

Beard, Beard and Beard (1968) lead us to believe that the propaganda practiced during the war was a success. "Countless Americans" desired "a 'brave new world' at the conclusion of the war" (p. 411). If this is true, then President Wilson had been able to convince a good number of citizens of the United States that the war in Europe was a kind of holy crusade, "with a vision beyond it of a peace 'planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty' " (Nye and Morpurgo, 1955, p. 655). To consider this understanding of what the country was standing for as simply "the illusion of fighting for peace and democracy", as Fromm did, seems to us superficial, a questionable simplification of a very complex matter; Fromm's mere mentioning of "moral considerations which had still existed in the First World War" fails completely, we think, to help the reader understand what was going on in the United States between April 1917 and November 1918.

We can well imagine Fromm was referring in the quotation under discussion to the secret treaties Russia, Great Britain, France and Italy made before or during the war and which Oswald Garrison Villard published in the *New York Evening Post* in January 1918 (Beard, Beard and Beard, 1968, p. 406). Beard, Beard and Beard interpreted the influence this information had on many people as follows:

... secret agreements, made long before 1914, between Russia, France, and Great Britain, were unearthed by historians working in the archives of Russia, Germany, and Austria thrown open to researches by revolutions in all those countries. On the basis of clear documentary evidence scholars dissected the myth, propagated by those Powers, that Germany was wholly responsible

for inaugurating the war; that on Germany must be placed all the war guilt; that the governments of Great Britain, France, and Russia united by the secret agreements were administered by innocent civilians suddenly and unexpectedly attacked by a blood-thirsty villain.

By reading copies of these diplomatic documents, scholarly works in European history founded on them or the publicity given to the findings, literate Americans in large numbers learned something of the innumerable lies, deceptions, and frauds, perpetrated by the governments of Czarist Russia, Great Britain, and France, as well as of the Central Powers, at the expense of their own peoples and other nations. The gleaming mirage that pictured the World War as purely or even mainly a war for democracy and civilization dissolved beyond recognition (p. 411).

We think Fromm could have been one of these persons "disheartened by the proofs of sinister purposes running against their dreams" (p. 411), and so he wrote about the "moral callousness of the First World War". But, it is to be noted, the United States is not mentioned in these secret treaties. President Wilson apparently caught wind of them in 1916 (Sigmund Freud and William Bullitt, 1967):

He had no exact idea of the secret war aims of the Allies; but the refusal of the Allies to accept the help of the United States for the achievement of their avowed war aims had convinced him that the secret aims of the Allies were no more noble than the aims of Germany. His desire to avoid a war that might result in an evil peace which would make new wars certain was almost as strong as his desire to lead a crusade for perfect peace. He wanted to bring forth not war but peace. His unconscious identification with Christ made it impossible for

him to decide to go to war until he could believe that it was a war for peace (p. 184).

A year later on the 21st of July 1917, Wilson wrote to Colonel Edward House, his personal agent in Europe,

England and France have not the same views with regard to peace that we have by any means. When the war is over we can force them to our way of thinking because by that time they will, among other things, be financially in our hands; but we cannot force them now, and any attempt to speak for them or to speak our common mind would bring on disagreements which would inevitably come to the surface in public and rob the whole thing of its effect. ... Our real peace terms — those upon which we shall undoubtedly insist — are not now acceptable either to France or Italy (leaving Great Britain for the moment out of consideration) (pp. 199-200).

On the 8th of January 1918 President Wilson countered openly the politics behind the secret treaties in an Address to Congress. This speech on "War Aims and Peace Terms" set forth 14 points as "the only possible program, as we see it" for "the world's peace", the first point reading:

I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view (Wilson, quoted in Commager, 1973, p. 138; cf. p. 140).

It would seem that Fromm thought well of these 14 points, when we read what he wrote about them in "Es geht um den Menschen! Eine

Untersuchung der Tatsachen und Fiktionen in der Aussenpolitik (Fromm, 1961a, p. 108). We are curious to learn if he was aware of how serious President Wilson was in his dedication to ending the war and establishing a just peace, for the victors and the vanquished. On the 14th of June 1917 Wilson said:

We know now as clearly as we knew before we were ourselves engaged that we are not the enemies of the German people and that they are not our enemies. They did not originate or desire this hideous war or wish that we should be drawn into it; and we are vaguely conscious that we are fighting their cause, as they will some day see it, as well as our own ... the great fact that stands out above all the rest is that this is a People's War, a war for freedom and justice and self-government amongst all the nations of the world, a war to make the world safe for the peoples who live upon it and have made it their own, the German people themselves included (Wilson, quoted in Freud and Bullitt, 1966, p. 199; cf. pp. 200-202).

