

they feel it is that the Labour Party should be returned at the next election. At any price? At some compromise with socialist principles? Only as a fully committed socialist party? To choose the last would almost certainly be signing up for another five years in the political wilderness, while preserving intact the purity of traditional socialist doctrine. In fact, the middle course is the one most likely to be adopted. It alone offers the possibility of the Labour Party successfully presenting itself to the nation as the "party of progress" (in opposition to the "party of order"), to use John Stuart Mill's phrase. Paradoxically, this profoundly unrevolutionary solution to the problems of Britain in the age of the Long Revolution is perhaps not too far removed from Mr. Williams' central tradition.

Erich Fromm and the Young Karl Marx

Erich Fromm (Editor), *Marx's Concept of Man*. (With a translation from Marx's *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* by T. B. Bottomore.) New York. Frederick Ungar Publishing Company. 1961. 260 pages. \$1.75.

A. James Gregor

THIS volume affords the reader access to approximately two-thirds of Karl Marx's *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*. The competent translation by T. B. Bottomore of selections from the *Manuscripts* is preceded by a long essay by Erich Fromm and con-

stitutes another in the increasing number of "humanist" interpretations of Marx. In this introductory essay Marx is conceived as an "existentialist thinker" protesting against "man's alienation, his loss of himself and his transformation into a thing," the every essence of whose thought is a "concern for man and the realization of his potentialities." All of which is, of course, substantially true. These early *Manuscripts* clearly document the values which animated Marx's protests against capitalism as a socio-economic and

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political system.¹ His subsequent formulations, couched in "value-free" language, succeeded in obscuring, at least in part, the values to which he had, as little more than a youth, unalterably committed himself.² It is important that such a consideration be borne in mind, for many commentators on Marx and Marxism, both proponents and detractors, have contended that scientific socialism required an ethical or moral supplement if it were to constitute a legitimate "world-view,"³ or that Marxism neither possessed nor needed values other than simple "technical rules of conduct, such as are required for communism."⁴

MARXISM, in fact, was nurtured on the moral and ethical fare of German Idealism. "The outstanding achievement," we are told in the *Manuscripts*, "of Hegel's *Phenomenology* — the dialectic of negativity as the moving and creating principle — is, first, that Hegel grasps the self-creation of man as a process, objectification as loss of the object, as alienation and transcendence of this alienation, and that he therefore grasps the nature of *labor*, and conceives objective man (true, because real man) as the result of his *own labor*. The *real*, active orientation of man to himself as a species-being (*i.e.*, as a human being) is only possible so far as he really brings forth all his *species-powers* (which is only possible through the co-operative endeavors of mankind and as an outcome of history) and treats these powers as objects, which can only be done at first in the form of alienation" (pp. 176 f.). History, for the young Marx, was infused with value, it served a moral purpose: the self-

realization of man. The position was never argued, as such: it was "inherited" from Hegel; it constituted the common ground shared by the Young Hegelians.⁵ However much the interpretations of history varied, the central theme of all was the moral concern for the full realization of man.⁶

The *Manuscripts*, themselves, establish these considerations with compelling finality. But this having been established, the question of interpretation and analysis becomes essential not only to formal Marx scholarship, but also to those interested in the purport and intentions of one of the foremost social critics of our epoch. And it is here, after having rendered yeoman service in the cause of an adequate appraisal of the intellectual development of Karl Marx, that Erich Fromm leaves much to be desired. First in the order of presentation, Fromm devotes far too much time inveighing against a view of Marx and Marxism that could only be entertained by the incredibly uninformed, impossibly naive or unredeemably biased: the view that Marx contended that the "striving for maximum profit constitutes the main incentive . . . in the life of the human

race, . . . that Marx neglected the importance of the individual; that the "drive for maximal economic gain [was] a *constant* drive;" that Marx believed in "the creative power of force;" that "maximum production and consumption are the unquestionable goals of society;" that he was concerned with "equalization of income" and making man "the servant of the state and of production." Should there be those who interpret Marx in such fashion, we can hardly expect them to be materially influenced by a book and an argument like that under consideration here. But more than that, in arguing against such postures, Fromm involves himself in a number of curiosities. In arguing against vulgar Marxism he informs us that Marx never referred to his view of history as "historical materialism" (p. 9) — a fact Fromm apparently conceives to be of some real significance. Its significance escapes the Marx scholar. In the *Manuscripts* Marx commends "genuine materialism" (p. 171), while Engels regularly refers to Marxism as "the materialist conception of history."⁷ Fromm himself forgets his polemical posture long enough to refer, on page seventy, to "Marx's historical materialism."

