

problem of modern man is a problem of reason; it is a problem internal to his own ego processes. It is not that the higher processes are simply a result of sublimation, as Brown contends, or that only technical reason is real, as Rieff contends. It is rather that reason consists of higher and lower processes of the ego (and possibly we should include the higher regulatory processes of the id). Modern man has identified too completely with the higher; there no longer is a sufficient dialogue between the higher and the lower. Modern man no longer lives, as he must, out of the fullness of reason. It is precisely the concept of generative man that may be closer, as long as we remain within the confines of psychoanalytic theory, to an adequate statement of the true relationship between the high and the low in man.

In the work of such men as Heinz Hartmann and Robert White, psychoanalysis is evolving a new image of man; it is an image of man no longer ruled by the pleasure-pain principle in any simplistic sense. It is a vision of man that portrays him with a crucial need to influence his environment. Man has the need to exercise his powers and achieve a sense of mastery with respect to an environment that he activates as it activates him. Effectance, competence, influence, mastery, the exercise of potentialities—whatever one calls it—this appears to be a crucial need which must be realized to some degree if man is to feel and to be human. Both Fromm and Erikson extend this theme. In fact, it is in the light of this understanding of man that they render their somewhat negative evaluation and interpretation of modernity. The facts are, they insist, that in modern societies, man's drive for effectance, mastery, and power has gone astray and has created an environment that both distorts and frustrates the very thing which man needs most. Effectance, mastery, and power in the sense that ego psychology speaks of it, i.e., as mutual activation and mutual regulation between man and his social and natural environment, has nearly been lost. In its place have come a thousand hideous demons. But Fromm and Erikson, to whom we turn next, will tell us a slightly different story about how it happened, what it means, and what must be done to correct it.

To follow them, however, is to steer a course between certain features of the emerging regressive counter culture that can champion the thought of such men as Brown and the core of detached urban-technological elite who can celebrate the thought of men such as Rieff. Neither a skeptical negative community proposed by some nor an instinctual utopianism advocated by others will carry us through the narrow gates of survival.

5

ERICH FROMM

*The Productive Personality and
the Coming of the Messianic Time*

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(The Westminster Press)

Erich Fromm is at the same time one of the most widely read and most severely criticized and misunderstood authors of our day. He must at least have the satisfaction, however, of knowing that most criticisms of his thought are so poorly conceived that they merit little serious consideration themselves.¹ His work is marked by a combination of genuine courage and Olympian detachment from some of the taboos of scholarly discourse.

Consequently, Erich Fromm is never quite in step with the fashions of his time. Orthodox Freudians have always been skeptical of Fromm because of his rejection of classical psychoanalytic instinct theory.² Neo-orthodox theologians, while appreciating aspects of his analysis of contemporary culture, found it fashionable to attack his allegedly optimistic and progressivistic anthropology as well as his utopian eschatology.³ Sociologists of the so-called structural-functional school such as Winston White have classified him as an "intellectual ideologist" along with other thinkers as diverse as Herbert Marcuse, William Whyte, C. W. Mills, John Kenneth Galbraith, and Hannah Arendt.⁴ Reviewers of his works in the popular press have become increasingly irritated with his Marxist humanism.⁵ Marxists themselves, while applauding his leadership in introducing Marxist thought to a larger American public in his three books *Marx's Concept of Man*, *Beyond the Chains of Illusion*, and *Socialist Humanism*, are critical of Fromm's tendency to emphasize the humanistic elements in the early Marx rather than his later ideas on revolutionary class struggle.⁶



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Even though the student movement in the United States is articulating ideas that at one time were closely associated with Fromm's name (his criticism of the capitalistic, consumer-oriented, technological and managerial elements in Western society, as well as his persistent call for a return to participatory democracy), many students are more likely to ground these ideas in the instinctual utopianism of Herbert Marcuse than in the more idealistic-sounding thought of Fromm.⁷ Marcuse himself admits that his analysis of contemporary culture and society has strong affinities with Fromm, but he accuses Fromm of mutilating Freud's instinct theory (the true ground for the "Great Refusal"), of "spiritualizing" freedom and happiness, of succumbing to the style of the "Power of Positive Thinking," and finally of playing into the hands of those who would perpetuate the consumer and performance-oriented society of which Fromm himself is so critical.⁸

In order to interpret Fromm and his concept of the productive personality, one must, first of all, locate him in the context of all the different intellectual interests and methodological procedures that characterize his writings. This variety alone leads to the confusion which has marred most attempts to interpret his thought. Fromm's writings extend over a period of forty years. He has a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Heidelberg and received his training in psychoanalysis from the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute. He has lived and taught respectively in Germany, in the United States, and in Mexico. In addition to his writings in psychoanalysis, sociology, ethics, and the psychology of religion, his *May Man Prevail* was an ambitious probe into the area of international politics. He has been one of the most energetic and successful initiators of the dialogue between Western thought and Eastern religion (especially Zen Buddhism). He has also been a significant stimulus to the international dialogue on Marxist humanism.

His blunt, uncomplicated, and readable style has contributed immensely to his enormous popular success, but it has also served to give a tone of pedestrian simplicity to his writing that makes his hurried historical judgments only too obvious while often obscuring the overall wisdom, force, and occasional brilliance of his formulations. However, it is for the very reason of his methodological richness and the variety of subjects he has touched that Erich Fromm is a man to be taken seriously. Many writers say some of the things that Erich Fromm has been saying these last forty years better than he does himself. But in many instances, Fromm said them first, and, taken as a whole, his thought constitutes one of the most commanding moral interpretations of Western civilization presently available.

History will probably grant that Fromm is indeed a wise man. But it will also record that he was a man very much in a hurry. Somewhere in the middle of his career Fromm undoubtedly made the decision to sacrifice methodological elegance and academic specialization for breadth of scope and singleness of purpose. Boiling below the surface of his calm and deliberate prose is a deep but well-directed sense of panic about the present human situation. It has been only since the middle of the 1960's that this kind of emergency mentality began to grip large portions of the academic community in the United States. Fromm has felt it for over thirty years. In retrospect, Fromm no longer seems like an alarmist.

His analysis of Western civilization—capitalism, bureaucracy, scientism, and technology—has been both sober and somber. But it has not been cynical, nor has it been nihilistic. He has used both psychoanalytic and Marxist concepts to unmask our ideologies, false consciousness, and false ideals. But whereas Rieff uses psychoanalytic concepts to show that all ideals are false, Fromm uses psychoanalysis to expose the motivational and characterological distortions that render valid ideals debased. In addition, although Rieff seems undisturbed over the present direction of corporate capitalism, scientism, and technology and, in fact, attempts to evolve an accommodational penultimate ethic in its support, Fromm's analysis of these movements almost matches that of Brown in the depths of its despair. But whereas Brown proposes to save us with a utopia of regression, Fromm has the audacity to propose a utopia of progression and advance. For Brown, the way out is *back*; for Fromm, the way out is *up*.

The remarkable fact of our times is that more intellectuals and young people are willing to believe that the way out is indeed back rather than up. Rieff has discussed this remissive faith which reigns in our day with his characteristic brilliance. In contrast to the way up or the way back, Rieff has proposed a lateral move—a side step, so to speak—into psychoanalytic detachment. What Rieff cannot understand is that there are other ways to get out by going up besides the way up that man has used in Western Protestant civilization for the last three or four hundred years. This is the essence of Fromm's intellectual commitment: to find a new solution to the approaching catastrophe toward which man is moving by redefining and reestablishing the utopian vision which forms Western man's consciousness. Fromm's error is that he does not fully understand that in our time the way up must also be accompanied by a way down and a way back. Modern man and modern civilization will be humanized when the way up incorporates the archaic foundations of human existence as both a support and a



limitation. Fromm in some ways knows that this is true, but he does not know it deeply enough. His problem is primarily one of style.

In the course of a single work, one may find Erich Fromm following any one of the following methodological styles: psychoanalytic energetics and metapsychology, sociology and the social psychology of character, a rather loose but often perceptive kind of philosophical and phenomenological eidetics, an uneven but frequently insightful hermeneutical appropriation of religious and mythological symbols, and, finally, a daring although often naïve program of ethical prescription at both an individual and a social level. Who attempts more than this? And who approaches these tasks with the kind of unguarded directness displayed by Fromm?

His most lasting academic contribution has come in the area of the social psychology of character. David Riesman acknowledges that Fromm's concept of the "marketing" character was a major inspiration and source for his own portrait of the "other-directed man" in his classic *The Lonely Crowd*,⁹ a book of such importance in sociological circles that it was able to inspire, eleven years after its publication, the massive symposium entitled *Culture and Social Character*, edited by Seymour Lipset and Leo Lowenthal.¹⁰ Yet Fromm has not spent a lifetime refining his social psychology of character. Much of the honor for Fromm's early insights has been awarded to Riesman. Wider horizons have commanded Fromm's attention and pressed him to grander though less elegant tasks.

What is probably most confusing to many psychoanalytically sensitive readers and many young people impressed with the instinctual utopianism of such men as Brown and Marcuse is the combination of scientific-sounding explanatory concepts on the one hand and phenomenological or eidetic concepts on the other. For instance, it is quite evident in Fromm's earliest major work, *Escape from Freedom*, that he had rejected traditional psychoanalytic libido theory. Of course, for many readers, to reject or restate psychoanalytic libido theory is to reject the body itself as fundamental to behavior. Fromm never intended to do this and, in fact, did not do it. In place of classical libido theory Fromm substituted a larger concept of bodily energy that included, but was not confined to, the classical tension reduction model of sexual libido. But more important than that, Fromm was making use of the concepts of organic individuation and integration put forth by Jean Piaget¹¹ and Kurt Goldstein.¹² These more organismic theories of development are body-oriented as much as—if not more than—the classical psychoanalytic theory of the libido. They assume that the

organism has an internal drive to grow and a positive interest in the world outside itself, an interest that transcends simple survival. Furthermore, this position assumes that the organism contains tendencies both toward higher levels of independence and toward higher levels of relatedness; it holds that growth proceeds simultaneously through a process of internal *differentiation* of the various parts of the organism and successively higher levels of integration of these parts.

These insights Fromm quickly incorporated into his thought and moved on to his wider interests. He did not follow the long and tedious path of the more systematic and conscientious ego theorists such as Heinz Hartmann, David Rapaport, Ernst Kris, and Rudolph M. Loewenstein, who have struggled to remain faithful to basic psychoanalytic theory by explaining these progressivistic forces within the organism in terms of *neutralization* of libidinal energies.¹³ Consequently, it was only in the late 1950's and the early and mid-1960's that psychoanalytic ego psychology in the works of Robert White, Robert Holt, and Peter Wolff began to take account of and incorporate the careful scientific advances to be found in the works of not only Jean Piaget and Kurt Goldstein but such men as Heinz Werner as well. In other words, it was only then that psychoanalytic ego psychology arrived, certainly in a more systematic and rigorous way, where Fromm was during the early 1940's. Psychoanalytic ego psychology stands today as both a confirmation and a correction of the neo-Freudian formulations such as those of Erich Fromm. Psychoanalytic ego psychology has now demonstrated that there are other ways to talk about human emotionality such as joy, happiness, pleasure, and love than the classical tension reduction model of orthodox psychoanalysis or early American experimental psychology such as that of Clark Hull.

The mediating figure between Fromm's work and the psychoanalytic ego psychologists was Ernest Schachtel and his brilliant theoretical formulations, especially his work *Metamorphosis*.¹⁴ Schachtel is himself a longtime friend and colleague of Fromm at the William Alanson White Institute of Psychiatry. In the foreword to *Metamorphosis*, Schachtel gives special thanks to Erich Fromm "from whom I have learned a great deal and whose friendly interest has contributed much to the development of my thinking." Much of what Fromm once said from a phenomenological and philosophical perspective about the more idealistic-sounding effects of joy, happiness, love, and hope, Schachtel has restated from a more scientifically convincing ontogenetic point of view, acknowledging at almost every step his fundamental agreement with Fromm. In turn, Fromm in his later writings relies



more and more on the work of Schachtel, especially for the development of his theory of memory, his theory of the unconscious, and his theory of the important concepts of *activeness* and *passiveness*, which are so fundamental to his understanding of the productive personality.

