

THE REPRESSION ~ OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

Otto Fenichel and
the Political Freudians

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into a discussion of the psychoanalytic uses of anthropology. Fenichel agreed with Alice Balint that he had not examined the origin of money, only its function; but he challenged her belief that additional anthropological field work would necessarily illuminate its origin. For Fenichel, Róheim's psychoanalytic anthropology unfortunately revealed that field work happily coexisted with deficient theorizing.

Alice Balint maintained that a crude determinism pervaded the old anthropological tradition on which Engels had based his work. "Against Marxists who are content with dogma," Fenichel concurred, it is necessary "to refer again and again to the necessity to studying real conditions" (XX/23 November 1935/4). Nevertheless he detected in Alice Balint the blight of culturalism; she exaggerated the role of education and accepted what Fenichel called "the swindel of personality." Paraphrasing Marx—and reversing his youthful formulations on education—Fenichel stated that "in capitalist society narrow limits are set on educational reforms." Society will not be changed by revolutionizing humanity through education, but by changing the social conditions (XXXVII/29 June 1937/5).

Against cultural optimism, Fenichel emphasized the biological, almost intractable, flow of psychic life. Yet he did not resolve the issue of the relative significance of culture and instinct. Indeed Fenichel's own formulations provoked dissent in the *Rundbriefe*. Recipients bandied about the theme of culturalism or what became designated "Rousseauism": man is naturally good but society is corrupt. Insofar as Rousseauism simplified to the point of falsehood the nature of desire, eros, and instincts, Fenichel, loyal to Freud, rejected it outright. However, Fenichel's own critique of the romantic illusion came perilously close to Freud's late pessimism; it almost accepted the opposite supposition: a natural aggression and evil renders man immune to cultural transformations.

Obviously political psychoanalysts could not accept this

proposition. As Freudians the group did not want to yield to vague ideas on the future resolution of neurosis and sexual antagonism; they resisted a culturalism or what they considered a reformism that failed to confront the psychic depths. Nevertheless several *Rundbriefe* recipients questioned whether Fenichel in rejecting culturalism overemphasized biology.

Two propositions that earned general assent were that the instinctual life of humanity is not accessible to shallow reforms, and that the instinctual life is not damned to eternal sameness. One recipient of the *Rundbriefe*, formerly a follower of Reich's, contributed: "There is only one correct answer to the question, what will the instinctual life of man be like after generations of socialist society? We do not know." However, he continued, clinical experience suggests that the cessation of sexual anxiety will produce an "incredible liberation." Socialism may not inaugurate paradise, but it will bring Utopia closer (?XXIV/? March 1936/9). While Fenichel agreed, he discerned hints of a Reichian sexual reductionism and romanticism in these statements. Sexual oppression, Fenichel replied, is a "consequence and instrument" of domination, but "only one consequence and instrument." Romanticism had distorted Reich's vision: an evil society corrupted a naturally benign sexuality; consequently, according to Fenichel, in Reich's schema the end of sexual repression initiated a life of joy.

These exchanges on romanticism and culture fed into a major theme that troubled the Fenichel circle, their relationship with the neo-Freudians. There were endless letters, reviews, and comments devoted to this issue. It was never resolved, and in large measure, the theoretical irresolution of the political Freudians hastened their demise. To the political Freudians, the neo-Freudians presented a hope and a threat. The conservatism and biologism of establishment psychoanalysis dissatisfied the neo-Freudians; to correct this imbalance, they introduced social and historical categories. Here they

crossed paths with the Fenichel group. However, in their eagerness to modernize psychoanalysis, they surrendered its critical spirit, its dimensions of the unconscious and sexuality. Here they parted from the Fenichel people.

Fenichel realized that his own position on the neo-Freudians required a finely tuned theoretical ear and a pragmatic tactical touch. The mixture was rare. Against the flat culturalism of the neo-Freudians, Fenichel stressed the instinctual and sexual depths. As a political Freudian, he also denounced biological reductionism and the social blindness of mainstream psychoanalysis. For this reason he warmly greeted the neo-Freudians as allies—only to criticize sharply their revisions. On this score he sided with the psychoanalytic conservatives with whom he shared little.

While Fenichel's position was theoretically coherent, even stringent, in the midst of psychoanalytic squabbles it pleased very few. As the neo-Freudians gathered support, the lines hardened. The conservatives glued themselves to Freud's texts and denounced a social or political psychoanalysis that built on these texts. The neo-Freudians rejected by the conservatives discarded more and more dimensions of psychoanalysis finally embracing a very lax sociologism. Fenichel who saw the truth in each position was welcomed by neither faction.

