

For Rainer,
Best,
Alan

**Eros, Anguish and Authority:
An Answer to Jung's Old Testament Exegesis**

a. Freud, Jung and Sexual Anguish

The themes of sexual anguish and privation, and the virtues of sublimation and renunciation, run repeatedly through Freud's writings and personal correspondence. Indeed, Freud might be described as *the* theorist of sexual anguish, who thematized this domain of human experience with a candor and outspokenness rare in any period, and especially noteworthy for Victorian times. His message was quite simple -- that at some critical juncture we all suffer sexual anguish, because the requirements of culture are at variance with the promptings of our instinctual being. The question is whether or not we become neurotic as a consequence. Neurotics waiver inconsequentially between denial of the instincts and the covert gratification of elicit desire through symptomatology. Those who abandon all constraint, on the other hand, may not fall ill, but will not develop the redeeming traits of character that make human society bearable in the long run. Finally, those who master their instincts emerge stronger, more civilized beings, who are capable of furthering the cause of civilization.

While many features of Freudian theory strike us as novel, the attempt to redeem suffering by giving it an ennobling value and *raison d'être* -- which is what Freud was trying to do for his time -- is the central





problem of Judaeo/Christian theodicy. Notwithstanding his militant atheism, Freud followed in this tradition inasmuch as he attempted a radical elucidation of the sources of human suffering, and of possible paths to redemption, and in his equally radical insistence that genuine salvation was attainable only by an elect or minority of humankind. Where Freud deviated from tradition was in his attempt to foster more openness and honesty about sexual matters. For even in the absence of solutions to the myriad vexations of desire, Freud declared that "civilized" sexual morality - - conditioned, as it is, by the sexual double standard, the lack of adequate contraception, of enlightened sex education, and so on -- results in a level of ignorance and hypocrisy in society that is absolutely unnecessary. Apart from its morbid and debilitating consequences, the taboo on sexual topics is also to be faulted for corroding our concern and capacity for truthfulness. The result, in his own words, is that "in matters of sexuality at present we are all, every one of us, hypocrites, whether we be ill or well." (Freud, 1898, p. 224)

Inevitably, of course, at various points Freud's papers, correspondence and dealings with colleagues suggest that he himself felt implicated in the problems he so vividly described. One very important clue is a paper entitled "Civilized" Sexual Morality and Modern Nervousness." According to Freud

. . . satisfying sexual intercourse occurs in marriage only over a period of a few years, allowing also, of course, for intervals of abstention on hygienic grounds required by the woman's state of health.

After these three, four or five years, marriage



ceases to furnish the satisfaction of the sexual needs that it promised, since all the contraceptives available hitherto impair sexual enjoyment, disturb the finer susceptibilities of both partners, or even act as a direct cause of illness. Fear of the consequences of sexual intercourse first brings the married couple's physical affection to an end; and then, as a remoter result, it usually puts a stop as well to the mental sympathy between them, which should have been the successor to their original passionate love. The spiritual disillusionment and bodily deprivation to which most marriages are doomed from the start puts both partners back in the state they were in before their marriage, except for being poorer by the loss of an illusion, and they must once more have recourse to their fortitude in mastering and deflecting their sexual instinct. (Freud, 1908, pp. 89-90).

Have we any grounds for suspecting an autobiographical element in this grim characterization of married life? Indeed we do. As Peter Gay points out, in 1893, at age 37, Freud wrote Fliess saying that Martha and he lived in abstinence. In another letter to Fliess, dated 1895, Freud lamented his lack of libido and, with a naivete that would make any sensible analyst blush, noted that his impotence seemed to recur at periodic intervals every twenty eight days, in apparent confirmation of Fliess's biorhythmic hypotheses (Gay, 1988, pp. 162-163). In a letter to



Freud on Nov. 6, 1911, written just after his visit to the Jung household, Emma Jung, Carl's wife, expressed alarm at Freud's remark that his marriage had long since been "amortized", and "there was nothing more to do except -- die." (McGuire, 1974, p. 456). To judge from these indications alone, we could reasonably infer that sexual passion ceased to play any part in Freud's life in his early 40's, as he boasted to Abraham with evident pride and regret.

In short, notwithstanding Freud's personal courage, and the commanding vigor of his personal presence, the cumulative impression one gets from his correspondence is of a man with a weak or inhibited libido, who found marriage a sad disappointment, and contrived to make a virtue of his lengthy periods of abstinence. But probing further along these lines is difficult. This is due less to the lack of information than to the fact that Freud's admirers find interest in his sex life suspicious, if not downright reprehensible. Following time honored precedent, the presumption seems to be that those who *are* inquisitive in this direction are looking for dirt, and a way of discrediting Freud's theories and discoveries. And this is true in some cases. But the man who thematized sexual anguish and the requirements of inner honesty for our century can scarcely be expected to command our continuing respect and interest unless his own conduct has been subject to sympathetic scrutiny. Judging from a variety of circumstances, it would appear Freud was not quite capable of practicing the unfailing candor he commended to his patients and to society at large. And he paid for this by the loss of his distinguished "crown prince", C.G. Jung.

By contrast with Freud, the theorist of anguish and desire, Jung is remembered as a theorist of the self, of individuation and of the collective

unconscious (Storr, 1973). On the whole, this reputation is deserved. However, the widespread perception of Jung as a theorist of the self is misleading if we overlook the many times Jung discussed sexual anguish while still under Freud's influence. In a letter to Freud dated September 25, 1907, for example, Jung openly admitted his envy of Max Eitington for what he termed "his uninhibited abreaction of the polygamous instinct", which even to the non-analytic ear is tantamount to a confession that Jung was struggling with his marriage vows. This is humanly understandable, no doubt. But it is scarcely a blanket endorsement of Freud's views.

Nevertheless, judging from other evidence, Jung *did* seem to share many of Freud's convictions on the subject. In this very same letter, for example, he remarked that

Dr. Gross tells me that he puts a quick stop to the transference by turning people into sexual immoralists. He says the transference to the analyst and its persistent fixation are mere monogamy symbols and as such symptomatic of repression. The truly healthy state for the neurotic is sexual immorality. Hence he associates you with Nietzsche. It seems to me, however, that sexual repression is a very important and indispensable civilizing factor, even if pathogenic for many inferior people. . . What else is civilization but the fruit of adversity? I feel Gross is going along too far with the vogue for the sexual short-circuit, which is neither intelligent, nor in good taste, but

**merely convenient, and therefor anything but a
civilizing factor (McGuire, 1974, p. 90).**

b. Freud, Jung and Otto Gross

Unfortunately, the annals of psychoanalytic historiography contain very little on Otto Gross, the man referred to in Jung's letter. But despite Jung's repudiation of him, he left a lasting impression on Jung, and indeed, on Ernest Jones, who was studying psychiatry at the Burgholzli at the time. According to Jones, Otto Gross "was the nearest approach to the romantic ideal of a genius I have ever met. . . . He was my first instructor in psychoanalysis. . . . The analytic treatments were all carried out at the Cafe Passage, where Gross spent most of the twenty-four hours -- the Cafe had no closing time. But such penetrative powers of divining the inner thoughts of others I was never to see again, nor is it a matter that lends itself to description" (Jones, in Eisseler, 1983, p. 174).

Among the literary intellegentsia, Otto Gross (1877-1919) is remembered as a profound but indirect influence on early 20th century thought and letters. Two noted German novelists, Franz Werfel and Leonard Frank, created vivid fictional portraits of him which convey Gross's great charisma, his intellectual passion and utter contempt for authority. During a brief interlude in Prague in 1916, Gross enlisted an obscure scribbler named Franz Kafka in his insistent struggle against all forms of patriarchal oppression. And his former mistress, Frieda von Richthofen -- later Frieda Weekley -- married English novelist D.H.Lawrence. Her headstrong



feminism -- which Lawrence depicts in several places -- owed much to Gross's influence. ¹

Who was Otto Gross? Otto Gross was the son of the powerful German criminologist and magistrate Hans Gross, who taught at the University of Graz. Gross the elder was a staunch supporter of Bismark, and judging from various informants, the relationship between father and son was difficult at the best of times. Young Otto studied psychiatry in Graz under the eminent neurologist Carl Wernicke, and in 1907, for a brief period, with Emil Kraepelin in Munich. To appreciate the kind of individual individual we are dealing with here, bear in mind that during his studies with Kraepelin, Gross actually spent most of his time in anarchist communes in the Munich district, and was talking quite seriously about pressing criminal charges against Kraepelin for his ignorance of analytic theory and technique. According to Gross, Kraepelin's attitude toward Freud, and his negligence towards patients, was an unpardonable outrage, and Ernst Jones had to intervene forcefully to dissuade him from this course of action (Eissler, 1983).

¹ Freida von Richtofen's sister Marianne was also a mistress of Gross's for a time, and bore him a son out of wedlock. She later married Max Weber. Martin Green's book The Von Richtofen Sisters: The Tragic and Triumphant Modes of Love chronicles their relationship with Gross, and the evident affinities between Gross and D.H.Lawrence (Green, 1974). Apparently, the life-lines of Gross and Lawrence converged in Schwabing, a bohemian suburb of Munich where the ideas of Freud and Marx were current among a thriving community of artists and intellectuals. Although a social history of Schwabing has yet to be written, it is apparent that Freud wished to distance himself from his counter-culture enthusiasts. On Dec. 26, 1908, he wrote to Karl Abraham that: "The Charlottenburg endemic is useless. There seems to be a similar center of infection in Munich, and it seems to have affected the craziest artists and people of that kind. No doubt one day there will be a great deal of noise, if the appropriate impulse is given (Abraham and Freud, 1965, p. 64).



