

noted and exploited by Turgenev, Tchekov, J. M. Synge and Sean O'Casey. It has given them a flying start; and the English playwright, condemned to deal with his inarticulate compatriots, finds difficulty in catching up. If he sticks to realism and makes his characters talk in the clichés of the moment, or in half-sentences, composed of 'sort-ofs' and 'I means' his work appears prosaic. If, on the other hand, he encourages them to quote Keats or interpolates, at a given moment, a carefully written purple passage, a lack of spontaneity becomes discernible. Only by supreme subtlety in the selection of dialogue can the playwright solve this formidable problem.

It is the duty of all ambitious authors to write for the theatre. The tradition of Shakespeare and Sheridan must be carried on. To encourage them to do so, certain changes will have to be made in the existing system. It must become possible, geographically and economically, for everyone in the country to go to the play at least once a week. How this is to be done is an open question. State subsidies may be the answer, or possibly the creation of a network of repertory theatres, under wise direction. The expenscs of production must be reduced to enable managers to put on experimental and unconventional plays. The provision of a wider audience will supply an excellent test for young playwrights. It will then be made clear whether their work really has a universal appeal, or whether its charm is only perceptible to their immediate circle. In addition, the members of the audience require education. Good taste in drama, as in wine, can be acquired through intelligent instruction.

Meanwhile, the writer who intends to become a dramatist will go into training. He will frequent the theatre and learn to gauge the reactions of the audience. He will observe the tense, concentrated silence which a well contrived passage imposes; he will mark the moment when an occasional cough, a rustle of movement, a faint restlessness, betrays the flagging of attention. He will be able to distinguish between the nervous giggling of the upper circle and the genuine laugh that sweeps the whole house. He will recognize the ecstatic murmur which greets the appearance of a dog on the stage. He will not be above learning from his commercial rivals; he will become a connoisseur of acting, and will prepare parts, as Tchekov did, for his favourite actors. He will discover what curtain lines are effective, how best he may,

explain a situation with clarity but without obviousness, and how long he may safely leave two characters alone on the stage. After a year or two spent in these preliminary exercises, he may begin to write. The type of play he chooses will depend on his temperament. Tragedy, comedy, revue, pantomime, symbolism, fantasy, poetic drama—nothing need be beyond his scope, once his technical education is complete. And if he is gifted with perseverance, imagination and creative ability, he may well write a play that will stand revival.

## SELECTED NOTICES

*The Fear of Freedom*, by Erich Fromm. Kegan Paul. 15s.

During the last fifteen years or so many sociologists and some psychoanalysts have been fascinated by the task of combining psychoanalysis and sociology, mostly of a Marxian brand. It was a highly heretical undertaking. Freudian psychoanalysis is, apparently, tolerated in the Soviet Union, but its interference with social doctrine is severely frowned upon. At the same time, Freudians tend to look askance at the intrusion of Marxism into their realm, with reason, for no psychoanalyst aiming at a merging of Freud and Marx has ever remained an orthodox Freudian. Fromm himself is a case in point. Also the result of previous attempts at a merging of the two doctrines was more often an incoherent hotch-potch than serious science. Yet the more intelligent Marxists badly felt the need—and the lack—of a social psychology; while the better sort of psychoanalyst must be ashamed of much that was produced in the pages of the periodical *Imago* under the heading of Freudian 'explanations' of social and historical facts.

I believe it is no exaggeration to say that Fromm's is the first serious contribution to the problem. It is characteristic that his attempt has been taken up, in this country, by Professor K. Mannheim, who has himself developed under the strong influence of both Marxism and Freudism, without adopting an orthodox attitude to either. *The Fear of Freedom* appears as the first volume of 'The International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction', of which Professor Mannheim is the editor. One must be grateful to him for this opening move of his new enterprise.