No time would be spent with such a lapse were it merely a curiosity. But it seems to betoken a "reinterpretation" of Marx and Marxism designed to endear itself to the unreflecting romantic and the sentimental existentialist. Marx finds himself increasingly embarrassed by implications of a seeming fellowship with the "tradition of prophetic Messianism" (p. 33), including the Society of Friends (p. 66), German mysticism (Jacob Boehme and Meister Eckhart) (pp. 30, 35, 64),

and Protestant Existentialism (particularly Paul Tillich) (pp. 44, 46, 59; *cf.* p. 73). Real or contrived connections have been argued, in the past, between Marx and Kant (pp. 53 f.), even between Marx and Kierkegaard (pp. 46, 49) and Marx and Goethe (pp. 28, 33n) — but Marx and Nietzsche? (p. 72). The entire enterprise, it would seem, becomes bizarre when connections are discovered between Marx and Zen Buddhism (pp. 21 n., 33, 64). Marxism, in this guise, is conceived as "a resistance movement against the destruction of love in social reality" (Tillich, quoted with approval by Fromm, p. 59), a protest against a society based upon "organized lovelessness" (Huxley, quoted with approval by Fromm, p. 63).

MUCH of the merit of what Fromm says is vitiated by a penchant for such misplaced emphasis. One cannot, for example, creditably read the *Manuscripts of 1844*, written when Marx was twenty-six, or for that matter the *Holy Family* or the *German Ideology*, written when he was twenty-seven, as though they constituted the whole body of available primary literature. And yet such seems to be Fromm's intention. Marx *did* identify himself with "humanism" and "naturalism" explicitly, both in the *Manuscripts* (p. 181) and in the *Holy Family*,⁸ but to suggest that he continued until his death to identify himself with the position assumed in these early documents, without

⁷ F. Engels, "Socialism: Utopian and Scientific," Marx Engels, *Selected Works* (Moscow: Foreign Languages, 1955), II, 136; "Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy," *Ibid.*, I, 369; "The Housing Question," *Ibid.*, I, 621; "Preliminary Note to The Peasant War in Germany," *Ibid.*, I, 640.

⁸ *Cf.* the Foreword to K. Marx and F. Engels, *The Holy Family* (Moscow: Foreign Languages, 1956), p. 15.

¹ Cf. J. Lindsay, *Marxism and Contemporary Science* (London: Dobson, 1949), pp. 19-27; *cf.* also A. G. Meyer, *Marxism: The Unity of Theory and Practice* (Cambridge: Harvard, 1954).

² Cf. H. Foppts, *Der entfremdete Mensch* (Basel: Recht und Gesellschaft, 1953), p. 167; K. H. Breuer, *Der junge Marx: sein Weg zum Kommunismus* (Cologne: Lohse, 1954), pp. 78-91.

³ Cf. E. Hansemacher, *Das philosophisch-ökonomische System des Marxismus* (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1909), pp. 668-688.

⁴ N. Bukharin, *Historical Materialism: A System of Sociology* (New York: International, 1925), p. 239.

⁵ Cf. S. Hook, *From Hegel to Marx* (New York: Humanities, 1950), pp. 87, 109, 111, 136 L, 175.

⁶ Cf. Cornu and Moenke, *Introduction to M. Hess, Philosophische und sozialistische Schriften, 1837-1850* (Berlin: Akademie, 1961), pp. xiv f.



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reservations, is to strain credulity and do considerable violence to Marx scholarship. Eighteen forty-five was a critical year in the intellectual maturation of Karl Marx, a year in which he decided to settle accounts with his philosophic conscience, a "self-clarification."⁹ To pretend that Marx had not, in fact, in any significant sense settled his accounts with his philosophical heritage, that he did not "clarify" his position, is to be at fisticuffs not only with his own unequivocal statement, but also with a considerable body of internal evidence.