Jung first met Gross in 1907 at a conference in Amsterdam. Here Gross gained Jung's envy and admiration, and Freud's deep appreciation, for his eloquent advocacy on Freud's behalf. But in addition to being a scientist of note, Gross was also a drug addict with a growing history of psychiatric hospitalizations who was teetering on the brink of collapse shortly after the conference where he acquitted himself so brilliantly on Freud's behalf. Seeking help, Gross approached Freud, who referred him to Jung. Gross entered the Burgholzli in 1908, and Jung undertook to analyse him, though he soon changed his diagnosis from that of an obsessional-compulsive neurosis to that of dementia praecox or schizophrenia (Green, 1974; Eissler, 1983). Whether or not either diagnosis was really correct, it was a heroic effort, involving many marathon sessions. Though the analysis failed, ultimately, Jung's self-sacrificing conduct did not go unrewarded, as the ideas gleaned from Gross's analysis furnished the material for his famous paper "The Significance of the Father in the Destiny of the Individual" (Jung, 1909)

Though the analysis commenced on a hopeful note, and seemed to yield several significant breakthroughs, Jung's hopes for Gross's recovery were ultimately dashed when Gross fled the Burgholzli, resumed his drug habits, and again embraced the odd, self-indulgent and increasingly criminal life style he had promised to abandon. Apart from the obvious embarrassment in career terms, Gross's flight from respectability and his renewed drug-dependency hurt Jung in a very personal way. Jung wrote to Freud that " this experience is one of the harshest of my life, for in Gross I discovered many aspects of my own nature -- but for the dementia praecox." (McGuire, 1974, p. 156). Evidently, Gross was one of those patients who, despite severe, palpable pathology and overwhelming

personal handicaps, have enormous insight into the thoughts, feelings and aspirations of their analyst, and contribute strongly to the growing personal rapport between them by illuminating the counter-transference. This fits nicely with what we know about their clinical encounters, which Jung described as a "mutual analysis" in an early edition of "The Significance of the Father on the Destiny of the Individual".

This brings us to the inevitable question, namely, why did Jung's therapeutic interventions, and his great openness and generosity with Gross, fail to have the desired effect? A number of factors were at work. To begin with, and as Sandor Ferenczi discovered later, mutual analysis often leads to the dissolution of the traditional boundaries between analyst and patient, healer and healed, authority and layman, and so may diminish any psychological leverage the analyst possesses as the expert on the meaning of unconscious mental processes. The levelling character of such frank mutual disclosure -- which as Ferenczi emphasized, is sometimes indispensable to secure the trust of deeply disturbed individuals -- may actually corrode an analyst's effectiveness as a catalyst for insight and transformation in the long run (Ferenczi, 1988).

Judging from Martin Green's portrayal, it appears that when Jung encountered Gross in 1907-1908, Gross's aspirations as a natural scientist and physician were giving way to a more urgent need to infuse his roles as a psychotherapist/guru with a revolutionary social praxis -- another reason poor Jung lacked leverage. Thus, while he candidly owned to the infantilism and manipulateness Jung patiently unearthed from his troubled psyche, Gross was probably just devious or self-deluded enough to insure that the true scope and intensity of his deepening disenchantment with the world of science and his emergent political agenda didn't come in for close analytic



scrutiny. This was deeply unfortunate. For in retrospect, it is clear that Gross's psycho-politics were tragically and inextricably fused with a life long compulsion to shock and humiliate his father. He certainly succeeded in that. In 1918, before his death, Gross was writing for Communist journals, and was the acknowledged leader of a commune of artists, anarchists and drug addicts who preached Marx, Freud and the dissolution of bourgeois marriage (Green, 1974).

In any case, and for whatever reasons, Jung's therapy was a failure. Gross fled to Munich and resumed his former life, and Freud moved quickly to have his articles expunged from the analytic corpus. The connection between Jung and Gross resumes briefly in 1913 when, after a series of bizarre misadventures designed to outrage bourgeois sensibilities -- including wild, drug fuelled orgies in a barn in Ascona, and the suicide of his mistress, Sophie Benz -- Otto Gross was apprehended by authorities in Berlin, who brandished a certificate from Jung saying that Gross was a dangerous and degenerate psychopath. Gross was deported thence to Austria where -- under the legal guardianship of his father, who had instigated the Berlin proceedings, and enlisted Jung's cooperation -- he worked once again in a psychiatric clinic. After mounting international protests, Gross was finally freed in 1914 on condition that he enter treatment with Wilhelm Stekel. Predictably, perhaps, this remedial intervention was a failure as well, and Stekel later remarked that he had never seen a more tragic waste of talent in his life. By 1916, Gross was addicted to drugs all over again, and he died in 1920 of pneumonia and malnutrition.

Leaving aside the obvious headaches and the interminable scandal that Freud would have incurred had he accepted Gross into the

psychoanalytic fold after 1908, we might ask ourselves why Otto Gross's *earlier* works were deliberately expunged from the analytic corpus. After all, before Gross entered Jung's care, and disgraced himself thoroughly, Freud regarded Gross as the only disciple save Jung capable of really original contributions to his new science (McGuire, 1974, p. 124).

The answer is really quite simple. Despite his undisputed brilliance, Gross's views on politics and sexual liberation were deeply at odds with Freud's. Freud's concept of social hygiene coupled an insistence on intellectual enlightenment and personal candor with a stoic renunciation and sublimation of the drives. That, for Freud, is the optimal solution; the one most likely to favor the advance of culture. By contrast, Gross coupled his insistence on enlightenment and candor with a glowing endorsement of promiscuity. Though Jung disowned Gross's views the moment he set eyes on him -- judging from his letters, at any rate -- it is significant that Jung left Freud's circle *repudiating* Freud's ethos of sublimation and renunciation. Indeed, with the passage of time, Jung acquired a reputation as a ladies man, and though he never publicly disparaged the institution of marriage, he honored his vows as much in the breach as in the practice.

However, while Jung distanced himself from Freud's circle, and from his austere philosophy of life, he paid dearly for his intellectual independence. Indeed, the psychic reverberations of his relationship with Freud, compounded by the effects of earlier traumas, soon sent Jung into a protracted spiral of depression, obsession and hallucination that lasted from about 1913 to early 1919 (Jung, 1963, chapter 6). Jung's torments commenced in earnest in 1914, when only analyst Antonia Wolff -- Jung's mistress, and former patient -- could sooth and succour him in his more fragmented moods. Accordingly, she was welcomed ambivalently into the



Jung household, where she and Emma Jung developed a peculiar personal and intellectual collaboration around Carl Gustav that lasted many years (Donn, 1988).

c. Jung's "Descent into the Unconscious"

Among Jung's followers, of course, the received version is that, like Freud's celebrated "self-analysis", Jung's "confrontation with the unconscious" was the crucible of experience in which his theory was born. And indeed, there is some truth in this. For like Freud during the 1890's, Jung was often depressed, filled with self-doubt, and intellectually paralyzed for long spells during this dark, lingering season of torment. And like Freud, Jung was afflicted with tremendous mood swings, and with transient neurotic, psychosomatic and psychotic symptomatology, and was desperately dependent on one or two intimates to maintain his emotional equilibrium.

Reflecting on these difficult years, Jung suggested he was inundated by archetypes of the collective unconscious, which entered his dreaming and waking states in the form of the compelling images and ideas which he chronicled in his journals. By contrast, I suspect, the standard psychiatric diagnosis might have been that he was in the grip of an agitated depression, punctuated with brief paranoid episodes and psychotic interludes of varying length and intensity. Unfortunately, neo-Kraepelinian psychiatric diagnosis focuses on manifest pathology, and says little or nothing about the recuperative capabilities of the individual in question. And Jung's recuperative powers -- though dormant at times -- were strong. One can't help admiring the determination with which this desperate,

broken, but very gifted man documented, elaborated and interpreted his disturbing fantasies, redeeming the many hours when he was a reluctant prisoner of his own shattered mind.

Nevertheless, and without disputing the actual existence of "archetypes", there is much evidence to suggest that many of the specific images, affects and fantasies Jung entertained during his "descent into the unconscious" were more personal than collective in character. And while Jung's great erudition and experience *entitled* him to theorize about a collective unconscious, his interpretive gloss on his own dreams and fantasies sometimes seem deliberately contrived to minimize or obscure the tragic dimension of his relationship with Freud, and the reasons its termination had such a deeply de-stabilizing effect on him.

When beginning his correspondence with Freud in 1906, Jung's reputation as a rising star in psychiatric circles was already well established. Accordingly, despite his deference to Freud's greater experience, Jung took pains in his correspondence not to minimize or evade his doubts about features of analytic theory, and most notably, about Freud's categorical insistence on the sexual etiology of the neuroses. Perhaps as their correspondence progressed, Jung contrived to exaggerate the extent to which his doubts had been dispelled, only to retract later on. But, as Jung confessed in his memoirs, behind this surface insincerity was the growing fear that he would inevitably lose Freud's trust and esteem if he was completely candid with him.

As Jung began writing the final chapters to Symbols of Transformation in 1911, his anxiety on this score became so acute that his difficult behavior around the house prompted Emma Jung to write three letters to Freud, pleading with him to relinquish his paternal anxieties about



posterity, and let Jung follow his scientific conscience without feeling threatened or diminished by him. The last of her letters indicates that though her first and second letters were written without her husband's knowledge, that she later told Carl of their existence, and that he, in turn, had insisted she apologize to Freud in her final letter. And apologize she did. But it was an odd, almost defiant apology. In Emma's words

Lately Carl has been analysing his attitude to his work and has discovered some resistances to it. I had connected these misgivings. . . with his constant worry over what you would say about it (i.e. Part II of Symbols of Transformation); but now it appears that this fear of your opinion was only a pretext for not going on with the self-analysis which this work in fact means (McGuire, 1974, p. 462).