Why is it so difficult to combine Freud's findings, not only with Marxism, but with any sociology? Because these finds reach into a sphere which is removed from the social sphere. It is a truism that this is not completely so. The core of Freudian psychology, after all, is the assumption that normal character and all its pathological deviations go back to the influences undergone by the child in the family during the first five to six years of its life. The family is part of Society, shaped by it, different in many respects in different periods and in different social groups. It seems easy to prove that the

effects of, say, a matriarchal social structure upon the child's development must altogether differ from those of a patriarchal society. This approach to the problem has become more tempting since B. Malinowski, the great deceased Polish sociologist, has demonstrated that patriarchal and matriarchal societies are no more than 'ideal types', and that the real types of family structure invariably combine elements of the patriarchal and of the matriarchal ideal type, in infinite variation. It should seem an obvious and not too difficult task to explain the typical character structure of a period and of a group by the specific conditioning of the child by a specific socially and historically determined type of family life. Unfortunately, it seems easier in the abstract than it is in practice. For Freud's findings are stubborn things. A few general formulæ may be fitted into a scheme of social psychology. But if we come to the details of Freud's material, we are rapidly brought up against facts which just do not allow of an easy fitting into any sociological pattern.

Freud himself once insisted, as a triumph of his views, that the psychoanalytic group in Calcutta had found, among its patients, exactly the same 'complexes', exactly the same structure of the subconscious, as are found among European patients. If that is so—and Freud, to the end, would not have doubted it—then every attempt at making the psychology of the subconscious fit into social psychology is doomed to failure. Sociology is concerned, in the first place, with differences. It takes it for granted that men have certain physico-chemical, biological and even psychological structures in common. It wants to know, however, why and how, despite this, the psychology of a man in Wall Street differs from that of a man in Calcutta. If, apart from individual differences the subconscious of both is essentially the same, then the psychology of the subconscious has obviously no contribution to make to the solution of this problem. A view apparently borne out by the entirely unintentional jocularities of many Freudian interpretations of historical facts.

But, it must be asked, how can Freud maintain such a view if family structures, which he himself regards as so essential, differ so widely? Here Fromm's criticism starts. It is, he says, because Freud's approach, despite his insistence upon the importance of social groups such as the family is mainly biological.

The 'Oedipus complex' (Freud's famous central discovery) must not simply be understood to result from the plain jealousy and envy of the little boy for his father. The Oedipus complex would be nothing of importance if it did not issue into the 'castration complex', the fear of the little boy for his physical integrity. And though it is easy to accumulate anthropological and folkloristic material to prove that castration once was not a phantasy but a real threat, there is little enough in most infantile stories in Western Society today to justify the fear of castration as the result of an actual threat. This fear is archaic in character, it develops upon the slightest provocation or no provocation at all, it is really part of man's hereditary racial endowment. Freud would probably have maintained that this fear must be traced back to an earlier geological period.

Thus even the Oedipus complex, this apparently entirely social fact, forming an adequate basis for a system of social psychology, is really only a superstructure upon a biological basis. It is impossible, all Freudians agree, to avoid the Oedipus and castration complex, even by removing the little boy from

all conceivable adult male competitors for the exclusive love of his mother. Sociologists will be inclined to ask: How can you account for this, seeing that the Oedipus complex is a sociological fact? But Freudians, with one of Freud's own favourite quotations, would reply in the words of the French psychiatrist Charcot: 'Cela n'empêche pas d'exister.' In other words: We do not very well understand it ourselves; but the fact is that we have observed it invariably under sufficient safeguards. To which all doubters will retort by questioning the accuracy of psychoanalytic observation. To which the psychoanalyst will reply with a polite invitation to the doubter to be analysed himself, adding that, besides his new insights, he will gain a lot for his health by the process. I leave it open how far this last promise will materialize. But I am pretty sure that, after a period of psychoanalysis, the former doubter will be convinced that the roots of the Oedipus and castration complex are deeper than can be explained by this or that incidental infantile experience.