Had Fromm stayed in closer contact with the developments of psychoanalytic ego psychology, he would now be able to state more convincingly the energetic and metapsychological grounds for some of his more philosophically and phenomenologically derived concepts. As an example, we can point to his crucial belief that man has certain "powers" which must be exercised if he is to remain truly human. This concept, which is at the heart of his vision of the productive personality, resonates very well with the concept of "efficacy" and the theory of independent ego structures and ego energies developed by Robert White which we reviewed in the last chapter. Fromm, however, especially in *Man for Himself* where he first systematically sets forth his theory of the productive orientation, gives credit to a wide variety of thinkers for helping him with his formulation—Bergson, James, Brentano, Husserl's analysis of the public "act," Aristotle, Spinoza, and Goethe, to mention only a few. Nowhere does he mention a psychoanalytic thinker except Freud. Of Freud's concept of the genital character, which as we will see later does indeed greatly influence Fromm's thinking, he says this, "The description of the genital character does not go far beyond the statement that it is the character structure of an individual who is capable of functioning well sexually and socially."¹⁶ Fromm knew what Heinz Hartmann,¹⁶ Philip Rieff, and Freud himself well knew—that psychoanalysis as it left the hands of Freud cannot project a positive ethical vision. Or to say it more concretely, it cannot clarify on the basis of its own concepts the positive ethical vision that it indeed implicitly holds.

It would be possible for Fromm to restate his understanding of productive "power" in the light of recent developments of psychoanalytic ego psychology. This would not gain him much but it would gain him something. We have already stated our agreement with the position of French and German phenomenology, especially the work of Paul Ricoeur: the fundamental structures of man's psychic life need to be stated from the perspective of the embodied *cogito* and its situation of relatedness to the world. But we also, as Ricoeur has suggested, believe it is profitable to use objective and scientific categories in a diagnostic way, as a method of revealing the depth of human experience that phenomenological analysis may not fully grasp, always taking care, as a final step, to restate the diagnostic findings in terms of their

relationship to the embodied *cogito*.¹⁷ This is the value of Fromm's early use of the scientific categories of Piaget, Goldstein, and, later, Schachtel. Their discoveries serve as a diagnostic resource uncovering deeper intentionalities of the organism that provide a possibility for man's more mature emotions such as love, hope, and joy. Were he to use the advances of psychoanalytic ego psychology, his empirical diagnostics might be more convincing to psychoanalysts themselves, psychoanalytically oriented political theorists, as well as instinctual utopians such as Brown, Marcuse, and their followers. Without some attention to metapsychological questions of energy and structure, no purely phenomenologically oriented thinker can ever be certain that his eidetic essences are anything more than sublimations, reaction formations, or projections. If Freud's early theory of psychological energies is correct, Norman Brown's view of the goal of mental life and his interpretation of the real meaning of symbols is basically correct. The fact that it can be demonstrated, as we did in the last chapter, that the totality of psychic energy does not operate on the basic tension reduction model is in itself diagnostic evidence that all of man's growth-oriented intentionalities are not simply sublimations.

But actually, for Fromm's purpose, his rather hurried use of selected scientific material which substantiates the growth-oriented character of both the body and its mental life is justified. Fromm is fully aware that a metapsychology of energy and structure cannot in itself reveal the essential structures—the eidetics—of man's relation to his world. Only a psychology that also operates at a phenomenological and existential level can accomplish this. It is the very fact that Fromm took this step that simultaneously renders his formulations less elegant but finally wiser and more trustworthy than those of most of his detractors.

Although Fromm is constantly correlating scientific and explanatory concepts with broader phenomenological and philosophical concepts, he takes still another step. He attempts to incorporate the symbolic material of the religions of the world, most specifically of Zen Buddhism and the symbolism of the "messianic time" found in Judaism and Christianity. All these various sources—scientific explanation, philosophical and phenomenological anthropology, and religious myth and symbol—are brought together to form an ontology from which Fromm derives both the best and the worst in man. It is also from these various sources that Fromm constructs both an individual and a social-ethical vision, which is indeed worth serious consideration.

It is Fromm's phenomenological description of the characteristics of the productive personality—love, reason, work—that leads Herbert

Marcuse to charge Fromm with a moral idealism which supports the domination and repression of Western capitalist society. This charge is all the more startling in view of the general similarity, in many respects, of their systems of thought. Fromm's concept of the "marketing" society is similar in spirit to Marcuse's idea of the "performance principle." Both Fromm and Marcuse have attempted to effect a synthesis between psychoanalysis and Marxist humanism. Both are Germans who were exposed to some of the same philosophical currents—Heidegger, Hegel, Marx—moving through Germany between the two wars. Yet, in spite of this general similarity in their intellectual concerns and backgrounds, they consider themselves enemies, as their bitter exchange in *Dissent* during 1955 and 1956 so clearly demonstrates.¹⁸

The premise of Marcuse's synthesis of Freud and the early Marx is his severe attack on neo-Freudianism which was set forth in the epilogue of *Eros and Civilization*.¹⁹ Although Karen Horney and Harry Stack Sullivan were both roundly criticized in this piece, Fromm is clearly the center of attack. But even in the introduction to *Eros and Civilization* he feels compelled to write, "Freud's 'biologism' is a social theory in a depth dimension that has been consistently flattened out by the neo-Freudian schools."²⁰ It seems that it was necessary, even before Marcuse could begin his book, to dissociate himself from Erich Fromm, whose project was so near and yet so far from his own.

It is good, then, to note this similarity between Marcuse and Fromm rather than the more often observed complementarity between Marcuse and Brown. Certainly both Marcuse and Brown are important figures in creating the consciousness of the contemporary counter culture, as Theodore Roszak has so correctly demonstrated.²¹ Yet there are many differences between Marcuse and Brown that are important to remember. Marcuse is interested in political reform through revolution, whereas Brown is interested only in a revolution of cultural consciousness.²² Although both Marcuse and Brown ground their thought in the instinct theory of Freud (specifically Eros and Thanatos), each comes out with a very different vision of the final relation that can exist between instinct and culture. For Brown, instinct (as it was for Freud) is inevitably in conflict with culture. He makes no special effort to envision a society in which instinct would have a freer play. His thought ends in a mysticism of regression that seems to remove the human project from any particular historical or social expression. Marcuse, on the other hand, believes in the possibility of a nonrepressive civilization. Such a civilization would be built on the rather con-

tradictory idea of "non-repressive sublimation."²³ In the present culture, dominated as it is by the "surplus repression" of the performance principle, expressions of sexual libido have been narrowed to specifically genital experience. The new culture that Marcuse portrays will be predicated upon the affluence amassed by the performance principle of the present industrial and technological society. But the affluent society should make it possible, he believes, to repudiate the repressive and narrowing consequences of the performance principle, thereby permitting a wider expression of man's libidinal energies to objects other than those appropriate to genital activity.

The heart of the confusion in Marcuse's thought, from a metapsychological point of view, is his persistent tendency to equate libido, sexuality, and Eros. This was certainly a problem for the later Freud, who introduced the idea of Eros as a general life instinct without reconstructing his libido theory in the light of this broader concept.²⁴ Marcuse is probably correct in saying that there are other erotic impulses (sensual impulses) in the human organism besides the strictly genital ones. But it does not follow that these other sensual impulses should be called sexual or libidinal, as he persists in doing. As we have learned from Robert White, the need of the ego for efficacy is indeed a sensual need; it is based on its own energy and experiences its own particular kind of pleasure. But the pleasure and sensuality of the ego and its need for playful efficacy is significantly different from the sensuality and pleasure of the id and its libidinal energies. Libidinal energies are phasic, consummatory, and seek for tension reduction. The energies of the ego are less phasic, nonconsummatory, and seem to enjoy variation in tension rather than simple tension reduction.

We have already pointed out that White's conception of the ego's tendency for playful efficacy and his theory of independent ego energy can constitute a metapsychological foundation for Fromm's belief that the productive personality needs to exercise its powers and potentialities. To be productive, in Fromm's sense of the word, does not imply the repression of the erotic and sensual dimensions of man. The ego and its capacities have their pleasure, and they are neither antagonistic to nor identical with the pleasures of the libido. But if man needs the pleasures of the ego's efficacious and playful participation in a responsive world more than the pleasures of the libido, then one's understanding of both man and society are likely to be different from what Marcuse would lead us to believe. The problem of modern man becomes somewhat different than that depicted in Marcuse's more recent and widely appreciated (among the radical young) *One-Dimen-*



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sional Man and Soviet Marxism.²⁵ It is not that the performance principle dominates Western man by repressing his sexuality (no matter how widely sexuality is defined). It is, rather, that the performance principle dominates man by defeating the pleasures of his sense of efficacy. This is the metapsychological ground for the analyses to which both Fromm and Erikson will lead us. For Fromm, modern society breaks down man's capacity to exercise his power, his potentialities, his experience of participating in a world by influencing and shaping it. For Erikson, modern society thwarts man's sense of mastery. For Erikson, mastery is always a sense of active wholeness, a sense of mutual activation and regulation between man and his environment. It is fair to see the pleasure of efficacy as a dimension of both Fromm's idea of power and Erikson's concept of mastery. At the same time, the two ideas (power and mastery) contain, at the hands of their respective authors, phenomenological and existential dimensions that go beyond any discussion of energetics, no matter how it might be conceived.

It will gradually become clear, I hope, that no metapsychology built on the tension reduction model, which neither Brown nor Marcuse ever overcomes, can be adequate to appropriate conceptualization of modern man or of modern society. And for the moment, let it be said that, as a guide to a possible synthesis between psychoanalysis and Marxist humanism, doubtless one is better off with Erich Fromm than with Herbert Marcuse.

The Human Situation

Before we can examine Fromm's concept of the productive character, we must look at his view of the human situation. The productive man is precisely the man who best answers the problematic of the human situation.

Fromm made a forceful interpretation of the human situation in *Man for Himself*—so forceful, in fact, that he repeats it nearly word for word in *Psychoanalysis and Religion* and *The Sane Society*. His description is basically a synthesis between scientific-evolutionary concepts and an almost Heideggerian phenomenological-existential analysis.

A scientific view of human evolution is fundamental to Fromm's understanding of the human situation. As we will see later, it is also fundamental to his ethical and normative thinking. Fromm shares a fundamental assumption with Freud: there is a parallelism between the

ontogenetic development of the individual and the phylogenetic development of the race. But there is an important difference between the two men. For Freud, the parallelism of ontogeny and phylogeny is the Oedipus drama between father and son and its endless cycle of rebellion, threat, repression, and sublimation. For Fromm, however, the parallelism consists of a common evolutionary path shared by both the individual and the race. This common path is the movement, through a process of individuation and differentiation, from relative solidarity with the rest of nature to a position of relative transcendence. As the child differentiates from his mother, so the race differentiates from nature. Fromm believes that the Oedipal struggle is not the key to this process for either the child or the race. Rather, the explanation rests in an evolutionary shift that causes man partially to lose the instinctual regulatory capacities possessed by the other animals and to develop and depend instead upon his higher brain centers and his gradually evolving capacities for awareness, reason, and imagination.²⁶

From a more phenomenological and existential point of view, Fromm sees the essence of the human situation as man's experience as a *contradiction*. Fromm writes:

Self-awareness, reason, and imagination have disrupted the "harmony" which characterizes animal existence. Their emergence has made man into an anomaly, into the freak of the universe. He is part of nature, subject to her physical laws and unable to change them, yet he transcends the rest of nature. He is set apart while being a part; he is homeless, yet chained to the home he shares with all creatures. Cast into this world at an accidental place and time, he is forced out of it, again accidentally. Being aware of himself, he realizes his powerlessness and the limitations of his existence. He visualizes his own end: death. Never is he free from the dichotomy of his existence: he cannot rid himself of his mind, even if he should want to; he cannot rid himself of his body as long as he is alive—and his body makes him want to be alive.