Whatever their ultimate basis or intention was, Emma's apologies and disclaimers proved fruitless. Jung's fears were well grounded. When Part II of Symbols of Transformation was finally published, the friendship vanished, leaving Freud and Jung to disengage as gracefully as their mutual anger and disappointment would allow.

d. Freud, Minna and the Investiture Motif

There were many factors involved in the dissolution of the friendship. Even in the absence of interpersonal tensions, the intellectual differences between Freud and Jung were substantial. To begin with, there was a widening chasm between their attitudes towards matters of faith and the meaning of religious experience. Moreover, as Anthony Storr and George Hogenson have pointed out, Freud's psychology was largely father centered and oriented around the Oedipus complex, while Jung's was mother-centered, and more attuned to the earlier, pre-Oedipal layers of psychic development (Storr, 1973; Hogenson, 1983).

Still, perhaps the single most compelling reason for the rupture between Freud and Jung was probably not their intellectual differences, but a breakdown in mutual trust that can be dated to a series of events in 1909, and reaching back two years earlier. In Memories, Dreams and Reflections, Jung relates that en route to the Clark University lectures in Massachusetts in August of 1909, Freud, Ferenczi and he whiled away the time by analysing one another's dreams, when things took a sour turn. According to Jung:

Freud had a dream -- I would not think it right to air the problem it involved. I interpreted it as best I could, but added that a great deal more could be said about it if he would supply me with some details from his private life. Freud's response to these words was a curious look -- a look of the utmost suspicion. Then he said, 'But I cannot risk my authority!' At that moment he lost it altogether. That sentence burned itself into my memory; and

**in it the end of our relationship was foreshadowed.
Freud was placing personal authority above truth
(Jung, 1963, p. 158).**

While Jung's memoirs do not divulge the problem Jung sensed behind Freud's dream imagery, in 1957, in an interview with John Billinsky (published in the Andover Newton Quarterly , X, 1969), Jung confided that during his first visit to Freud's home (with Ludwig Binswanger) in 1907, he inadvertently learned more about the background to this dream of Freud's than his official memoir divulges. According to Billinsky, Jung declared

Soon I met Freud's wife's younger sister. She was very good looking and she not only knew enough about psychoanalysis but also about everything that Freud was doing. When, a few day's later, I visited Freud's laboratory, Freud's sister-in-law asked if she could talk with me. She was very much bothered by her relationship with Freud and felt guilty about it. From her I learned that their relationship was indeed very intimate. It was a shocking discovery to me, and even now I recall the agony that I felt at that time. Two years later Freud and I were invited to Clark University in Worcester, and we were together for every day for some seven weeks. From the very beginning of the trip we started to analyse each other's dreams. Freud had some dreams that bothered him very

much. The dreams were about the triangle - Freud, his wife, and his wife's younger sister. Freud had no idea that I knew about the triangle and his intimate relationship with his sister-in-law. And so, when Freud told me about the dream in which his wife and her sister played important parts, I asked Freud to tell me some personal associations with the dream. He looked at me with bitterness and said: 'I could tell you more, but I cannot risk my authority' (Billinsky, 1969, p. 42).

According to Billinsky, Jung then went on to add that his knowledge of Freud's "triangle" became a burden, and a potent disruptive factor in their relationship. Not surprisingly, contemporary scholarship is divided on whether Freud actually enjoyed sexual congress with Minna Bernays, and on whether Billinsky's account of his interview with Jung is reliable. In his own defense, Billinsky claimed that his interview with Jung was tape-recorded, and entrusted to the Frances Wickes Foundation (Schoenwald, March 4, 1991), formerly at Harvard, and now with the Jung Foundation in Boston. Nevertheless, Anthony Storr, Paul Roazen and the late Henry Murray all agree that Billinsky's testimony is highly suspect, and have expressed great doubt about Jung's alleged belief that Freud and Minna actually had an affair at some point (Personal communications with Storr, 1991, and Roazen, 1991).

Meanwhile, in 1975, the editor of the Freud/Jung letters, William McGuire, assisted historian Richard Schoenwald of Carnegie Mellon University in unearthing some unpublished seminar notes of Jung's that

make explicit reference to his thoughts and feelings in this regard, and which corroborate Billinsky's assertions (Schoenwald, 1975, p. 362). And George Hogenson, another noted Jung scholar, whose work McGuire endorses, checked Billinsky's testimony with Carl E. Meier, arguably Jung's closest male colleague. Meier corroborated Billinsky's assertions, and only expressed some surprise and dismay that Jung had chosen to confide such a sensitive matter to someone he'd only known for a brief time.

Regardless of differing opinions, however, there is widespread agreement that during the 1890's Minna Bernays was esteemed by Freud as an intellectual confidante second only to Wilhelm Fliess. This is not controversial. And though they may never have made love in the flesh, Freud and Minna had ample opportunity to do so on the various vacations they took alone together in Italy, as Peter Swales' indefatigable efforts have recently demonstrated (Swales, 1982; Swales, 1987).

Having established that, I suppose we must still allow for the possibility that 1) what Minna *actually* said to Jung was not precisely what the elderly Jung remembered, or 2) that Minna's fearful, urgent declamations confounded feelings or fantasies of Freud's with actual deeds. But either way, whether Freud actually made love to Minna is somewhat beside the point. The point that I am trying to establish is that Jung *believed* that he did, and had good reasons for doing so, since in psychological reality, if not historical actuality, Freud was enmeshed in a triangle with his wife and sister-in-law that played havoc with his emotional life. Moreover, and more importantly, Jung's belief -- whether accurate or mistaken -- had momentous consequences for the history of psychoanalysis.

Assuming Freud's innocence, for the moment, the question then emerges; why was Freud so secretive about his feelings and fantasies about Minna? Perhaps Freud feared that in learning about his inner longings (or actual deeds) Jung would be "one up" on him, or that these secrets, should they come to light, would threaten his reputation and hold on posterity. Freud probably feared such revelations would damage him because -- for all his audacity of mind, and his unusual tolerance of individual idiosyncrasy -- Freud was quite conventional, and like any good bourgeois, was terrified of scandal.

A reason of comparable or perhaps even greater importance may have been Freud's deep reluctance to relinquish his role as an authority, and a corresponding unwillingness to share of his inner, emotional life openly and honestly with colleagues, and to treat them as real equals, as Jung later complained (McGuire, 1974, pp. 525-527). Moreover, and more importantly -- though Jung fails to note this, oddly enough -- Freud obviously *did not trust Jung* to guard his secrets -- whatever they were -- and as a result, couldn't follow the "basic rule" that he himself laid down for analytic interpretation. In a manner of speaking, then, Freud put himself above the law he had laid down as a prerequisite for genuine candor.

Why was Freud's reticence so offensive to Jung? After all, though he refused to free associate, Freud did not lie or falsify his associations, as Jung admittedly did immediately thereafter, to avoid any further unpleasantness on their voyage (Jung, 1963, p.160). But Freud *was* hiding something, and this bothered Jung immensely. For while Freud struggled to master his old feelings for Minna, and the problems it introduced into his marriage, Jung was involved in a delicate and compromising relationship with a student and former patient, Sabina Spielrein, that was unravelling

fast (Carotenuto, 1985; Kerr, 1988a). In probing Freud's associations on their transatlantic voyage, perhaps Jung secretly hoped that Freud's candor would foster shared confidences, enabling Jung, in turn, to unburden himself, and create an atmosphere of greater mutual understanding that might enable them to resolve -- or failing that, to tolerate -- their emerging theoretical differences. Instead, however, Freud harbored fears about losing his authority, and perhaps, indeed, his hold on posterity, and so spoiled the "mutual analysis" that he, Ferenczi and Jung were engaged in, failing Jung as a friend at a time when he needed him most acutely.

Moreover, to get this whole picture in perspective, it should *also* be remembered that Freud's reticence about his extra-marital attractions followed in the wake of an intense idealizing transference Jung had toward Freud. We know this to be true because early on in their relationship, Freud reproached Jung in rather emotional language for not responding to his prodigious daily correspondence from Vienna. Jung's apology was illuminating. On October 28, 1907, Jung wrote to Freud saying:

Actually -- and I confess this to you with a struggle -- I have a boundless admiration for you both as a man and a researcher, and I bear you no conscious grudge . . . it is rather that my veneration for you has something of the character of a "religious" crush. Though it does not really bother me, I still feel it is disgusting and ridiculous because of its undeniable erotic undertone. This abominable feeling comes from the fact that when

**I was a boy I was the victim of a sexual assault by
a man I once worshipped . . .**

**This feeling, which I have not quite got rid of,
hampers me considerably. Another manifestation
of it is that I find psychological insight makes
relations with colleagues downright disgusting . . .
Consequently, I skirt round such things as much as
possible, for, to my feeling at any rate, every
intimate relationship turns out after a while to be
sentimental and banal or exhibitionistic, as with
my chief, whose confidences are offensive.**

**I think I owe you this explanation. I would
rather not have said it.**

With kindest regards,

**Most sincerely yours, Jung
(McGuire, 1974, p. 95)**

**Judging from this letter, Jung's idealization of Freud, though genuine,
was rendered profoundly ambivalent by a traumatic association between
situations of intimacy with older, idealized men and the ultimate violation
of his person. But for our purposes, the specific *content* of Jung's confession
is actually less significant than the candor and courage it took to make this
self-disclosure. It was a gesture of trust and openness. Among friends,
such honesty ordinarily compels an equal openness and vulnerability from
the person confided in at some point soon thereafter. When Freud refused
to risk a comparable confidence under favorable circumstances en route to**

America two years later, he betrayed an active *mistrust* that contrasted painfully with Jung's memory of his earlier openness.

In fairness to Freud, and by his own admission, however, in the interval between Jung's confession and the journey to America, Jung actively *contributed* to Freud's mistrust of him in a bizzare episode that occurred when Jung visited Freud's household for the *second* time. During the course of this visit, Jung and Freud were discussing parapsychology and precognition, which had fascinated Jung since childhood. According to Jung:

Because of his materialistic prejudice, he (Freud) rejected this entire complex of questions as nonsensical, and did so in terms of so shallow a positivism that I had difficulty in checking a sharp retort on the tip of my tongue...