Marx, in fact, during this early period, consistently labored to disabuse himself of idealistic residues. That there are idealistic vestiges in the early writings is so evident it hardly need be documented. But since the issue has been joined one need only refer to his early statements on the nature of revolution: in the "Debatten ueber Pressefreiheit und Publikation der landstaendischen Verhandlungen," of 1842, Marx suggested that "the Belgian Revolution was a product of the Belgian Spirit [Geistes];"¹⁰ and in the "Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie," he contended that "Germany's revolutionary past is particularly theoretical, . . . it is the philosopher in whose brain the revolution begins."¹¹ These can be legitimately identified as vestigial idealistic elements. The tone and temper, even in the early *Holy Family*, was to be significantly altered. "The question is not what this or that proletariat or even the whole of the proletariat at the moment considers as its aim. The question is *what the proletariat is*, and what, consequent on that *being*, it will be compelled to do. Its aim and historical action is irrevocably and obviously demonstrated in its own

life situation as well as in the whole organization of bourgeois society today."¹² There need not necessarily be a manifest contradiction between the two positions, but there certainly is a redirection of emphasis, a reassessment with respect to the weight of constituent factors determining the course of revolutionary dynamics.¹³ This whole period, commencing with 1844 and ending in 1845, marks a period of intense self-criticism. This is no more evident than in the varied treatment of alienation (Entfremdung, Entaeusserung) in the *Manuscripts* and in the subsequent literature.

FROMM correctly conceives the concept of alienation as being central to Marx's discussion in the early documents and the concept does provide, in fact, the ethical substructure of even the last of Karl Marx's analyses. But Fromm does not indicate that the concept is significantly altered after 1845. The period with which we are concerned was a period of critical appraisal. Marx made concerted efforts to "concretize" the formal abstractions of German Idealism, even in its reformed guise. Marx sought to establish his revolutionary world-view on

the sure foundation of empirical fact rather than abstract deduction. In the *Manuscripts* this program is, as yet, incomplete. Fromm quotes an extremely significant passage: "*Private property is . . . the product, the necessary result of alienated labor . . . Private property is thus derived from the analysis of the concept of alienated labor . . .*" (p. 52; cf. pp. 105 f.) But he does not comment on this singular presentation. The very stylization is Hegelian: the notion that the empirical fact of private property is the *result* of alienated labor, the *concept* of alienated labor, is singularly abstract — *idealist* if one will.

The young Marx continues: ". . . although private property appears to be the basis and cause of alienated labor, it is rather a consequence of the latter . . . (p. 106) private property . . . has resulted from alienated labor . . ." (p. 107). The singularity here is too evident to pass without comment. "Alienation" in the *Manuscripts* is a vague concept and in the last analysis seems to be, with respect to private property, an esoteric and logically precedent act.¹⁴ Like Hegelian concepts, the concept of alienation in the *Manuscripts* sometimes operates as a logically prior necessity (and then it is tautological¹⁵) with respect to empiric fact (in this case private property), and sometimes it operates as a causally prior necessity. The concept of "alienation" operates in much the same way in the writings of Moses Hess who directly influenced the articulation of the notion in the Paris manuscripts.¹⁶ It is "necessary" that the Human Essence develop in an historical, evolutionary process.¹⁷ Alienated human essence, for Hess, is essentially a logically necessary postulate if history is to

have meaning. Man develops his essence through tension and conflict, through the loss of his proper object; alienation gives rise to private property. History resolves itself in communism, the abolition of private property. We have indicated that Marx entertained essentially this position in the *Manuscripts*.

Marx ultimately sought to provide an "earthly" (irdische), materialistic basis for human history (p. 200¹⁸) to "bring out empirically, and without any mystification and speculation, the connection of the social and political structure with production (p. 197¹⁹). . . . There, where speculation ceases, in real life, there commences real, positive science, manifest practical activity, the practical evolutionary process of man."²⁰ As a consequence the concept of alienation is treated in an entirely *empirical* manner in the *German Ideology* of 1845. The discussion commences with "real" premises: that men must produce in order to live, that they must reproduce in order to maintain the species, and that as production increases a division of labor commences on the basis of the natural distinctions among men (originally no more than a division of labor in the sexual act) — differences in predisposition, needs, accidents and so forth. This division of labor implies

14 "Der Begriff der 'Selbstentfremdung' wurde von Marx in den Pariser Manuskripten verschiedenlich verwendet und scheint dort auf die unbestimmte Vorstellung eines esoterischen Aktes der Entfremdung hinzuweisen." Popitz, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

15 *Ibid.*, p. 142 n. 48.