With it's back up against the wall, the German government realized in October 1918 that President Wilson's suggestions for a peace settlement, his 14 Points, were the best it would get and opened negotiations with him. The Allies were informed of this German manoeuver and agreed on the 5th of November 1918 to go along with the U.S.A. and Germany with certain reservations; the second point — the freedom of the sea — was not to their liking.

On the very same day that the Allies accepted the 14 Points President Wilson had set forth in his effort to establish peace those qualified to vote in the U.S.A. went to the polls to vote on who was to

represent them in both Houses of Congress. President Wilson's party, the Democrats, lost, resulting in Republican majorities in the Senate and the House of Representatives. This implied that those who had voted on the 5th of November did not stand behind President Wilson, on this day he had been repudiated by a significant portion of the American public.

Theodore Roosevelt, who had been between 1901 and 1909 President of the U.S.A. commented on this development as follows:

Our allies and our enemies and Mr. Wilson himself should all understand that Mr. Wilson has no authority whatever to speak for the American people at this time. His leadership has just been emphatically repudiated by them. Mr. Wilson and his Fourteen Points and his four supplementary points and his five complementary points and all his utterances every which way have ceased to have any shadow of right to be accepted as expressive of the will of the American people (Roosevelt, quoted in Commager, 1973, p. 151).

The fighting in Europe ended on the 11th of November 1918. The Peace Conference met in Paris on the 18th of January 1919. Great Britain's

Lloyd George, representing the world's largest empire and one-quarter of its population, had been elected on the slogan "Make Germany Pay!" Clemenceau, France's "Tiger", was so intent on weakening Germany that he appeared to be a narrow, vindictive old man with little interest in anything except France's immediate future. Orlando, Italy's delegate, wanted new territory and sat out much of the conference in a huff (Nye and Morpurgo, 1955, pp. 663-664).

President Wilson had assumed during the war that it was temporarily necessary to accept the fact that secret treaties had been made among the Allies in the interest of the united effort to defeat Germany. He thought, according to Freud and Bullitt (1967) that after the war was over he could force the Allies to accept his terms for peace by exercising the financial power of the United States: "He felt sure that by using his economic weapons and his power to sway men by words he could achieve the peace he desired" (p. 200). But the result of the elections at home on the 5th of November 1917 had changed matters significantly. President Wilson appeared in Paris in January 1918 as a Chief of State whose political party had been repudiated by the voting population, a fact we can assume the European diplomats were aware of. And so, in Fromm's (1961a) words:

Obwohl ... [die britischen, französischen und italienischen Führer] Wilsons Vierzehn Punkte angenommen hatten, bestanden sie unter den verschiedensten Begründungen auf territorialen Neuerwerbungen, über die sie sich bereits während des Krieges in Geheimverträgen geeinigt hatten und die Wilsons Grundsätzen der Selbstbestimmung Hohn sprachen. Sie wollten ihre Kriegsbeute haben und überstimmten Wilson (p. 108).

Beard, Beard and Beard (1968) thought that regardless of the fact that "the terms imposed on defeated Germany did not conform" to his war aims, President Wilson did have a "moderating influence", for example "the government of France would have taken immediate steps to occupy and hold Germany down by military force for an indefinite

period" (p. 405). What, then, finally became the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations Covenant was not Wilson's doing. He and many other citizens of the United States would have had it otherwise (Nye and Morpurgo, 1955, pp. 663-664; Freud and Bullitt, 1967, pp. 203-295; Beard, Beard and Beard, 1968, pp. 404-487).

One last word to the passage from Fromm's work quoted by us early in our speech! Freud and Bullitt (1967) pointed out quite clearly that illusion was certainly present in the American war effort, as exemplified in the person of President Wilson. It is worth noting, we think, that domestic affairs were Wilson's chief interests before 1913. Before his inauguration in January 1913, Wilson had commented to a friend:

"It would be the irony of fate if my administration should have to deal chiefly with foreign affairs." He had been interested in domestic politics for forty years and felt certain of his ability to solve domestic problems; but he had never been interested in international politics and his ignorance of foreign relations was as comprehensive as his ignorance of foreign countries (p. 152).

