

Eigentum des Erich Fromm Dokumentationszentrums. Nutzung nur für persönliche Zwecke. Veröffentlichungen – auch von Teilen – bedürfen der schriftlichen Erlaubnis des Rechteinhabers.

B 6

Rapaport, David. Consciousness: a psychological and psychodynamic view. In H. Abramson (Ed.), Problems of Consciousness, New York: Josiah Macy, Jr., Foundation, 1951, pp. 18-57

Consciousness, in psychodyamic theory, is seen as a function of the ego or as "an apparatus in the service of the ego" (20). "Let us for a moment assume that consciousness is somehow a superordinate sense organ; what happens on the receptors, and much of what happens intrapsychically, is relayed to it and is re-xrepresented by it in a certain code. From the point of view of this "superordinate sense organ," both the intrapsychic happendings and those on the receptors constitute an 'external world.'" (20).


There is a difference between a dream consciousness and a waking consciousness."


In the state of fleep, very little of what impinges on the receptors is raix relayed to this sense organ of consciousness, but dreams testify to the fact that much of what happens intrapsychically is relayed to it. Rapaport gives examples of three variants of consciousness in arrange this paper. First, he speaks of a case of amnesia (a 'loss of personal identity'), then he gives some observations of his own which he made of himself as subject the trained himself to write down dreams, hypnagogic reveries, daydreams, and various thoughts. which occurred while he was falling asleep or while asleep), and finally some observations of the Korsakow's Syndrome (which is characterized by progressive forgetting of recent experiences, confabulations when asked to recall experiences, and emotional lability. At one time, this syndrome was thought to be the translational as evidence was gathered, that it could accompany almost any condition associated with organic brain damage.)

"It is worth pointing out that the manner of re-representation in dream consciousness differs from that in waking consciousness." What seems implied here is the difference between secondary process and primary process (with the use of condensation, displacement, substitution espetsally evident in the latter).

Whay seems most pertinent is Rapaport's discussion of his own experiences 🛲 this in investigating varieties of consciousness while falling asleep and while asleep. He trained himself to awaken as much as possible after each dream, reveries, and hypnagogic hallucination and to write them down. Usually, he was in a state of drowsiness and he wrote in the dark without disturbing himself from the position in which he was when he awoke. The writing became more or less automatic, as though the hand wrote without any subjectively experienced decision that it should write. He was able to collect two sets of these recordings one covering a period of seven weeks and another a period of one week. "The study of these records show that: a) they contain thought fragments which do not seem to differ from waking thought; b) they contain segments which I noted while recording were just like the daydreams into which I drift off occasionamlly, interrupting my regular work, in the daytime, and their character, as recorded, bears this out; c) they contain material which is introduced by comments to the effect that I am unable to continue recording and the sleepiness is catching up with me. I am apparently 'falling off' to sleep, but I 'come to' soon and record what passed while 'falling off.' These are usually called reveries or some of them 'hypnagogic hallucinations.' They vary greatly in length, and in character: some of them are like dreams, some quite unlike the latter. d) These records contain dreams, but these also vary greatly in character: some of them are accompanied by the awarenss 'this is just a dream'; others seem quite 'real.'" (27-28).

Rapaport then presents several continua making on which each of these four states, i.e., thought similar to waking, daydream, reverie, and dream, thought, can be







distinguished.

"First of all progressing from waking thought to dream, the reflective awareness docreases. It is a commonplace that waking consciousness is characterized both by being aware of a content and by the possibility of becoming aware of this fact of awareness. This is what I call here reflective awareness. Now, in the common dream there is little or no such possibility present. Where there is some of it preserved, the dream is of the sort in which we are aware that 'this is just a dream.' Daydreams and reveries, too, have many varieties in this respect. They range from those which are so automatically recorded that there is no more trace of them but the awarness that there was an experience, to those which are clearly recognized to be translations into the language of reverie or daydream of the thought at which the 'falling off' began......There is a continuum here ranging from waking thought to dream, and in the progression toward the dream the reflective awareness, the awareness of awareness, progressively fades out" (28).

The second continuum (Rapaport calls these 'parameters,' not continua, although in the body of his remarks, he refers to some of them as 'continua') is the ability to exert effort, to will. The more closely the dream state is approached, the more difficult it becomes to exert voluntary effort. One indicator of this in Rapaport's notes made during these states of consciousness are such comments as "this is not important material, it need not be recorded.'

