

unlikely areas as industrial development and foreign policy planning — there are problems of pressures and stress, of conflict and ambiguity, which professional understanding of unconscious motivations and group dynamics can help to alleviate.

Until recently, we were *persona non grata* in government offices. Gradually, however, this unfortunate reality seems to have begun to change. If, indeed, our input is sought in the decision making process, this will give us an opportunity not just to react to processes of change, but to plan, predict and prepare for future eventualities.

In order to prepare ourselves for this ambitious, but very realistic role, we will have to invest much energy in education. We will have to define clearly our teaching aims, especially in those areas in which our involvement has been marginal until now. We will have to do much soul-searching and learn to overcome our own resistances, as well as to adapt to new goals. We will have to learn to seek the knowledge that we can gain from other, related professions and to put it to the best use. All this we must do in order to widen our scope, and to meet the needs of such a dynamic society as ours.

### *The Challenge of Peace*

We have started to become involved in many areas of public life and to overcome our isolation. It is my sincere hope that this conference will result in increased involvement in the basic problems of our society — not only those related to war, as has been the case until now. We must now prepare ourselves for the prospect of peace, which may reveal a different kind of stress — one to which we will have to relate. To face up to this glorious challenge — of peace — will be our most serious task to date. We shall find the right answers, if we only dare to pose the relevant questions.

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## *The Conscience in Psychological Theory and Therapy\**

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### ABSTRACT

The aim of this paper is to sketch the concept of moral man in different psychological theories: Psychoanalytic theories, behaviourist philosophy, and the work of Piaget and Kohlberg.

Absolute morality implies the possession of an innate sense of right and wrong. This is denied by behaviourist theory. Psychoanalysis is committed to the idea of moral man, and Freud conceived the superego as a parental introject whose function was to decide which impulses are acceptable and which are not. He is criticized both by Fromm and Money-Kyrle on the grounds of providing a basis for a merely relativist morality. Money-Kyrle's model of the conscience is consistent with absolute morality. Empirical evidence for such a morality is provided by Piaget's work with children, and Kohlberg's cross-cultural work.

The paper discusses the implications of ethical theory for therapy.

The question whether man has an innate sense of right and wrong has long preoccupied philosophers. It implies that there are some essential tenets of morality universal to all men. They are accepted as moral standards by people of different cultures, and even if they are sometimes violated, this violation is regarded as wrong.

If this is not so, morality is merely relative, inculcated in some way by the society in which one lives. It is no more than keeping the rules of the club to which one belongs. If the society is itself corrupt, the standards it inculcates will be likewise. If those who believe morality is merely relative are right, man would have no way of judging the rights and wrongs of the social order that surrounds him.

I should like to sketch the ways in which moral man is conceived by different schools of psychology: Psychoanalysis on the one hand, behaviourism on the other; theories based on psychological research, such as

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Piaget's and Kohlberg's. To be consistent with a concept of moral man, the theory must have a model for the conscience. It must also conceive men as possessed of free will, since morality would have no meaning in a determinist setting.

### *The Behaviourist Model*

Behaviourism as a philosophy did not originate in the 20th Century. The first behaviourist Philosopher was Thomas Hobbes, whose "Leviathan" contains a system of political philosophy based on his psychological model of man. Human beings are "self-moving bodies" driven by passions. Preservation of life is the ultimate aim, and the realities are competition for scarce resources and insecurity with regard to physical safety. War is the perpetual tendency, hence a contract is entered into to prevent it and preserve life. One of Hobbes' psychological laws is "The Law of Gratitude: ... no man giveth, but with intention of Good to himself." All behaviour is ultimately based on self-interest; even apparent altruism is really egoism.

Let us take a brief look at the modern behaviourist model, as outlined by B.F. Skinner. For him morality is a meaningless abstraction, there is only moral behaviour. "Man is perhaps unique in being a moral animal, but not in the sense that he possesses morality; he has constructed a social environment in which he behaves with respect to himself and others in moral ways."