Reason, man's blessing, is also his curse; it forces him to cope everlastingly with the task of solving an insoluble dichotomy. Human existence is different in this respect from that of all other organisms; it is in a state of constant and unavoidable disequilibrium.²⁷

This contradiction, disequilibrium, or *mélange* of human existence leaves men with at least two insolvable *existential* dichotomies. One is the fact of death; it confronts all men and cannot be escaped. Man's mortality leads to another dichotomy—the fact that no man can ever realize the totality of human capacities in the span of a single life.²⁸ Commentators who charge Fromm with glib utopianism and perfec-



tionism generally forget to interpret his utopianism in the light of these fundamental limitations which he places upon the possibilities of human existence. There is no solution to these existential dichotomies, but there are better and worse ways of handling them. In addition, Fromm makes a sharp distinction between these existential dichotomies and those he calls historical contradictions. Historical contradictions in "individual and social life . . . are not a necessary part of human existence but are man made and soluble."²⁹ As we will see, Fromm's utopian vision of the productive personality is a vision of the man who can creatively live with (but not solve) the existential dichotomies while at the same time energetically solving (and not accepting) the historical contradictions. Only the most pessimistic can deny that between the two sets of contradictions there does remain the possibility of progress and melioration. It is in the margin between the two that we must locate Fromm's eschatology and the vocational field for the productive personality.

This broad understanding of the human situation (derived from what Fromm himself calls an "anthropologico-philosophical" analysis and what others might call an existential-phenomenological analysis) leads us to make two sets of observations. First, it clearly puts him in the company of certain existentialist approaches to the human situation, especially that of such thinkers as Søren Kierkegaard, Paul Tillich, Reinhold Niebuhr, and, more recently, Paul Ricoeur. All these men believe that the essence of man centers around an existential contradiction and disequilibrium or, as Paul Ricoeur puts it, a "disproportion" or "mélange." Common to each of these thinkers is the vision that man is stretched between two poles of existence—one being his rootedness in nature and the other being his transcendence mediated by awareness, imagination, reason, and the capacity for signification. For each of these men, this existential contradiction constitutes the possibility of a fall into evil that man invariably but unnecessarily takes. These thinkers further agree that the structure of evil is man's attempt to find security by overemphasizing one or the other side of this polarity—either his finitude and rootedness or his drive toward transcendence.

Fromm differs from these thinkers in several respects. On the one hand, Fromm holds out for the possibility that man can learn to live creatively with the tension of this contradiction without succumbing to the fall into one or the other side of the polarity. He believes that although the contradiction itself is insolvable, the fall into evil is neither necessary nor inevitable. Fromm entertains this possibility, at least, on the theoretical level. On the level of practical history, Fromm

is only too aware that man has perennially chosen the path of evil. In addition, most of these thinkers equate evil with either the flight into transcendence or the flight into finitude, although evil as flight into transcendence is often emphasized more. This explains the great preoccupation, especially among theologians such as Reinhold Niebuhr, with the category of pride. Fromm, on the other hand, is likely to emphasize evil as the regressive fall into finitude—incest, narcissism, death or the premature return to nature. The difference, however, is primarily a matter of style and sensibility rather than conceptuality as such. Theologians such as Niebuhr and Kierkegaard, who pay more attention than does Fromm to evil as flight into transcendence, admit that this flight is primarily a matter of "boasting" or "glorifying" in the "flesh" (Niebuhr)³⁰ or a matter of "absolutizing" the "relative" and the "finite" (Kierkegaard).³¹ Fromm, on the other hand, although primarily emphasizing evil as regression, is fully aware that it takes a variety of transcendental and Promethean forms in sadism, irrational authoritarianism, scientism, and exploitation.

Our second observation deals with the relationship between Brown and Fromm and their perceptions of the human situation. Both Fromm and Brown would admit that some form of union is the goal of life. They would further agree that anxiety and the possibility of death which it signals is man's primary problem. But from here the differences become massive. For Fromm, union must take place from a situation of individuation; individuation and the loneliness it brings are for him irreducible parts of the human situation and ontological givens in the *telos* of human existence. Reason, awareness, imagination, and the drive toward individuation that comes with their exercise are not, for Fromm, the result of repression, as they are for Brown. Whereas for Brown the threat of death creates repression which in turn creates reason, awareness, and imagination, for Fromm the situation is just the reverse. Fromm would contend that it is because man already has evolved the capacity for awareness, reason, and imagination that he can perceive anxiety and death and attempt through various irrational flights, to secure himself against them. For Brown, man's play projects only his desire for union. For Fromm, man's play projects both his desire for union and his desire for individuation, which is to say his desire for a higher union which includes and respects his individuality. This is why, for Fromm, the desire for union has a distinctively progressive meaning; it is an act of the will which builds on the organism's deeper natural tendency toward both union and individuation but which *synthesizes* these two tendencies with artistic discipline. Diony-

sian man finds union through play, and play is always a matter of release and regression. The productive personality also finds union through play, but play is always a matter of artistic discipline and self-creation, a self-creation whereby the deeper urges of the organism toward both union and individuation are actively transformed and synthesized into ever higher states of balance through a centered act of the will.

Fromm's emphasis upon the givenness of man's reason, awareness, and imagination means that in his thought the concept of *union* is always irreducibly both cognitive and affective. Union is never just a matter of the affections, the feelings, and the body; it is always a perceptual-cognitive matter as well as an affective desire. Man never simply wants affective, bodily union with the world; this wish, or desire, is always strained or filtered through a need for cognitive orientation as well. Hence, for Fromm, the major concepts that he uses with a particularly Freudian sound—union, desire, play, narcissism, sadism, masochism—all receive a peculiarly Frommian redefinition in view of the fact of the irreducibility of both the cognitive and the affective dimensions of life in his thought.

Character and History: The Social Psychology of Modernity

The best-known, and possibly the most abiding, of Fromm's contributions is his psychological analysis of the major character types that have dominated modern Western history. Erich Fromm was the first psychoanalyst of eminence to broaden psychoanalytic characterology to include a social psychology of historical character types. His characterology parallels, in a loose way, the classic character types of Freud—the oral, anal, and genital types. But there is a major difference: he reverses diametrically the Freudian logic of fixation. Whereas the classical Freudian view asserts that patterns of child training produce the character types of a given culture, Fromm maintains that it is the nature and demands of the social structure of a given culture which create, through the agency of the parents, the kind of character type it needs to support that particular social system. Child-training methods do not by themselves create the adult character and social systems of a given civilization; rather, the adult social system creates and forms the methods of child training necessary to produce and fix in its young the kind of character orientations that it needs.³² As Fromm writes, "In order that any society may function well, its members must acquire the

kind of character which makes them *want* to act in the way they *have* to act as members of the society or of a special class within it."³³

But there is another important difference between the characterology of Freud and Fromm. For Freud, character was a deep-seated pattern of organization or compromise formation between a man's instinctual desires and the prohibitions of culture. For Fromm, character is also a deep-seated pattern of organization resulting from a conflict. Character, even for him, is a compromise formation. But the conflict is not between the id and the prohibitions of culture; it is between man's situation of rootedness in nature and his irreducible transcendence over nature. Character, then, for Fromm, has to do with the peculiar way a person or culture goes about coping with the problem of existential separateness and finding a modicum of union with nature and his fellowman.

On the other hand, Fromm's concept of character has been strongly influenced by Freud. Fromm shares with Freud the convictions that character underlies and is more fundamental than behavior, that it is the unconscious dimension of the personality, and that character as a whole, rather than specific character traits, is the important determinant of behavior.³⁴ Fromm also came to believe, as did Freud, that the character orientations associated with the pregenital stages of development are somehow inferior to the constellation of character patterns associated with what Freud called the genital stage of development.³⁵

But Fromm's central preoccupation has not been the study of the character of individuals; rather, he has concerned himself primarily with the study of social character, the character traits held in common by the members of a given society. A single civilization may exhibit a predominant character type. This predominant type is formed by the common experiences that shape and pattern the life of the people in this society. The most important of these common experiences is the shared experience of *work*.

This interest of Fromm's in the psychology of social character does not lead him, he claims, to a sociological reduction. Often Fromm's analysis of a given historical phenomenon such as primitive Christianity, the Protestant era, or Nazi Germany, begins with an analysis of the major occupational patterns that exist in the situation he is studying. He then infers the major characterological patterns and conflicts. He ends with an analysis of the relevant ideas and ideals which both order and exploit these characterological trends. Social character is created by social existence, but it can in turn shape both social existence and cultural ideas. The crucial intermediary role that Fromm attributes

to social character in the entire historical process distinguishes him from the social determinism of the pseudo Marxists, the psychologism of orthodox psychoanalysis, and the so-called "idealist" position of Max Weber.³⁶ He grants an interdependence and a relative autonomy to all these causal factors—structural and economic existence, social character, and cultural ideals. His concentration on the specific variable of social character is a strategic though not an exclusive preoccupation.

Fromm's classification of character orientations is organized according to two sets of distinctions. First, he makes a distinction between productive and nonproductive orientations. Then he makes a distinction between two types of relations with the world: (1) relations of assimilation which involve the acquiring of *things* and (2) relations of socialization which involve our interpersonal relationships with *people*.³⁷ The former distinction between productive and nonproductive orientations is somewhat analogous to Freud's distinction between genital and pregenital character types. The second distinction between assimilation of *things* and socialization with *people* serves much the same function in Fromm's thought as does the distinction between I-It and I-Thou in the thought of one of Fromm's former teachers, Martin Buber.

But underneath and more fundamental than either of these distinctions is the one between passive and active modalities of relating to the world. At one point Fromm discusses this distinction with the words "reproductive" (passive) and "generative" (active).³⁸ A reproductive response to experience simply tends to absorb it without contributing a creative response in return. The generative response is an active, potent response that gives something in return, that enriches the experience and the world with a new perspective and a new charge of energy. The generative response to experience attempts to give more than it receives. This is the key to the meaning of activeness and productivity in the thought of Fromm. The weakness and near-tragedy of his thought is that he chose to develop his positive characterology around the word "productive" (with all of its resonance with the terminology and ethos of productionism and the performance principle of bourgeois, capitalistic society), rather than the word "generativity" (with its more species-relevant implications for the creative renewal of the human race). In addition, a better choice of words might have helped him avoid his overstatement of the normative role of activeness in human life and helped him to express more accurately the proper role of these active modalities in the context of the inescapable and fundamental passivities in the truly generative life.