While Freud was going on this way, I had a curious sensation. It felt as if my diaphragm were made of iron and were becoming red-hot -- a glowing vault. And at that moment there was such a loud report in the bookcase, which stood right next to us, that we both started up in alarm, fearing the thing was going to topple over on us. I said to Freud: "There, that is an example of a so-called catalytic exteriorization phenomenon."

"Oh come", he exclaimed. "That is sheer bosh."

"It is not," I replied. "You are mistaken, Herr Professor. And to prove my point I now predict

that in a moment there will be another such loud report!" Sure enough, no sooner had I said the words than the same detonation went off in the bookcase.

To this day I do not know what gave me this certainty. But I knew beyond all doubt that the report would come again. Freud only stared aghast . . . this incident aroused his distrust of me, and I had the feeling I had done something against him. I never afterward discussed the incident with him.

On April 2 of 1909, Jung wrote to Freud attempting to mitigate whatever bad feelings remained in the wake of this puzzling event. In his own words

When I left Vienna I was afflicted with some *sentiments d'incompletude* because of the last evening I spent with you. It seemed to me that my spookery struck you as altogether too stupid and perhaps unpleasant . . . (McGuire, 1974, p. 216).

Unfortunately, we will never know for sure what Freud said to Jung that evening in Vienna in 1909. Perhaps he was too stunned to say much of anything. Freud's subsequent remarks are revealing, however. On April 16 of 1909, several months before their journey to America, Freud wrote to Jung that

It is strange that on the very same evening when I formally adopted you as eldest son and I anointed you -- *in partibus infidelium* -- as my successor and crown prince, you should have divested me of my paternal dignity, which divesting seems to have given you as much pleasure as I, on the contrary, derived from the investiture of your person (McGuire, 1974, p. 218).

Just for the sake of argument, let us assume that these words were well chosen, and not merely a quaint figure of speech. What do they tell us about Freud's experience of Jung?

Freud's use of "investiture", like the term "crown prince", is significant, since the investiture ceremony was the mechanism by means of which power and authority were invested in a new ruler by the aging monarch in the middle ages. Monarchy is not exactly a democratic institution, and by using the investiture metaphor repeatedly in correspondence, Freud implied that he was the legitimate possessor of royal powers and prerogatives, which he, in turn, wished to bequeath to Jung. For example, as late as March of 1911, Freud wrote to Binswanger: "When the realm I have founded is orphaned, no one should inherit it but Jung. You see, my policy invariably pursues this aim, and my conduct toward Stekel and Adler fits into this system" (Binswanger, in Gay, 1988, p. 219). This preference was not to last, however. In a later letter to Jung, dated January 10, 1912, Freud hinted openly that Ferenczi would likely be his designated heir, remarking that: "The choice of one's successor is one of the royal

prerogatives. Let us allow our royal science the same privilege" (McGuire, 1974, p. 294).

Strange as it may sound, Freud's followers acquiesced completely in his king-making maneuvers, which are anomalous in questions of scientific research, and have all the character of a neurotic obsession. Imagine a Newton, a Lavoisier, a Darwin or an Einstein bequeathing their respective theories to an ardent disciple, empowering them -- and them alone -- to extend and apply it farther afield, or to be the sole arbiter of what is or is not legitimate in physics, chemistry, biology or cosmology. The very idea is absurd, and reeks of grandiosity. Apart from its authoritarian tone, there was something Lear-like and dangerously self-deluded in Freud's political machinations, and his frantic search for an heir.

Still, after the bookcase episode, and on the eve of their departure for America, Freud was sufficiently sober to suspect that Jung's behavior was designed to *divest* him of his "fatherly dignity", implying in the process that Freud's power -- while quite real, perhaps -- wasn't altogether legitimate. There are plaintive and angry overtones to Freud's interpretation of events. In the remainder of this letter, Freud reported that he had heard similar noises in his rooms before, and that his own superstitious streak -- which he had since relinquished (sic!) -- was connected with a fear of dying that reached morbid proportions in 1899 while he composed The Interpretation of Dreams, and which died along with his friendship to Fliess. Similarly, he insisted, his wonder at the mysterious explosions disappeared when he was no longer under the spell of Jung's charismatic personality. The implication is clear -- superstition is superstition, and with proper analysis, Jung's irrational beliefs would succumb to reason. It was a clear attempt on Freud's part to reassert his

authority, and yet another expression of the positivistic attitude that unflinchingly drove Jung away.

Unfortunately, in retrospect, Freud's claim to be free of numerological superstition at this point of his life was profoundly disingenuous. In 1909, and for many years thereafter, Freud continued to cherish the utterly irrational conviction that he was destined to die between the ages of 60 and 62 (Storr, 1989). Freud's belief that his death was fated to occur then stemmed from his vestigial faith in elements in Fliess's theories, and his attempt to downplay his own superstitious streak in the name of analytic rationality was obviously designed to defend him against a candid confrontation with the source of his obsession for an heir; his dread of an early death. Earlier in life, Freud had apologized to Fliess for burdening him with his incessant "death delirium", and though these diminished in intensity when he gave up cocaine, Freud was obviously using his relationship with Jung in an attempt to master his fear of dying, which remained acute. Jung's investiture, as Freud intended it, was the crowning expression of his efforts in this direction.

Consciously or otherwise, Jung turned down the job -- at least in Freud's estimation. For despite the gestures of fealty that mark Jung's initial correspondence, tensions were emerging that obstructed the smooth transfer of power. Freud, for one, was becoming increasingly wary of what he perceived as Jung's (unconscious) anti-Semitism. Then again, on Jung's side, his paternal grandfather, C.G. Jung the elder (1794-1864), had been an outspoken proponent of Romantic and vitalist philosophy in Basel in the early 19th century. Throughout the 19th c. in the German speaking world, positivism and Romanticism were rival philosophies of life, and the bitter debates between their various representatives were doubtlessly well



known to Jung, whose entire cultural heritage propelled him toward the vitalist camp. Judging from Jung's visceral distaste for Freud's tepid positivism -- as Jung experienced it, anyway -- his cultural and ancestral loyalties made him poorly suited to play the role Freud had scripted for him.²

Jung's annoyance with Freud on this score is attested to by his dream of the ghostly customs official, which occurred sometime after their return from America. In the dream, Jung was at the Swiss-Austrian border toward evening, when he saw a stooped, elderly Austrian official with a peeved, melancholic expression walking by. Others present said that the old man was not really there, but a ghost: "... one of those who still couldn't die properly". Jung identified the ghostly official as Freud, and interpreted the dream as symptomatic of his own lingering dependence on Freud, because his conscious veneration was presumably being compensated by a frankly less flattering portrait. And this makes good sense. After all, Freud was accustomed to giving himself regal airs in correspondence, and this compensatory dream production was a straightforward symbolic demotion.

But since Freud accused Jung of harboring death wishes against him -- a very serious accusation, in view of circumstances -- the dream official's inability to "die properly" was troubling, and Jung rationalized it by suggesting that it was an allusion to Freud's "potential immortality". Without wishing to contradict Jung's interpretation, in which ambivalence and "divided judgement" figure prominently, it is also distinctly possible

² As one of Basel's leading citizens, and an ardent exponent of Romantic philosophy, Jung's grandfather was probably acquainted with his somewhat younger contemporary J.J. Bachofen, another prominent opponent of positivism. For a scholarly discussion of Bachofen's conflict with positivist historian Theodor Mommsen, see Gossman, 1983.

that Jung's dream expressed a realistic insight into Freud's fixation on posthumous fame, prompted by Freud's repeated allusions to his imminent death, his joy at having found a worthy heir, and his repeated fainting spells in Jung's presence.³ Judging from Jung's letters, it probably dawned on him early on that Freud's fainting fits and neurotic symptomatology actually belied the rigid exclusivity of his theories, with their emphasis on sexuality, and that the morbid fear of death is a powerful pathogenic agent. An insight like this -- even an unconscious one -- cuts anyone's idols down to size, and the demotion from "king" to a more modest authority conveyed the disgust Jung felt for being made party to Freud's neurotic pursuit of narcissistic completion.

To complicate matters, perhaps Jung could not tolerate (much less enjoy) the intimacy Freud anxiously solicited, because it called forth the fear of violation associated with a childhood seduction. And as we have already established, when the bookshelf explosions occurred, and Jung's investiture was de-railed, Freud was already cognizant of this trauma, and his failure to make the pertinent connections and interpretations here is striking. Indeed, the fact that he took this episode so *personally* shows the loss of clinical detachment, and that his own neurotic need of Jung was coloring his reactions. In a sense, then, Freud failed Jung as his analyst even *before* he failed him as a friend.

But even if Freud had made the pertinent connections, and brought them all to Jung's attention, it is likely that his emphasis on the sexual component of the transference would have alienated Jung. After all, even

³ In the remainder of what follows, I will not discuss Freud's well known tendency to faint in Jung's presence, since this has been thoroughly canvassed in the literature (e.g. Roazen, 1974, pp. 246-250; Hogenson, 1982, pp. 77-79, 161).

when Freud was exploring the effects of childhood sexual traumas, what was missing in his work was a frank acknowledgement of the way in which deranged strivings for power and intimacy become sexualized in disturbed adults. The pursuit of intimacy *through the abuse of power*, and at the expense of trust and mutuality, is what sexual abuse is all about. Though he hinted at it, Freud never said -- in so many words -- that the seduction of children is an arena where self-aggrandizement, and the desire to extort unconditional obedience and identification, find free play -- at the expense of *both* victim and perpetrator, who lose themselves in sordid intimacies and sham reciprocity.

