

238. Erikson's psychosoc. theory & Harlow's adaptation theory "offer a conceptual explanation of the individual's social development by tracing the unfolding of the genetically social character of the human individual." (Hof. Survey Mon. I. p. 48 (490))

1/10 239. D. Rapaport. Organization & Pathology of Thought, Col. Univ. Press, NY 1951

11 D. Rapaport, On the Psycho-Analytic Theory of Affects
Int. Journal of Ps., 1934, vol. 34.

240. "Autonomy of the ego for the id"
"autonomy of the ego for external reality."

241. R. considered activity & passivity not in the usual psycho-analytic sense / specific aims of drives but as referring to "the degree of control of structure over drive." (492)
(Some Meta psych. considerations concerning) activity & passivity, unpubl. 1953 / lecture

242. [Examine concept of activity & passivity.]

243. R. "distinguishes between motivational investigators of behavior - those arising from drives as direct derivatives - and those of non-motivational origin, & the latter causes." (492)
Nebraska Symposium on Motivation
ed. H. Jones 1960. Lincoln
Univ. of Nebraska Press.

"While all motives are causes, not all causes are motives."
All this based on Freud's early concept of consciousness as 'sense organ.' functioning with attention centers.

(12) 244. D. 2: Re Structure of psychoanal. Theory: A Systematizing attempt. 1959 In Psychology: A Study of a Science. ed. Koch

245. Consciousness is result of an act,
creative consciousness v. consciousness as passive adaptation of sense data or other thought. All knowledge is concentration.
great lack in Ego psychol. They do not study process of concentration.
as clinical question: How does ^{any} conc. become the.

246. A. "Indeed, clinical theory has been treating consciousness as an organization thing all the years"

246. "Hartmann has said personal communication, that Freud's inability to solve the problem of quality, that is, the non-quantitative aspect of structure, was his greatest disappointment, one