16 Cf. A. Cornu, Karl Marx: *Die oekonomisch-philosophischen Manuskripte* (Berlin: Akademie, 1955), p. 8.

17 M. Hess, "Ueber das Geldwesen," *op. cit.*, pp. 332 f.

18 K. Marx and F. Engels, *Die Deutsche Ideologie* (Berlin: Dietz, 1953), p. 24.

19 *Ibid.*, p. 22.

20 *Ibid.*, p. 23.

9 Cf. Marx's Preface to *The Critique of Political Economy*, Marx, Engels: *Selected Works*, I, 364; Popitz, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

10 In F. Mehring (Editor), *Aus dem literarischen Nachlass von Marx, Engels und Lassalle* (Stuttgart: Dietz, 1902), I, 215.

11 In S. Landshut (Editor), *Die Fruehschriften* (Stuttgart: Koenig, 1953), p. 217.

12 K. Marx and F. Engels, *The Holy Family*, p. 53; "What . . . had to be done . . . was to prove correctly how in present capitalist society the material, etc., conditions have at last been created which enable and compel the workers to lift this social curse." *Selected Works*, II, 20. There is already a suggestion of this change in Marx's letter to Ruge, September, 1843; cf. Landshut (Editor) *op. cit.*, p. 170.

13 Cf. A. J. Gregor, "Marxism as a Theory of History," *European*, VIII, No. 3 (November, 1958).



the possibility, indeed the fact, that intellectual and material activity — enjoyment and labor, production and consumption — devolve on different individuals, upon different classes. The division of labor and private property are identical concepts. *Out of these conditions arises "alienation."*²¹ The order, indicated in the *Manuscripts*, is reversed. *Private property* causes alienation. What had been a logical or speculative presupposition in the *Manuscripts* has become, in the *German Ideology*, an empirical analysis, and thus it remains in all of Marx's subsequent writings. In the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, of 1848, Marx mocked the "true" socialists who conceived the real activity of a money economy in terms of the abstract "alienation of Humanity."²² The concept of alienation is muted specifically as "Entfremdung," as late as 1857-8 in the draft outlines of the *Critique of Political Economy*.²³ There it is no longer the central concept, having logical or temporal priority to the circumstances prevailing in capitalist society, but treated rather as a *consequence* of the system of private property. The worker undertakes productive effort and creates, as a consequence, capital — which, because it then passes into the possession of another, the capitalist, becomes an alien power. Alienation in this sense is the result of private property and is resolved with the abolition of private property.²⁴ Self-alienation, as a concept, is identified in mature Marxism as the "false consciousness" of ideology which is resolved only with the resolution of *real* alienation, the collective ownership of the means of production.

Fromm has indicated, albeit unconsciously, that alienation in the *Manuscripts* is something other than

alienation in the *German Ideology* and the subsequent economic analysis of capitalist society. In the more mature Marx, alienated labor is the consequence of private property. In the *Manuscripts* private property is the consequence of alienated labor. Fromm, as a Marxian "humanist," reads only the latter position in Marx. Cornu, an "orthodox" Marxist, reads only the former.²⁵

FINALLY, self-realization, as a value, as an almost romantic normative ideal, remains a concern for the mature Marx. In the *German Ideology* this ideal is expressed in terms of the now famous utopian characterization of man in communist society wherein he "hunts in the morning, fishes in the afternoon, rears cattle in the evening and criticizes after dinner" (p. 206²⁶).

But in the more mature Marx, this kind of activity, the "free" activity of the individual, is that activity undertaken after the close of the working day. To understand this one need but read Engels' arch criticism of the anarchist proposals advocating "free" and "voluntary" labor as opposed to the *organized* working day.²⁷ In industry individual will must be subordinate to central direction if one does not wish to destroy the complex organization of productive enterprise and

21 *Ibid.*, pp. 37-31.

22 Marx, Engels: *Selected Works*, I, 58.

23 K. Marx, *Grundriss der Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie* (Berlin: Dietz, 1953), pp. 715-717.

24 *Ibid.*, p. 716.