For Skinner, "moral behaviour," which is better termed socially acceptable behaviour, is brought about by operant conditioning. When a particular act is punished, the individual learns to avoid it, and this avoidance continues even when punishment becomes a remote possibility. On the other hand, behaviour earning reward of any kind is thereby "positively reinforced", and its repetition encouraged.

Skinner holds that people should be punished for illegal acts not because they are responsible, which he does not think they are, but in order to modify behaviour, theirs or that of others.

It is clear that in this model the rules of what is good and bad vary with the particular society. A totalitarian society could without difficulty make its members behave in ways of which it approves.

Since according to Skinner there is no moral sense transcending socially conditioned behaviour, there is no criterion that it is wrong to betray one's parents, kill one's friends, exploit those weaker than oneself, or sacrifice

one's children to Moloch or the state. If society finds it expedient, it is right.

It is no coincidence that Hobbes advocated a total ruler, seeing this as the only way to control man and prevent them savaging one another. This is consistent with behaviourist philosophy, which is relativist and has no place for an absolute ethic.

### *Psychoanalytic Models*

#### *(1) The Freudian Superego*

To Freud we owe the concept of the superego. He describes it as a part of the ego altered by identification, by introjection of the parents, as a result of the resolution of the Oedipus complex. Its function is to decide which id impulses are acceptable and which are not.

It is thus a mechanism for directing moral action, as well as a source of moral emotions, in particular guilt feelings.

As Fenichel points out, the formation of the superego is complex. The boy does not always develop a feminine superego, nor the girl a masculine one, as one would expect if it were simply a case of identifying with the frustrating Oedipal object. The superego tends to be masculine or feminine according to the more dominating parent. In our culture this is more often the father.

It is worth noting that this model is more complex than the behaviourist one. It is not a question of acting to avoid punishment or disapproval, or acting to earn approval. The psychoanalytic model accounts for moral action independent of outward acknowledgment, and clearly men are strongly motivated to act thus, feeling guilt when they do otherwise.

While behaviourism makes no attempt to explain guilt feelings, the Freudian model does. However, this is not simple. Guilt feelings are clearly not fear of punishment. They seem to be part anxiety, part self-reproach, as if the superego were punishing one. Fenichel defines that as "'loss of the superego's protection' or 'the inner punishment performed by the superego' ... felt as an extremely painful decrease in self-esteem and in extreme cases as a feeling of annihilation."

Guilt feelings may be appropriate and rational, or inappropriate, not connected with any violation of one's values or with any wrong done. They may be unconscious, making their power felt in some other way.

Freud was as much concerned with the role of the superego in producing neurosis, which was then uncharted territory, as with its moral function.

The superego, thus, goes some way towards explaining conscience, though it is not identical with the conscience. In his "Critical Dictionary of Psychoanalysis", Charles Rycroft defines the conscience as "either a person's system of moral values, or that part of a person which he experiences as voicing moral values. The word refers properly only to *conscious* values and conscious 'still small voices' and should not be confused with the *superego* which differs from it by being partly unconscious and containing imperatives to which the individual does not consciously subscribe."

A need to obey learned rules blindly, to obey authority no matter what, is superego-based. On the other hand, an ability to follow one's own values, to be critical of authority if necessary, is a function of "conscience". But for this Freud has as yet no psychological model.

### (2) *Fromm's Criticism of Freud's Model of Moral Man*

Fromm (1960) criticizes Freud for being a determinist. He also shows that his ethic is merely relativist.

In Freud's model, the pleasure principle, represented by the id, serves libidinal needs. The reality principle, represented by the ego, serves adaptation to society. Insofar as these induce him to behave morally, it is from necessity, because of societal demands. Fromm calls this aspect of the Freudian model "homo economicus." Insofar as relationship serves the mutual satisfaction of needs, he speaks of "homo sexualis". The point Fromm is making is that there is nothing moral about either of these. "Homo economicus" behaves decently to avoid collision with society. "Homo sexualis" behaves "altruistically" to the other so that the other may love him in return. Both these are functions of the ego.