In short, while emphasizing the neuropathic consequences of childhood seduction, Freud failed to recognize explicitly that pathogenic traumas of a sexual nature result from *the pathology of power relations* as much as from the vagaries of frustrated sexual desire. Accordingly, in terms of the counter-transference, he would probably have failed to acknowledge how his pursuit of intimacy with Jung -- colored, as it was, by neurotic needs -- replicated features of Jung's childhood trauma, and dismissed Jung's transference as irrational and uncalled for, or motivated chiefly by a lingering erotic desire for an older man.

Leaving transference and counter-transference to one side, Jung's attempt to divest Freud of his "fatherly dignity" -- as Freud experienced it -- resulted from the many conflicting loyalties that unconditional fealty to Freud would inevitably have engendered. To begin with, there was the paternal grandfather and Jung's anti-positivist bias, mentioned earlier, which was rooted in his paternal ancestry, and the whole cultural and historical ambiance of 19th century Basel. Similarly, Jung's fascination with the occult was connected with his *maternal* ancestry, and the uncanny

experiences he had in the company of his mother, and his maternal cousin Helen Preiswerk. Even as a child, Jung knew that his mother's mother and father were on intimate (if not always affectionate terms) with various spirits and angels (Ellenberger, 1970, pp. 661). Like William James, whose attitude toward supernatural experience was very similar, Jung struggled to remain true to the actual data of experience, and not to deny the existence of things he could not comprehend or explain satisfactorily from a rational or scientific point of view. But from another standpoint, Jung's unwillingness to relinquish his openness to the occult was an *affirmation* of his maternal ancestry, and a refusal to be estranged from his cultural and historical roots. If we grant the existence of paranormal phenomena, then the startling reports from the realm of the mothers that shocked Freud, and startled Jung, externalized Jung's emerging resistance to Freud's insistence that he relinquish his earlier loyalties in the interests of perpetuating his -- i.e. Freud's -- work and memory.

e. Elijah, Philemon and Basilides: Sex and the Search for Inner Authority

But if Freud was rattled by Jung's refusal to embrace his scientific *Weltanschauung*, and by his apparent ability to call forth spontaneous refutations of his denial of the paranormal, in the final analysis, it was Jung who was more devastated by the loss of the friendship. While vacationing in Italy some months before his break with Freud, Jung had what he variously described as a dream or a fantasy in which he found himself in a silent, blasted, moonlike environment. In his own words:

The atmosphere was that of the other world. Near the slope of a steep rock I caught sight of two figures, an old man with a white beard and a beautiful young girl. I summoned up my courage and approached them as though they were real people, and listened attentively to what they told me. The old man explained that he was Elijah, and that gave me a shock. But the girl staggered me even more, for she called herself Salome! She was blind. What a strange couple: Salome and Elijah. But Elijah assured me that he and Salome had belonged together from all eternity, which completely astounded me... They had a black serpent living with them which displayed an unmistakable fondness for me. I stuck close to Elijah because he seemed to be the most reasonable of the three, and to have a clear intelligence. Of Salome I was distinctly suspicious. Elijah and I had a long conversation which, however, I did not understand (Jung, 1963, p.181).

In retrospect Jung would interpret this fantasy in terms of his psychology of archetypes, greeting Salome as an early intimation of the "anima", and Elijah as a precursor of the "wise old man". There is not much point in disputing this interpretation, which may be true, up to a point. But judging from the circumstances surrounding Jung's dream, his attempt to

invest them with archetypal significance seems almost deliberately contrived to obscure their highly *individual* message.

At the time of this dream, as John Kerr points out, Jung was probably quite anxious about Sabina Spielrein, who had gone to Vienna seeking Freud's help in overcoming her profound but neurotic attachment to Jung. As her address to the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society on Nov. 26, 1911 indicates, Spielrein was profoundly familiar with Jung's evolving theories, so that apart from damaging disclosures about Jung's conduct, Jung probably feared that Spielrein would give Freud an unvarnished account of Part II of Symbols of Transformation, and so hasten the day of reckoning between him and Freud (Kerr, 1988a; Kerr, 1988b).

To the naive reader, perhaps, Freud's correspondence from this period seem designed to reassure Jung that Spielrein is faring satisfactorily, much as Elijah assured Jung that he and Salome belonged together -- Salome being the Herodian princess who sought revenge for her frustrated attempts at seduction by demanding the head of John the Baptist. But given Jung's anxiety over the forthcoming section fo Symbols of Transformation - - of which Freud was well aware, thanks to Emma Jung -- these vague blandishments of Freud's were anything but reassuring. Reading between the lines, Jung was probably coming to the conclusion that Spielrein had transfered a portion of her erotic father-transference to Freud, and was either becoming a Freudian, or attempting to avenge herself on Jung in some other fashion.

Accordingly, in Jung's dream of 1911, Salome (Spielrein) is struck blind, and is subject to suspicion. Significantly, however, the reproach touches Spielrein alone, for Elijah -- a Jewish prophet, who is nonetheless familiar with a big black serpent , who shows "an unmistakable fondness"



for Jung (sic!) -- is a man "of clear intelligence" who elicits Jung's admiration. They proceed to have "a lengthy conversation" which, however, Jung does not understand.

Far from being a descent into the "collective unconscious", the lifeless lunar landscape of this puzzling oneiric encounter represented the devastating sense of existential aloneness that Jung, a vigorous, gifted, but exquisitely vulnerable man anticipated in the wake of his bitter estrangement from his two closest Jewish friends, Freud and Spielrein. Salome (Spielrein) is struck blind for her desertion, but more importantly, for our purposes, the nature and content of Jung's "conversation" with Elijah (Freud) eluded Jung's comprehension. The message is clear. Something was wrong between Jung and Freud, whom he deeply admired, but did not really understand (and vice versa). A breakdown in dialogue is imminent.

Clearly, something *did* go wrong in the "conversation" between Freud and Jung, and they parted paths. But though Jung imparted a bold and resolute tone to his final letters to Freud, inwardly Jung was still dependent on Freud, and incapable of finding, experiencing and defining his own *inner authority* adequately. This accounts for the crisis that followed, and for the curious metamorphoses of "Elijah" in Jung's burgeoning fantasy life. In the bleak, fantastic "other world" Jung inhabited much of the time -- for Jung now was frankly depressed or hallucinated for lengthy periods -- a Jewish prophet, however intelligent, wasn't much of a guide, and accordingly, newer, more exotic personages soon made his acquaintance. In his own words:

Soon after this fantasy another figure rose out of the unconscious. He developed out of the Elijah figure. I called him Philemon. Philemon was a pagan and brought with him an Egypto-Hellenistic atmosphere with a Gnostic coloration . . .

Psychologically, Philemon represented superior insight. He was a mysterious figure to me. At times he seemed to me quite real, as if he were a living personality. I went walking up and down the garden with him, and he was to me what the Indians call a guru . . .

Philemon had a lame foot, but was a winged spirit (Jung, 1963, pp. 182-185).

Unfortunately, we lack all the necessary information to interpret Philemon's symbolic significance with complete confidence. However, some informed guesses might be illuminating. To begin with, Philemon's *appearance* may be significant. In a manner of speaking, Jung had been lamed in his encounter with Freud, and at the time of Philemon's appearance, was experiencing great difficulty standing on his own two feet, psychologically speaking. Philemon mirrored Jung's sense of being injured and dependent, but by way of compensation, had wings to transport himself upwards. Presumably, Philemon's wings represented Jung's desire to transcend his helplessness by spiritual means.

Then again, the apparition's *name* probably had significance for Jung. Jung deemed Philemon a pagan, but as he was no doubt well aware, the

briefest of St. Paul's epistles is to a Christian man by that same name. Interestingly enough, the epistle to Philemon precedes the epistle to the Hebrews, which is the most vigorous and sustained denunciation of Judaism in the New Testament. In the epistle to the Hebrews, St. Paul declares that the Mosaic laws, and the Mosaic covenant, are now null and void. He declares the emergence of a new spiritual dispensation and openly asserts the pre-eminence of Jesus over Moses and Aaron.

Admittedly, this may be pure coincidence. But then again, it may not be, as Jung was familiar with these epistles, and cites them in his work. In the 4th edition of Symbols of Transformation, there is a brief but illuminating reference to the epistle to Philemon in a footnote to a discussion on the genesis and meaning of religious symbolism. Jung's interlocutor at this juncture is obviously Freud, whose book Totem and Taboo he is obliquely criticizing. In Totem and Taboo, Freud argued that all religious symbolism operates in the service of repression, or of maintaining an agonizing inner conflict in a state of continuing unconsciousness. By contrast, Jung insisted that symbols of the divine emerge by a "natural process" designed to help people master conflicts and situations that are in fact acutely conscious, but that they are utterly powerless to change or resolve through their own conscious effort. The paragraph reads as follows.

The God-image thrown up by a spontaneous act of creation is a living figure, a being that exists in its own right. As proof of this it may be mentioned that the relationship between the creator and the created is a *dialectical* one, and that, as experience shows, man has often been the person who is

addressed. From this the naive minded person concludes, rightly or wrongly, that the figure produced exists in and for itself, and he is inclined to assume that it was not he that fashioned it . . . The naive intellect cannot help taking its autonomy into account and putting the dialectical relationship to practical use. It does this by calling upon the divine presence in all difficult and dangerous situations, for the purpose of unloading all its unbearable difficulties upon the Almighty and expecting help from that quarter.

To illustrate this point, Jung cited Philemon, verses 4 and 6 in a footnote, then continued:

In the psychological sense this means that complexes weighing heavily on the soul are *consciously* transferred to the God image. This, it should be noted, is the direct opposite of an act of repression, where the complexes are handed over to an unconscious authority, inasmuch as one prefers to forget them (Jung, 1912, pp.60-61).

Unfortunately, these conjectures, while suggestive, don't actually *prove* anything. After all, Jung's remarks here refer to images of God, not to the

spiritual guides or mediators who initiate the seeker into the presence of the divine, which is what Jung's ghostly guru presumably was.