Even after the First World War, when he was on board the ship *George Washington* destined for Paris in January 1919, President Wilson

said that he intended to give Bohemia to Czechoslovakia. When he was asked what he intended to do with the three million Germans in Bohemia, he replied: "Three million Germans in Bohemia! That's curious! Masaryk never told me that!" At dinner in the White House in February 1916 there was a discussion of the Jewish race. Wilson insisted that there were at least one hundred million Jews in the world. When he was told that there were

less than fifteen million, he sent for the World Almanac and even after seeing the figures could scarcely believe that he had been mistaken. He gave the southern Tyrol to Italy because he did not know there were Austrians of German blood south of the Brenner Pass (pp. 153-154).

President Wilson's lack of knowledge in European history was not the only factor which played a significant role in his creation of illusions about what he could accomplish in his dealings with the Allies during and for a while after the First World War. In April 1917, for example, Arthur James Balfour, Great Britain's Foreign Secretary, came to the United States to orient President Wilson on the state of affairs among the Allies: He said the situation was "desperate". In Russia a revolution had taken place just a few weeks ago and it seemed likely that this country would withdraw from the war; if so, many more German troops could be sent to the western front. In France the morale of the people "was collapsing". And in England the "financial condition ... threatened calamity" (Freud and Bullitt, 1966, p. 198). Freud and Bullitt thought President Wilson had the power at this time during the war to dictate "his own peace terms", because the Allies were totally at the economic and financial mercy of the United States.

According to Freud and Bullitt President Wilson did not wish to take advantage of the Allies when they were down and he did not want to endanger the unity of the nations fighting Germany. He supposed a peace conference would be held at which Great Britain "would loyally

cooperate with the United States in establishing a just and lasting peace" (p. 198). Freud and Bullitt wrote that President Wilson seems

to have misunderstood totally the sort of respect that the governments of Europe had for Wilson. For the President as wielder of the physical strength of America, they had the greatest respect; for Woodrow Wilson as a moral leader, they had no respect. So long as the physical assistance of the United States was vital to the Allies they had to defer to the President of the United States; but Woodrow Wilson was never able to make any European statesman ... crusade for [the] peace which he had proclaimed (pp. 198, 199).

We have learned from Freud and Bullitt that behind President Wilson's inability to see through people and to give them less than the benefit of a doubt — Freud and Bullitt mentioned that President Wilson was "always anxious to 'dodge trouble' " (p. 198) — was his life-long habit of being only interested "in subjects which could somehow be connected with speech" (p. 72). They wrote:

He [President Wilson] had an enormous ability to ignore facts and an enormous belief in words. His feelings for facts and phrases was the exact reverse of the feeling of a scientist. He could not bear to allow a beautiful phrase to be slain by a refractory fact. He delighted in allowing an unpleasant fact to be annihilated by a beautiful phrase. When he had invented a beautiful phrase, he began to believe in his phrase whatever the facts might be (p. 193).

On the eve of the entrance of the United States into the war, President Wilson knew, Freud and Bullitt contended, that the war would end "in an evil peace" (p. 193). This is what the facts told him! But they were not to be swallowed. President Wilson thought he could only request his people to enter the war "as a means to produce peace" (p. 194). But he knew this would not be the case. Still, he presented his case to Congress and the people of the United States as a matter of crusading for peace (p. 193):

In his war message he expressed not his desire that the war should be a crusade but his belief that it was a crusade, and forgot the facts... Thereafter he did his best to suppress the unpleasant facts, and in large measure he succeeded. The facts of the war became to him not the actual facts but facts which he invented to express his wishes. From time to time the actual facts rose out of suppression and he drove them back by renewed assertions of the imaginary facts which expressed his desires. He was persuaded by his own words. He began to believe utterly in his phrases. By his words he made many men in many lands believe that the war would end in a just peace, and he made all America "drunk with this spirit of self-sacrifice"; but no man was more deceived or intoxicated by his words than he himself (p. 194; cf. pp. 208, 224-225).