25 "Nach dieser Auseinandersetzung mit der Nationalökonomie kritisiert Marx die Grundlage der kapitalistischen Produktion und der buergerlichen Gesellschaftsordnung, das Privateigentum und dessen notwendige Folge, die entfremdete Arbeit als Hauptmerkmal des Kapitalismus." Cornu, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

26 Marx and Engels, *Die Deutsche Ideologie*, p. 30.

27 F. Engels, "On Authority," Marx, Engels *Selected Works*, I, 835-838.

return to the handicraft industry of the past. Marx's statement, cited by Fromm (pp. 59 f., 76), clearly indicates the position assumed. Marx's conception of the future society is one in which "associated producers regulate their interchange with nature rationally, bring it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by some blind power; they accomplish their task with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most adequate to their human nature and most worthy of it. But it always remains a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that development of human power, which is its own end, the true realm of freedom, which, however, can flourish only upon that realm of necessity as its basis. The shortening of the working day is its fundamental premise."

IF Fromm has obscured the fact that there was development in the thought of Karl Marx, he is further guilty, it would seem, of pontification concerning matters still in legitimate dispute. On page 22, Fromm tells us that "for Marx science itself and all powers inherent in man are part of the productive forces." Now the discussion concerning the components of the classical but vexedly ill-defined material productive forces has gone on for over a century, and it is not likely that Fromm has resolved the problem. If he has resolved it, he has not argued his case; he has proclaimed it. To assume so naive a position is to offer "orthodox" Marxists an easy success in debate.

It is relatively clear that the forces of production include certain natural preconditions, i.e., nature as the object which human labor transforms.²⁸ The instruments of labor

constitute, as closely as one can determine, the dynamic component of the material productive forces.²⁹ Certainly man's labor power as a force of nature is an element of the productive forces,³⁰ but this is not to say that *science, per se*, is such an element. Man's first historical act is the production of means with which to satisfy his elementary material needs³¹ — man becomes a tool-making animal. The second historical act is the satisfaction of new needs which attend the application of the first instruments of labor.³² Tools, then, the instruments of production, constitute the prime essential of the "material basis of all social organization . . ." ³³ Engels specifically took up the question of the role of science in the development of technology, the instruments of production, in his letter to H. Starkenburg.³⁴ "If, as you say, technique largely depends on the state of science, science depends far more still on the *state* and the *requirements* of technique. If society has

28 Cf. K. Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Program," *op. cit.*, p. 18; *Capital* (New York: Modern Library), I, 199; cf. F. V. Konstantinov, *Los fundamentos de la filosofía marxista* (Mexico, D.F.: Grijalbo, 1958), p. 364.

29 "Relics of bygone instruments of labor possess the same importance for the investigation of extinct economical forms of society, as do fossil bones for the determination of extinct species of animals. Not what is made, extinct species of labor it but how, with what instruments of labor it is made distinguishes different economical epochs." Marx, *Capital*, p. 200 (I have taken some liberty with the translation. I refer the reader to the German, *Das Kapital* (Berlin: Dietz, 1953), I, 188.); cf. also Konstantinov, *Los fundamentos . . .* p. 377; *El movimiento histórico* (Mexico, D.F.: Grijalbo, 1960), pp. 47-50; K. Kautsky, *Ethica e economia materialistica della storia* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1958), p. 102; G. Plekhanov, *The Development of the Marxist View of History* (Moscow: Foreign Languages, 1956), p. 155; A. J. Gregor, *op. cit.*, pp. 151-154.

30 K. Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Program," *op. cit.*, II, 18; Konstantinov, *Los fundamentos . . .* p. 377.

31 Marx and Engels, *Die Deutsche Ideologie*, p. 24.

32 *Ibid.*, p. 25.