Still, there is a close enough fit between the content of these remarks and Jung's protracted crisis to permit us to suppose that they provide the contextual factors that should be born in mind when trying to make sense of Jung's reveries, or at any rate, the way in which *he* interpreted them. Still, this taxing state of affairs could not go on indefinitely, and things finally came to a head. Jung relates that in 1916, he felt "compelled from within, as it were, to formulate and express what might have been said by Philemon" (Jung, 1963, pp. 190-191). One Sunday afternoon that summer, the front door bell to Jung's house began ringing frantically. As Jung recalled this occurrence, his entire family heard the ringing bell, and rushed to see who it was. Mysteriously, however, no one was there. Jung was sitting by the front door when this transpired, and not only heard the bell, but saw it moving by itself on a still and windless day. At that point, says Jung,

We simply stared at one another. The atmosphere was thick, believe me! Then I knew that something had to happen. The whole house was filled as if there were a crowd present, crammed full of spirits. They were packed deep right up to the door, and the air was so thick it was scarcely possible to breath. As for myself, I was all a-quiver with the question: "For God's sake, what in the world is this?" Then they cried out in chorus, "We

**have come back from Jerusalem where we found
not what we sought" (Jung, 1963, pp.190-191).**

In response to the crisis of the invading spirits, Jung felt compelled to write a fragment entitled Septem Sermones ad Mortuos or Seven Sermons for the Dead. Indeed, as Jung points out "As soon as I took up the pen, the whole ghostly assemblage evaporated". An exhaustive analysis of this fragment is out of the question here, but several salient details should be noted. Though acting ostensibly as Philemon's mouthpiece, Jung did not attribute the fragment to Philemon, but to Basilides, a 2nd century Christian gnostic who lived in Alexandria (Quispel, 1968). The first "sermon" opens with the following remark:

**The dead came back from Jerusalem where they
found not what they sought. They prayed me let
them in and besought my word, and thus I began
my teaching.**

In short, the first premise of this strange communication is that "the dead" -- whoever they are -- were seeking spiritual counsel from Jung/Basilides, since they could not find it in "Jerusalem". Moreover, though the wording is deliberately ambiguous, Jung seemed to experience this dramatic event as the real point of departure for his own "teaching", or in other words, perhaps, for the recovery of his own sense of inner authority. In view of the oneric equation of Elijah with Freud, it seems plausible to suppose that "Jerusalem" represents Vienna. As Jerusalem is the historic



center of monotheistic religion, and Vienna the home of psychoanalysis, the sub-text is clear; Freudianism is spiritually bankrupt, and cannot adequately account for the awesome mysteries of inner experience.

Finally, though attributed to a Christian Gnostic, the remainder of the fragment is frankly polytheistic. Indeed, in The Seven Sermons, Jung subordinated the Biblical God to Abraxas, a Gnostic deity. According to Jung, it is Abraxas who is the true generative force behind the visible universe, who dwells poised at the final "hypostasis" before the last mad, metaphysical leap into the uncreated Void. In Jung's cosmogeny, Jehovah is reduced to the level of an ignorant and self-intoxicated demi-urge, just as He is in Gnostic mythology and in Plato's Timaeus.

Who are "the dead"? We can't be sure. In Gnostic literature, "the dead" usually represents the common run of fallen humanity, who are unknowingly enmeshed in a delusional state of cosmic proportions, not unlike the Hindu notion of Maya or Samsara (Jonas, 1963). Judged from this point of view, "the dead" might represent humanity in general. And then again, they may represent a specific people, or a specific group of people. After all, the dead plagued Jung's dreams and fantasies at so many times, in so many different contexts, that they probably represent a variety of things. On more than one occasion, "the dead" plagued Jung's sleep with questions he couldn't answer, engendering deep feelings of shame and inadequacy. So perhaps "the dead" were Jung's parents. Or his patients. Then again, perhaps they were his ancestors, since Jung's pride in his lineage, and his feelings of ancestral piety, were unusually strong, becoming ever more pronounced with age. And perhaps, to the contrary, "the dead" represented people still living whom Jung had lost forever, like Speilrein and Freud.

One thing is not in doubt, however. To discover his sense of inner authority -- embodied in Philemon/Basilides -- Jung had to reject Freud's first, and the fact that the haunting took place in the summer of 1916, when Jung was 41, suggests that the process was still not complete. The need of a spirit guide and the search for grounded selfhood during Jung's late 30's and early 40's suggest that Jung's crisis was a belated adolescent ordeal -- a symptom of unfinished business or arrested development that intruded in a painful and unexpected way on Jung's adult personality. Or alternatively, it could be construed as an early and exceedingly acute crisis in the domain of generativity, which Erikson regarded as characteristic of mid-life development (Erikson, 1963). Either way, it may be useful to note that Jung's choice of a Gnostic pseudonym for this puzzling fragment was evidently linked to his attitudes toward sexuality. Deep in his heart, Jung had never accepted the Freudian dictum that disturbed sexuality lies at the core of all neurotic disturbances. Moreover, in defiance of his earlier allegiance to Freud, which obliged him to embrace the monogamous ideal -- or at any rate, to try -- by 1916, when he wrote the Seven Sermons, he was living (more or less openly) with his wife *and* his mistress.

Significantly, Jung did not preach sexual revolution as a universal panacea, as Otto Gross did. Nor was he a feminist in any meaningful sense of the word. Nevertheless, in the long, laborious process of discovering and authenticating his own inner authority, Jung *did* reject Freud's Mosaic morality in favor of a Gnostic antinomianism, which entails a total rejection of conventional mores by the spiritual elite of illuminated or "perfect" souls (Jonas, 1963; Friedman, 1984, pp. 209-212). Indeed, in his book Psychology and Religion (Jung, 193), Jung endorsed the doctrine of the Carpocrations, a Gnostic sect who advocated total surrender to all bodily appetites and



inclinations as the only unerring path to redemption. Despite its obvious elitist coloration -- which was antithetical to the levelling spirit of Gross's sexual radicalism -- Jung's conduct and beliefs in the sexual sphere gave some of his ideas and utterances a certain affinity with ideas expressed by Gross. And despite the rupture in their relations occasioned by Gross's headlong flight from respectability, and Jung's subsequent aid to Hans Gross in having Otto incarcerated, the lingering thread that connected Jung to Otto Gross intellectually is that they both knew and admired Ludwig Klages, and cited him extensively. Like Klages -- who was also a student of Gnostic literature -- both Jung and Gross shared a fierce antipathy toward Mosaic, monotheist religiosity, and of its several Christian offshoots, whose severe patriarchalism they derided. And like Klages, Gross and Jung were both deeply conversant with Nietzsche, and with the work of Swiss scholar J.J.Bachofen, whose matriarchal theory they invoked to criticize Freud. In a manner of speaking, then, Jung, Gross and Ludwig Klages were all born again pagans locked in fierce spiritual combat with the suffocating

influence of the Mosaic and monotheist morality which, by their reckoning, shapes the moribund character of the modern age.⁴

In any case, it should be emphasized that taken at face value, and without benefit of interpretation of any kind, the content of Jung's Seven Sermons suggests very strongly that Jung was an anti-Semite, albeit a very sophisticated one, or failing that, that Jung *became* an anti-Semite in the wake of his struggle with Freud. Indeed, if we take Jung's utterances at all seriously, it would be naive to stop here, for there are strong neo-pagan strains in Jung's Seven Sermons which attack the basic underpinnings of the Christian faith as sharply as those of her older Semitic sister,

⁴ Incidentally, Bachofen was a pious Lutheran, and would never have endorsed the neo-Gnostic or neo-pagan strains of Klages and Jung -- much less Gross's advocacy of sexual revolution. Indeed, Martin Green's characterizations of Klages and Gross vindicate the thesis advanced by Erich Fromm in "The Theory of Mother Right and Its Significance for Social Psychology" (Fromm, 1934). According to Fromm, the different inflections given to the interpretation of Bachofen by his epigones invariably reflect their political agendas. Gross's ideas fall within the orbit of the radical, Marxist camp, while those of Klages -- and of Jung, parenthetically -- have a reactionary, metaphysical cast. Although his book is a masterpiece of literary/historical research, when Green speaks of the *matricentric* cast of Gross's life and work, and opposes it to the *patricentric* spirit of Weber and Freud, he does Fromm a great disservice, since the distinction between the matricentric and patricentric modes of life and thought originates with Fromm; a fact Green fails to point out. For more on this point, see Burston, 1989.

notwithstanding the fact that Jung chose a specifically Christian gnostic as his mouthpiece.⁵

Was Jung really an anti-Semite? Not surprisingly, there is compelling evidence and argument on both sides of this question. And in view of the copious efforts of Jung's critics and champions alike, it is impossible to summarize all the relevant data here. Suffice it to say that many of Jung's disciples were Jewish, and that most of them reject this idea as baseless, if not defamatory. On the other hand, Jung's various papers from the late 1920's and early 1930's seem to evince a guarded openness to the ideas and aspirations of National Socialism, and many of his followers from this period were known to be strongly sympathetic to Nazi ideology. Then again, Jung's pro-Nazi followers fell away as Jung became more and more disenchanted with National Socialism, and more outspoken about Hitler's intense morbidity, and in the course of the war, Jung actively assisted prominent Jewish families to escape certain death at the hands of the Nazis.