Earlier, in 1915, President Wilson had already visualized his hope as to how the First World War would proceed with the United States fighting side by side with the Allies:

Among the results he expected were the deaths of thousands of American boys and the destruction of billions of dollars' worth

of American wealth; but his eyes were fixed on other probable results: he would become the dictator of the terms of peace, the arbiter of the world; he would lay down terms of peace so just that men would never have to die in war again; he would be the Prince of Peace who at the end of the war would come to judge both the quick and the dead.

He did not doubt that he could persuade the people of America to follow him on this crusade. He knew that many Americans had already been convinced by distinguished British propagandists that the war was a "war to end war", and his confidence in the power of his own oratory was enormous. He had once said: "I wish there were some great orator who could go about and make men drunk with this spirit of self-sacrifice." He had no doubt that he was a great orator and that he could make the American people drunk with a spirit of self-sacrifice. Later, when he brought America into the war, he proved that his confidence in his oratorical powers had not been misplaced. He did make America drunk with the spirit of self-sacrifice (p. 171).

Fromm (1961a) wrote about the First World War being fought "under the illusion of fighting for peace and democracy". If we define "illusion" as "an act of deception" (Brown, 1993, p. 1311), then President Wilson did deceive the American people, because he knew, according to Freud and Bullitt, that the war was being fought by the Allies for selfish purposes. But the fact that President Wilson deceived others must be seen, we think, in the fact that he repeatedly deceived himself. Time and again he used "a beautiful phrase" to slay "a vicious fact that threatened his peace of mind" (p. 262). He could even betray "the trust of the world as a matter of principle" while working out the Treaty of Versailles with the Allies (p. 264). He did this with three arguments. The first one was as follows:

Each time he made a compromise which was irreconcilable with his pledge to the world that the peace would be made on the basis of the Fourteen Points, he would say in the evening to his associates: "I would never have done that if I had not been sure that the League of Nations would revise that decision" (p. 261).

The second argument was even more questionable:

He invented a magnificent sophism: He told his friends that since he had come to Europe to establish the principle of international cooperation he must support this principle and cooperate with Lloyd George and Clemenceau even at the cost of compromises which were difficult to reconcile with the Fourteen Points. He was able to fix his eyes so firmly on the words "international cooperation" that he could ignore the fact that his compromises, made in the name of the principle of international cooperation, would make international cooperation impossible. He labored for international cooperation by establishing the reparations settlement and the Polish Corridor! He applied his principle not to reality but to his conscience with such success that again he felt relieved from his obligation to fight. Indeed, it became a matter of principle not to fight! Once again, as so often in his life, a beautiful phrase had come to his rescue and slain a vicious fact that threatened his peace of mind (p. 262).

The third excursion was Bolshevism.

He described the French Army marching into Germany, obliterating whole cities by chemical warfare, killing women and children, conquering all Europe and then being submerged by a Communist revolution. Again and again he repeated: "Europe is on fire and I can't add fuel to the flames" (pp. 262-263).

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It seems to us that this discussion of the quotation we took from Fromm's work (Fromm, 1961a) shows that with good-will much can be learned from encountering Erich Fromm. Certainly we knew very little of what has now been put down on paper by us before the conference in Ascona. Still, Fromm's work as it stands seems to us time and again as being inexact and in many instances superficial. His tendency to simplify matters has been brought out in our comment here although, as we have seen, hit the mark time and again, if not in what we would consider the bull's eye, which we would suppose is the case in the book which appeared under Freud's and Bullitt's names.

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Mention has been made time and again of President Wilson's speech of the 2nd of April, 1917, which he delivered at a joint session of the two Houses of Congress. this speech has been given a title by Commager (1973a) and reads as follows:

WILSON'S SPEECH FOR DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST GERMANY

Address delivered at Joint Session of the Two Houses of
Congress, April 2, 1917

(U.S. 65th Congress, 1st Session, *Senate Doc. 5*)

I have called the Congress into extraordinary session because there are serious, very serious, choices of policy to be made, and made immediately, which it was neither right nor constitutionally permissible that I should assume the responsibility of making.