The third, and final continuum, Rapaport presents is that concerned with "..formal characteristics of thought, that is in the form in which intrapsychic and external perceptions are represented in these various forms of consciousness." (29). He then goes on to mention a few of the formal characteristics of thought in which these forms of consciousness differ. The first is concerned with verbalization versus imagery. "The closer the thought to the waking form, the more verbalized it is; the closer it is to the dream form, the more itsm medium becomes visual imagery. I do not mean to imply that there is no visual imagery involved in waking thought, or that there is no verbalization in dream thoughts: both are common, yet the preponderances are so striking that xit x x an axafx the sax thing x x x whenexperimental with explicitness versus implicitness. "As one proceeds from the waking toward the dream forms of thought one find that in the waking form the thought is explicit, in the dream forms it becomes implicative." (29). An example of this ix would be a dream in which "I know that my father is satisfied with me." There is nothing in the dream to indicate why I might know this, no external expression on the part of my father or the like.. .. this is an implicit experience. Such forms are common in dreams, but absent or rare in waking thought. A third difference is found in the use of logical vs. primary process thought. In dreams, the mechanisms of the primary process: condensation, displacement, and substitution, prevail. The outstanding characteristic of waking thought is its logic. "It is not that we do not find in waking thought such aberrations of logic...nor is the dream free of waking logic, as represented by secondary elaboration, but progressing from the waking state to the dream state, the role of logic becomes less, and that of the above mentioned forms increasingly greater" (30). Rapar here is implying continuous transitions where one cannot draw hard and fast dividing lines. I cannot say that up to here these are hypnagogic hallucinations and here begin the daydreams, because I have records where daydreams shade in their middle into hallucinations, to become at the end again like daydreams. In other words, what was described by Freud as the contrast between the primary and the secondary process is clearly present in these observations, but with a continuous transitipn between these two forms. It is always a question of more or less....just for the sake of those who might wonder, it so happens that Freud was aware of this (39). (Reference is to Freud's Interp. of Dreams. In Basic Writings. Modrn Library Edition. 1938. p. 459 & 536). The fourth difference mentioned by Rapaport are the changes in syntax as one progresses toward the dream state. "It seems that conjunctions tend to fall out more and more and the position usually accorded to what is syntactically important;



Eigentum des Erich Fromm Dokumentationszentrums. Nutzung nur für persönliche Zwecke. Veröffentlichungen – auch von Tellen – bedürfen der schriftlichen Erlaubnis des Rechteinhabers.

- 1-

in a sentence tends to be taken by what is psychologically outstanding" (30-j1).

KAXX ZEMANIA XERAHYX ERAHIN KENTERIKIRI KENTERIKI KANKEN KERERIK KANTERIKA KENTERIKA K

Freud demonstrated that one crucial aspect of mental development may beconceptualized as a progressive transition from what he called the primary process to the secondary process, the former being characterized by the striving for immediate, even if hallcuinatory, gratification of needs, the latter by delay of such gratification. detour from the direct, dangerous, or hallucinatory path to a search for the possibility of gratification in reality. He formulated that the primary process pix abides by the pleasure-principle, the secondary process by the reality-principle. The primary process operates by condensations, displacements, and symbolizations, and tolerates contradictions, as for example, in dreams; while the secondary process, thought, operates more or less by logic, syntax, the rule of the excluded third, the law of contradictions. The development of the varieties of conscious experience here discussed is a salient part of the development of the secondary process abiding by the reality principle" here ferring to varieties of consciousnessations experienced in the Korsakow syndrome (38). Previously, Rapaport refers in more specifically to these variettes of conscious experience. "....we can be aware of a door as a percept, as a memory of one, as a thought, as general knowledge, as imagery pure, as a dream or daydream image, as an illusion, as a delusion, as a deja vu phrenomenon, and -- so as not to stretch this enumeration too long -- as various combinations and degrees of certainty of each of these....Furthermore, an idea we have in our consciousness may be experienced by us as a fact, an assumption, as something false that is negated, as something doubted, as something hoped for, etc. These infinitely multitudinous and infinitely subtle varieties of conscious experience play a decisive role in the ability of our thinking to orient us correctly in the infinitely complex and changing these varieties of conscious experience play a crucial role in the function of judgment. The clinical phrase 'poorm judgment,' describing form of pathology so characteristic for most psychiatric conditions of gross organic etiology, is dependent upon an impoverishment of the range of varieties of conscious experience which can be evoked, and upon an unregliability of the coordination affirmation of reality changes with varieties of conscious experience evoked by them. It is demonstrable that these varieties of conscious experience lie at the core of functions described by the concepts reality-principle, reality-testing, and judgment in his Two Principles of Mental Functioning (37).

"Consciousness, from the point of view of the clinician, is not a mere descriptive term. I have given three illustrations of the great variability of the phenomenon of consciousness. The questions is, can me we reduce these varities to a common deonominator? So far, I believe, only one general attempt has been made to that end. It was the attempt made by Freud in the seventh chapter of his The Interpretation of Dreams. Freud's theory may be summed up as follows: All psychological happening is motivated, that is, ultimately it serves the purpose of diminishing a tension. The quantity of the tension in question is termed cathexis (charge). Drives, needs, strivings, interests are terms to describe such cathexes, their origins and their direction, that is, the goal object on which these cathexes can be discharged.