What of the superego? Fromm holds that by "explaining" the conscience as superego, Freud deprives it of objective validity. His argument is this: The superego represents fatherly norms. The father, in turn, derives them from *his* father. The norms are thus culturally determined. This makes the superego socially conditioned.

Fromm contends that the feelings which are repressed are not by way of being universal taboos. They vary from culture to culture: feelings regarded as undesirable in a particular society tend to be repressed. For example, in a peaceful society, a man feeling the impulse to kill would repress it, and possibly feel anxiety in its stead. On the other hand, in a warlike tribe, a man feeling a revulsion against killing and repress this, might develop symptoms such as nausea. In Western society, a business

man feeling an impulse of generosity to a poor customer would repress it. He might well be aggressive to the customer by way of reaction formation.

Thus, the unconscious for Fromm contains good as well as bad, and its discovery by the individual is an enriching experience in itself.

Therapy has an enabling effect on morality: It makes man more moral in that it frees him to be more himself.

### (3) *Money-Kyrle's Model of the Conscience*

Money-Kyrle (1953), as philosopher and psychoanalyst, asks how it is possible that a science like psychoanalysis — which is neutral — can further human morality. To put it another way, how can the pursuit of truth, of knowledge, lead to an increase of moral goodness? Money-Kyrle holds that it is by no means obvious that the pursuit of truth, in the form of making the unconscious conscious, serves morality.

He recalls the Platonic thesis that to know what is good leads one automatically to seek it out. This argument, as Money-Kyrle points out, rests on a tautology: Plato defines the good as "that which is desirable".

The question needs to be asked all over again for psychoanalysis. Money-Kyrle's answer is something like this: Through knowing his unconscious impulses, and knowing that they are rooted in phantasies which are irrational, a man is enabled to change his emotional behaviour.

What is even more relevant to the present inquiry is Money-Kyrle's conception of two types of conscience:

The first is the Freudian superego, which results from splitting the parent and introjecting "the less realistic and terrifying part". Like Fromm, he shows that superego morality is a relativist morality, because the parental code is derived from the mores of society.

"Thus the super-ego morality of a 'good' German Nazi is very different from that of a 'good' British socialist, and still further removed from that of a 'good' Trobriander or Dobuan. There is indeed only one common element in the super-ego moralities of different societies or sub-groups: they all alike demand the same unquestioning obedience, but to codes of very different kinds."

There is, however, a second kind of morality based not on fear but on love. Money-Kyrle derives this from the Kleinian "depressive position". Melanie Klein holds that the development of the superego is not tied to the Oedipal stage, but begins quite early in infancy. It arises through fantasies of being persecuted from within: the "paranoid position."

The "depressive position" is consequent upon this. The infant sees the

maternal breast as two objects, the good (giving) and the bad (depriving, persecuting) breast. Having in fantasy or in reality vented his rage and frustration upon the "bad" breast, he comes to realize that the good and bad breast are one and the same. The realization brings the fear that he has destroyed it. There is remorse, depression. Out of this arises the desire to make reparation.

This is the origin of the second type of conscience. It is convenient to refer to the first type as the "persecutory", the second type as the "depressive" conscience. Money-Kyrle explained moral conflict as conflict between the claims of the two types of conscience. For example, it may be a case of obeying authority versus helping the underdog.

The two types of conscience may co-exist, though usually one or other predominates. Money-Kyrle presents us with an attractive description of four types of people, classified according to the nature of their conscience:

(1) Those who claim to have no moral scruples. This is due to hypo-manic denial of conscience.

(2) Those who are at once self-righteous and censorious. Their guilt is "for export only". They are full of moral indignation, because they project their guilt on to others.

In contrast to types (1) and (2), types (3) and (4) are *conscious* of a conscience.

(3) are authoritarian in type, concerned with obedience to a stern super-ego or external authority. Here the persecutory element dominates.