On the third of February last I officially laid before you the extraordinary announcement of the Imperial German Government that on and after the first day of February it was its purpose to put aside all restraints of law or of humanity and use its submarines to sink every vessel that sought to approach either the ports of Great Britain and Ireland or the western coasts of Europe or any of the ports controlled by the enemies of Germany within the Mediterranean. That had seemed to be the object of the German submarine warfare earlier in the war, but since April of last year the Imperial Government had somewhat restrained the commanders of its undersea craft in conformity with its promise then given to us that passenger boats should not be sunk and that due warning would be given to all other vessels which its submarines might seek to destroy, when no resistance was offered or escape attempted, and care taken that their crews were given at least a fair chance to save their lives in their open boats. The precautions taken were meager and haphazard enough, as was proved in distressing instance after instance in the progress of the cruel and unmanly business, but a certain degree of restraint was observed. The new policy has swept every restriction aside. Vessels of every kind, whatever their flag, their character, their cargo, their destination, their errand, have been ruthlessly sent to the bottom without warning and without thought of help or mercy for those on board, the vessels of friendly neutrals along with those of belligerents. Even hospital ships and ships carrying relief to the sorely bereaved and

stricken people of Belgium, though the latter were provided with safe conduct through the proscribed areas by the German Government itself and were distinguished by unmistakable marks of identity, have been sunk with the same reckless lack of compassion or of principle.

I was for a little while unable to believe that such things would in fact be done by any government that had hitherto subscribed to the humane practices of civilized nations. International law had its origin in the attempt to set up some law which would be respected and observed upon the seas, where no nation had right of dominion and where lay the free highways of the world. ... This minimum of right the German Government has swept aside under the plea of retaliation and necessity and because it had no weapons which it could use at sea except these which it is impossible to employ as it is employing them without throwing to the winds all scruples of humanity or of respect for the understanding that were supposed to underlie the intercourse of the world. I am not now thinking of the loss of property involved, immense and serious as that is, but only of the wanton and wholesale destruction of the lives of non-combatants, men, women, and children, engaged in pursuits which have always, even in the darkest periods of modern history, been deemed innocent and legitimate. Property can be paid for; the lives of peaceful and innocent people cannot be. The present German submarine warfare against commerce is a warfare against mankind.

It is a war against all nations. American ships have been sunk, American lives taken, in ways which it has stirred us very deeply to learn of, but the ships and people of other neutral and friendly nations have been sunk and overwhelmed in the waters in the same way. There has been no discrimination. The challenge is to all mankind. Each nation must decide for itself how it will meet it. The choice we make for ourselves must be made with a moderation of counsel and a temperateness of judgment befitting our character and our motives as a nation. We must put excited feeling away. Our motive will not be revenge or the victorious assertion of the physical might of the nation, but only the

vindication of right, of human right, of which we are only a single champion.

When I addressed the Congress on the twenty-sixth of February last I thought that I would suffice to assert our neutral rights with arms, our right to use the seas against unlawful interference, our right to keep our people safe against unlawful violence. But armed neutrality, it now appears, is impracticable. Because submarines are in effect outlaws when used as the German submarines have been used against merchant shipping, it is impossible to defend ships against their attacks as the law of nations has assumed that merchantmen would defend themselves against privateers or cruisers, visible craft giving chase upon the open sea. It is common prudence in such circumstances, grim necessity indeed, to endeavor to destroy them before they have shown their own intention. They must be dealt with upon sight, if dealt with at all. the German Government denies the right of neutrals to use arms at all within the areas of the sea which it has proscribed, even in the defense of rights which no modern publicist has ever before questioned their right to defend. The intimation is conveyed that the armed guards which we have placed on our merchant ships will be treated as beyond the pale of law and subject to be dealt with as pirates would be. Armed neutrality is ineffectual enough at best; in such circumstances and in the face of such pretensions it is worse than ineffectual; it is likely only to produce what it was meant to prevent; it is practically certain to draw us into the war without either the right or the effectiveness of belligerents. There is one choice we cannot make, we are incapable of making: we will not choose the path of submission and suffer the most sacred rights of our Nation and our people to be ignored or violated. The wrongs against which we now array ourselves are no common wrongs; they cut to the very roots of human life.

With a profound sense of the solemn and even tragical character of the step I am taking and of the grave responsibilities which it involves, but in unhesitating obedience to what I deem my constitutional duty, I advise that the Congress declare the recent course of the Imperial German Government to be in fact

nothing less than war against the government and people of the United States; that it formally accept the status of belligerent which has thus been thrust upon it; and that it take immediate steps not only to put the country in a more thorough state of defense but also to exert all its power and employ all its resources to bring the Government of the German Empire to terms and end the war.