Abram Kardiner, for instance, wrote to Fenichel soliciting a sympathetic review of his *Individual and His Society*.⁸ With bitterness, Kardiner complained that the New York analytic establishment unanimously derided his attention to an anthropological psychoanalysis, judging that his work subverted canonical psychoanalysis. Since Fenichel was "looked upon as a champion of conservatism," a friendly review might turn the tide (LX/11 August 1939/9).

Fenichel bridled at Kardiner's label: "I don't think that my point of view in psychoanalytic questions can be summarized by the slogan of conservatism." He agreed that the "applica-

tion of psychoanalysis to sociology is the main task" and the "first applications of this kind à la Reik or Róheim have been basically wrong." However, he wrote to Kardiner, "the opposite danger does also exist today . . . one might neglect or underestimate the specific discoveries of Freud and the unconscious" (LX/11 August 1939/9).

As was his habit, Fenichel reviewed the book at length and sent the review with a letter to Kardiner. He sympathized with the book's social orientation but not with its rejection of instinct theory. He told Kardiner, "the libido theory has never denied that the personal structures are formed by the frustrating and limiting influences of the outer world" (LXVIII/July 1940/6). Kardiner expressed "deep chagrin" at Fenichel's criticism and failure "to grasp what I was driving at" (LXX/10 August 1940/7). Kardiner subsequently joined Sandor Rado in breaking away from the New York Institute to establish a separate clinic associated with Columbia University.

The same theoretical and tactical jockeying marked Fenichel's relations with Karen Horney, Margaret Mead, and, above all, Erich Fromm. Fenichel saluted Horney's attack on "extreme biologism," which, he noted, remained a constitutional failing of current psychoanalysis. Yet Fenichel anticipated that Horney's receptivity to the "social moment" would entail a "turning away from Freud and a surrendering of specific analytic knowledge" (?XXXIX/11 September 1937/7).

Horney's *Neurotic Personality of Our Time* fully confirmed Fenichel's fears. While it hinted of socialism, her book completely neglected sexuality; ultimately, Fenichel concluded in a review, it can explain neither the social nor psychic structures (XL/23 October 1937/11). He sent the review to Horney who judged it "very fair," but reiterated that they fundamentally differed on instinct theory: "I see it as something which must be overcome" (XLII/7 January 1938/9).



With Fromm, Fenichel maintained the broadest discussions. In Germany they had moved in the same left-wing analytic circles. For several years Fromm belonged to the Institute of Social Research (or, the Frankfurt School), which included Max Horkheimer, T. W. Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse. In the Frankfurt School's journal, Fromm published an article on the social bases of psychoanalytic therapy which prompted Fenichel to reestablish the contact with Fromm that exile had severed. Fromm's essay attacked Freud's therapeutic posture—noninvolvement—as a liberalism camouflaging a cold authoritarianism; Fromm praised Ferenczi as the more radical analyst who dared to encourage love and warmth in therapy. Freud remained a nineteenth-century aristocratic liberal, according to Fromm, correct in his therapeutic behavior, but fundamentally unable to affirm the happiness of his patients.⁹

Fenichel commented in the *Rundbriefe* that on many points Fromm's critique recalled Reich's, although Fromm did not cite Reich. Fenichel wrote to Fromm, suggesting they resume their "interrupted connection": those devoted to a "social psychoanalysis" should work together. Yet he rejected much of Fromm's essay. Fromm's point that Freud was a child of his time was undoubtedly correct. "How could it be otherwise?" To polemicize against Freud as a repressive bourgeois missed the mark. It reminded Fenichel of Reich "who always reproached Freud for not being a Communist" (XXIII/3 March 1936/12).

Fenichel also did not accept Fromm's critique of Freud's therapeutic practice, a recurring objection lodged against Freud by the neo-Freudians. Many neo-Freudians championed Ferenczi; by encouraging affection and love in therapy, he broke with Freud's asceticism. Fenichel defended Freud's orthodoxy as more radical than Ferenczi's reform. The neutrality prescribed by orthodox psychoanalysis, he wrote to Fromm, does not deny the patient's claim to happiness. Nor did he

agree that Ferenczi's teachings on love radically transcended the social taboos that beset Freud. In fact, in his last years a reactionary flavor permeated Ferenczi's ideas. Alluding to Ferenczi's final illness and mental deterioration, which his followers have always contested, Fenichel wrote that he did not know why Fromm celebrated "the great Ferenczi in this period of his decline." To be sure he retained his "genial flashes of insight"; but this did not suffice to elevate him to a "revolutionary analyst who overcame liberalism" (XXIII/3 March 1936/12).