"There is some evidence to show that early in tontogeny, when the drive cathexis cannot be discharged because the drive object is not present, a hallucinatory image of previous discharge situations (gratifications) arises. It This is the primitive prototype of all conscious experience. It corresponds to the drive cathecting of the memory trace of gratification. In the adult when dreaming,



Eigentum des Erich Fromm Dokumentationszentrums. Nutzung nur für persönliche Zwecke. Veröffentlichungen – auch von Teilen – bedürfen der schriftlichen Erlaubnis des Rechteinhabers.

4

when in dire deprivation (starvation, dehydration), when sick (delusions, hallucinations), or when in special states (drugs, hypnosis) etc. this primitive prototypic form of conscious experience appears again. One of thems salient characteristics of this form of conscious experience is that something intrapsychic (the goal of motivation) appears in consciousness as if it were a perception of external reality. Another salient feature is of it is that the perceptions (and thoughts) which become these conscious do notabide by logic but by a respective (such as that described by the dream mechanisms: condensation, displacement, substitution, symbolization, etc.) based on the syncretic, diffuse, and undifferentiated character of primitive perception (and memory brace). In fugues we see one manifestation of this type of consciousness: the drive-need is imperious and the ideas expressing it monopolize consciousness.

"Later on in ontogeny, thedelay of drive discharge does not result in hallucina-Jory ideation monopolizing consciousness. Intrapsychick controls develop, and not only the object of the drive but objects which lead in reality to the gratifying object, or facilitate getting to it, also enter consciousness. Delay of discharge and detour from the direct per path to gratification becomes possible. Thes is a slow, gradual development, which parallels the differentiation of external perception and is to a great extent dependent on it. This development establishes a harmonious relationship and unity between the consciousness of external perception and the consciousness of the gratifying objects and those leading toward it. The cathexes, which originally were drive cathexes, become bound in the organizations controlling drive discharge. Function of delay has given rise to delaying structures. The controlled motivations are stall directed toward discharging their cathexes, but they can be delayed in doing so. The controlling structures have cathexes bound up in them. These cathexes, termed hypercathexes or attention cathexes, play a crucial role in relation to consciousness. The 'sense-organ' consciousness regulates the distribution of these attention cathexes. Without a 'cathecting' by these, ideas do not become conscious. The study of the phenomena of repression has amply demonstrated this. The attention cathexes are allocated to external perceptions and to memory traces, and thereby these become conscious. A drive-tension which rises to discharge-threshold intensity will attract attention cathexis to the memory From there the attention cathexis will spread trace of its representation. to memories of objects and experiences related to the drive object. The relationships themselves thus become conscious, and through them an experiment (we call it thought process) occurs which establishes the best avenue to the goal (gratification). The drive-dascharge is in the meanwhile delayed until this experiment is completed; then 'the sluices of motility are opened,' as it were, and discharging action guided by the completion thought process takes place.

"The gradual development to thought as 'experimental action' from thought as 'hallucinatory gratification' reflects the gradual development from monoideic consciousness of the drive-gratification to polyideic consciousness of the relation of perceived external reality, internal need, and memories of past experiences. This gradual development corresponds to varieties of forms of consciousness in which various balances are struck between the perception of internal and external reality, in which internal experience is to various (ever descreasing) degrees experienced as external reality, and in which the differentiation between internal and external perception (thought and perception of reality) are differentiated with increasing clarity. Correspondingly, the thought-forms consciously experienced change gradually from prelogical to logical, from syncretic to abstract, from idiosyncratic to socialized. (The role of interpersonal relationships, communication, and socialization in this process is grossly underplayed here, for the sake of simplicity of presentation.) This gradual development is reflected in those forms of conscious experience which I have described in reporting on the preliminary studies of my recordings of dreams, reveries, daydreams, etc.



Eigentum des Erich Fromm Dokumentationszentrums. Nutzung nur für persönliche Zwecke. Veröffentlichungen – auch von Teilen – bedürfen der schriftlichen Erlaubnis des Rechteinhabers.

-5-

"When thought has reached the differentiation where it appears as experimental action m and explores reality for the safest and most feasible path toward gratification, it has attained a complex organization of safeguards guaranteeing material appraisal of reality and a sharp distinction of wish and reality, certainty and uncertainty, etc. It is this complex organization that is reflected in those varieties of conscious experience which I have described above in connection with the Korsakow syndrome, in which these safeguards are to a considerable extent put out of action by the pathological process" (40-42).

An abide; in the discussion of this paper, a Dr. Mead, whom I take to be an anthropol/ist—it could possibly be Margaret Mead, but no identifying data is given in the body of the paper itself_refers to societies in which the idea of suicide is not present. "There are such societies. There are societies in where we have no record of anyone ever having committed suicide, where the idea of suicide is not present..." (p. 46)