What this will involve is clear. It will involve the utmost practicable cooperation in counsel and action with the governments now at war with Germany, and, as incident to that, the extension to those governments of the most liberal financial credits, in order that our resources may so far as possible be added to theirs. It will involve the organization and mobilization of all the material resources of the country to supply the materials of war and serve the incidental needs of the Nation in the most abundant and yet the most economical and efficient way possible. It will involve the immediate full equipment of the navy in all respects but particularly in supplying it with the best means of dealing with the enemy's submarines. It will involve the immediate addition to the armed forces of the United States already provided for by law in case of war at least five hundred thousand men, who should, in my opinion, be chosen upon the principle of universal liability to service, and also the authorization of subsequent additional increments of equal force so soon as they may be needed and can be handled in training. It will involve also, of course, the granting of adequate credits to the Government, sustained, I hope, so far as they can equitably be sustained by the present generation, by well conceived taxation. ...

While we do these things, these deeply momentous things, let us be very clear, and make very clear to all the world what our motives and our objects are. My own thought has not been driven from its habitual and normal course by the unhappy events of the last two months, and I do not believe that the thought of the Nation has been altered or clouded by them. I have exactly the same things in mind now that I had in mind when I addressed the Senate on the twenty-second of January last; the same that I had in mind when I addressed the Congress

on the third of February and on the twenty-sixth of February. Our object now, as then, is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth insure the observance of those principles. Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is involved and the freedom of its peoples, and the menace to that peace and freedom lies in the existence of autocratic governments backed by organized force which is controlled wholly by their will, not by the will of their people. We have seen the last of neutrality in such circumstances. We are at the beginning of an age in which it will be insisted that the same standards of conduct and of responsibility for wrong done shall be observed among nations and their governments that are observed among the individual citizens of civilized states.

We have no quarrel with the German people. We have no feeling towards them but one of sympathy and friendship. It was not upon their impulse that their government acted in entering this war. It was not with their previous knowledge or approval. It was a war determined upon as wars used to be determined upon in the old, unhappy days when peoples were nowhere consulted by their rulers and wars were provoked and waged in the interest of dynasties or of little groups of ambitious men who were accustomed to use their fellow men as pawns and tools. ...

We are accepting this challenge of hostile purpose because we know that in such a Government, following such methods, we can never have a friend; and that in the presence of its organized power, always lying in wait to accomplish we know not what purpose, there can be no assured security for the democratic Governments of the world. We are now about to accept gauge of battle with this natural foe to liberty and shall, if necessary, spend the whole force of the nation to check and nullify its pretensions and its power. We are glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of false pretense about them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples, the German peoples included: for the rights of nations

great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience. The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty. We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when those rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of nations can make them.

Just because we fight without rancor and without selfish object, seeking nothing for ourselves but what we shall wish to share with all free peoples, we shall, I feel confident, conduct our operations as belligerents without passion and ourselves observe with proud punctilio the principles of right and of fair play we profess to be fighting for.

I have said nothing of the Governments allied with the Imperial Government of Germany because they have not made war upon us or challenged us to defend our right and our honor. The Austro-Hungarian Government has, indeed, avowed its unqualified indorsement and acceptance of the reckless and lawless submarine warfare adopted now without disguise by the Imperial German Government, and it has therefore not been possible for this Government to receive Count Tarnowski, the Ambassador recently accredited to this Government by the Imperial and Royal Government of Austria-Hungary; but that Government has not actually engaged in warfare against citizens of the United States on the seas, and I take the liberty, for the present at least, of postponing a discussion of our relations with the authorities at Vienna. We enter this war only where we are clearly forced into it because there are no other means of defending our rights.

It will be all the easier for us to conduct ourselves as belligerents in a high spirit of right and fairness because we act without animus, not in enmity towards a people or with the desire to bring any injury or disadvantage upon them, but only in armed opposition to an irresponsible government which has thrown

aside all considerations of humanity and of right and is running amuck. We are, let me say again, the sincere friends of the German people, and shall desire nothing so much as the early reestablishment of intimate relations of mutual advantage between us, — however hard it may be for them, for the time being, to believe that this is spoken from our hearts. We have borne with their present Government through all these bitter months because of that friendship, — exercising a patience and forbearance which would otherwise have been impossible. We shall, happily, still have an opportunity to prove that friendship in our daily attitude and actions towards the millions of men and women of German birth and native sympathy who live amongst us and share our life, and we shall be proud to prove it towards all who are in fact loyal to their neighbors and to the Government in the hour of test. They are, most of them, as true and loyal Americans as if they had never known any other fealty or allegiance. They will be prompt to stand with us in rebuking and restraining the few who may be of a different mind and purpose. If there should be disloyalty, it will be dealt with a firm hand of stern repression; but, if it lifts its head at all, it will lift it only here and there and without countenance except from a lawless and malignant few.