In (4) the depressive element prevails. They are concerned more with loyalty to their own values and those who represent them than with authority; they are unafraid of disobedience. "In practice they may be less law-abiding citizens, but they are more kindly and ready to take up arms in the defence of other people's wrongs."

One way this model of the depressive conscience proves itself is in providing a satisfactory explanation of guilt feelings.

What the Freudian model accounts for is an expectation of punishment, a feeling that one ought to be punished for what one has done or a feeling of being reproved by something inside oneself. This adds up to an extremely powerful and painful emotion, but there is still a missing link.

Let us compare this with the feelings engendered by the depressive conscience. These latter are clearly feelings of remorse, and regret at having done damage.

One may argue that the depressive conscience is itself primitive, the guilt representing regret at having bitten off the hand that feeds one, as it were.

So it may be, in the infant; but it is reasonable to imagine it developing into a remorse based on empathy with others, a regret at having done to others as one would not be done by, a distress at having hurt those one loves.

Another characteristic of depressive guilt feelings is their potentially constructive nature. If guilt feeling springing from the "persecutory" conscience lead to reparation, they do so indirectly: they may also be paralyzing or even counter-productive. It is not so with "depressive" guilt feelings. Having damaged, there is an emotional need to make reparation. And since remorse in the depressive conscience is based on empathy, on identification with the other, a further development is generalization: One comes to feel that one should not do to others as one would not be done by. And this corresponds fairly closely to the Kantian concept of morality, that only that which is universalizable is morally right.

It would seem, therefore, that Money-Kyrle's model of the conscience comes very close to what we think of as the conscious, discriminatory, rational conscience.

#### *Theories based on Psychological Research*

##### (1) Piaget

From his research on the development of moral judgment in the child, Jean Piaget (1952) concludes that there are "two separate kinds of moralities which follow one another without constituting definite stages." The first type, which arises from moral constraint by the adult, is heteronomy. The second type, arising out of mutual respect and cooperation, is autonomy.

In heteronomy, the child obeys rules blindly because they were given him by his parent. When questioned, he can give no reason for them stronger than that the parent received them from his parent in turn. It is significant that, at this stage, he cannot define the concept of "he", sees it merely as a "naughty word", something for which one is punished. This example illustrates the nature of heteronomous morality: It is a case of obeying because one must.

Piaget finds an intermediate stage, in which the child obeys the rule rather than the parent: he sees to have internalized the rule.

In the autonomous stage, the child initiates acts of kindness and generosity, even self-sacrifice, which are in no way prescribed. This kind of morality is based on feelings of mutual respect and cooperation, and the

peer group plays an important part in engendering it. There is an understanding that what hurts oneself hurts the other. Piaget sees in this the starting point of a "morality of good" as opposed to the "morality of duty."

It is evident that Piaget's "morality of Good" is not derived from parental precepts and is therefore not culture-dependent. Thus Piaget makes a case for the existence for an innate sense of right and wrong.

## (2) Kohlberg

The psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg (1972), continuing in the Piaget tradition, carried out research on the development of moral judgment in adolescents aged 10 to 16 in different culture: U.S.A., Mexico, Taiwan, Turkey, Yucatan.

The question he wanted to investigate was whether a developmental sequence was discernible, and whether there were common factors in the different cultures. His method was based on posing an imagined moral dilemma and asking what the characters ought to do.

He found that in all cultures one could distinguish progressive stages, which are:

- (1) Punishment and obedience orientation
- (2) Instrumentalist-relativist orientation
- (3) Interpersonal Concordance
- (4) Law and Order
- (5) Social Contract
- (6) Universal Ethical Principle

In Stage 1, "good" is done only for gain and to avoid punishment, whereas in Stage 2 there are elements of reciprocity, but pragmatically interpreted: "You scratch my back and I'll scratch yours." In Stage 3, approval and disapproval becomes important.

In Stage 4, there is a Law-and-Order maintaining orientation. The rule is obeyed as such and is internalized. Kohlberg holds out that Freud and Piaget have confused this stage with Stage 1 (obedience from fear of punishment).