A brief summary of Fromm's thinking on the nonproductive orientations will help us, by contrast, to understand the productive orientation. The nonproductive orientations, regardless of their differences, share one thing in common: beneath their various behavioral manifestations they conceal a common proclivity toward passivity and regression. The nonproductive orientations of acquiring and assimilating the world of things are *receiving*, *exploiting*, *hoarding*, and *marketing*. Parallel to these orientations of assimilating things are four orientations descriptive of our relationships to people: *masochistic loyalty*, *sadistic authority*, *destructive assertiveness*, and *indifferent fairness*.³⁹ We can illustrate the flavor of these orientations by discussing briefly the orientations of assimilation which, in general, are more firmly and convincingly portrayed. The receptive character believes that all good comes from the outside and that he has only to *accept* it passively. The exploitative character also believes that the good comes from the outside but feels that he must *take* it, possibly even with force. The hoarding character, on the other hand, feels that the outside world is hostile, and that the good is inside and he must *preserve* it. The marketing character is a modern phenomenon, a product of market capitalism of the twentieth century. The marketing character experiences himself as somewhat like a salable commodity who molds himself to conform to the desires of others. He *exchanges* a malleable and likable personality for the approval and acceptance of the market.⁴⁰

To understand how Fromm relates his typology of character to history and finally to an understanding of the modern period, several things must be understood. First, Fromm, in contrast to Freud, does not believe that there is a chronological succession, either ontogenetic or phylogenetic, from receptive orientations on up to productive orientations. The receptive is not necessarily earlier and the hoarding or marketing is not necessarily later. Secondly, Fromm does make the startling claim that his orientations are exhaustive: man must relate to the world either nonproductively—by accepting (receiving), taking (exploiting), preserving (hoarding), exchanging (marketing)—or productively.⁴¹

Fromm makes no real effort to apply his typologies before the modern period, and even here he does it illustratively rather than exhaustively. The modern period has seen all these types of personality. Fromm's evolutionary view of the individuation process leads him to believe that modern man does indeed enjoy more freedom; he is more individuated from nature and from other men than was primitive and archaic man. As Fromm often says, modernity brought more

freedom "from" but less freedom "to." This absence of a positive concept of freedom and a positive social vision left modern man more and more alone and anxious. Receptive orientations were sometimes resorted to as solutions and can be seen, according to Fromm, in the masochistic loyalty encouraged by Calvinism and Lutheranism as well as by Nazi Germany in more recent times. The exploiting, or taking, orientation can be seen in the "pariah" and "adventure" capitalists of the nineteenth century.⁴² The preserving, or hoarding, orientation existed alongside the exploiting orientation during the nineteenth century and constituted a more conservative and methodical approach to economic pursuits.⁴³

The distinctive product of modernity and its institutions is a character type never before seen in the history of man; the evolution from individual to corporate capitalism has brought about the so-called marketing character. Freed from control by overt authority, modern man has now succumbed to the subtle and silent control of the market, of the demands of the corporation, and of the abstract principles of production and management characteristic of an advanced technological society. Alienated from himself as a center of productive power, conforming to the expectation of silent authorities, and manipulated to develop an insatiable desire to consume the products of modern industry, the marketing character is only a short step away from the passivity of the so-called "receiving" character type. The marketing character is also *homo consumens* dedicated primarily to "the satisfaction of consuming and 'taking in'; commodities, sights, food, drinks, cigarettes, people, lectures, books, movies—all are consumed, swallowed."⁴⁴

Fromm extends his concept of the marketing character to a variety of modern phenomena—the drug culture, computerization, and, finally, a growing modern preoccupation with death ("necrophilia"). The passivity of the marketing personality leads him both to conform to and to depend upon anything that promises instant ease. His desire to "take in" instant happiness may lead him to turn either to drugs or to the effortless existence of a computerized world. Behind the behavior of both the addict and the technocrat is a deep-seated passivity and alienation from oneself as a center of creative power. Finally, however, Fromm sees in the desire for oblivion in the drug culture and the fascination with inanimate machines in the technocrat a hidden preoccupation with death and the possible birth of a fifth type on non-productive character—the "*necrophiliac*."⁴⁵

Fromm's interpretation of modern existence must be viewed at two

levels. At one level, modernity is simply a more advanced degree of individual and social individuation. At another level, modernity is corporate and state capitalism (e.g., Russia) with its endless circle of production and consumption and an increasingly numerous marketing personality to fill its needs. It is Fromm's central conviction that these two meanings of modernity cannot coexist. Modernity as an inevitable process of social individuation is ambivalent; to survive it, mankind must produce highly mature people who can learn to relate to the world while at the same time affirming and accepting their individuality and separateness. Fromm clearly believes that modernity in the second sense will destroy the positive possibilities of modernity in the first sense. The marketing personality—the characterological issue of corporate and state capitalism—simply does not possess the strengths to live up to the challenges of a highly individuated and differentiated social world. It is from this perspective that we must view Fromm's pessimism about modern man, a pessimism that sociologists such as Winston White have so much difficulty comprehending. Modern Western man, especially of the middle class, may indeed have many virtues; but his virtues and strengths match neither the challenges nor the opportunities that he faces.

It is tempting to put oneself in the shoes of Erich Fromm and imagine Fromm's response to Rieff's concept of the psychological man and Brown's concept of Dionysian man. Certainly, Fromm would consider both of them as predictable variations of his concept of the marketing character. Psychological man, as Philip Rieff depicts him, is man dedicated to the high art of refined consumption, a consumption mitigated and controlled only by the application of psychoanalytic insight. Psychological man indeed knows that consumption is the end of life, but this end should be humbled—as should all the goals and ends of life—by the healthy skepticism of analytic wisdom. Dionysian man would most likely be seen by Fromm as the final receptive and regressive expression of the marketing character; Dionysian man would be passivity taken to its final regressive goal of union with the all-providing mother and with death. Passive release is the modality common to both psychological man and Dionysian man; the difference is only that psychological man submits his releasing modalities to analytic restraint. Both Rieff and Brown believe that repression and release are the major choices that have always confronted man.

Fromm, on the other hand, presents a completely different set of categories for comprehending the major human choices. *Activeness or passiveness, not repression or release—these are the fundamental al-*



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ternatives for Fromm. He would say that the psychological, Dionysian, and marketing character types have in common their shared decision for passivity.

According to Fromm, psychoanalysis, in the hands of such men as Rieff and Brown, has continued along the road that it began to take even before it left the hands of Freud. In *Sigmund Freud's Mission*, Fromm claims that psychoanalysis was basically a conservative social movement from the beginning; it offered an inner balance and a quasi-religious frame of reference for middle-class urban intellectuals who had neither the energy nor the will to make a more radical analysis of the ills of Western civilization or to develop a more profound and constructive alternative.⁴⁶ The destiny of psychoanalysis has been to become, through advertising and the mass media, a powerful tool of propaganda supporting the dynamic of corporate capitalism. There is little doubt at all that Fromm would be willing to apply this analysis of the sociological impact of psychoanalysis to Rieff's concept of psychological man. He would also venture the guess that, in spite of Brown's original intentions, the fate of his concept of Dionysian man will be very much the same; it too will become entangled with the passive and releasing modalities of the ethos of corporate capitalism and its normative character type—*homo consumens*.

Psychology and the Science of Ethics

Fromm derives his concept of the productive character partially on the basis of a broad philosophical psychology which he sometimes calls a philosophical anthropology. However, he also amplifies and enriches it through a highly selective and somewhat rigid interpretation of both Eastern and Western religious symbols. His first and chief method, the use of psychology and psychoanalysis for a rational analysis of the normative human character type, is a radical departure from the modern tradition of careful separation of psychology as a science from ethical and philosophical concerns.

For Fromm, ethics has to do with the nature of human character; it attempts to discover the optimal organization (the optimal character) of human energies and the conditions necessary to bring it about. He resurrects an ancient tradition, one that both Rieff and Brown try to bury, when he writes, "Humanistic ethics is the applied science of the 'art of living' based upon the theoretical 'science of man.'" ⁴⁷ In

addition, Fromm claims that "ethics as an applied science depends on . . . psychology as a theoretical science."⁴⁸ By psychology, Fromm does not mean the more experimental and empiristic psychologies modeled after the natural sciences.⁴⁹ The psychology he has in mind is indeed empirical and scientific but in a larger sense than is generally considered acceptable in most scientific circles today. In fact, Fromm's psychology becomes so broad that it gradually shades into what he calls "philosophical anthropology." Psychology for Fromm is rational reflection upon and ordering of the internal life, both conscious and unconscious, of man.

Fromm holds a more elevated vision than does Philip Rieff of psychology and psychoanalysis as moral sciences. He is fully aware of the penultimate significance of psychoanalysis and its capacity to "unmask" and humiliate the rationalizations behind our moral pretensions.⁵⁰ In other words, Fromm simply acknowledges and generally approves of the level of ethical significance of psychoanalysis about which Rieff writes. But he aspires to go farther than either Freud or Rieff is willing to go. Fromm believes that psychoanalysis discovered the modern science of characterology. It has provided us with an initial typology of nonproductive character orientations. But more than that, in its uncertain vision of the genital personality, psychoanalysis has provided us with a positive characterology that Fromm himself attempts to elaborate further in his idea of the productive character. In the hands of Fromm, psychoanalysis becomes extended into a general philosophical psychology and moves from a penultimate to a positive ethic. Fromm aspires to develop an objective ethic, an objective and rationally articulated vision of what man is to become. This ethic is properly comprehended when it is understood that Fromm is indeed trying to project a new vision for what Philip Rieff derisively calls a community of positive "social obligation." In the thought of Fromm—in contrast to most interpretations of his position—we will see how an ethics of community wins out over an ethics of individualism. Fromm destroys false authority in order to restore competent and rational authority. He attacks economic individualism in order to restore true freedom and individuality in community. His good society would lessen everyone's "freedom from" in order to increase their "freedom to."

Authority and community are not antagonistic to individual fulfillment in the thought of Fromm as they are for Rieff. Rational authority and rational ethics have for their purpose the fulfillment of man at both the generic and the individual levels. The good of all men and the good of the individual can be kept in balance only if some dis-



inction can be drawn between the real and the false needs of man. And it must be further demonstrated that the real needs of man, while personally fulfilling and satisfying the individual, are at the same time relevant and serviceable to the fulfillment of the race.

The Anthropology of Productive Man

Let us follow chronologically the development of Fromm's ideas on the nature of the productive personality. We will omit Fromm's discussion in *Escape from Freedom* of the concept of "spontaneous activity." We need only observe that spontaneous activity, for Fromm, is a centered act which integrates the total personality into acts of work and love.⁶¹ These acts of work and love overcome man's loneliness by bringing him back into union with himself, his society, and nature.⁶²

In *Man for Himself*, Fromm replaces the concept of spontaneous activity with the concept of the productive character. Here the loose affinity of Fromm's vision with Freud's concept of genital man is acknowledged. For Fromm, the key to the affinity has to do with a controlling analogy or "symbol" which genitality suggests to him (although probably not to Freud). Genitality is symbolic of productiveness—the production of new life through the "union of sperm and the egg."⁶³ This generative and species-relevant view of productiveness constitutes a controlling image which dominates all of Fromm's writing on the nature of productiveness, robbing it, one must note, of its occasional individualistic meaning.

Although generativity at the biological level provides a model for Fromm's concept of productiveness, the productive orientation, as he understands it, is a broader concept and "refers to a fundamental attitude, a mode of relatedness in all realms of human experience. It covers mental, emotional, and sensory responses to others, to oneself, and to things."⁶⁴ "Productiveness," as Fromm defines it, "is man's ability to use his powers and to realize the potentialities inherent in him."⁶⁵ In addition, Fromm, following Aristotle, believes that productiveness relates to the realization of those "capacities" or "potencies" *unique* to man.

But what are the capacities unique to man? Productive thinking (reason), love, and work—this is Fromm's answer to the question. In *Man for Himself* he sets forth a phenomenological description of the nature of reason, or, as he calls it, "productive thinking." He lists the characteristics of productive thinking: (1) the capacity to think of ends as well as of means, (2) the capacity to discern the basic or

essential features of its object, (3) the capacity for both involved interest in the object and objective respect for the object, and, finally, (4) the capacity for perceiving objects holistically in relation to their contexts.⁶⁶ These phenomenologically derived characteristics of productive thinking are recognizable as a description of thinking free from deficiency and scarcity motivations. Less believable when phenomenologically derived, at least to the scientifically-minded, what Fromm said in 1947 on this subject is now generally accepted as correct, especially after the more scientific descriptions of mature thinking developed by Jean Piaget, Robert White, Ernest Schachtel, Jerome Bruner, and others. Reason, in the grand sense of the word, is really not so difficult to believe in as Freud, Rieff, and even Brown have believed it to be.

Fromm's theory of the productive character is carried farther in his stunningly popular book *The Art of Loving*, published in 1956. Of the three coordinates of the productive personality—reason, love, and work—this book develops the concept of love, and, in fact, gives it a position of predominant importance. Creative work unites us with nature and with objects, but only productive love answers the deepest of all needs—union with other people. And, finally, love itself is the key to the proper use of reason.