Fromm himself, regrettably, does not deal with the Oedipus complex proper, and by this omission loses contact, to a certain extent, with previous formulations of the problem, however inadequate. We are promised, in his introduction, a general character study of modern man, to which the present work is only a preface. To this we are eagerly looking forward, hoping that the gap will be closed. In the meantime, Fromm does base his contention of the fundamentally biological character of the Freudian doctrine upon other aspects of it, which refer to still earlier layers of the subconscious. More and more, psychoanalysts have come to recognize that the individual variations in the reaction to the Oedipus complex and to the fear of castration are pre-determined by what has happened to the subject in still earlier childhood, from lactation, and even from embryonic life onwards. Here the biological view reigns unchallenged. Early childhood is seen to fall into various phases more or less precisely limited in time (if the child's development does not correspond, on the whole, to the time-table, something is gravely wrong with its biological endowment). Each phase is determined by the preponderance of the child's interest in one 'erogenous' zone on his own body. During the first two years or so the child's contacts with the social world are mainly limited to the mother, whose chief role is biological, and the child's earliest development is mainly a biological, not a social affair. More and more, psychoanalysts incline to the view that it is really these first two years which are decisive. There is only one step from this view to the other view that (apart from the rare cases of violent catastrophes in the earliest period of life) it is really a child's biological endowment which determines its development. Freudism is about to come round full circle. Starting with a sharp attack upon an exclusively physico-biological approach to medicine, with the contention that psychological and often even physical disease can be cured by giving the subject an insight into his repressed early life-story, it now more and more discards the importance of the story, and emphasizes the overwhelming importance of largely unalterable factors in early life. Combined with this is a considerable change of emphasis in practical psychoanalysis. In the early stages access to the deeper layers of the subconscious was obviously much more difficult and limited than it is today, after K. Abraham gave a full technique of the study of pre-Oedipal early child-psychology. Yet this

advance in knowledge and technique, which normally ought to produce confidence in complete success of the method, has been accompanied by an increasing querying of the therapeutic value of the uncovering of the profoundest layers of the subconscious. More and more the quest arises for a method which would bring healing without boring into infinite depths. Fromm, in the present work, does not mention these technical problems of psychoanalysis. But I know that, like all other members of the school not content with a mechanical use of techniques, accepted once and for all, he has been deeply impressed with them. His unorthodoxy is explained at least as much by the technical experiences of the psychiatrist as by the puzzles Freudism presents to the sociologist. His basic objection that, ultimately, the Freudian approach leads back to an entirely biological conception of the psyche, is valid in the field of medical practice as much as in that of social psychology.

Fromm attempts to solve both the medical and the sociological problem by a radical turn-about. He maintains that the biological (sexual) causation postulated by the Freudian school is largely fictitious. He does not deny the validity of the bulk of the Freudian findings in the realm of infantile sexuality (I leave out of account a few highly technical points discussed in other contributions of his). But he denies that individual neurosis and general maladjustment such as revealed in Nazi psychology can be ultimately traced to the biology of sex. He maintains that the psychology of the individual, as well as the psychological crisis of our age, can be understood only from the angle of 'self-expression' and its disturbances. What man really wants is not simply satisfaction of his biological drives. If that were the case, animals, which are subjected to more biological thwarting than little man, would have to be more neurotic than men. The great need of man is self-expression, a widening of his individuality. That individuality includes love, a widening of the self not through the possession of an object, but through the extension of the self, so as to include other selves which are cherished as much as one's own self.

Fromm attempts to trace this need for self-expression back into earlier stages of the development of life. The whole process of the development of life is a process of increasing individuation. The history of mankind only repeats the history of life as a whole. The history of the human individual only repeats, as should be the case, the history of the human species. Freedom is only the subjective reflex of the objective fact that we are differentiated individuals, not tied by inborn instincts, but able and obliged to live and decide by ourselves. The quest for freedom, then, becomes the main content of human history in its subjective aspect, and the occasional abandonment of this quest, in the individual and in the group, the chief disturbance of this fundamental urge. In all this Fromm is so close to Bergson that I wonder why he does not point out the similarity himself. This is not orthodox Freudism, to be sure, nor is it Marxism. That, however, does not prevent it from being perfectly true, though perhaps somewhat one-sided.