It should be noted that there is no criticism of the nature of the rule in this highest of the "conventional" stages. At stage 5, there is attention to the nature of the rule or to creating laws ex nihilo. The object is to find a just social contract.

This still leaves some problems unsolved, such as the conflict between morality and keeping the law, when the law does not prevent an injustice.

If the only way to save someone's life is to break the law, stage 6 moralists would hold that this should be done. Stage 6 morality is based on reversibility and universalibility, and treating each person as an end in itself. These are the principles of morality described by Kant. Clearly, this stage transcends cultural conventions.

Kohlberg found that each successive stage has new logical features, incorporates the features of the lower stages, and addresses problems unrecognized or unsolved by lower ones

The same pattern of development is found in all the cultures studied.

Kohlberg is not content with empirical evidence against relativists, he points out flaws in their philosophical arguments. For example, practice is often confused with values held. It is fallacious to say that honesty is a middle class value because working class children sometimes steal, when in fact they state, on questioning, that stealing is wrong.

Another mistake is to commit the naturalistic fallacy. If an analyst said to a patient: "Your striving for power is bad because it is based on anxiety," the patient would ask: "Why does that make it bad?" He would require an answer in terms of values.

Kohlberg shows that Stage 6 morality is the most adequate. He concludes that there are universal moral principles which apply to all cultures. Mature morality is not something acquired by conditioning or internalization of rules.

He claims that moral decisions are based on conscious conflict, and that the moral force in personality is cognitive, though affect is involved. "Principled morality . . . is motivated by awareness of the feelings and claims of the other people in the moral situation."

## Discussion

It is not difficult to see how the models that Piaget and Kohlberg derived from their research correspond to the behaviourist and psychoanalytic models.

Piaget's "morality of duty" is superego morality, or Money-Kyrle's "persecutory conscience" morality. His "intermediate stage" seems to be the internalization of parental precept to become "superego". The "morality of good" corresponds to the "depressive conscience" of Money-Kyrle.

If we consider Kohlberg's stages, behaviour theory morality corresponds



to stages 1 to 3 (from avoidance of punishment to seeking “reinforcement” in the form of approval).

Superego morality or “persecutory conscience” is Stage 4, possibly including Stage 3. Stage 6 (and possibly also Stage 5) correspond to Money-Kyrle’s “depressive conscience” morality. Although Kohlberg classifies both Stages 5 and 6 as post-conventional, it may well be that Money-Kyrle would see only Stage 6 as typifying “depressive conscience”. The principles of reversibility and universality which characterize Stage 6 are, moreover, based on the ability to put oneself in the other’s shoes.

### *Ethics and the Neutrality of the Therapist*

All this raises the question whether the taking of a moral stance conflicts with the principle of neutrality in therapy.

The psychoanalyst, particularly, is committed to neutrality, both for procedural and ethical reasons.

Procedurally, psychoanalysis cannot occur, either as scientific or therapeutic process, unless the analyst is neutral and unjudging. It is this accepting attitude which enables depression to occur. As Rycroft puts it, a thought must be entertained before the patient can decide for or against it. The patient may say to the analyst: “I want to murder you . . . no, actually, I don’t.” It is important to be permitted, enabled, to experience forbidden feelings.

The second sense in which psychoanalysis, and, in my view, any psychotherapy has to be neutral, is in not imposing any specific value system on the patient, neither that of the therapist or that of the institution which employs him (which may be the state). It is easy to see that the latter can bring about a serious infringement of the freedom of the individual in the extreme example of the totalitarian state. Witness the hospitalization of dissidents in the U.S.S.R. But the bias may be subtle. Even in Israel, some immigrant psychiatrists diagnose schizophrenia more frequently than other nationals. And even in a non-totalitarian state, it may take a deliberate effort not to regard deviation from the norm as equivalent to sickness.