Love is characterized as an "art" requiring "knowledge and effort." In depicting truly human love as an art, Fromm immediately warns us to remove from our minds all images of love as a simple, passive release of nature's goodness. Love, as was earlier the case with "spontaneous activity," is a centered activity requiring discipline and artistic synthesis. However, love, although a specifically existential phenomenon, recapitulates at this higher level a distinctively natural phenomenon—the act of generation.

Fromm is constantly juxtaposing phenomenological and existential descriptions of productive love with biological descriptions of generativity. In doing this, he is not reducing the higher to the lower; rather, he is saying that the lower reveals a paradigm of how life is created, a paradigm that is analogically restated at successively higher levels. At the existential level he says: "Giving is the highest expression of potency. In the very act of giving, I experience my strength, my wealth, my power."⁶⁷ In all the nonproductive orientations, giving is experienced as impoverishment, as a matter of "giving up." But for the productive person, giving is experienced as a way of expressing one's richness. Not he who "has" but he who "gives" is the one who is rich.

This phenomenology of productiveness as giving can be illustrated at

the level of sexual love between man and woman. Beneath this is a deeper paradigm in the interaction of sperm and ovum. From the more archaic and elemental levels, one can ascend again and comprehend the meaning of productivity and giving as a total existential orientation. With regard to productivity and giving at the level of sexual relations Fromm writes:

The culmination of the male sexual function lies in the act of giving; the man gives himself, his sexual organ, to the woman. At the moment of orgasm he gives his semen to her. He cannot help giving it if he is potent. If he cannot give, he is impotent. For the woman the process is not different, although somewhat more complex. She gives herself too; she opens the gates to her feminine center; in the act of receiving, she gives. If she is incapable of this act of giving, if she can only receive, she is frigid.⁵⁸

In this process of mutual giving and receiving, creativity occurs, a creativity analogous to the union of sperm and ovum. Fromm reminds us "that the union of sperm and ovum is the basis for the birth of a child. But in the purely psychic realm it is not different; in the love between man and woman, each of them is reborn."⁵⁹

But at a higher level of one's total existential relationship to the world, the productive giving at the biological and sexual levels is recapitulated. But here it is neither sperm nor ovum, neither penis nor vagina that is given and received, although they may indeed be a portion of the totality of what is given. In addition, one gives "of his joy, of his interest, of his understanding, of his knowledge, of his humor, of his sadness—of all expressions and manifestations of that which is alive in him."⁶⁰ In giving to the other person, he creates a new sense of liveness in the other, a sense of aliveness that cannot help rebounding to enrich the life of the giver. "In the act of giving something is born, and both persons involved are grateful for the life that is born for both of them."⁶¹

Beyond the element of giving, love contains four elements, all of which further illustrate the active character of love. The four elements are *care*, *responsibility*, *respect*, and *knowledge*. *Care* involves an attitude of active concern for the "life and growth" of both our object of love and that which is born out of this love.⁶² *Responsibility* is not so much duty as it is a voluntary responsiveness to the "needs, expressed and unexpressed, of another human being."⁶³ *Respect* (derived from *respicere*, "to look at") refers to the ability to see "a person as he is, to be aware of his unique individuality."⁶⁴

Finally, love must include *knowledge* of the other person. Here, however, Fromm makes an important distinction between two kinds of knowledge, a distinction that has great implications for the proper positioning of man's entire capacity for reason and knowledge in the context of the total life process. On the one hand there is ordinary knowledge, knowledge by thought. Psychological knowledge is rooted in this kind. In addition, however, there is a deeper kind of knowledge that is rooted in participation or love itself and in which abstract, objective knowledge is finally grounded. For Fromm, true knowledge and reason are in the service of the one grand project of life: the project of finding participation through giving, that is, the project of finding union through creating new life.

One of the most intriguing features of Fromm's understanding of the productive man is the synthesis he makes between psychoanalysis and Marxist thought, especially the early Marx. In the end, it may be that Fromm actually draws more from the early Marx than he does from Freud. What is so startling, however, is to hear how similar, at some points, these giants of modern thought can sound. Fromm believes the early Marx was thoroughly influenced by Hegel's idea that a man's potentialities are manifested through a dialectical process, a dialectical process of "active movement" whereby one's potentialities are activated by contact with the outside world.⁶⁵ It is through active relationships with people and objects that one manifests concretely in existence one's "natural essence," one's "species-being." The sexual relationship itself provides the best available index for assessing the level of man's actualization. Marx once wrote:

From this relationship man's whole level of development can be assessed. It follows from the character of this relationship how far man has become, and has understood himself as, a species-being, a human being. The relation of man to woman is the most natural relation of human being to human being. It indicates, therefore, how far man's natural behavior has become human, and how far his human essence has become a natural essence for him, how far his human nature has become nature for him.⁶⁶

In another quotation, we can see Marx's early theory of the relationship between the active individual and the life of the species, a view that I believe Fromm holds. The following quotation from Marx appears no fewer than three different times in Fromm's written and edited works, attesting, I believe, to its importance for his own thinking. It addresses the weaknesses of alienated, piecemeal, specialized labor of modern industrial capitalism.



Since alienated labor: 1) alienates nature from man; and 2) alienates man from himself, from his own active function, his life activity; so it alienates him from the species. It makes species-life into a means of individual life. In the first place it alienates species-life and individual life, and secondly, it turns the latter, as an abstraction, into the purpose of the former, also in its abstract and alienated form. For labor, *life activity, productive life*, now appear to man only as means for the satisfaction of a need, the need to maintain his physical existence. *Productive life is, however, species-life. It is life creating life. In the type of life activity resides the whole character of a species, its species-character; and free, conscious activity is the species-character of human beings. Life itself appears only as a means of life.*⁶⁷

This species-character of man, this free and conscious activity which is the very essence of man, this life for which mere biological existence is only a means, seems very close to what Robert White calls effectance needs, what Maslow calls "growth needs" (as opposed to deficiency needs), or what Schachtel calls allocentric (as opposed to autocentric) modes of perception. The specifically human level of enjoying and relating to the world has been attained when, as Marx says, "need and enjoyment have thus lost their egoistic character, and nature has lost its mere *utility*." Then, and only then, has "its utilization become human utilization."⁶⁸

Although activeness is close to the essence of productive man, Fromm does give some recognition to the place of the more passive and regressive dimensions of human existence. Fromm believes that the nonproductive orientations (which are the equivalent of regressiveness and passiveness) are negative and destructive only when they are "dominant in the character structure."⁶⁹ But when the productive orientation is dominant, then all the nonproductive orientations take on a constructive meaning.⁷⁰ As we will see later, it is Fromm's evolutionary thinking, not his general anthropology, that leads him to the unfortunate identification of activeness with virtue.

In his *Revolution of Hope*, Fromm extends his concept of the productive character to include a discussion of productive hope. Hope is a central element of the productive character. It is basically a poetic experience and is best grasped in music, poem, and symbol.⁷¹ Fromm attempts a phenomenological description, but the full grasping of the nature of hope requires an appropriation of symbolic expressions, especially the eschatological symbols of man's religious myths. Hope, then, is the bridge between Fromm's attempt to give a rational description of the productive character and his attempt, to which we will soon turn, to distill it from man's religious myths and symbols.

Fromm describes hope as the capacity to "see and cherish all signs of new life." It is "a state of being" and "inner readiness . . . of intense but not-yet-spent activeness."⁷² Hope has an orientation toward the future, but an orientation clearly based on giving birth to potentialities active in the present. This kind of hope Fromm clearly distinguishes from the kind of hope that passively waits on deliverance from the future or the kind of pseudorevolutionary hope that tries violently to force changes which are grounded in no present possibilities. Hope is strongly related to faith, and faith is defined as a "certainty about the reality" of present possibilities. Hope also involves fortitude, the capacity "to resist the temptation to compromise hope and faith by transforming them—and thus destroying them—into empty optimism or into irrational faith."⁷³

Hope and the Messianic Time

At a time when it was still fashionable for psychoanalysts to classify religion as a compulsion neurosis on a mass scale, Fromm proposed a psychoanalytic interpretation of religion that saw it as constructive for the human enterprise. As early as *The Dogma of Christ*, written while he still considered himself an orthodox analyst, Fromm began to break out of the standard analytic treatment of religion. Religion, for Fromm, is man's most global and inclusive project of overcoming the existential dichotomies and finding union. All religion, whether theistic or non-theistic, is a "system of thought and action shared by a group which gives the individual a frame of orientation and an object of devotion."⁷⁴ Although religion often restricts itself primarily to superego functions (authoritarian religion), Fromm recognized that religion also includes, in varying degrees, adaptive, creative, and even *playful* attempts to find orientation amid life's existential and historical dichotomies.⁷⁵ Fromm can, with Brown, call religion play, but he means it much more in the sense used by Johan Huizinga or Adolf Jensen. Healthy religion, constructive religion, projects both man's desire for independence and his desire for union. However, Fromm admits that there have been and can be regressive religions—religions that seek union without freedom.

Fromm believes there is a clear continuity between his vision of the productive character and the ethical core of the great world religions.⁷⁶ All the great world faiths—Judaism, Christianity, Taoism, Buddhism, Zen—celebrate the values of love, reason, and productive work. Fromm moves through the world's religions somewhat like a butcher, cutting out the good pieces and throwing the rest in the dump heap of history. If there are variations in the ways these different religions handle

these ideals (and, of course, there are), Fromm tends to ignore them. Fromm follows Feuerbach in the belief that man's image of God is a projection of the highest values that men in various ages hold for themselves. Belief in a god is a sign of man's alienation from himself, his projection onto God of that which is an unrealized possibility for men.⁷⁷ The love, justice, and reason in terms of which men sometimes portray God are actually projections of man's productive possibilities.

Fromm holds that the dogmas, propositions, and theological orthodoxies in which most religions are wrapped are quite secondary to the inner ethical experience which these doctrines intend to convey. He proposes his own program of demythologization, a study of the inner religious experience (the "X experience") behind various theological formulations. Fromm wants to study what Bultmannians might call the structure of experience behind and beneath religious myth and symbol. His program, however, would include not only Christianity (as it does for Bultmann, and his school) or Western religious experience (as it does for Paul Ricoeur). It would include all the religions of the world, especially the great world religions emerging from what Karl Jaspers has called the axial age. It is Fromm's uncomplicated expectation that they would all reveal a structure of existence, an orientation, similar to the one that he has summarized in his concept of the productive character—an expectation, one might venture to guess, that would cause most historians of religion to shudder.

Fromm's tendency to appropriate those aspects of religion which confirm his vision of the productive character and discard the remainder has gained him little favor among the world's students of religion. Liberal laymen and ministers trained by an older liberal theology of the 1920's and 1930's have often read his thoughts on religion with enthusiasm, but younger theologues trained under the aegis of neo-orthodoxy and professional students of religion only smile, if not sneer.

To write off Fromm's view of religion too quickly is to overlook the moral meaning of his position. During a period of historical relativism and general skepticism, Fromm, the psychoanalyst, was holding forth the vision of a universal structure to man that reflects itself in universally acknowledged values and truths. Such an idea seems more believable today than it did twenty years ago when Fromm first put it in writing. The widely acclaimed generative linguistics of Noam Chomsky⁷⁸ and the authoritative cross-cultural studies in moral development by Lawrence Kohlberg⁷⁹ both suggest a universally shared common structure of the human mind that expresses itself in widely recognized common principles about the nature of the good and the

true. It is precisely Fromm's contention that these universal principles are implicit in the symbolism of the great world religions.