Accordingly, Fromm lays stress, in his psychology of the subconscious, not upon those factors which influence the physiological functioning of sex, but upon those which determine the full expression of the self in love. He traces the psychological troubles of mankind in its present phase to the pre-

valence of the sado-masochistic component in their feelings, to the prevalence, in terms of social psychology, of the 'authoritarian character'. Freud, he points out, originally regarded sadism (and its inversion, masochism) as rooted in one of the pre-Oedipal phases of child sexuality. He later had to admit that it was not wholly sexual in character, and explained it as a composite of sexual drives with a hidden 'death-drive', an innate tendency in life to destroy itself. Fromm discards the death-drive, and will be supported on this point by many Freudians. His conception, ingenious and impressive, is that human destructiveness goes exactly as far as the thwarting—not of biological needs, but—of self-expression. Whatever man cannot express in creativeness he expresses in destruction. This view can be solidly supported with arguments drawn from the physio-psychological researches of Bernfeld and Fettelberg, who have nearly succeeded in proving that all psychological energy is one and that the assumption of two basically different types of psychological energy is untenable. Destructiveness, then, is the need of self-expression thwarted in the outside world and turned against its own root, the self (masochism) or against the outside world (sadism).

Having got so far, Fromm finds it easy to develop a system of social psychology, which is Freudism put upside down. The primary psychological need of the individual is not to get physical satisfaction from the outside world (the worst starvation does not produce neuroses if it is due to purely natural, not to social, causes), but the quest for self-expression in the outside world. If this is thwarted, destructiveness sets in, secondarily affecting also the biological functions. We are confronted, at bottom, with a new psychology, which has no more than its historical origin and some of its subject-matter in common with Freudism.

It is not unimportant to remember that this new psychology has some affinity with the teachings of Jung; the idea that self-expression is the first need of the subconscious would be emphatically welcomed among Jungians. But the closest affinities to Fromm's view can be found in the school of Adler. Fromm has a few critical remarks about Adler, and they are pertinent. Adler, as everybody knows, traces everything to the thwarting of the lust for power, to the individuals' inferiority against other individuals. Fromm retorts that, more often than not, the inferiority is entirely fictitious, and, more fundamentally that the inordinate craving for power is itself a result of the deviation of the individual's normal attitude to life. Only those who are thwarted in adequate self-expression, and are unable to make normal love contacts in the world, are craving for superiority or, conversely, for being swallowed up into a bigger whole. This ambivalent craving for superiority and inferiority is, in his view, precisely the essence of the sado-masochistic attitude to life, which, to him, is almost identical with the neurotic character itself. Adler takes as the normal reaction what is the pathological deviation; he argues as if every individual were by inborn instinct a little Hitler. Or it might be said that he treats the spirit of competition, this most specific psychological reflex of the capitalist order of economic life, as human nature itself. It might also be said that Adler's approach is incredibly narrow. To reduce the rich gamut of human needs of self-expression to the one quest for power!

But all this is only to say that Adler was a narrow-minded fellow who

spoil a good case. The essence of the Adlerian approach is not the power-motive, however much Adler himself put it into the forefront of his argument, but a view which puts thwarting of the self (or the 'ego', if that expression is preferred) into the centre of psychopathology. A view which puts the self rather than the drives into the centre of psychology must be described as a revised Adlerism rather than as a revised Freudism. One more proof that, in any attempt to develop a social psychology, you are inevitably driven away from Freudian assumptions.

Now to the sociologist it may be a matter of indifference whether something derives from Freud or from Adler, provided only it helps him to understand social psychology. Yet this is not quite so. For abandoning Freudism means, in this case, abandoning Freud's insights concerning early childhood and the subconscious. Much of what Fromm says is very convincing. It strengthens one's feeling that something essential is lacking in Freud, something which can only be approached from an entirely new angle. Yet, while I read Fromm's ingenious interpretation of destructiveness as the result of the thwarting of self-expression, I could not help remembering that little children, at a certain period coming under a precise time-table of development, do tear and break everything within their reach, not as the result of any thwarting of their other activities, but quite simply as an activity lustful in itself. I remembered that Freudians had succeeded in distinguishing two sub-phases of this early infantile sadistic phase, one where cruelty is combined mainly with mastication, and a later one where it is exerted with the whole body. Also, Freudians have shown that these two sub-phases of the sadistic phase are closely connected with parallel phases of sexual development, and accompanied by sexual pleasure. Can all this be treated as more or less irrelevant?