33 K. Marx, *Capital*, I, 406, n. 2.

34 Marx, Engels: *Selected Works*, II, 804.



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a technical need, that helps science forward more than ten universities." Such a position is consistent with that assumed in the *German Ideology* and accords itself well with the more explicit statements concerning the relationship of the ideological superstructure and the economic base of society that characterizes the materialist conception of history. In the *Manuscripts* themselves, Marx contends that "religion, family, state, law, morality, science, art, etc. are only particular modes of production, and fall under its general law" (p. 128). He refers to these as various forms of "alienation," forms later lodged in the "ideological superstructure" identified as "efflux of [man's] material behavior" (p. 197), "ideological reflexes and echoes of [his] life process" (p. 198). Engels, in 1877, contended that while the discovery of the materialistic conception of history and the theory of surplus value rendered socialism a science,³⁵ "modern socialism is nothing but [a] reflex in thought . . . an ideal reflection in the mind . . ."³⁶

Such an interpretation would make science essentially a by-product of developments in the economic base of society rather than one of the material productive forces. And most orthodox Marxists have thus conceived it.³⁷ Independent Marx scholars have, at best, held that science somehow "floats" between the material productive forces and the ideological

superstructure of society.³⁸ If there is error in interpretation here, it will take more than a pronouncement by Erich Fromm to correct it.

FROMM's apparent errors, his seeming lack of familiarity with basic Marxist works and his insistent but misplaced emphasis, jeopardize the essentially sound elements of his exposition. The young Marx was a critical naturalist, a humanist in a profound and social sense. How and how much of this youthful sentiment infused itself in the later Marx is a problem which can only be carefully and laboriously explicated. To muster Marx, and Marxism, into the ranks of Quakers, mystics, Protestant divines and Zen Buddhists, to identify Marxism with that "orgy of love" both Marx and Engels roundly mocked, seems but little calculated to enhance such a program.

35 Engels, "Socialism: Utopian and Scientific," *op. cit.*, II, 136.

36 *Ibid.*, p. 137.

37 "Our doctrine has definitely outgrown the visual angle of ideology. The premeditated designs, the political views, sciences, systems of law, etc., instead of being the means and the instrument of the explanation of history, are precisely what require to be explained, because they are derived from determined conditions and situations." A. Labriola, *Essays on the Materialistic Conception of History* (Chicago: Kerr, 1904), p. 104; cf. also Konstantinov, *El materialismo historico*, pp. 83 f., *Los fundamentos* . . . pp. 391 f., 329 and n. 1; P. Judin and M. Rosenthal, *Diccionario de Filosofia y Sociologia Marxistas* (Buenos Aires: Seneca, 1959), pp. 11, 33, 34, 78, 108; I. M. Bochenski, *Die dogmatischen Grundlagen der sozialistischen Philosophie* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1959), p. 58.

38 C. W. Mills, *The Marxists* (New York: Dell, 1962), p. 105.

A Vision Beyond the Absurd

Leonardo Ricci, *Anonymous (20th Century)*. New York. George Braziller, Inc. 1962. 254 pages. \$5.00.

Emile Capouya

"Are all apostles? Are all prophets? Are all teachers? Are all workers of miracles?" — I Cor. 12:29

If I were a poet, says Leonardo Ricci, rather than an architect and painter, it would be easy for me to write this book. Except that words, even for poets, have lost their resonance as they have lost much of their essential meaning. But what am I to do? The painter's symbols no longer evoke communion, the architect's buildings no longer reflect community. I am filled with a revelation that those desiccated arts cannot express. So I am forced to practice as best I may the unfamiliar art of speech, giving out imperfect hints of what has been revealed to me. And in my professional life too, in the practice of my own mysteries of painting and architecture, henceforth I shall work under the sign of revelation. I am confident that, insensibly, all men will be led to do so by their intuition of what is to come. Speech, painting, and the art of building will change insensibly till all three

are making their full contribution to the new estate of man.

Formerly, says Ricci, men lived by myth. They still do, but many of us are disabused of the myth and are committed instead to the absurd. In our day there is even a school of philosophy devoted to the absurd, deploring it and celebrating it. But while the myth may have become meaningless, the absurd is at best the ground of a stoic philosophy of suicide, of an honorable death-in-life. Or else it is the metaphysics of mere contingency, teaching frenzied pursuit of sensation to relieve the boredom of a featureless chaos.

The myth is barren. The absurd is mortal poison. But there is a third and saving canon that, though it may be neglected, is still the vital element in any humane polity, culture, or tradition. That is the commitment to logic — by which Ricci means *logos*, the concept, the creative word.

SUCH language is stirring but unsatisfying. Ricci is aware of it. He tries, accordingly, to invest his categories with meaning through

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