aspirations. Fromm adopted a similar mission. He speaks of the modern human family with an intensity which borders on urgency. While remaining optimistic, Fromm views man as working against his own best interest, possibly even his own destruction. Humanistic ethics presents a frame of reference which can turn man around and meaningfully reorganize his priorities. Only such an ethic promises to give man a sense of purpose and sanity--individually, nationally, and internationally.

Fromm's concerns are for peace and international brotherhood. This lifelong interest was the result of an event that determined his development more than anything else: the First World War. Fourteen when the war started, he soon lost the sense of conquest and the excitement of



victories because of his developing insight into the real horrors of war. The war changed Fromm from a boy to a man. He could not dismiss or escape the question "How was war possible?" How was it possible to introduce mass hysteria and national hatred on seemingly decent, God-fearing people? How can these people, friends and acquaintances a few years older than himself, bring senseless inhumanity and death on an international scale?

Another event occurred during Fromm's adolescence which was likewise formative. During these years, Fromm became attracted to a beautiful twenty-five year old woman. She was his senior by some years and, more than likely, unaware of his amorous feelings. She had been engaged twice but broke-off both engagements to live with a widowed father. Shortly after his death, the young woman committed suicide, leaving a note stipulating she was to be buried with her father. The entire episode touched Fromm deeply. Why would an attractive, young girl prefer death to the pleasure and excitement of living? His question eventually led him to Freud and Psychoanalysis. Freud's theories seemed to be an answer, at least in part, to the whole frightening experience.

However, while the individual phenomenon was to some extent answered by Freud, his speculations were too narrow to treat the larger, social phenomenon. World War One and later national tragedies prepared the way for Fromm's subsequent interest in Karl Marx.

Fromm classifies Marx and Freud as the chief architects of modern times. Both men built their theories on the thesis that there was a fundamental principle of orderliness which was the basis of all reality. Fromm's writings never move beyond this singular view of reality. Many of the ideas and theoretical concepts of Freud and Marx, and the contradictions between them, serve as the background for Fromm's own synthesis which arose from his attempt to solve and understand these differences.

A sketch of Fromm's intellectual development could hardly be complete without mentioning his acquaintance with Buddhism in 1926. The philosophy of the East became an integral part of Fromm's thinking. It is from this source that Fromm was initiated into a spiritual system based upon pure rationality and without any irrational appeals to revelation or authority. It was to become for Fromm a part of his style of life.

In his academic career, Fromm took up his studies of philosophy, psychology and sociology at the University of Heidelberg. Here he received his Ph.D. in 1922. From 1928 to 1931 he continued his training at the famous Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute. Upon graduating in 1931, he, together with Frieda Fromm-Reichmann and others, founded the Psychoanalytic Institute at Frankfurt. He came to the United States in 1933 at the invitation of the Chicago Psychoanalytic Institute. He moved to New York in 1934, where he began a private practice. In 1946, he became one



of the founders and trustees of the William Alanson White
Institute of Psychiatry, Psychoanalysis, and Psychology.

In 1949, for reason's of his wife's health, he moved
to Mexico. He accepted a professorship at the National
Autonomous University of Mexico and started the Department
of Psychoanalysis. He retired in 1965 and is now Honorary
Professor at the National Autonomous University of Mexico.



VITA

William Martin Kennedy, sixth child in a family of eight, was born to Goldie Myrick Kennedy and John Laurence Kennedy on September 12, 1934, in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Moving to Orange, Texas in 1944, he graduated from St. Mary's High School in 1954. The next nine years were spent in studies for the Catholic priesthood. Ordained in 1963, he assumed parochial duties in the Houston-Galveston diocese. In February, 1970, after seeking a leave of absence, he left the ministry and was employed by the Harris County Probation Department as a Juvenile caseworker. This occupation was interrupted in order to complete a Master of Education degree in Counseling and Guidance at Loyola University in Chicago. In August of 1970, he married Theresa Lynn White. In September, 1970, he accepted the position of Assistant Principal at the Community School in Houston, Texas. In June of 1971, Mr. Kennedy was enrolled in the Graduate School at East Texas State University. In May of 1973, he received the Doctor of Education degree with a major in Student Personnel and Guidance and an in-depth minor in Psychology.

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