It is a distressing and oppressive duty, Gentlemen of the Congress, which I have performed in thus addressing you. There are, it may be, many months of fiery trial and sacrifice ahead of us. It is a fearful thing to lead this great peaceful people into war, into the most terrible and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself seeming to be in the balance. But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts, — for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own Governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free. To such a task we can dedicate our lives and our fortunes, everything that we are and everything that we have, with the pride of those who know that

the day has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she has treasured. God helping her, she can do no other (Wilson, 1917).

While we are concerned here with a very brief study of the circumstances under which illusion played a significant role in the thinking and feeling of many American citizens during the First World War, we think it would be enlightening for our readers to learn how Woodrow Wilson understood the American state of affairs when he became President of the country. He had called for a "New Freedom" and in his first inaugural address he reformulated what he meant by the term. Commager (1973b) thinks the "address is one of the most notable statements of democratic faith in our political literature, and for eloquence compares favorably with Jefferson's First Inaugural and Lincoln's Second Inaugural". The speech was presented on the 4th of March 1913:

MY FELLOW CITIZENS:

There has been a change of government. It began two years ago, when the House of Representatives became Democratic by a decisive majority. It has now been completed. The Senate about to assemble will also be Democratic. The offices of President and Vice-President have been put into the hands of Democrats. What does the change mean? That is the question that is uppermost in our minds to-day. That is the question I am going to try to answer, in order, if I may, to interpret the occasion.

It means much more than the mere success of a party. The success of a party means little except when the Nation is using

that party for a large and definite purpose. No one can mistake the purpose for which the Nation now seeks to use the Democratic Party. It seeks to use it to interpret a change in its own plans and point of view. Some old things with which we had grown familiar, and which had begun to creep into the very habit of our thought and of our lives, have altered their aspect as we have latterly looked critically upon them, with fresh, awakened eyes; have dropped their disguises and shown themselves alien and sinister. Some new things, as we look frankly upon them, willing to comprehend their real character, have come to assume the aspect of things long believed in and familiar, stuff of our own convictions. We have been refreshed by a new insight into our own life.

We see that in many things that life is very great. It is incomparably great in its material aspects, in its body of wealth, in the diversity and sweep of its energy, in the industries which have been conceived and built up by the genius of individual men and the limitless enterprise of groups of men. It is great, also very great, in its moral force.

Nowhere else in the world have noble men and women exhibited in more striking forms the beauty and the energy of sympathy and helpfulness and counsel in their efforts to rectify wrong, alleviate suffering, and set the weak in the way of strength and hope. We have built up, moreover, a great system of government, which has stood through a long age as in many respects a model for those who seek to set liberty upon foundations that will endure against fortuitous change, against storm and accident. Our life contains every great thing, and contains it in rich abundance.

But the evil has come with the good, and much fine gold has been corroded. With riches has come inexcusable waste. We have squandered a great part of what we might have used, and have not stopped to conserve the exceeding bounty of nature, without which our genius for enterprise would have been worthless and impotent, scorning to be careful, shamefully prodigal as well as admirably efficient. We have been proud of our industrial achievements, but we have not hitherto stopped thoughtfully

enough to count the human cost, the cost of lives snuffed out, of energies overtaxed and broken, the fearful physical and spiritual cost to the men and women and children upon whom the dead weight and burden of it all has fallen pitilessly the years through. The groans and agony of it all had not yet reached our ears, the solemn, moving undertone of our life, coming up out of the mines and factories and out of every home where the struggle had its intimate and familiar seat. With the great Government went many deep secret things which we too long delayed to look into and scrutinize with candid, fearless eyes. The great Government we loved has too often been made use of for private and selfish purposes, and those who used it had forgotten the people.