There is little doubt, however, that Fromm fails to comprehend the significance of many religious expressions. His tendency to see religious development in analogy to his general theory of ontogenetic and phylogenetic evolution has led Fromm to make serious errors in his interpretation of primitive and archaic religious forms. For Fromm, the history of religions is the history of man's development from incestuous to productive orientations.⁸⁰ By "incestuous," Fromm means those orientations to life's existential dichotomies which find union through passive attachment to the primary ties of mother, home, tribe, land, or blood.⁸¹ It can hardly be denied that there is a tendency in Fromm to say that in the ontogenetically and phylogenetically late there are, indeed, actualized more strictly human values. The result of this kind of thinking is to say that there is more reason and more love in modern man than there was in primitive and archaic man. Certainly, this elevation of the late at the expense of the early is indeed out of fashion with the spirit of leading students of religion such as Mircea Eliade, Claude Lévi-Strauss, Adolf Jensen, and others who seem to be primarily interested in showing either the continuity or the superiority of primitive man to modern, individuated existence.

But this bias of associating the primitive and the archaic with the incestuous and the passive should not become an obstacle to a proper hearing of Fromm's central message. The historical dichotomies of the modern world when added to the age-old existential dichotomies of human existence require a higher strategy of union than modern man seems capable of exhibiting. This higher strategy Fromm has summarized in his concept of the productive character. Of all the religious symbols Fromm appeals to, the one that best gives the concept of the productive character vital poetic and symbolic expression is the Old Testament symbol of the "messianic time."

Vital self-experiences are most fully comprehended and expressed in symbolic language. This conviction leads Fromm to turn time and time again to the religions of the world, especially to Judaism, the faith in which he himself was nourished as a child. For Fromm, the Old Testament is a story of man's emergence from a primitive union with nature and man. It is a story of man's gradual evolution, through struggle, repentance, and hope, to the higher union of the messianic time. Fromm writes that the two ages, paradise and the messianic time,

are the same, inasmuch as they are a state of harmony. They are different, inasmuch as the first state of harmony existed only by virtue of



man's *not yet* having been born, while the new state of harmony exists as a result of man's having been fully born.⁸²

The messianic time, and the new innocence and harmony that it represents, comes from going *forward*, not *backward*. In fact, it comes at the end of a long struggle against idolatrous attempts to find union and security in the things of the created world, in the work of one's hands—in short, in the past. For Fromm, the Biblical concept of idolatry corresponds with his definition of incest. It is a cognitive and affective dependence "on the past and a hindrance to full development."⁸³

Fromm believes that in the prophetic literature of the Old Testament and in the Talmud, the messianic time is political, this-worldly, and historical. It is "horizontal" rather than "vertical" or "other-worldly" as it was in Daniel and in other Jewish apocalyptic literature. The messianic time is often associated with the appearance of a specific messianic figure, sometimes a leader, sometimes an anointed king, but often in the form of God or the Lord himself. But the messianic figure is more the "sign" of the messianic time than the "savior" or the one who actually ushers in the messianic time.⁸⁴

The vision of "peace" is the central mark of the messianic time. It will be time of peace and harmony between man and man as well as between man and nature.⁸⁵ There will also be harmony between the nations and a renunciation of all weapons of force.⁸⁶ But this higher harmony comes only as a result of man's own gradual attainment of freedom, responsibility, and love.

In this view, man becomes the agent responsible for ushering in the messianic time. This view of the order of initiatives bringing forth the higher harmony puts Judaism into the greatest conflict with Christianity, a conflict that reveals itself throughout Fromm's writing. But his vestigial Jewishness and his psychoanalytic sensibilities (and probably in that order) render Fromm antagonistic to the idea that the messianic time (or the Kingdom of God) comes as an act of grace on the part of God. To Fromm, this would lead man back toward the inactiveness and idolatry which are at the very heart of the human tragedy.

Fromm quotes the famous Jewish scholar Leo Baeck and asserts that in the "prophetic literature the messianic vision rested upon the tension between what existed and was still there and that which was becoming and was yet to be."⁸⁷ Of course, this tension is precisely the tension of activeness which Fromm ascribes to the productive charac-

ter. This kind of tension between possibilities partially present but yet to be fully realized gives birth to what Fromm calls "dynamic hope," the theme of his later book entitled *The Revolution of Hope*. It is clear that Fromm believes that man himself *activates* the messianic time.

Productive Man: A Summary

We must now state what we have learned about productive man in terms of his relationship to himself, his experience of time, his relationship to his social world, and his relationship to the "other." We stated earlier that Fromm's solution to the problems of modernity is an *undialectical progressivist* solution. We mean by this that Fromm wants to meet modernity with a progressive advance, but an advance that does not sufficiently incorporate within it the so-called low in man—in short, his ontogenetic and phylogenetic history. However, I have not made this charge against Fromm categorically. Fromm is not as progressivistic, not as blindly perfectionistic, and not as wildly utopian as many contemporary apologists for the *status quo* make him out to be. In general, I see productive man as an ally of generative man; they are of the same piece, so to speak, fighting for much the same thing. I believe that it is important to state the progressivist dimensions of Fromm's thought as accurately as possible; only then can one honestly state the ways in which his thought is indeed *not sufficiently* dialectical, *not sufficiently* complex to meet the needs of modernity. However, in many important ways, Fromm depreciates the ontogenetic and phylogenetic early and fails to give a complete account of how man's maturity must include the early and the low.

It is not possible to portray directly productive man's relationship to himself. Productive man always discovers himself indirectly through the world of his action; he does not know his own potentialities until he sees them reflected back from the world upon which he acts. Once this is acknowledged, however, it is possible to speak of productive man's relationship to himself. From this perspective, the first thing to note is that productive man experiences himself as an instability, as a tension or mixture between his progressive capacities for reason, conscience, and imagination and his potentially regressive desires for union and security.

As we have already seen, in his portrait of productive man's relation to himself, there are certain ways in which Fromm does take account of that which is ontogenetically and phylogenetically early. We have seen that productiveness as a progressive advance includes within it

man's primitive desire for union. Productiveness also includes, as we have noted, the so-called nonproductive orientations; when the passive nonproductive orientations are organized and guided by the productive orientation, they take on a new and positive meaning. Finally, we have seen that productiveness recapitulates at historical and existential levels of existence the fundamental urge to produce new life.

What, then, has Fromm left out? Why do we still suspect that Fromm has a bias toward the high and the progressive? Why do we continue to distrust his efforts to incorporate the archaic into productivity? Our suspicions indeed have reasons. It is one thing to say that the phylogenetically and ontogenetically low has value when stated in the context of productivity. This Fromm often does. *It is something else, however, to state that meaning of the ontogenetically and phylogenetically low in terms of their meaning for themselves.* This Fromm does not do at all. We can see this first in his typology of character. This typology of character is modeled, in part, on the basis of Freud's developmental psychology. Therefore it suggests a scheme of ontogenetic growth as well as an ideal typology of historically discernible character types. But if this is the case, we are left with the impression that all the stages of growth prior to maturity and productivity are predominantly *passive*. And, of course, this is absurd. The infant and the child have their form of activeness just as has the mature adult.

The truth is that Fromm has no developmental psychology. He reformulates Freud's in order to create a typology of historical character types. This failure, which has been no small problem to the practicing psychologist who is otherwise attracted to Fromm's thought, betrays a bias. Nowhere does Fromm explicitly pay attention to children. Those remarks about children which can be found are likely to be tainted with his typology of character which tends to see everything that is not productive as *passive*. One cannot resist the thought that, for Fromm, children are a bore. Doubtless it is true that he also finds somewhat tedious the child in the man—the infantile residues in every mature adult. One gains the impression from Fromm that each child's development is something of a straight line moving from passive receptiveness and mother love through a somewhat more active and demanding kind of father love until finally the child reaches a fully active and productive maturity, where, fortunately, he can then give more than he receives.

What Fromm lacks, then, is a well-articulated epigenetic principle. It is precisely the epigenetic principle which states that all the ele-

ments of the high and the mature are found in an undeveloped form in the early, the low—the very beginning. The reverse is also the case; true maturity must contain, at a more differentiated level, all the components of the beginning. Erikson uses this principle primarily with his theory of ontogenetic development. Yet it is also present in his attitude toward primitive and archaic man; implicitly it is for Erikson a phylogenetic principle as well.

Fromm's failure to state adequately something like an epigenetic principle can be seen more dramatically in relation to what he says about the superego in man. Fromm acknowledges that the superego and the authority of the father have played an important role in the development of the race. But when it comes to the present, he believes that we are at the place in historical development where it is no longer necessary for the child to have a superego, with all its inevitable rigidity, no matter how kindly or lovingly it has been imposed. He writes, "I do not believe that with regard to the child, in a non-authoritarian society, the authoritarian conscience has to exist as a precondition for the formation of humanistic conscience."⁸⁸ If this means that children can grow up without a superego to support them during the period before the archaic and ever-present structures of the ego (the true seat of mature conscience) become stabilized, then I think Fromm is very much mistaken. To say that each man needs something of a superego during his childhood and youth is to say nothing derogatory about his eventual capacity for self-direction. In fact, I would assert, on the basis of the epigenetic principle, that the rudiments of conscience and reason (the marks of adult, humanistic ethics) are present from the beginning. But it is the nature of man that desire and imagination are, in the beginning of life, poorly balanced by perception, conscience, and reason. Although the rudimentary forms of conscience and reason are present from the beginning of life, they need to be supported by the gentle promptings of a healthy superego.

But there is a deeper problem in Fromm's willingness to dispose of the superego so easily. This willingness is part of his unbridled drive toward universality—a universality that does not take into consideration the relative moralities of other people or of oneself. There are no completely universal men devoid of those provincial moralities which occur simply because each man lives in a particular place and pursues a particular vocation utilizing special techniques under unique conditions. Every man (and certainly every child) must have a morality to cover the special and unique about his life. He should also have a grasp of certain universal principles common to all men and all

places. But in addition, he must have an ideology and a personal identity that brings the two together. It is precisely this which Fromm does not have and it is this which he cannot appreciate in others. He wants to make each man too quickly into the universal man—into the productive man that is a universal man. We have the feeling that he forgets the particularity of each man; he overlooks, we fear, that each man, in addition to having been at one time a child, is also a man of a particular country and class and may be a fireman, a doctor, a fisherman, or a hunter and, because of these particularities, must have special moralities and customs to guide him in these spheres. At best, there will be a dialogue between his universal conscience and his morality; and possibly his universal conscience can learn to know and affirm what his morality at one time blindly dictated. But that he can live without his special moralities or grow up without a superego is an illusion that we must challenge.

This drive toward universality leads to another reason why we distrust Fromm. We wonder if finally all is reduced to consciousness and lucidity in productive man. This feeling is akin to another that we cannot fail to raise: Does not Fromm have more answers about more things than most men should have? His desire for a science of man (a true psychology) upon which to ground an ethics is certainly an idea to be taken seriously. If man develops a new humanism which commands worldwide attention, such a science will doubtless play a part. But would not such a science, unsupplemented by other measures, do exactly what Fromm's elimination of the superego and man's provincial moralities have done? Would it not reduce all of life too quickly to the universal and deny the particular? If such a science develops (and we believe that it must), it must progress in the context of a personal and cultural dialogue—a hermeneutical dialogue that attempts to comprehend not only the universal but the particular about the symbols and values of each man and each group. To take seriously the particularity in either oneself or other people is to confront mysterious elements of life that are not easily reduced to the categories of a science, not even the broad kind of philosophical anthropology suggested by Fromm. The dictum to make all things conscious suggests that neither the unconscious nor the particular is viewed by Fromm as very deep, very profound, or very complex. Regression in the service of the ego, it should be noted, does not mean bringing all things into consciousness. It means, rather, relaxing the boundaries of the more controlled sectors of the ego so that they can descend into the deeper regulatory functions of the ego and the id, not in order to reduce these

denser areas to the clear light of consciousness, but to be nourished and re-created by forces and patterns that the conscious ego can only partially comprehend or understand.

We see the same tendency in Fromm's concept of time. Productive man's eye seems almost totally cast in the direction of the future. In addition, productive man believes that the future must be *made* to occur. Very little comes to man from the future; man must bring, must force, must usher it in himself. But why is this the case? The answer is clear. Productive man must actively form the future because in reality he does not experience receiving very much from the past. Fromm speaks about the passivities of life—those things we receive, and, in part, receive from the past. But he does not believe in very deeply or trust very profoundly these passivities. Shouldn't every psychiatrist know that he who can receive little from the past will also expect to receive little from the future? So we feel a lack of continuity in productive man's experience of time, a lack of organicity which marks the truly gracious life.