But this is not yet all. It must not be forgotten that the self is mainly a centre of integrated, purposeful action. It is, therefore, if not identical to, yet closely connected with the sphere of conscious life. Every psychology centring round the self tends to emphasize the conscious as against the unconscious or, worse still, tends to minimize their difference and contrast. The strongest objection to Adler, and one the strength of which Fromm is well aware, is, that he rationalizes wholly subconscious motives into intelligible conscious ones. And exactly this objection seems to be valid against Fromm also. His work is subject to an all-pervading tendency to minimize the importance of the unconscious, to deny the fundamental difference between earliest childhood and adulthood, or, at any rate, to minimize their significance for adult maladjustment. Like Jung and Adler, but much more so than Jung, he tends to obliterate the significance of the Freudian findings in the field of child and sexual psychology, and to interpret behaviour as mainly intelligible in terms of the situation of the adult. It is true that, by doing so, he gains a much better jumping ground for a social psychology. But does he not sacrifice many of the fundamental insights which have made of individual psychology a science during the last generation?

At any rate, he does gain a jumping ground for his sociology. For it is now easy for him to interpret the disease of our era, and of Western civilization during the last four hundred years, in terms of the normal relations of the adult. In medieval civilization, he maintains, man had, on the whole, normal

means of self-expression. Here his analysis is much more Marxian than would appear from his scanty quotations of Marx. In the Middle Ages, he would say, in Hegel-Marx terminology, man was not yet alienated from himself. His work had not yet become a commodity, though his products were. He worked for himself, getting a great deal of enjoyment out of his work. His social ties were still natural ties, and appeared to him even more natural than they in fact were. He was not confronted with abstract duties pressed home through the mechanisms of the market and of the law, but with concrete personal ties with his family, his neighbours, his guild fellows. He did not live for gain, but earned to live. Consumption was still the essential aim. We do not further elaborate this well-known picture, of the correctness of which there is little doubt. Fromm goes on to say that as a result of this scope for normal self-expression, God, in the Middle Ages, appeared, in the main, as a good and loving God. He punished but He could be reconciled, like a reasonable father is to his naughty child. Man could achieve God's grace by his own good works.

This social order collapsed towards the end of the Middle Ages, and in the renaissance the modern 'independent individual' was born, the crown of a secular process of individualization. In the world thus transformed those at the top might, to an extent, enjoy themselves still more, but for the masses the position changed radically for the worse, not so much materially but psychologically. In a competitive society, the natural relations between man and man were broken. Struggle, only limited by the law and its protectors, was put into the place of co-operation. Life for gain was put into the stead of gain for life. Labour became a commodity, even the specific psychological characteristics of the individual became a marketable commodity. Man gained a great deal more freedom *from* ties. He lost almost all his freedom *to* make his human contacts and his work means of self-expression. The picture has been drawn before by others. Fromm goes on to discuss the psychological consequences, which are obvious.

The individual is completely lost in this world of freedom, which to most means only freedom from all those ties which make life worth living. He is thrown back into a desperate state of anxiety. The anxiety grows considerably when free competition is going down before monopoly, for now the last opportunity, for the middle classes at any rate, to mould their life by their own efforts, is lost. They feel themselves submerged by gigantic powers they cannot control, powers which almost invariably spell evil. Even during the earliest stages of this development the lower strata reacted, through the medium of Protestantism, with a morality of absolute obedience to the existing power, of abject subservience, of renunciation of all pride, and at the same time with fearful repressed resentment, reflected in the Calvinist idea of a tyrant god who saves and damns man according to his whims. The anxiety, the renunciation of individuality, the self-debasement and the resentment of the Reformation era may have somewhat abated for a time, but are now coming to the surface again as a result of recent developments known to everybody. Those who do not find a normal sphere of self-expression have only the choice between two substitutes: either they must try to enlarge their self by a wild craving for power, or escape the fear of complete isolation by merging themselves into a wider whole, subjecting themselves completely to a stronger will. These are

the ambivalent urges of the authoritarian character, which is the Fascist character. This is the socio-psychology of Fascism.