Fromm responded in detail to Fenichel's comments. Ferenczi was no revolutionary, yet his relationship with patients struck a different note from Freud's. Fromm also explained his dearth of references to Reich "on personal as well as factual" grounds. Personally he found intolerable Reich's "pathological self-love and arrogance." Moreover, despite appearances, he and Reich tap antagonistic traditions. "Philosophically Reich in no way represents historical materialism; rather he represents a mechanical materialism. . . . In reality he has never understood Marxism." While unyielding about Ferenczi, Fenichel completely accepted Fromm's evaluation of Reich. Reich's "impossible behavior," he noted, compelled his own move from "secure Oslo to insecure Prague." In general, Fenichel believed, Reich has rendered more difficult the project of a social psychoanalysis (XXV/23 April 1936/10).

Even as Fenichel endeavored to reestablish relations, Fromm was moving in a neo-Freudian direction. After Fromm published several essays clearly influenced by Horney and other neo-Freudians, Fenichel asked, "What became of Fromm's Marxism?" (90/10 July 1942/14) When Fromm's *Escape from Freedom* appeared, a transition work marking his departure from classical psychoanalysis, Fenichel published a long critical review. "For the purpose of avoiding and correcting mistakes which psychoanalysis admittedly has made," he



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charged that Fromm, Kardiner, Horney, and others “abandon psychoanalysis altogether instead of applying it in a better way.”¹⁰ Fromm embraced a vague social idealism which he falsely imagined was more “real” and “concrete” than Freud’s antiquated concepts.

Privately, however, Fenichel sounded another note: the theoretical issues could not be cleaved from the plight of their circle. To the version of the Fromm review he circulated in the *Rundbriefe* Fenichel added that it was “regretable” that “we” do not write better books than the neo-Freudians. “Perhaps it could be made possible that such better books be written by the reestablishment of our old and forgotten habit of discussing important issues of Marxist psychoanalysis among ourselves” (86/3 March 1942/1). He increasingly accompanied his criticisms of the neo-Freudians with the same lament. “We,” the more political and radical analysts, have surrendered to the neo-Freudians.

In 1937 he sharply criticized Margaret Mead’s *Sex and Temperament* for its “unsurpassable naïveté, bourgeois prejudice, and sociological ignorance” (XXXIII/1 February 1937/9). Eight years later when he evaluated another book by Mead, *And Keep Your Powder Dry*, regret mollified his critique. Fenichel, troubled by his group’s minimal productivity and visibility, concluded that Mead’s book was idealistic and inadequate, yet “its task is our task,” the concrete investigation of social and character structures. In one of his final letters, he noted that fifteen years ago this was “our” program; but we have watched as non-psychoanalytic thinkers assumed the lead. “When will we have the opportunity to sit down together? . . . We all have ideas which go far beyond what Margaret Mead says.” Today, he commented, the analysts know neither anthropology nor history; and if a few anthropologists command psychoanalysis they are deficient in history and sociology (114/2 January 1945/13).

The isolation of the Fenichel group was defined, perhaps caused, by their distance from both the neo-Freudians and the psychoanalytic conservatives. Even as Fenichel fired away at the neo-Freudians, he reiterated that the opposite extreme, a psychological reductionism which explained everything by the Oedipus complex, still flourished. Ernest Jones’s “Evolution and Revolution”¹¹ reminded Fenichel of the vigor of this psychologism. “It is enlightening to see how the ‘leaders’ of ‘orthodox’ psychoanalysis have learned nothing in the last years” (87/22 March 1942/9). That the conservatives continued to prosper was brought home to Fenichel by a critical review of Kardiner by Róheim and a review of Fromm by Menninger; these reviews he considered “obviously unjust” (83/27 November 1941/9). Fenichel often reminded the others that “we” must not cease to distinguish ourselves from the reactionary critiques of the neo-Freudians.

This delicate theoretical posture suffered when translated into the protean world of organizational politics. When Horney and her followers broke with the New York Society, the Fenichel circle faced unpleasant choices: they could not support the revisionists, even though they applauded their general orientation; and they also harbored serious differences with the conservatives who maintained the organization. This “paradoxical situation” pained Fenichel. The Horney group challenged the official organization partly because it failed properly to assess social factors; but Fenichel entertained “no doubt” that we must be against the Horney group since they renounced the essence of psychoanalysis (80/3 September 1941/1).