Yet we must take very seriously Fromm's remarks about the dynamic character of hope. Productive man does have an active quality about his ego; generative man, as Erikson speaks of him, also has this active quality. Both of these character types truly feel that there is much in life and in the future that they must form themselves. But generative man does not, as does productive man, simply capitalize on present potentialities. He has the experience of being nourished by and cooperating with past and present forces which *blend* with his own activeness to form the future. As we will see, the principle of *reciprocity* is more marked with generative man than with productive man. And this is because Erikson knows better than does Fromm that men act partially out of their own energies but also partially because they have been acted upon; just as he knows that a man's giving is partially guided by his own will but is also very much a product of the spontaneous gratitude that comes from having received. Therefore, Erikson knows, in ways which escape Fromm, that the final demarcation between the passive and the active in man is very difficult to draw. There may be more of a place in life for *grace* than Fromm would like to admit.

What have we learned about productive man's relationships with his social world? We have learned that he is a man of love and that he can give of himself even more than he receives. We have learned that through his productive giving he activates his social world just as he in turn is activated in the process of his giving. Productive man is very



much a political man. His political interests exceed by far those of psychological man, Dionysian man, and even perhaps those of generative man. Psychological man is political only to the degree necessary to maintain the abundance that makes his psychological comfort possible. His only great political virtue is his distrust of all true believers. Dionysian man, of course, believes that politics is the realm of death; strangely, he can accept death but he cannot accept politics.

Fromm grounds the political activity of productive man in his self-interest and self-love. Love, as Fromm understands it, applies to oneself as well as to others. Genuine self-love and self-interest are the cornerstones of the productive character and his ethic. The difficulty with modern society has not been its doctrine of self-interest; rather, the problem has been with the serious "deterioration of the meaning of self-interest."⁸⁹ The concept of self-interest has been narrowed so that it includes only economic interests. Fromm, on the other hand, believes that one's self-love and self-interest must serve the actualization of the "real self" and its real needs. And, as we have seen, one's real needs are not antagonistic to the interests of the community simply because real needs, according to Fromm, are species relevant.

In his ambitious *The Sane Society*, Fromm sets forth his vision of "communitarian socialism," his theory of the good society in which productive man would live. On the one hand, it is a society whose goal is the unfolding of the "human powers" of its individual members, where every member is an "end in himself" and never a "means toward another's end." On the other hand, it would also be a society where "opportunism" is considered asocial, where social concerns become "personal matters," where "private" pursuits do not interfere with "human solidarity," and where "responsible" participation is both permitted and encouraged.⁹⁰

When Fromm becomes more concrete we hear him speak of a society where the "workers" control (although not necessarily own) the means of production. Workers would be individually activated by sharing in the definition and direction of the productive activity that constitutes their occupation. In this vision of things, the portion of their individual powers which would be actualized is that part relevant to the meaning and direction of the corporate enterprise of which they are a part. In the end, Fromm envisions a world of more centralization rather than less, but a centralization balanced by a kind of decentralization designed to stimulate "participation and responsibility" in centralized decisions. Fromm's new society would be a veritable beehive of active participation in community affairs. The entire popula-

tion would be divided into groups of five hundred persons for the purpose of debating and directly influencing centralized decisions—a nation of town meetings. Clearly, under such a system the individual powers to be actualized are only those relevant to the responsible influence and direction of the whole.

One is inclined to believe that productive man is more than political—he is hyperpolitical. He exercises his powers by making decisions about everything—at his work, in his neighborhood, in his community, in his state, in his nation—with regard to all the world. Productive man is interested in everything, is informed about all, is willing to debate each new issue, and exercises his franchise in every sphere that touches his life. Productive man is active man; he exercises his powers over far more areas of life than is the case with most contemporary men. He attempts to influence with conscious intentionality all spheres of life to the very end of the horizon of his consciousness.

Productive man is influencing, controlling, and guiding everything around him. But the reverse is also true. Because all his neighbors are also productive men, he too is controlled and influenced by them. Hence, the social and political world of productive man is indeed a communitarian society. It will be a tighter, in some ways more restrictive, society than has been the case for the last one hundred years. Productive man in the new active society will have far more "freedom to" and far less "freedom from" than Western bourgeois man has known in the past.

Participatory democracy, the small group, the face-to-face encounter, the small unit within the larger unit—this is the nature of the shape of things to come. In contrast to Rieff's new world, the small group, the face-to-face encounter, has a political rather than a specifically therapeutic meaning for Fromm. People will come together in small gatherings not to make each other comfortable but to stimulate each other in the responsible use of their powers as human beings. The new communitarian society that Fromm envisions can indeed include the therapeutic vision put forth by Rieff, but the reverse is not the case. There is no place for productive man in the world of psychological man, just as there is no room for an ethic of positive community within a penultimate ethic of negative community. But it is certainly true that the positive communitarian ethic of productive man can embrace some of the therapeutic aims of psychological man. Men in the new communitarian society will indeed be more comfortable (have more inner well-being), but it will come as a consequence of their increased productivity and not as an end in itself.



Will there be religion in the new communitarian society, the new active society? The answer is yes; it will be a grand public and civil religion, a general religion that *celebrates* and *ritualizes* the new positive ethic of productive man. Fromm believes in religion—what he calls humanistic religion. All men have the need for “a system of thought and action . . . which gives the individual a frame of orientation and an object of devotion.”⁹¹ If man needs “systems of action” and “objects of devotion,” then it follows that man needs ritual. Fromm speaks of ritual as “collective art.”⁹² It is a “shared” activity that attempts to investigate and give expression to the great themes of life that are often lost in the routinization of everyday affairs. The kind of ritual art about which Fromm speaks is vastly different from the individualistic art that marks most modern expressions. Modern societies are without collective art. Instead, we consume the art of others in an effort to give expression to our desire for some transcendence over the deadening grind of our mechanized existence. We “drink in,” as Fromm says, the “movies, crime reports, the liquor, the fun.”

Once again, productive man and generative man (as we will soon see) have in common this great regard for ritual. But a close examination shows that there is a significant difference. The ritual that Fromm seems to have in mind is the grand ritual, the total ritual that every great religious tradition and every grand community always develops. He speaks of Greek drama, medieval passion plays, the Indian dance, and Hindu, Jewish, and Christian religious rituals. What does he omit? And why is the omission so important?

Fromm omits the rituals of everyday life. He omits the organic patterns of mutual regulation, that kind of adaptive settledness which comes when individuals and communities have discovered, almost without knowing, a reciprocal pattern for relating to one another that is creative, fulfilling, and regulatory for all involved. *What Fromm misses is the continuity between the little, everyday rituals and the grand, collective rituals.*

This, then, is what gives his thought its lack of organicity. This is why we fear that all will be reduced to consciousness, planning, activeness, debate, discussion—a world of meetings, committees, memos, canned collective art, contrived collective experience. This is why productive man will strike us, in comparison to generative man, as so hyperpolitical. Can any man take all of that? Each man must take some of it. There is little doubt of that. And men in the future must be able to manage more of this kind of activity than in the past. But there must be a limit. Relationships cannot multiply endlessly. There must

be a limit to one's active participation; certainly one cannot take responsible action in all these spheres of life.

Generative man, as we will see, is a creative ritualizer. He is willing and able to actively evolve the new, to take conscious responsibility in wide areas of life, to exercise decision as both a duty and a way to fulfillment. But he has the capacity to ritualize life at the level of both its grand and its small expressions. He has the gift to join with others in the creation of new patterns of mutual regulation, patterns that will doubtless find expression in grand community rituals but apply to life's most mundane and unspectacular activities as well. Generative man is content to permit some of life to have a certain quality of unconscious organicity. When old rituals break up and need revision, he will be able to confront this task; but when new rituals gain a certain workability to them, he will not resist their gaining a new sedimentation. For rituals are somewhat like the beds of rivers—they provide an avenue, a direction, and a secure limit through which life's energies and needs can flow.

Finally, what should be said about how productive man will meet the “other,” the “stranger”? To answer this question, we must ask another. What does the flight into premature universality do to the other whom we confront? Fromm, as did Brown, can affirm all men as his brothers. Whereas Brown believes that all men have the same regressive wishes, Fromm believes that all men have the same progressive wishes. Or, more accurately stated, he believes that all the great expressions of the human spirit throughout all time amount to very much the same thing. So he can say, “The human reality . . . underlying the teachings of Buddha, Isaiah, Christ, Socrates, or Spinoza is essentially the same.”⁹³ To Fromm they all advocate the same ideals, the same great values of love, reason, and truth. Is Fromm mistaken in this uncomplicated assertion? Probably not. It is probably true that one can abstract from the world's great spiritual expressions a quite similar basic ethical vision. But this does not really help us very much. For abstract ethical vision can mean very different things when placed in the context of the specific moralities of different cultures. Man in the context of the conflicts of pluralism, which will mark modernity in the future, must do more than affirm what all men have in common. *He must understand the differences that surround their commonness.* He must understand how universality is embodied in particular styles and he must comprehend how particular styles can give birth to that which is universal. We will see soon how generative man attends to both the universal and the particular in the stranger and that he does this be-

cause he first attends and takes with equal seriousness both the universal and the particular in himself. For generative man *cares* for both the very large and the very small, i.e., what is of universal meaning but also what is of meaning only to certain individuals, certain groups, and certain cultures.

6

ERIK ERIKSON

*Generative Man and
the Household of God*

There is no better way to open our chapter on Erikson than with a brief meditation on a quotation from his last book, *Gandhi's Truth*. It demonstrates with characteristic Eriksonian sensitivity the common ground between the generative man and the religious reformer.

We have seen how deeply Gandhi at times minded having to become a householder, for without his becoming committed to a normal course of life by child marriage, he might well have been a monastic saint instead of what he became: politician and reformer with an honorary sainthood. For the true saints are those who transfer the state of householdership to the house of God, becoming father and mother, brother and sister, son and daughter, to all creation, rather than to their own issue.¹

Gandhi was not a saint; nor was he a very good father. But he was a religious reformer, and one partially because what he had learned (and failed to learn) about generating and maintaining a household of his own was later projected at a much higher level onto what he generated and attempted to maintain not only for India but for the British Empire, and, finally, for humanity itself.

To generate and maintain a world, but in such a way as to include and yet transcend one's own issue, one's own family, tribe, nation, and race—this is the essence of the generative man, the essence of his ethics and of his religious meaning. Generativity, for Erikson, is a process that stretches from man's most archaic and unconscious biological tendencies to the highest cultural products of his imagination

39. Alfred North Whitehead, *The Function of Reason* (Beacon Press, Inc., 1958), p. 4.
40. White, *ERPT*, p. 24. Also see Robert White, "Motivation Reconsidered: The Concept of Competence," *The Psychological Review*, Vol. 66 (Sept., 1959), pp. 297-333.
41. White, *ERPT*, p. 35.
42. *Ibid.*
43. K. C. Montgomery, "The Role of the Exploratory Drive in Learning," *Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology*, Vol. 47 (1954), pp. 6-64.
44. R. A. Butler and H. F. Harlow, "Discrimination Learning and Learning Sets to Visual Exploration Incentives," *Journal of General Psychology*, Vol. 57 (1957), pp. 257-264.
45. White, *ERPT*, p. 28.
46. Desmond Morris, *The Naked Ape* (Dell Publishing Company, Inc., 1969), p. 107.
47. White, *ERPT*, p. 30.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 39.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 85.
52. *Ibid.*, p. 91.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 77.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 79.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 138.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 195. (Italics mine.)
57. *Ibid.*
58. Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy*, pp. 453-470.