This, though certainly not a comprehensive treatment of Nazi psychology, is unexceptionable as far as it goes. I do not think, however, that Fromm's explanations would have lost much by completely discarding the psychological apparatus of his deductions. This amounts to repeating in terms of his sociology what has been said above of his psychology: that it discards the subconscious. Despite his wide horizon and his undogmatic combination of various approaches, Fromm has not fully succeeded in making the science of the subconscious fruitful for social psychology. Perhaps it will look different once he publishes his more general views on the subject. I am, however, inclined to see in this partial failure the revelation of a fundamental difficulty, mentioned above. It does not seem possible, not, at any rate, in the present state of knowledge, to combine an ever-deeper delving into the recesses of the individual soul and a practically valuable understanding of the everyday surface behaviour of individuals and groups. The last thing psychotechnics tends to base itself upon in elaborating tests is a profound analysis of the subconscious. Psychological theories seem to fall into two groups: those using a common-sense psychology for the practical understanding of practical things, and those trying to understand at all costs, the abysses. Occasionally, a scholar changes over from one side to the other. Fromm is a case in point. But if, to my mind, he drops too much of what has been gained by four decades of researches into the psychology of the subconscious, his handling of surface psychology has undoubtedly gained from his contact with the psychology of the depths, and has enabled him to understand aspects of modern mass psychology not easily accessible. Looking at it from the opposite angle, that of Marxist sociology, he has succeeded in showing how much can be got out of Marxism if it is used undogmatically and in conscious and critical combination with other methods.

FRANZ BORKENAU

*The Colossus of Maroussi.* By Henry Miller. (Secker and Warburg.)

GREECE is the central figure in this book, which discloses some of the writer's talents at their best as well as his irritating defects. The reader who is familiar with Henry Miller's style will recognize the art of surprise, the frequent transition from narrative to lyrical monologue, from realities to the realm of dreams, his exaltations and his outbursts, the long tumultuous phrases as though written in a state of frenzy. He will also recognize, with displeasure, his predilection for certain sordid aspects of life.

*The Colossus of Maroussi* deserves to be read by a large public in this country, which discovered modern Greece more than a century ago. I am thinking of those English travellers (Leake, Hobhouse, Dodwell, etc.), who first began to explore the land where the finest myths of the Aryan race were born, and to study the language and the manners of its present inhabitants before Byron gave his life for Greek independence. It is from those forerunners and from their successors that there came the new way of approaching Greece as a living entity, as a nation which is haunted by a crowded, immemorial past and is yet only half-revealed, half-created, and may well prove to possess a power of

regeneration invaluable to our fading world. Miller has followed the path of these men. His book has been published in London almost simultaneously with James Aldridge's *Signed with Their Honour*, a novel recommended by the Book Society, which is, in a way, another tribute paid to Greece by an English-speaking writer. Aldridge saw Greece at the miraculous time of her victories over the Axis. Miller visited her before. It is to his credit that he guessed her fighting spirit and entered into closer contact with the character of her people.

*The Colossus* is not a travel book and has nothing in common with a novel. The writer tries his best to persuade us that his visit to Greece was a revelation, the greatest date of his life; some parts of his book assume the aspect and the value of an autobiography. One cannot avoid observing that Miller started his journey very much in the mood of his forefathers, the first colonists of America: filled with disgust for the known world. Greece was inevitably bound to offer him a new start, to reopen a window to heaven, to that blue sky which alone enabled the French 'poètes maudits' to continue living and writing poetry. The extent of his despair for the rest of the world is shown by the terms in which he compares the French with the Greek spirit. He had loved France more than anything else in the world—at any rate, far more than his own country. Finally, however, he came to the conclusion that France can only be 'a very beautiful garden', a sort of nursing home. When you start feeling strong, he says, you find that its atmosphere is no longer 'nourishing'. The French spirit, he asserts, has limits that are too obvious and narrow. The Frenchman became a realist because it is 'safe and practical', whereas the Greek is an 'adventurer'. There is truth in this judgment of both parties.