In short, it is all very difficult to judge. On the one hand, evidence of anti-Semitism; on the other, of intimate and supportive relations with Jews. However, a survey of the literature on this question does disclose one indisputable fact, namely, that most accounts (on both sides of this issue) focus primarily on Jung's profoundly ambiguous remarks about Jewish and German psychology, and his shameful conduct in the early 1930's or his

⁵ In The Gnostic Religion, Hans Jonas points out that the historic Basilides was a vocal anti-Semite, who like his better known counterpart, Marcion, sought to expunge any traces of Old Testament teaching from Christian theology (Jonas, 1963, chapter 6). The fact that Basilides stood in for Philemon in The Seven Sermons merely buttresses the likelihood of the supposition that Jung chose the name Philemon for his guru (consciously or otherwise) because of its proximity to the epistle to the Hebrews, where St. Paul comes perilously close to advocating exactly the same thing.

attempts to atone thereafter. However, if we take the Seven Sermons and Jung's late life utterances into account, we stumble on a whole new perspective on Jung's alleged anti-Semitism that warrants close scrutiny.

f. An Answer to Jung: History and Interpretation in The Old Testament

Around 1950, Jung's Seven Sermons came to the attention of the Jewish philosopher Martin Buber. Buber was incensed by features of Jung's work that are best illustrated by his remarks on the genesis of religious symbols in later editions of Symbols of Transformation. On the one hand, as we saw in connection with Philemon, Jung appeared to believe that representations of God are in fact human creations, and that the dialogue between man and God is *really* a conversation of man with himself, even when it isn't experienced or interpreted as such. On the other hand, Jung refused to rule out the possibility that these images that appear to emerge from the unconscious exist "in and for themselves", in which case we could speak of a genuine theophany, rather than a mere projection of unconscious contents. As Buber was at pains to point out, the stubborn ambiguity in all of Jung's formulations on this point are not a trivial matter for a man or woman of faith. Either the God-image represents an entity that exists "in and for itself", or it is a human creation, and the customary relationship between the creature and its Creator is reversed. And either way, one must choose.

In Eclipse of God, published in 1952, Buber was also critical of Jung's "Abraxas opus" (Buber, 1952,), or The Seven Sermons, which came into his possession through Jung's erstwhile follower, Hans Trub. Buber also criticized Jung's handling of the problem of evil. But while effective as a



methodological and epistemological critique, Buber's answer to Jung lacked a certain psychological sophistication. For Jung's Gnosticism, and his Carpocratian "deification of the instincts", which Buber so abhorred, were not just the products of muddled thinking, but were colored by Jung's relationship to Freud. The depth and intensity of Jung's personal loss, evidenced in his prolonged breakdown, and in the eventual composition of the Seven Sermons, was illustrated again in graphic detail in An Answer to Job -- which followed Buber's critique -- where Jung, throwing caution to the winds, took up his diatribe against the Biblical Jehovah in earnest. According to Jung, for example, in the Book of the Job, God

behaves as irrationally as a cataclysm; the next moment he wants to be loved, honored, worshipped and praised as just. He reacts irritably to every word that has the faintest suggestion of criticism, while he himself does not care a straw for his own moral code if his actions run counter to its statutes (ibid., pp.384-385).

Therefore, one cannot doubt Yahweh's connivance. His readiness to deliver Job into Satan's murderous hands proves that he doubts Job precisely because he projects his own tendency to unfaithfulness upon a scapegoat. There is reason to suspect that he is about to loosen his matrimonial ties with Israel but hides his intention from himself. This vaguely suspected unfaithfulness causes him, with

**the help of Satan, to seek out the unfaithful one,
and he infallibly picks on the most faithful of the
lot, who is forthwith subjected to a gruelling test.
Yahweh has become unsure of his own
faithfulness (ibid., pp.390-391).**

In short, to Jung's way of thinking, Jehovah/Yahweh is a jealous god who demands exclusive loyalty, but can't be trusted to respect the terms of his own covenant. The repeated references to Yahweh's philandering are striking. In Jung's own words

the Bible knows only of Eve as Adam's legitimate wife. It nevertheless remains a strange fact that the original man that was created in God's image had, according to tradition, two wives, just like his heavenly prototype. Just as Yahweh is legitimately united with his wife Israel, but has a feminine pneuma as his intimate playmate from all eternity (Sophia), so Adam has Lillith (the daughter or emanation of Satan) to wife, as a satanic correspondence to Sophia. Eve would then correpond with the people of Israel. We naturally do not know why we should hear at such a late date that the Ruach Elohim, the "spirit of God", is a fairly independant being who exists side by side with God, and that long before the marriage

with Israel Yahweh had had relations with Sophia. Nor do we know why, in the older tradition, the knowledge of this first alliance had been lost (ibid., pp. 392-393).

Without attempting an exhaustive analysis, I think most people will grant that the Book of Job puts the believer in a just and loving God in a very difficult position. If the author(s) of this narrative is to be believed, God destroys Job's enormous family to prove a point to Satan about the incorruptibility of the just, then watches impassively while Job, wild with grief and perplexity, is accosted by pious believers who admonish him earnestly to examine his conscience and to repent, since such catastrophe could only be visited on someone who strayed from the paths of righteousness. But Job is innocent, and he knows it, so he rebukes his accusers, at which point God intervenes in a terrifying epiphany, and punishes Job's tormentors for their ersatz faith and groundless homilies. In a rather implausible conclusion, the text relates that God then replenishes Job's herds, and provides him with new wives and male offspring, but without supplying Job with an explanation -- much less an apology -- for the apparently irrevocable destruction of his first family. And it asks us to believe that Job is joyously reconciled with the Almighty in the wake of this heartless treatment.

Leaving the lack of realism in the narrative aside, most 20th century people would agree that the book of Job depicts a Deity who is more enamored of his own power, or with winning a paltry bet, than he is with truth, justice, or mercy, which are supposedly his chief attributes.

Moreover, here is a Deity anxious to ascertain the unconditional loyalty of

his followers, though He is quite fickle to them in return -- a supernatural embodiment of all the failings Jung found in Freud. Though thinking by analogy to his own experience, Jung was probably quite justified in arguing that Job surpassed his Creator ethically, and that this is a source of dramatic tension in the narrative (Bloch, 1972). What we do not know is if it merely appears that way to us in retrospect, or whether this was actually intended -- consciously or unconsciously -- by the author(s).

However, while a charitable critic will grant Jung this much, perhaps, Yahweh's alleged philandering tendencies, which He projects onto and persecutes in Adam/Job, don't really hold up under critical scrutiny. And this *is* a serious problem, because the whole thrust of Jung's interpretation of Old Testament lore hinges on the supposition that God's arbitrary and authoritarian demeanor are linked to a sexual double standard; one which affords him access to extra-marital pleasures, but denies the same rights to poor Adam. One can search the text of Job in vain for any tangible justification for this linkage, particularly in view of the fact that -- as Jung fails to note, significantly -- *the word Shekina never actually appears in the Old Testament*. But as C.J. Groesbeck points out, Jung's interpretation, though tenuous at best, resonates strongly with the triangular constellations of Freud [Yahweh], Martha [Israel] and Minna [Sophia], and of Jung [Adam], Emma [Eve] and Spielrein or Toni Wolff [Lillith] (Groesbeck, 1982).

Jung's problem becomes apparent when we finally realize that there is no textual warrant within the Book of Job to suppose that Yahweh's authoritarianism -- which is not at issue here -- is connected to sexual duplicity *per se*. Jung arrived at this conclusion by projecting the marriage of Jehovah and Israel and the figure of Sophia backwards to Job's

time several centuries before. Yet the (largely Kabbalistic) lore regarding God's marriage to Shekina, to which Jung repeatedly alludes, and the symbolic parallels between Shekina and Lillith, are late-Hellenistic, medieval or post medieval products, and would have been utterly foreign to the authors of Job. Moreover, it is entirely characteristic that Jung speaks of "Sophia", and not of *Shekina*, since the conflation of the Graeco-Gnostic Sophia with the indigenous Hebrew Shekina begins with Philo of Alexandria; a Platonizing, Hellenistic Jewish philosopher of the first century (Pulver, 1946; Scholem, 1974, p. 22; Patai, 1978).

In other words, by positing the existence of a unitary, timeless, collective unconscious, Jung was able to transpose "Sophia" -- an entity distinct from Israel, and equivalent to Shekinah in the Hellenistic imagination -- back to Job and Genesis, and to apply this anachronistic perspective to much older material, where no reference to Shekina -- let alone Sophia -- is made. But this is a reckless way of proceeding. In The Hebrew Goddess, the celebrated scholar Raphael Patai notes that the Shekina emerges as a fixture of Israelite faith only in the 2nd or 1st century B.C.E., and that the earliest documentation of the Shekina as God's consort appears in Philo. Baruch Halpern, professor of Humanities and Religion at York University, remarks that the personification of "wisdom" in Israel -- Hokhma -- begins as a trope in Proverbs in the 1st century B.C., in a literature that is already influenced by Hellenistic thought. The dates for Job, by contrast, vary anywhere from the 7th to the 3rd century B.C.E.,

predating Hellenistic influence.⁶ (Dates for the composition Genesis vary from the 8th to 5th century, depending on the portion of the text in question. In principle, however, the problem is the same).

To any scholar who is not uncritically enamored of Jung's ideas, and who is mindful of the historical specificity of symbols, the "collective representations" of Jews in a later historical epoch, living under vastly different circumstances, simply cannot be introduced to explain the experiences or beliefs of their more primitive counterparts, who were as yet unexposed to the cultural diversity and historical vicissitudes of the Hellenistic and Roman periods. This procedure isn't simply "psychologizing" problems of faith, as Martin Buber and Maurice Friedman complain (Buber, 1952; Friedman, 1984); it is *mythologizing* history.