In the middle of World War II the symmetry between the military and psychoanalytic battle seemed obvious to Fenichel. The alliance of the reactionary Western forces and revolutionary Soviet forces mirrored the configuration within psychoanalysis. An ironic coalition of conservatives and revolutionaries composed the Allies. There is

an analogy . . . in our little field of psychoanalytic politics. . . . In spite of some correct criticisms which are brought forward by the “advanced” people [Horney’s splinter group, the Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis], there is no doubt that they are going to abandon psychoanalysis and Freud altogether. . . . We are forced to side in this matter unreservedly with the “conservative forces” (89/15 May 1942/1).

The *Rundbriefe* never consumed all of Fenichel’s enormous writing energies. In Prague, his home after the break with Reich, he completed a number of penetrating essays. He also gave a course of lectures in Vienna, *Problems of Psychoanalytic Technique*, which has recently been called a “neglected classic” in its field.¹² Several of the sociological essays from this period belong to the best of his oeuvre. Perhaps because he had by then parted from Reich, the essays were not burdened with leaden discussions on the parallels between Marxism and psychoanalysis; these preoccupations had disfigured the piece he had published earlier in Reich’s journal.¹³ And unlike the following years in the United States, the political psychoanalytic community retained an identity that could still sustain—intellectually and emotionally—dissident theorizing.

“The Drive to Amass Wealth,” a critique of Edward Glover, a discussion of Erich Fromm, an evaluation of Freud’s theory of the death instinct, an essay on anti-Semitism, and other manuscripts were all products of these three years (1935–38). Since several of these works are included in Fenichel’s *Collected Papers* they do not require lengthy description here. The essays on wealth and the death instinct partake of earlier discussions.

In 1932 Reich criticized Freud’s new formulations of the death instinct as marking a theoretical retreat.¹⁴ Fenichel generally seconded Reich’s objections: the new theory of primary masochism and self-destruction shifted the cause of suffering from external repression to internal biological need, thus ob-

viating a “critique of the social order.”¹⁵ As Fenichel put it, in accord with the theory of the death instinct, neurosis originates in a conflict of two kinds of instinctual energies, self-destructive and erotic. “Such an interpretation would mean a total elimination of the social factor from the etiology of neuroses, and would amount to a complete biologization of neuroses.”¹⁶

In contrast to conventional studies, Fenichel’s “Drive to Amass Wealth” is distinguished by its avoidance of antipsychoanalytic sociology or a psychoanalytic reductionism.¹⁷ For Fenichel reductionism marred Ferenczi’s contributions. Ferenczi passed too quickly from the child’s interest in feces to the role of money; he ignored the decisive social institutions, as if capitalism itself arose out of the instincts to collect and accumulate.¹⁸ To Fenichel, capitalism makes use of instincts but is not a product of them. “In the tendency to trace social institutions directly back to biological instincts, we see the same danger of *biologizing*,” which deemphasizes “actual infantile experiences.” “If any individual wishes to collect things, money does not result therefrom.” However, a superficial sociology is equally unsatisfactory: the proposition of economic primacy is “correct,” but too general and abstract.¹⁹

Fenichel’s “Psychoanalysis of Anti-Semitism,” originally delivered before a Prague Zionist group, was published in several versions; the last was included in *Anti-Semitism: A Social Disease*, edited by Ernst Simmel.²⁰ This essay may be the best Fenichel wrote; incisive and original it suggests Fenichel’s brilliance once he relinquished the usual systematization. It ranged beyond the usual theories of anti-Semitism to meditate on the problem of the Jew as the archaic and uncanny—the unconscious—which must be eradicated.

To be sure, Fenichel emphasized the limits of a narrow psychoanalytic approach to anti-Semitism. “The instinctual structure of the average man in Germany was no different in



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1935 from what it was in 1925." Consequently psychoanalysis alone cannot explain the success of nazism. In the six years that separated the two published versions of his essay, Fenichel diluted his Marxism. The later version concludes by reminding the reader of the importance of the prevailing social and economic circumstances, which are "beyond the scope of this paper. However, this does not mean that they are of secondary importance."²¹ The earlier version, by contrast, states that anti-Semitism is a "weapon in the class warfare dominating the present civilized world."²²