CHAPTER 5

Erich Fromm: The Productive Personality and the Coming of the Messianic Time

1. See John H. Schaar, *Escape from Authority: The Perspectives of Erich Fromm* (Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1961); J. Stanley Glen, *Erich Fromm: A Protestant Critique* (The Westminster Press, 1966).
2. For evidence of Fromm's importance for many practicing psychologists and psychoanalysts as well as the general esteem granted to him in the scholarly community, see the recent symposium *In the Name of Life: Essays in Honor of Erich Fromm*, ed. by Bernard Landis and Edward S. Tauber (Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1971).

3. See Will Herberg, "Freud, Religion, and Social Reality," *Commentary*, Vol. 23 (Fall, 1957), pp. 277-284.
4. White, *Beyond Conformity*, pp. 37-49.
5. "The Rotten Middle Class," *Time*, Jan. 25, 1963. Here the reviewer seems upset most of all that Fromm would suggest, "Marx is a figure of world historical significance with whom Freud cannot even be compared."
6. A. I. Titarenko, "Erich Fromm in the Chains of Illusion," *Science and Society*, Vol. 29 (Summer, 1965), pp. 319-329.
7. For a review of the contradictory uses the student generation sometimes makes of Fromm's thought, see David Riesman, "Notes on Education Reform," in *In the Name of Life: Essays in Honor of Erich Fromm*, ed. by Landis and Tauber, pp. 193-217.
8. Herbert Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry Into Freud* (Beacon Press, Inc., 1955), pp. 216-251.
9. David Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd*, abridged ed. (Yale University Press, 1961), pp. 4, 5, 19n., 22n.
10. Lipset and Lowenthal (eds.), *Culture and Social Character*.
11. Erich Fromm, *Escape from Freedom* (Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1941), p. 26. (Hereafter cited as *EFF*.)
12. Fromm, *MFII*, p. 219.
13. There is evidence that although Fromm remained aloof from the development of psychoanalytic ego psychology, his thought may have had some influence upon the development of this strand of psychoanalytic theory. See David Rapaport's discussion of Fromm's contributions in "The Points of View of Metapsychology," given at the William Alanson White Institute of Psychiatry and Psychoanalysis, May 22-23, 1959. Also see *The Collected Papers of David Rapaport*, ed. by Morton M. Gill (Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1967), p. 921. I am indebted for these references to David Schecter's "Of Human Bonds and Bondage," in *In the Name of Life: Essays in Honor of Erich Fromm*, ed. by Landis and Tauber, pp. 84-99. Schecter's article is also helpful in demonstrating the usefulness of some of Fromm's concepts for the study of early ego development.
14. Ernest G. Schachtel, *Metamorphosis: On the Development of Affect, Perception, Attention and Memory* (Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1959), p. 43.
15. Fromm, *MFII*, p. 83.
16. For a definitive statement of the ethical neutrality of classical psychoanalytic theory, see Hartmann's *Psychoanalysis and Moral Values*. It is, in part, the purpose of this present book to demonstrate that psychoanalysis does indeed have an implied ethical vision, but that it has difficulty rendering its basic concepts consistent with the positive ethical view it often holds.
17. Ricoeur, *Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary*, p. 13.
18. For this exchange, see the following articles: Herbert Marcuse, "Social Implications of Freudian Revisionism," *Dissent*, Vol. 2 (Summer,



1955), pp. 221-240; Erich Fromm, "The Human Implications of Instinctual Radicalism," *Dissent*, Vol. 2 (Fall, 1955), pp. 342-349; Marcuse, "A Reply to Erich Fromm," *Dissent*, Vol. 3 (Winter, 1956), pp. 79-81; Erich Fromm, "A Counter-Rebuttal," *Dissent*, Vol. 3 (Winter, 1956), pp. 81-83.

19. Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, pp. 203-251.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

21. Roszak, *The Making of a Counter Culture*, pp. 84-123.

22. See the following exchange between Marcuse and Brown on the issue of political versus cultural (read mystical) revolution. Herbert Marcuse, "Love Mystified: A Critique of Norman O. Brown," *Commentary*, Vol. 43 (Feb., 1967), pp. 71-75; Norman O. Brown, "A Reply to Herbert Marcuse," pp. 83-84.

23. Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, p. 193.

24. Freud, "Beyond the Pleasure Principle," p. 62.

25. Herbert Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society* (Beacon Press, Inc., 1964); *Soviet Marxism: A Critical Analysis* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1958).

26. Fromm, *EFF*, pp. 24-39; also D. T. Suzuki and others, *Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis*, ed. by Erich Fromm (Grove Press, Inc., 1963), p. 92.

27. Fromm, *MFH*, p. 40; also Erich Fromm, *Psychoanalysis and Religion* (Yale University Press, 1950), p. 22 (hereafter cited as *PAR*); and Erich Fromm, *The Sane Society* (Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1955), pp. 23-24 (hereafter cited as *TSS*).

28. Fromm, *MFH*, p. 42.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 43.

30. Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man: A Christian Interpretation* (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941), pp. 186-207. Note, however, that Niebuhr tends to derive the fleshly or sensual orientations from the orientations of pride. "The Biblical and Christian thought has maintained with a fair degree of consistency that pride is more basic than sensuality and that the latter is, in some way, derived from the former" (p. 186).

31. Søren Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*, tr. by Walter Lowrie (Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1954), p. 80.

32. Fromm, *MFH*, p. 60.

33. Fromm, *EFF*, p. 298.

34. Fromm, *MFH*, p. 57.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 36.

36. Fromm, *EFF*, pp. 295-296.

37. Fromm, *MFH*, p. 58.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 88.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 111. For a more detailed discussion of the orientations of socialization, see Fromm, *EFF*, pp. 136-206. Here he calls them mechanisms of escape. It should be noted that Fromm's theory of character orientation has been changed and adapted somewhat to fit the circumstances of recent research he has done on social character in a Mexican village. Specifically, he

has added a new set of categories dealing with sociopolitical orientations. See his *Social Character in a Mexican Village*, pp. 80-82.

40. Fromm, *MFH*, pp. 62-82.

41. *Ibid.*, pp. 54-61.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 80.

43. *Ibid.*, pp. 65-67.

44. Fromm, *TSS*, p. 166. See also Richard Evans, *Dialogue with Erik Erikson* (Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1967), p. 28 (hereafter cited as *DEE*); Erich Fromm, *The Revolution of Hope* (Bantam Books, Inc., 1968), p. 40 (hereafter cited as *ROH*). Fromm's recent publication of his research on social character in a Mexican village demonstrates how decisively the Mexican peasant is affected by the consumer-oriented attitudes found in more sophisticated urban populations. Old traditions are swept away and nothing replaces them except the vague dreams of a remote consumer paradise. Fromm and Maccoby also discovered that efforts to develop the village economically tended to support the social advancement of individuals formerly considered deviant by the more traditional culture. These individuals who became the new entrepreneurs were productive-exploitative type characters who, under new economic circumstances, tended to gain wealth and ended up being the leaders of the village.

45. Erich Fromm, *The Heart of Man: Its Genius for Good and Evil* (Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1964), pp. 37-61.

46. Erich Fromm, *Sigmund Freud's Mission: An Analysis of His Personality and Influence* (Harper & Brothers, 1959), p. 112.

47. Fromm, *MFH*, p. 18.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

49. Fromm, *PAR*, pp. 4-6.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 61.

51. Fromm, *EFF*, p. 281.

52. *Ibid.*, p. 259.

53. Fromm, *MFH*, p. 84.

54. *Ibid.*

55. *Ibid.*

56. *Ibid.*, pp. 102-106.

57. Erich Fromm, *The Art of Loving* (Harper & Brothers, 1956), p. 23. (Hereafter cited as *AOL*.)

58. *Ibid.*, p. 23.

59. *Ibid.*, p. 33.

60. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

61. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

62. *Ibid.*, p. 26.

63. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

64. *Ibid.*

65. Erich Fromm (ed.), *Marx's Concept of Man* (Frederick Ungar Publishing Company, 1961), p. 28. (Hereafter cited as *MCOM*.)





66. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
67. Erich Fromm and Ramón Xirau (eds.), *The Nature of Man: A Reader* (The Macmillan Company, 1968), p. 219; also see MCOM, pp. 34, 101.
68. Fromm, MCOM, p. 33. Also see Erich Fromm, *Beyond the Chains of Illusion: My Encounter with Marx and Freud* (Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1962), pp. 27-32, for further discussion of Marx's early concept of man.
69. Fromm, *MFH*, p. 113.
70. *Ibid.*, pp. 113-114.
71. Fromm, *ROH*, p. 11.
72. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
73. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
74. Fromm, *PAR*, p. 21.
75. Fromm, *ROH*, p. 73.
76. Fromm, *PAR*, pp. 37-51.
77. *Ibid.*, p. 49. Here he writes, "God is not a symbol of power over man, but of man's own powers."
78. Noam Chomsky, *Syntactic Structures* (The Hague: Mouton & Co., N.V., 1957).
79. Lawrence Kohlberg, "Development of Moral Character and Moral Ideology," *Review of Child Development Research*, Vol. 1, ed. by Martin L. Hoffman and Lois W. Hoffman (Russell Sage Foundation, 1964), pp. 383-431.
80. Fromm, *PAR*, p. 29.
81. Fromm, *EFF*, p. 37.
82. Erich Fromm, *You Shall Be as Gods: A Radical Interpretation of the Old Testament and Its Tradition* (Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1966), pp. 123-124.
83. *Ibid.*, p. 72.
84. *Ibid.*, p. 138.
85. *Ibid.*, p. 125.
86. *Ibid.*, p. 128.
87. *Ibid.*, p. 133, and Leo Baeck, *Judaism and Christianity: Essays*, tr. by Walter Kaufmann (The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1958), p. 31.
88. Fromm, *MFH*, p. 167.
89. *Ibid.*, p. 139.
90. Fromm, *TSS*, p. 276.
91. Fromm, *PAR*, p. 21.
92. Fromm, *TSS*, p. 347.
93. Fromm, *PAR*, p. 63.

CHAPTER 6

Erik Erikson: Generative Man and the House of

NOTES

1. Erik H. Erikson, *Gandhi's Truth: On the Origins of Non-Violence* (W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969), p. 10, as *GT*.)
2. Erik H. Erikson, *Identity and the Life Cycle: Selected Papers* (International University Press, Inc., 1959), p. 97. (Hereafter cited as *IALC*.) Also see *Childhood and Society*, 2d ed., rev. and enlarged (Vintage Books, Inc., 1963), p. 267. (Hereafter cited as *CS*.) Also see *Identity: Youth and Crisis* (W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1968), p. 267. (Hereafter cited as *IYC*.)
3. Erik H. Erikson, *Insight and Responsibility: Implications of Psychoanalytic Insight* (W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1964), p. 132. (Hereafter cited as *IAR*.)
4. Erikson, *IALC*, p. 97.
5. Erikson, *IAR*, p. 131.
6. Erikson, *GT*, p. 132.
7. See David Elkand, "Erik Erikson's Eight Ages of Man," *York Times Magazine*, April 5, 1970, pp. 25-27, 84-86. Also see Erik Erikson, "The Measure of Man, I," *The New Yorker*, Vol. 46, No. 39 (Nov. 14, 1970), pp. 59-136. Also see Erik Erikson, "Profiles: The Measurement of a Book by Robert Coles entitled Erik H. Erikson's *Childhood and Society*," *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 77, No. 462 (Feb. 1976), pp. 100-104.
8. Erik H. Erikson, "Autobiographic Notes on Erik Erikson," *Daedalus*, Vol. 99, No. 4 (Fall, 1970), p. 742.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 748.
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Ibid.*, p. 744.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 748.
13. Erikson, *IYC*, p. 36; also see Evans, *DEE*, p. 10.
14. Erikson, *CS*, p. 418.
15. *Ibid.*; *IYC*, p. 75.
16. Erikson, *IAR*, p. 29.
17. *Ibid.*
18. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 237.
20. Erikson, *CS*, p. 424.
21. Erikson, *IAR*, p. 237.