At last a vision has been vouchsafed us of our life as a whole. We see the bad with the good, the debased and decadent with the sound and vital. With this vision we approach new affairs. Our duty is to cleanse, to reconsider, to restore, to correct the evil without impairing the good, to purify and humanize every process of our common life without weakening or sentimentalizing it. There has been something crude and heartless and unfeeling in our haste to succeed and be great. Our thought has been "Let every man look out for himself, let every generation look out for itself", while we reared giant machinery which made it impossible that any but those who stood at the levers of control should have a chance to look out for themselves. We had not forgotten our morals. We remembered well enough that we had set up a policy which was meant to serve the humblest as well as the most powerful, with an eye single to the standards of justice and fair play, and remembered it with pride. But we were very heedless and in a hurry to be great.

We have come now to the sober second thought. The scales of heedlessness have fallen from our eyes. We have made up our minds to square every process of our national life again with the standards we so proudly set up at the beginning and have always carried at our hearts. Our work is a work of restoration.

We have itemized with some degree of particularity the things that ought to be altered and here are some of the chief items: A

tariff which cuts us off from our proper part in the commerce of the world, violates the just principles of taxation, and makes the Government a facile instrument in the hands of private interests; a banking and currency system based upon the necessity of the Government to sell its bonds fifty years ago and perfectly adapted to concentrating cash and restricting credits; an industrial system which, take it on all its sides, financial as well as administrative, holds capital in leading strings, restricts the liberties and limits the opportunities of labor, and exploits without renewing or conserving the natural resources of the country, a body of agricultural activities never yet given the efficiency of great business undertakings or served as it should be through the instrumentality of science taken directly to the farm, or afforded the facilities of credit best suited to its practical needs; water-courses undeveloped, waste places unreclaimed, forests untended, fast disappearing without plan or prospect of renewal, unregarded waste heaps at every mine. We have studied as perhaps no other nation has the most effective means of production, but we have not studied cost or economy as we should either as organizers of industry, as statesmen, or as individuals.

Nor have we studied and perfected the means by which government may be put at the service of humanity, in safeguarding the health of the Nation, the health of its men and its women and its children, as well as their rights in the struggle for existence. This is no sentimental duty. The firm basis of government is justice, not pity. These are matters of justice. There can be no equality or opportunity, the first essential of justice in the body politic, if men and women and children be not shielded in their lives, their very vitality, from the consequences of great industrial and social processes which they can not alter, control, or singly cope with. Society must see to it that it does not itself crush or weaken or damage its own constituent parts. The first duty of law is to keep sound the society it serves. Sanitary laws, pure food laws, and laws determining conditions of labor which individuals are powerless to determine for themselves are intimate parts of the very business of justice and legal efficiency.

These are some of the things we ought to do, and not leave the others undone, the old-fashioned, never-to-be-neglected, fundamental safeguarding of property and of individual right. This is the high enterprise of the new day: To lift everything that concerns our life as a Nation to the light that shines from the hearth-fire of every man's conscience and vision of the right. It is inconceivable that we should do this as partisans; it is inconceivable we should do it in ignorance of the facts as they are or in blind haste. We shall restore, not destroy. We shall deal with our economic system as it is and as it may be modified, not as it might be if we had a clean sheet of paper to write upon; and step by step we shall make it what it should be, in the spirit of those who question their own wisdom and seek counsel and knowledge, not shallow self-satisfaction or the excitement of excursions whither they can not tell. Justice, and only justice, shall always be our motto.

And yet it will be no cool process of mere science. The Nation has been deeply stirred, stirred by a solemn passion, stirred by the knowledge of wrong, of ideals lost, of government too often debauched and made an instrument of evil. The feelings with which we face this new age of right and opportunity sweep across our heartstrings like some air out of God's own presence, where justice and mercy are reconciled and the judge and the brother are one. We know our task to be no mere task of politics but a task which shall search us through and through, whether we be able to understand our time and the need of our people, whether we be indeed their spokesmen and interpreters, whether we have the pure heart to comprehend and the rectified will to choose our high course of action.

This is not a day of triumph; it is a day of dedication. Here muster, not the forces of party, but the forces of humanity. Men's hearts wait upon us; men's lives hang in the balance; men's hopes call upon us to say what we will do. Who shall live up to the great trust? Who dares fail to try? I summon all honest men, all patriotic, all forward-looking men, to my side. God helping me, I will not fail them, if they will but counsel and sustain me (Wilson, 1913)!

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