Four other articles from these years not included in the *Collected Papers* should also be mentioned here. The first, a series of questions about Engels's *The Peasant War in Germany*, was evidently written for a study group.²³ The second evaluated Fromm's lengthy contribution to the Frankfurt School tome, *Autorität und Familie*, in which Fromm developed the concept of the authoritarian-masochistic character.²⁴ While chiding Fromm for an overdescriptive approach, Fenichel praised the essay.²⁵

Edward Glover's *War, Sadism, and Pacificism* (1933) was the subject of the third piece. Fenichel found nothing to recommend in Glover's reductionist discussion of war. Real social interests and economic forces do not enter Glover's account. "Glover's main error can be formulated this way: all psychological factors that partake of war, he treats as causes of war."²⁶ Glover wrote an unfriendly reply, deriding Fenichel's review as the usual fare of socialists or Communists; he noted that Freud was in full agreement with his book and that psychoanalysis was incompatible with all "isms." Fenichel counterreplied: if my honored teacher agrees with you, then here I "cannot follow" Professor Freud.²⁷

The fourth manuscript is a lecture Fenichel delivered to a cultural society in Basel, "Psychoanalyse und Gesellschaftswissenschaften" ("Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences"). Mak-

ing no claims for originality, Fenichel argued that neither psychoanalysis nor Marxism could be ignored. "Psychologism" failed to do justice to the great social realities of war and capitalism. While a distrust of much psychology is justified, especially academic psychology, it is impossible to comprehend social dependency and authoritarianism without psychoanalysis. The emotional life can only be studied with psychoanalysis, which is not a universal science but an aid in social theorizing.²⁸

Fenichel had lectured in Basel when he toured Europe in early 1938, a dark year for central Europe. The Austrian Anschluss was eight weeks off; the Munich Pact and dismemberment of Czechoslovakia were on the horizon. In addition to Switzerland, Fenichel lectured in France, the Netherlands, and England. He was not reassured; the prospects for life and work looked bleak in Europe. He concluded that a "reduced security of existence" threatened everyone. He had never viewed his stay in Prague as more than "temporary."²⁹ Even prior to his trip through Europe, he had decided to emigrate to the United States; now he redoubled his efforts to obtain the necessary visas and permits.

Fenichel's few years in Prague left a deep imprint on Czechoslovakian psychoanalysis, which was then in its formative phase.³⁰ He commanded a small group of closely knit analysts. The other senior analysts were friends from Vienna and Berlin—Annie Reich, Steff Bornstein, and Henry Lowenfeld. With his inexhaustible energy Fenichel set out organizing the informal Prague analytic community into a regular branch of the International Society.

Later, in Los Angeles, Fenichel fondly recalled the intensity and warmth of the Prague analytic atmosphere. It did not last: Europe was becoming a Nazi colony. A 1938 report from the Prague analysts dryly noted that "the events in central Europe" have brought an end to the Vienna Society and with it the associated Prague group. It observed that half the membership



38. As one of Freud's reactionary acts, Reich lists his "removal" of Fenichel as an editor of the *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse* "because he would not suppress the left" (*Reich Speaks of Freud*, p. 181).
39. "Bericht über die Fortschritte der Psychoanalyse in den Jahren 1909-1913," *Jahrbuch der Psychoanalyse* 6 (1914): 263-424. For an earlier survey, see Karl Abraham, "Bericht über die österreichische und deutsche Literatur bis zum Jahr 1909," *Jahrbuch für psychoanalytische und psychopathologische Forschungen* 1 (1909): 575-94.
40. *Bericht über die Fortschritte der Psychoanalyse in den Jahren 1914-1919*, foreword by Otto Rank (Leipzig: Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, 1921).
41. O. Fenichel, "Fortschritte der Psychoanalyse 1930 bis 1936." (Manuscript) pp. 1-2, 19, 28.

CHAPTER FIVE / Psychoanalysis and Its Discontents: Freudians Against Freudians

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- Freud to Binswanger (9 October 1936), *Letters of Sigmund Freud*, ed. E. L. Freud (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 431.
- See Jones, *Freud*, 3: 186. See the account of the meeting between Freud and Boehm in Richard F. Sterba, *Reminiscences of a Viennese Psychoanalyst*, p. 155 ff.
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 - See Helmut Dahmer, *Libido und Gesellschaft* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1973), pp. 332-35.
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 - O. Fenichel, "A Critique of the Death Instinct," *Collected Papers* (New York: Norton, 1953): 370-71
 - See generally Ernest Bornman, *The Psychoanalysis of Money* (New York: Urizen, 1976).
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