Miller associated the magic of Greece with many things, some futile and some great and immortal. He speaks of the light of Greece—a most elusive subject—and succeeds where others have failed. His pages on this subject can be compared to those of Pericles' Ghiannopoulos, a modern Greek writer, very little known outside his country, but one of the most acute observers and keen worshippers of Greek nature who, in the end, drowned himself in the waters of the Saronic Gulf in a fit of æsthetic frenzy.

Two aspects of Greek nature impressed Miller: The peaceful landscape composed of well-balanced forms upon which light bestows a divine clarity, and the chaotic, wild landscape which brings confusion to the mind. This contrast is reflected in the Greek soul. It lies at the root of ancient tragedy. Greek equilibrium came as the result of a struggle, as the outcome of the composition of these 'antinomian spots'. Miller is right in recalling it: 'Out of the fiery anarchy came the lucid, healing metaphysical speculations which even today enthral the world'. The serene atmosphere of Attica and the form of the Greek islands simply helped the Greek mind to escape the 'death-traps' and establish the sovereignty of reason over the fears and passions which dominate primitive life.

Are we today fully conscious of the value of this victory? Hitler made us realize how precarious its fruits can be. We are, however, too willing to criticize the very essence of our civilization. Henry Miller in the chapter of a new book published in the *HORIZON* last November, went so far, in a moment of irritation, as to express doubts as to whether it is worth while defending

Property of the Erich Fromm Document Center. For personal use only. Citation or publication of material prohibited without express written permission of the copyright holder.  
 Eigentum des Erich-Fromm-Dokumentationszentrums. Nutzung nur für persönliche Zwecke.  
 Veröffentlichungen - auch von Teilen - bedürfen der schriftlichen Erlaubnis des Rechteinhabers.



OUR FRIENDS IN THE SERVICE will find it helpful to select their reading from books recommended by their favourite authors. We have asked the outstanding WE MODERN authors to name the ten books that have most vitally influenced them and list popular editions:

FREDERIC PROKOSCH, author of THE ASSASSINS (\$2.00), NIGHT OF THE POOR (\$2.50), THE ASIATICS (o.p. searching), DEATH AT SEA (\$2.00).

His Choice:  
 TOM JONES by Henry Fielding . . . . . \$1.45  
 DON QUIXOTE by Miguel De Cervantes . . . . . \$1.45  
 GANTERBURY TALES by Geoffrey Chaucer . . . . . \$ .95  
 PLAYS by Molière . . . . . \$ .95  
 L'EDUCATION SENTIMENTALE by Gustave Flaubert . . . . . \$ .95  
 BROTHERS KARAMAZOV by Fyodor Dostoyevsky . . . . . \$1.45  
 SHORT STORIES by Anton Tchekov . . . . . \$ .95  
 MOBY DICK by Herman Melville . . . . . \$ .95  
 THE TOWER by W. B. Yeats . . . . . \$2.50  
 HOLDERLIN'S MADNESS by David Gascoyne . . . . . \$2.00

KATHERINE ANNE PORTER, author of FLOWERING JUDAS (\$2.50), PALE HORSE, PALE RIDER (\$2.00), PROMISED LAND (\$2.50).