I do not hold with the view of Szasz that he who pays the piper calls the tune. If there is a state health service, it does not follow that the psychiatrist should serve the interests of the state rather than the individual. The state exists for the sake of the citizens and not vice versa. Nor would it be right for a psychiatrist or psychotherapist to aid an

individual in unethical behaviour, whether or not he pays him. Who would take on a professional thug who asked to be relieved from guilt feelings about killing people?

The crucial question here is the meaning of neutrality. If it is merely a matter of not taking sides, it becomes parallel to the position of a neutral country which is prepared to train terrorists, no matter which side they are on.

A second kind of neutrality is one based on an ethical viewpoint, involving such universal principles as the sanctity of human life and human freedom. It is this ethical viewpoint which is after all the *raison d’être* of the neutrality. I think that this is the nature of the neutrality of psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis is not value-free. Were it so, it would become a technology and serve any cause whatever, good or bad.

That psychoanalysis is uncommitted to morality, and that one of its functions is to “liberate” from all guilt feelings is, after all, no more than a popular fallacy. There are two kinds of guilt feelings: those connected with violations of the individual’s value system, and those not connected with any such wrong-doing. The philosopher Marcia Cavell terms them appropriate and inappropriate. It is the inappropriate which particularly interests psychoanalysts. They may be based on repressed memories, or on infantile ideas assuming the omnipotence to evil wishes. They may themselves be unconscious and masquerade as various symptoms. As to appropriate guilt, it is the task of psychoanalysis to help the analysis and distinguish it from the inappropriate. Martin Buber in a paper on “Guilt and Guilt Feelings” (1957), holds that the analyst must recognize them and realize his task stops at this boundary; the difficult journey from guilt to remorse and reparation can only be made by the patient alone. Marcia Cavell (1970) spells out the analyst’s task as helping the patient to become fully conscious of appropriate guilt and helping him to bear it and take full responsibility.

It is my thesis that the neutrality of the psychotherapist is based on the assumption that the other, the patient, is an autonomous being with his own absolute sense of right and wrong. It is this very assumption which makes it possible for him to limit his function to enabling one. When the model of man is a mechanistic one, the therapy can only substitute one mode of functioning for another. This involves a decision on the therapist’s part which mode is preferable, presumably from the point of view of society, to which the individual is expected to adapt. Even if the patient is consulted, it is rather like asking him whether he would prefer his knee

joint fixed in flexion or in extension. The therapy makes him no freer than before.

Brull emphasizes the function of psychotherapy in making the patient free. This can only be done by a therapy that sees the other as a fellow human being with an innate sense of right and wrong, be it psychoanalytic, Rogerian or existential.

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### *Brief Treatment with Oxazepam in Crisis Intervention — with a Symptom-Profile Study in Acute Anxiety Patients*

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Twenty-two adult anxious neurotic patients completed a two-week crisis intervention program following their first visit to a community mental health center. The treatment consisted of brief psychotherapeutic intervention combined with a daily dose of oxazepam 30 mg for one week and placebo for one week according to random double blind cross-over design. Pretreatment symptom profiles codetermined outcome. Subjects responding to the anxiolytic effect of oxazepam had profiles high on free floating anxiety, acute obsessive symptoms, emotional lability and somatic complaints. The depressant action of oxazepam became apparent in Ss with different symptoms: neurotic depressiveness and longstanding obsessive and phobic symptoms.

It is generally assumed that the presence of neurotic symptoms other than anxiety, influences the action of the benzodiazepine anxiolytics on the main symptom [9,11]. A description of patients on an unidimensional continuum is not enough for the prediction of outcome [5].

It would be useful to have at one's disposal a rationally based method for determining a multidimensional symptom profile as a predictor for selecting the positive drug responders [10].

In the present study we attempt to come to grips with this problem by developing a non-metric statistical description of drug-specific multidimensional symptom-profiles and compare this method with a unidimensional approach.

A strong non-specific (placebo) effect can be expected to occur during the first week following acceptance of any therapeutic regime [12, 14], and patients tend to withdraw too soon. Thus, an anxiolytic drug trial has to be

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