Jung almost admits as much when he says "Nor do we know why, in the earlier tradition, the knowledge of this earlier alliance (between God and Shekina) had been lost". Actually, there *is* no textual warrant, however tenuous or remote, for supposing that knowledge of an alliance between God and Shekinah/Sophia was "lost" to the authors of Genesis, as Jung alleges. It is merely a convenient hypothesis, without a shred of real evidence to support it. Rather than conjure with imponderables like these, it would be more prudent -- and more economical -- to suppose that later commentators simply invented the "tradition" that Jung claimed was lost. In supposing it lost, Jung actually credits post-Hellenistic Jewry with recovering an "earlier" tradition, but without furnishing *any* independent

⁶ In a personal communication with the author, dated October 18, 1989, Prof. Halpern remarks that Job is written in a dialect different from standard Biblical Hebrew, and is impossible to date with certainty. He favors the 6th or 5th century because the concepts of causality entertained by the book's various protagonists, and argues that competing notions of causality and transcendence are the real subtext of the narrative.

evidence for this assertion, and without taking into account the time honored custom of ascribing every new ethical and cosmological conception in Judaism to an older, traditional source, much as Jung himself credited his Seven Sermons to Basilides and Philemon. (This is largely how Kabbalah developed. When no concrete, textual referents could ground the complex symbolic equations which Platonizing, mystical Jews introduced into their evolving textual exegesis, they conveniently assumed the knowledge was "lost" to legitimate their own interpretive frame of reference).

In short, Jung's interpretation of the Old Testament combined some brilliant intuitions with an intemperate polemic shaped by the subjective urgency of his own personal experiences. Drawing on late Hellenistic and hermetic lore that was unknown to the authors of Genesis and Job, Jung insisted that the the *hieros gamos* or sexual congress of Sophia (Shekina) and Yahweh is the real source of divine cosmogonic/intellectual creativity, and is therefore justified on those grounds. Correspondingly, Jung infers, Adam, being made in God's image, has Lillith -- or *should* have, if God would play fair. As the aging Jung waxes eloquent on this theme, one can almost hear the younger Jung reproaching Freud (Yahweh) for hypocrisy, and urging him to own up to the inspiring, sustaining and possibly erotic role that Minna (Sophia) played during his creative illness -- something he should have done in fact, rather than in fantasy, and so long after the fact.

Probing more deeply, one also detects a note of self-justification here. Jung's involvements with his own "anima" figures -- notably Sabina Spielrein and Toni Wolff -- stimulated his creativity enormously. There is no doubt about that. But by the same token, his passionate extra-marital attachments wounded those close to him, and Jung could not follow his creative Muse without damaging loved ones in the process. After he

returned to Emma exclusively, Jung's former mistress Toni Wolff died a haunted, lonely woman (Stern, 1976; Donn, 1988), a mere two and half years years before Jung's last, feverish duel with Yahweh. Jung carved a monument in her honor, and probably regretted the suffering he caused her. But in all probability, knowing Jung, he regarded her fate as a tragic inevitability; something fated or predestined, and not as something he had any power to change or avert. His ultimate unwillingness to shoulder the responsibility for the pain caused by his extra-marital involvements is another reason why An Answer to Job is such a fascinating compilation of speculative heretical theology. ⁷

g. Conclusion:

⁷ Incidentally, the figure of Lillith *is* a fitting symbol for Toni Wolff. Raphael Patai notes that Lillith was "a well known she devil" in Israel in the 8th c. B.C.E. However, she wasn't actually introduced into Talmudic commentary on the book of Genesis till the 3rd c. A.D. (which tells strongly against Jung's speculations about Job). In any event, in the Talmud, Lillith appears as Adam's first consort, who displeased both God and man because she refused to adopt a subservient role vis a vis her intended spouse, so that God was obliged to try again, creating Eve, who was appropriately submissive. Later, in Kabbalistic lore, Lillith emerges as a lustful succubus who is murderously hostile toward women in childbirth, toward new born infants, and to marriage in general. As such, on a positive plane, she represents women who reject their subordinate status in patriarchal culture, and who refuse to harness their libido to reproduction within the patriarchal sphere. (Hence their independence and attractiveness to many men). But she also embodies the agonizing imperative of splitting reproductive longing from sexual passion among "outlaw" women in the patriarchal milieu, and their consequent envy and hostility toward married women and married life -- features Jung conveniently overlooked in this context. For a fascinating analysis of Lillith from both a Jungian and a feminist perspective, see Barbara Black Kultov's "Lilith", in *Quadrant*, 1983, vol. 16, #1, pp. 63-87.

And what, if anything, can we learn from all this? As regards Jung's alleged anti-Semitism, a number of things are now fairly obvious. To begin with, it appears that Freud's apprehensions about Jung's anti-Semitism had some slender basis in fact. Leaving his political machinations in the 1930's to one side, Jung's Gnostic diatribes against Yahweh confirm Freud's suspicions in this regard. At the same time, as Erich Fromm and Martin Buber noted, Jung's neo-pagan diatribes against Jehovah, are really as injurious to the Christian faith (or to any Biblically based view of world history) as they are to Judaism specifically (Fromm, 1947; Fromm, 1950; Buber, 1952). If this is not apparent to most of Jung's readers, it is because Jung was loathe to follow these ideas through to their ultimate logical conclusions with rigorous consistency. (And so, no doubt, are they).

In any case, on the basis of the preceding, it is apparent that Freud really used Jung's anti-Semitism as a pretext for dismissing many of Jung's *legitimate* misgivings about his theories. And the fact that he did so with such pusillanimous conviction merely *intensified* Jung's anti-Semitism. Jung's anti-Semitism probably started out as an expression of the prevalent, low-grade anti-Semitism common to most Swiss people of his own day and age. As such, it was probably a rather *minor* factor in his personal psychology, and not one that interfered much with his scientific judgement -- Freud notwithstanding. However, as Harry Slochower pointed out, Freud's handling of the transference in Jung's case was deeply flawed. So if Jung's contact with Freud elicited or intensified dormant anti-Semitism, Freud was hardly blameless in the matter, as his bitter accusations imply (Slochower, 1981). Of course, this does not *excuse* Jung's deplorable behavior in the 1930's. As the old saying goes, two wrongs do not make a right. But it does make it more *intelligible* in retrospect.

Moreover, the forgoing considerations should prompt us to consider the relationship between theory and experience in psychoanalysis. Many analytic clinicians still cling to the naive presumption that analytic theory is a product of the "self-analysis" of its founder, which cured him of his neurosis -- (a notion Jung borrowed from Freud, obviously) -- or of careful processes of inductive inference applied to the behavioral anomalies of patients encountered in the clinical setting, which are then tested, refined and elaborated in the crucible of clinical experience. While not entirely fallacious, these are half-truths, at best. A considerable literature attests to the fact that despite Freud and Jung's pioneering efforts in clinical practice, the psychology of unconscious mental processes was already quite advanced by the late 19th c. Kant, Schelling, Carus, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, von Hartmann and Lipps should all be counted among the early progenitors of analytic theory, though in fairness to Jung here, he was generally more mindful of these men's claims to posterity than Freud (e.g. Jung, 1949; Ellenberger, 1970; Kerr, 1988a; Burston, 1991).

Then again, another important point attested to by the preceding reflections is the well nigh inevitable impact of personal losses and specifically *adult* traumata on the intellectual constructions of the analytic theorist. For while the kinds of conflicts and losses suffered by Freud and Jung through the breakdown of their relationship may have had childhood *analogues* of various kinds, the feelings and experiences they had are intelligible only in specifically adult problems and situations. This does not mean that adult traumata exceed childhood trauma in intensity, but only in quality or kind. These personal conflicts and losses -- with patients, disciples, and various embodiments of Temptation or the Muse -- all colored the specific constellation of "collective representations" that Freud

and Jung took to be constitutive of our culture or humanity. This is a sobering thought. For it implies that the structures of the collective unconscious that Freud and Jung thematized for this century, (though manifestly indebted to the preceding one), were shaped equally by their needs to make sense of their own uniquely *personal* experiences, and to model their idea of the "collective" psyche on unassimilated (or unassimilable) bits of their own. It suggests that the application of psychoanalytic theory to the psychology of religion almost inevitably involves a subjective element; one that entails the projection of personal "contents" onto the screen of the collective psyche.

Another interesting dimension to this inquiry is the dawning realization that the early history of the analytic movement was profoundly influenced by the commerce between the Freud and Jung *households*, and not just by the two men's meetings and private correspondence. After all, Jung's *first* visit to Freud's home brought with it Minna's tortured confessions, (whatever they were), which quite literally changed the course of Jung's life. The *second* visit, appropriately enough, brought the bookcase episode, which communicated Jung's unease about Freud's domestic situation, among other things.

Furthermore, Freud's visit with the Jungs, and his bitter and wistful remarks about marriage, emboldened Emma Jung to widen the field of interaction dramatically between the two principals. Because of Carl's moody behavior, she felt compelled to write to Freud, thereby inserting herself into the dialogue between her husband and his master. Judging from their content, the aim of her letters was to extend to Freud her warm wishes of consolation and hope. (And in this, I believe, she was completely genuine). But it was also to enlist Freud's sympathy, and to confide her

fears regarding Jung's anxiety over losing Freud's trust and friendship. In this way, Freud gleaned things about Jung and the true measure of his feelings that Jung himself had contrived to conceal somewhat. This situation could not be comfortably resolved for all concerned, and exacerbated the bitterness behind their theoretical disputes somewhat.

In any case, this domestic commerce in ideas and confidences, confessions and denials, between husbands, wives, and mistresses undoubtedly has cultural and historical properties and patterns that deserve more detailed scrutiny than we gave it here, particularly since the bulk of the evidence is scripted and spoken in the male voice. And another form of exchange between the households, the traffic in analytic patients, also deserves closer scrutiny, as do the tragic deaths of Otto Gross, who fled the confines of the family only to shipwreck horribly on the farther shores of poverty, addiction and paranoia, and Sabina Spielrein, who was shot in mysterious circumstances in Rostov-on-the-Don.

Meanwhile, when considering the scope or limits of any analytic semiotics of sacred texts, it must constantly be born in mind that the historical, familial and working worlds of the theorists who create these interpretive methodologies invariably impinge on the deepest wellsprings of theoretical reflection. As John Donne said, "No man is an island . . .", and accordingly Jung's critique of the Holy Family in An Answer to Job must perforce illumine the structure of social relations that underlies it.

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