Her Choice:  
 RELIQUES by Thomas Percy . . . . . \$1.90  
 SONNETS by Wm. Shakespeare . . . . . \$2.50  
 CONFESSIONS OF ST. AUGUSTINE . . . . . \$ .95  
 LIFE OF JOHNSON by James Boswell . . . . . \$1.45  
 MADAME BOVARY by Gustave Flaubert . . . . . \$1.00  
 WUTHERING HEIGHTS by Emily Bronte . . . . . \$ .95  
 TRISTRAM SHANDY by Laurence Sterne . . . . . \$ .95  
 DR. FAUSTUS by Christopher Marlowe . . . . . \$ .95  
 HOUSE OF THE DEAD by Fyodor Dostoyevsky . . . . . \$2.50  
 WAR AND PEACE by Leo Tolstoi . . . . . \$1.45

WILLIAM CARLOS WILLIAMS, author of COLLECTED POEMS (\$2.50), IN THE AMERICAN GRAIN (\$1.00), LIFE ALONG THE PASSAIC RIVER (\$1.75), WHITE MULE (\$2.50), IN THE MONEY (\$2.50).

His Choice:  
 EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS by Henry Adams . . . . . \$ .95  
 CIVILIZATION AND DECAY by Brooks Adams (o.p. searching) . . . . . \$2.69  
 AUTOBIOGRAPHY by Lincoln Steffens . . . . . \$ .95  
 THE ENORMOUS ROOM and others by E. E. Cummings . . . . . \$2.50  
 LET THERE BE BEER by Bob Brown (o.p.) . . . . . \$ .25  
 RED RENAISSANCES and other pamphlets by H. H. Lewis . . . . . \$ .95  
 HIGH WIND IN JAMAICA by Richard Hughes . . . . . \$2.50  
 IDLE DAYS IN PATAGONIA by W. H. Hudson . . . . . \$1.00  
 VIVA MEXICO by Charles M. Flandrau . . . . . \$ .95  
 TROILUS AND GRISEYDE by Geoffrey Chaucer . . . . . \$3.50  
 THE GROUND WE STAND ON by John Dos Passos . . . . . \$2.00  
 COLLECTED POEMS by Kenneth Fearing . . . . . \$1.50  
 SOME POEMS by Arthur Rimbaud, trans. by Lionel Abel . . . . . \$1.50

Other WE MODERNS who have been asked include Henry Miller, Kenneth Patchen, Marianne Moore, Allen Tate, Horace Gregory, W. H. Auden, Kay Boyle, Eugene Jolas and Wallace Stevens. Have you further preferences?

GOTHAM BOOK MART, 51 WEST 47, NEW YORK  
 Agents for 'Horizon', 'Life and Letters', 'Townsmen', and other Foreign and American 'Little Mags.'

# HORIZON

EDITED BY CYRIL CONNOLLY

Vol. VII No. 39 March 1943

## CONTENTS

	PAGE
FIVE SONNETS FROM A SEQUENCE <i>Kenneth Gee</i>	146
THE TWINS <i>Louis MacNeice</i>	148
EARTH <i>D. S. Savage</i>	148
SAVED FROM THE SALVAGE <i>Logan Pearsall Smith</i>	149
LETTER TO MY SON <i>Osbert Sitwell</i>	159
PAINTING IS A WAGER <i>André Masson</i>	178
INTERMENT OF A LITERARY MAN <i>Philip Toynbee</i>	183
PLAYWRIGHTS OF THE FUTURE <i>Anthony Goldsmith (Lt.)</i>	195
SELECTED NOTICES:	
THE FEAR OF FREEDOM <i>Franz Borkenau</i>	203
THE COLOSSUS OF MAROUSSI <i>D. Nicolareizis</i>	210
CORRESPONDENCE	214
REPRODUCTIONS OF TWO DRAWINGS by ANDRÉ MASSON	
between pages 180 and 181	

The editorial and publishing offices of HORIZON are at 6 Selwyn House, Lansdowne Terrace, W.C.1.—Six months' subscription, 10/- net, including postage, U.S.A.—\$2.50. Agents for U.S.A. & Canada, Gotham Book Mart, 51 West 47th Street, New York City, U.S.A. For advertising terms please write to The Business Manager, Terminus 4898

All MSS. submitted should be accompanied by a stamped, addressed envelope, and will not be returned if this is not enclosed